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WORLD HISTORY 

1815-1920 



BY 



EDUARD FUETER 

AUTHOR OF "HISTOIRE DE l'HISTORIOGRAPHIE MODERNE' 



TRANSLATED BY 

SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN SMITH COLLEGE 



m 



NEW YORK 

HARCOURT. BRACE AND COMPANY 



_f-*b 



COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY 
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC. 



PRINTED IN THE U S A. BY 

THC QUINN a BODEN COMPANY 

RAHWAY. N. J 



TRANSLATOR'S NOTE 

A decade ago Professor Fueter attracted the attention of historical 
scholars all over the world by his admirable Geschichte der neueren 
Historiographie (Munich, 191 1). Its worth was quickly recognized 
by its being translated into French in an enlarged edition with addi- 
tional material from the hand of the author. The same keen in- 
sight, excellent judgment, and great breadth of interest and reading 
which characterized this History of Modern Historical Writing is also 
seen in his Welt geschichte der letzten hundert Jahre, 1813-1920 
(Ziirich, 192 1). In two respects Professor Fueter is peculiarly well 
equipped to write a History of the Modern World. Aside from his 
scholarly historical training, as a Swiss he is able to look down from 
his neutral heights upon the rest of Europe with singular detach- 
ment and impartiality. Rarely have such heated questions as the 
World War, the Irish question, or the American War of Secession 
been treated with such succinctness, fairness and understanding. 
The second advantage which Professor Fueter enjoys is the fact that 
through various kinds of newspaper work he has come into direct con- 
tact with the great problems of the day. The habit of seizing what 
is vital rather than what is traditional is reflected in this book. He 
has thrown overboard much that is usually found in histories of the 
pineteenth century to make room for what he considers more im- 
portant. Though one may, perhaps, not always completely agree 
with his account, one can hardly fail to be interested and stimulated 
by the originality and vigor with which he presents it. 

Except for a very few slight corrections or modifications made 
at the request of the author, the translation adheres, it is hoped, as 
closely to the German edition as is consistent with readable English. 
For convenience of reference the chapters are nimibered consecutively 
instead of by "Books" as in the original work. 

S. B. F. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction: the Conception of World History vii 

BOOK I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS— THE POINT 
OF DEPARTURE 

CHAPTER 

I. The Last Hundred Years as a Period in the His- 
tory OF THE World 3 

II, The Geographical Organization of the World in 

1815 S 

III. The New Economic System 7 

IV. The Economic Consequences of the French Revo- 

lution II 

V. The "Panic of the French Revolution" . . 16 

VI. HUMANITARIANISM 1 9 

BOOK II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNA- 
TIONAL ALLIANCE AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY 
TENDENCIES 

VII. The Solidarity of International Conservatism 25 
VIII. The Establishment of Independent States in 

Central and South America 29 

IX. The Independence of Greece 36 

X. The Conservative Alliance and Italy ... 44 

XI. The Conservative Intervention in Spain . . 52 
Xll. The Collapse of the Conservative System in 

France 57 

XIII. Breaches in the Conservative System in the 

Other States of Europe Resulting from the 
July Revolution (Belgium and Poland) . . 69 

XIV. The Collapse of the Old Regime in England . . 82 

iii 



iv , CONTENTS 

BOOK III. FROM THE OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO 
THE NEW 

CHArriB PAGE 

XV, European Settlement in the United States 103 

XVI. The Founding of a French Colonial Empire in 

North Africa 112 

xvii. russla and the european advance in central 

AND Eastern Asia 129 

XVIII. The English Policy in India and the Colonial 

Wars with China 140 

XIX. The First Europeanization of a Non-European 

People (Japan) 154 

XX. The Outcome of an Attempt at Colonization 
IN Europe (The History of Ireland in the 
Nineteenth Century) 165 

BOOK IV. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH 

ESTATE, AND THE FORMATION OF NEW 

NATIONAL STATES IN EUROPE 

XXI. The Social Revolution in France . . .189 
XXII. The Crimean War. Russia and the Eastern 

Question 212 

XXIII. The Panic Over Socialism After the February 

Revolution ... 223 

XXIV. The War of Secession in the United States . 228 
XXV. The Founding of a Liberal National State in 

Italy 248 

XXVI. Germany Under Austro-Prusslan Rule . . 261 
XXVII. The Struggle Betvi^een Prussia and Austria; 

Prussla's Conquest of Germany . . . .285 

BOOK V. ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

XXVIII. New Economic Problems 317 

XXIX. The New Colonial Policy: I. Africa . . 325 
XXX. The New Colonial Policy: II. Asla and Aus- 
tralasia 352 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 

XXXI. 



III. The Anglo- 



V 

PAGE 



The New Colonial Policy: 

Saxon Empires 361 

XXXII. The Socialist Movement and the Attitude of 

Governments Toward It 381 

XXXIII. The Struggle Between Austria and Russia for 

the Balkans 403 

XXXIV. The World War, 1914-1918 423 

Index 475 



WORLD HISTORY. 1815-1920 

INTRODUCTION. THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD 

HISTORY 

What has hitherto been called "universal history" or "world history" 
(Weltgesckichte) has been nothing but a conglomeration. People 
believed they were writing world history if they articulated together 
in a formal fashion the events of various continents. Writers have 
been satisfied with a mere juxtaposition of narratives, when in fact 
they ought to have shown the interdependence of occurrences taking 
place in widely separate localities. 

The present work has an altogether different purpose. It will 
attempt to survey the history of the last hundred years from a really 
universal point of view. It will not aim at a schematic treatment of 
different continents as of equal importance. A world history which 
should devote the same attention to the chance happenings of a 
tribe of African negroes and to the development of the British Em- 
pire would be as unworthy of the name as a history of Italy in the 
nineteenth century which treated in equal detail the Duchy of 
Parma and the Kingdom of Sardinia. On the contrary, events shall 
be so selected as to bring into the foreground those which have 
universal significance; the criterion of importance shall be, not the 
local, but the universal importance. Europe and the European 
nations will indeed be given first place; but only those phenomena 
shall be set forth in detail which have exercised a wide influence 
beyond old Europe. 

A brief exposition like the present is better adapted to this aim 
than a detailed narrative. If one has to refrain from discussing many 
interesting details it is all the easier to make clear the major lines 
of development and the connecting threads in the history of lands 
and peoples. The outline of the background will stand forth all 
the more clearly if the number of decorative figures in the foreground 
of the landscape is restricted to the most significant and essential ones. 

The intelligent reader must console himself if a popular and con- 
ventional anecdote, or a name dear to him, is either briefly men- 
tioned or passed over entirely. For he will say to himself: What 



2 INTRODUCTION 

the present needs above all else is a grasp of history from the stand- 
point of a world outlook and not a collection of anecdotes. Far too 
long has the conventional historical instruction in the schools treated 
the history of Europe as an isolated development. It is high time 
this should cease. And also from practical reasons. A century and 
a half ago, when the historians of the Aufklarung, or Age of Enlight- 
enment, undertook for the first time to write real universal history, 
their work was little more than a by-product of speculation in the 
field of the philosophy of history. Now, in the twentieth century, 
problems of world politics and world economics are no longer mere 
academic questions. History must adapt itself to this new situation 
if it is to be seriously considered as an introduction to political and 
economic thought. This is particularly true of the period which is 
to be treated in this book— for reasons which will be explained in 
the next chapter. 



BOOK I 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS— THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 



CHAPTER I 

THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS AS A PERIOD OF 
WORLD HISTORY 

It has often been said, even by great philosophers, that history 
simply repeats itself ; that, though to a superficial view much changes, 
and though names and forms vary, nevertheless fundamentally the 
same driving forces of history remain ever and immutably the same. 

This view is mistaken. Naturally certain fundamental problems 
are always recurring. Human nature has certain needs which must 
always be satisfied in much the same way. The conflicts which 
arise from individuals living together and from states existing side 
by side show kindred traits from century to century. But so soon 
as the observer raises himself above these identical phenomena of 
a primitive nature, mighty are the differences which are revealed 
from century to century and between one quarter of the globe and 
another. Although the basic principles of human society may alter 
but little, nevertheless the conditions under which these principles 
act change greatly. A mere quantitative change in conditions may 
have enormous consequences. Think, for instance, of the rapidity 
of communication which we owe to steam. Theoretically, the modern 
steamship and railway serve the same needs as the sailing-vessel and 
the ox-cart of olden times ; but the possibility of quicker communica- 
tion with distant parts of the world has brought with it consequences 
which would make it ridiculous to regard the difference between the 
present and the past merely as a shortening of the time necessary 
for the transportation of goods. 

Now it is the aim of history to call attention to these changes 
and shifting conditions, and to consider their consequences. No 
period is so well adapted to this as the nineteenth century. For in 
this century there took place one of those great changes which permit 
us to differentiate one age sharply from another. This change was 
the spread of European civilization, including European science and 
knowledge as well as European colonization, over the whole earth. 
Naturally, here also, one can cite analogies or at least similar phe- 
nomena from earlier periods. For instance, there are close resem- 
blances to the conquest of South America by Spain and Portugal 

3 



4 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

in the sixteenth century. But even if such events of an earlier 
period seem essentially similar from a superficial point of view, there 
remains, nevertheless, the great difference which results from the 
far broader extent of the modern movement. No event of the past 
century (1815-1920) has exercised so powerful an influence upon the 
future of mankind — and not least on the European states them- 
selves — as this Europeanization of the world. Compared with this, 
how slight was the importance for their own age of European colonial 
policy in previous centuries! 

The plan of the present work will, therefore, place in the fore- 
ground those events which are connected with this most important 
development. It will seek first to describe the point of departure — 
the world as it was in 18 15 — and then the material and intellectual 
conditions out of which resulted the conquest of the world by the 
European nations and by European civilization. 



CHAPTER II 

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 
WORLD IN 1 815 

To-day the world is an economic unit. Economic disasters and great 
revolutions which occur in one part of the world are quickly felt 
everywhere else. A hundred years ago it was quite otherwise. 

In 1 81 5 the world was still divided into three parts. One of these 
was virtually isolated from the other two; and these two traded with 
one another regularly only in certain products. 

The part which was virtually isolated and which, because of its 
isolation, was not at all progressive, was the vast region of Eastern 
Asia. Here Japan was completely inaccessible to foreigners, and 
China had opened the door only a crack. Foreign ships were allowed 
to touch at only one Chinese port (Canton). Even those foreign 
traders who wanted to export Chinese tea were forbidden to make 
regular settlements or to travel freely inland. Furthermore, even 
this limited opportunity was exploited to only a small extent. The 
direct trade of European nations (especially of the English) was 
quite unimportant. And although China at that time was still 
inferior to the European nations in the science of war, the Europeans 
did not yet think of intervening with an armed hand for the benefit 
of their traders. 

The second division of the world from an economic point of view 
consisted of Europe and those parts of America settled by Europeans. 
The third area comprised the numerous remaining regions which 
had come within the sphere of European colonial influence. In these 
latter regions Europeans had secured for themselves privileges for 
exploiting "colonial wares" which could not be produced in Europe 
at all, or at least only under unfavorable conditions, because of the 
climate. There was, as yet, no question of settlements to provide for 
an overflow population (aside from the scattered penal settlements). 
A surplus population did not yet exist in Europe in 181 5. At that 
time no European nation thought of reserving unoccupied regions 
outside Europe as places of settlement; even in the case of England, 
the country in which an excess population first began to appear, the 

igration prior to 1825 was altogether insignificant. Europe's 

5 



6 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

contact with the colonies was limited therefore to the regulation and 
retention of trade; even if expeditions were made into the interior 
for commercial purposes, these aimed only at the protection of the 
commercial settlements on the coast. 

Thus the colonial policy of the European nations in 1815 was in 
theory still the same as during the three preceding centuries. But 
the wars of the eighteenth century and of the Napoleonic Age had 
brought a fundamental change in the relative strength of the various 
nations. While in the earlier periods the various naval powers had 
waged bitter strife for commercial advantages in the colonies, in 
181 5 only one great sea power survived. To be sure, remnants of 
the earlier conditions still existed in the shape of Dutch, French, 
or Portuguese colonies. But the most dangerous rival of the British 
colonial empire, the French dominion in Asia and America, had been 
definitely destroyed and had fallen into the hands of the more 
powerful competitor. And there was no likelihood that the situation 
would soon change, because great sea power had been necessary 
for the conquest of these overseas regions, whose products were so 
much desired; and in 181 5 England alone possessed such sea power. 
The French navy was gone, the Spanish fleet decayed, and even the 
Dutch shipping had sunk into insignificance. Any immediate re- 
vival of the old rivalry on the sea was out of the question. The 
only cases in which European nations might extend over new terri- 
tories outside Europe were cases where there was a land connection, 
or where sea communication offered only slight difficulties, as in 
the expansion of Russia over Siberia and Central Asia, the creation 
by France of a colonial empire in Algeria, or, to a certain extent, 
the addition of new lands to the South and West by the United States. 

England's dominant position was further strengthened by the fact 
that, true to her policy for four centuries, she refrained from acquir- 
ing territory on the continent of Europe. The nation which possessed 
the only great sea power of the time could, if she desired, also con- 
centrate her whole attention upon an overseas policy, because in 
Europe she claimed no territory which bordered on a continental 
military power. 



CHAPTER III 
THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM 

Now it chanced that the only nation which possessed the necessary 
sea power for extending European authority over the world was 
also at the same time the nation which first developed the modern 
industrial system and thereby inaugurated the period of great emi- 
gration. In this its own citizens naturally had at first the greatest 
share. Here we must glance back a little into the past. 

In the course of the eighteenth century, the factors which gave 
the impulse to the rise of the modern factory system, namely, the 
substitution of power-driven machinery for manual labor and the 
application of steam to industry, were in part the result of the new 
scientific speculation which arose in Italy in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. But, in the main, certain specific needs of the 
time and the country led to the inventions which were to revolu- 
tionize the industrial life of the whole world. Thanks to the un- 
equaled quality of her wool and the wealth of her mines, England 
had already secured a leading position in the textile and iron in- 
dustries. This development modified the whole social structure 
of the country. The lucrative extension of sheep-raising decreased 
the number of agricultural laborers and furnished industry with an 
imusually large amount of cheap labor. But at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century one branch of industry was threatened with 
destruction. The forests of England which had supplied the fuel 
for smelting iron and making steel began to be exhausted. Unless 
the metal industries were to migrate to Sweden or Russia, where for- 
ests abounded, coal must be substituted for charcoal. To pump the 
water from the coal mines, some mechanical contrivance was neces- 
sary which could work more effectively than hand-pumps. This led 
to the invention of the steam engine by James Watt. Soon the new 
machine began to be applied to other purposes than pumping water 
from coal mines. In the textile industries steam-driven machinery 
was soon installed. A few decades later followed the two inventions 
which placed the steam engine at the service of commerce — the 
steamship and the railway. About the same time there occurred 
also in America the invention of the cotton-gin, which placed at 

7 



8 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

the disposal of English industry a hitherto undreamt-of supply of 
cotton, for which in turn new uses were discovered. 

This introduction of manufacturing on a large scale, known in 
England as the "Industrial Revolution/' taken all in all, was the 
most important event of the nineteenth century. Thanks to the 
new means of communication, commerce and industry were now for 
the first time organized on a really world basis. Hitherto, European 
trade with the overseas regions had been limited to the importation 
of luxuries and raw materials which could not be produced in Eu- 
rope; henceforth food supplies from other parts of the world could 
be imported more cheaply by the industrialized European nations 
than they could be raised at home. The industrialization of 
a country, that is, the employment of propertyless workingmen in 
factories at the expense of home agriculture and the multiplication 
of factory employees far beyond what the soil at home would feed, 
could now be carried on to an extent and with an intensity un- 
dreamt-of in former times. Masses of men, who formerly would 
either have starved or through recurrent under-nourishment have 
been subject to epidemics and heavy mortality, could now not only 
live, but even enjoy relative comfort with a lower mortality rate 
than had ever been heard of before. The importation of food from 
parts of the world outside Europe, made possible by the new means 
of transportation, assured not only cheapness but also regularity of 
supplies, so that local crop failures no longer resulted in famine. 
Likewise, as there was no longer any geographical limitation upon the 
exportation of manufactured goods, and as goods could be sold in 
distant countries, there was nothing to prevent great expansion in 
manufacturing. The Malthusian theory had declared that popula- 
tion tended constantly to outrun food-supply, and that if the birth- 
rate were not voluntarily checked, famine or war or some other dis- 
aster must keep it within bounds. Now the Malthusian theory — 
formulated under the influences of the first phases of the industrial 
change in England — seemed contradicted. 

This optimistic view, however, which perhaps reached its height 
in the second half of tiie nineteenth century, lost sight of the fact 
that the solution which it supposed it had found could hold good 
only for a brief and unusually favorable period. It forgot that the 
overseas regions could come to the aid of Europe's excess popula- 
tion only so long as these regions themselves remained thinly popu- 
lated. However, this is not the place to consider in detail the 
question of overpopulation nor that of the social and political con- 
sequences of the rise of an industrial proletariat; these can best be 



THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM 9 

treated later in the chapter on English History (ch. xiv). Here 
it need only be pointed out that the new economic organization of 
trade on a world basis was not merely a cause, but just as much a 
consequence, of the increase of population which resulted from the 
Industrial Revolution. 

Manufacturing on a large scale, with the aid of steam-power, 
made far less demands on the strength of the individual worker 
than had the old manual labor. Children, women, and unskilled' 
workmen could be used to tend many machines just as well as grown 
men and technically trained workers. Particularly in the first 
period, prior to the legislation for the protection of children, factory 
employees became self-supporting while still very young and could 
begin to raise families. As wages varied arbitrarily and were rela- 
tively high when times were good, workingmen became careless and 
made no effort to limit the number of children, particularly as the 
children did not have to divide up an inheritance but merely shared 
in the opportunity to work. Only a few leaders warned the work- 
ingmen to keep their families small in order to limit the number of 
those competing for places to work. And since, in spite of the un- 
hygienic conditions under which the working population for the 
most part lived, a regular supply of imported food tended to reduce 
mortality, the population of the industrial countries grew in num- 
bers to an extent which has no parallel in earlier centuries. 

It soon appeared that for an amelioration of the evils which arose 
from this, particularly for the evil of unemployment in normal times, 
there was but one remedy: emigration. If all the people who lived 
exclusively by manual labor but were unable to find work at home 
could move away to thinly settled or unoccupied regions, especially 
outside Europe, the increase of population which was caused and 
kept up by the Industrial Revolution could be borne without incon- 
venience. This was at first the case. After 181 5 great areas stood 
open for settlement, particularly in North America, South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand, that is, in territories which were not 
unsuited to white men. Furthermore, the economic situation was 
such that this emigration of European labor not only relieved the 
mother country from the burden of feeding those who departed, 
but also positively contributed to the support of those who remained. 
Distant lands, which could produce practically no necessaries of 
life so long as they remained hunting-grounds in the hands of wild 
native tribes, became in the hands of white settlers great granaries 
from which the industrial masses of Europe could be fed, and to 
which the manufactured products of European factories could be 



10 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

sold. Apparently an equilibrium had been established. Thanks 
to the new economic organization on a world basis, the enormously 
increased population of the world could be fed, in fact better fed, 
than was possible in previous centuries. But this was only a tem- 
porary and provisional situation. Scarcely a hundred years had 
passed before it became evident that the conditions on which the 
economic equilibrium rested no longer existed; then came to an 
end, one may say, the Age of the Industrial Revolution and the 
Expansion of Europeans over the World. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 

The Industrial Revolution which took place in England had as its 
counterpart in much of the rest of Europe the revolution in prop- 
erty rights and business relations which arose from the spread of 
the French conception of legal equality. Here also we must glance 
back into the past. 

Up to the end of the eighteenth century, in nearly all the countries 
of Europe (but less in England) institutions were in existence which 
aimed to protect the privileged classes who possessed inherited 
wealth from the competition of new elements struggling upwards 
from the bottom of society. Almost everywhere the law took care 
that the families which had secured possession of considerable prop- 
erty (particularly landed property), or of a good government office 
(one of the most fruitful sources of income in those days), should 
be enabled to defend their property against competitors from the 
lower social ranks, even when the latter were more capable and 
energetic. Various legal privileges reserved a great part of the gov- 
ernment offices for members of a definite social class. Various laws 
took care that the property of the favored families could not be 
divided, lest individual members of the family might be in danger 
of being depressed into the ranks of the poor. In general, the legal 
system worked in such a way that all the landed property of a family 
passed to the eldest son and was kept together in his hands; the 
younger sons and daughters were provided for by being given a place 
in the army, the government, or the church. Usually, therefore, 
the rank of officer in the army, the lucrative appointments in the 
government, and the rich ecclesiastical endowments (in which ladies 
also might share) were reserved for the "nobility," i. e., for the 
wealthy class. In the city republics the rights of the ruling bourgeois 
aristocracy were protected in the same way; the rest of the people, 
whether rich or poor, were excluded from all important positions 
and often even from the exercise of certain trades ; here also election 
to most of the offices was restricted to the members of a few families, 
who were thus assured of appointment to offices which they often 

II 



12 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

could not have won on a basis of ability and free competition. To 
these privileges must be added that of exemption from taxation for 
nobility, clergy, and the ruling bourgeois aristocracy, which like- 
wise assured a mighty financial advantage to the favored few. 

During the French Revolution this system of privileges was re- 
placed by the principle of legal equality for all. All the limita- 
tions which had reserved the numerous places of profit for in- 
heritors of wealth disappeared. Now a commoner could be an army 
officer, a poor man a justice, and even a very poor man a bishop. 
Primogeniture was abolished; a law of inheritance was introduced 
which gave younger and elder children an equal share, so that no 
family's wealth was protected by the state from being divided up. 
The privileges of the guilds were set aside, so that the exercise of 
certain trades was no longer reserved for the benefit of a few fam- 
ilies. Separate tribunals for the nobility, with their partiality for 
the rich, were abolished. Many of the factors which made prefer- 
ment according to social position possible simply disappeared. The 
most important examples of this were the secularization of mucli of 
the church property, such as the monasteries and other ecclesiastical 
foundations which served no practical religious purpose, and the 
cutting down of the revenues of those establishments which were 
permitted to continue in existence, such as bishoprics. The income 
of the ecclesiastical offices which survived was now so moderate 
that even if they had been reserved as formerly for the children of 
the nobility, they would not have sufficed for their support. 

Friends and opponents of the French Revolution have too often 
judged this system of equality from the standpoint of the city bour- 
geoisie. In reality, however, its significance is far greater as regards 
agricultural land in the country districts. Any one who wants to 
judge the results of the French Revolution must begin with the 
changes which took place in the condition of the peasants and in 
the division of the soil. 

The principle of equality of inheritance, for evident reasons, is 
not nearly so important in the case of movable property as in that 
of real estate. The joint management of a concern by brothers, the 
provision of compensation for retiring members, the adaptation of 
an organization to a greater or less number of participants, above 
all, the expansion of business — these are all matters which are easier 
to arrange in a commercial or industrial undertaking than in agri- 
culture. In agriculture, particularly if a country is already so 
thickly populated that it is difficult to enlarge an inherited estate 
or buy new lands, serious consequences arise from laws compelling 



CONSEQUENCES OF FRENCH REVOLUTION 13 

the heirs to share the land equally or make an equivalent provision. 
Even if some of the heirs withdraw from the land, the situation is 
no better, since those who remain on the property are heavily bur- 
dened financially by the compensation which they have to provide for 
those who withdraw. Now if there happens to come a natural in- 
crease in the population and a decrease in the death rate (as was 
the case in the nineteenth century as a result of the new means of 
communication, better hygiene, and long periods of peace), only 
two alternatives are open to countries already thickly settled: either 
a subdivision of the land into smaller parcels, with all the technical 
difficulties in cultivation which this involves, or an artificial limita- 
tion of the birth rate (provided, of course, that the law of equal in- 
heritance is not modified). This is the dilemma, as is well known, 
which the French saw clearly, and solved admirably, at least from 
an economic point of view, by choosing the second alternative. 

If a country avoids the evil consequences of legal equality by 
such a restriction of population, and remains, so to speak, in the 
first phase of the revolution, it secures a social structure whose 
solidity is scarcely equaled by any other form of economic organ- 
ization. The bulk of the population does not consist of homeless, 
propertyless workingmen, nor of a crowd of day laborers whose 
families live physically and mentally almost like cattle under a 
few great landlords; it consists of a body of peasant proprietors 
who are hardworking and thrifty, because out of their own experience 
they know the value of property, and because they labor for them- 
selves and their families and not for absentee landlords. 

It has been necessary to examine a little more in detail the his- 
torical significance of this idea of "equality," inasmuch as scarcely 
any other historical event has been so much misrepresented as the 
proclamation of this principle by the French Revolution. From 
the outset, amateur philosophers of history have taken special de- 
light in holding it up to reproach, repeating the platitude that Nature 
herself knows no equality, and that men are never equally endowed 
at birth. This is undoubtedly true; but, looked at closely, this very 
fact is an argument, not against, but in favor of the abolition of 
the pre-revolutionary class privileges. The advantages which the 
members of the propertied class enjoyed before the Revolution did 
not give free play to ability, but on the contrary acted as a shield 
to the incompetent, who could not otherwise have withstood the 
competition of talented rivals from the lower ranks of society. As 
to "the rule of the fittest," whatever such an indefinite, theoretical 
phrase may mean, certainly there was a closer approach to this 



14 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

Utopian conception under the legal equality introduced by the 
French Revolution than under the earlier system of privileges for 
certain families and classes. Historical events have also proved 
that another theory, by which the privileged classes tried to justify 
their position, is no longer tenable; namely, the theory that only 
scions of the nobility possessed the necessary qualities to make 
good military officers. The very wars of the French Revolution 
proved this to be nothing but a legend. Every one knows that some 
of the most successful French generals came from the lower ranks 
of society; diis was the time when it was said that every soldier, 
even the humblest born, carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack. 

Of course the principle of equality in inheritance is open to serious 
criticism, and the historian would be the last person to assert that 
there is nothing but good in it. Writers in England, that is, in the 
country where primogeniture has been retained within certain limits 
in combination with general freedom of testamentary disposition, 
have with some justice called attention to the bad effects in France 
of extreme subdivision of agricultural land. One might add also 
that a class of independent large landlords can render to the state 
valuable services which cannot be had easily in any other way. 
But these are matters which have nothing to do with that favorable 
recognition of talent which is supposed to have been destroyed by 
the doctrine of equality. For the innovations of the French Revo- 
lution had precisely the result that the man who was poor but tal- 
ented henceforth need struggle only against the disadvantages due 
to his poverty, but not against those due to the political and legal 
privileges of the rich. 

More justifiable is another theoretical objection. Little as the 
historian can endorse in general talk about "the good old times," 
he must admit that some of the unrest in modern society is to be 
traced back to this legal equality. When the propertied or ruling 
classes were protected by all sorts of political privileges, they nat- 
urally had less idea of the difficulty of the struggle for existence than 
later. The rest of the population likewise, being excluded from the 
enjoyment of sinecures, were more resigned to their fate than later; 
realizing that they never could stand on an equal footing with their 
mighty masters, they did not make the attempt. But in the case 
of this objection also, in view of the great increase in population, 
one cannot accept unreservedly the statement that legal equality 
and freedom to exercise a trade have caused the boundless striving 
for wealth of modern times with all its disturbing consequences. 

In the history of the nineteenth century it is of fundamental im- 



CONSEQUENCES OF FRENCH REVOLUTION 15 

portance that these "Ideas of the French Revolution" coincided at 

the outset with "liberal" or even republican forms of government. 
In itself, the adoption of the kind of equality just described naturally 
has no inherent connection with a free form of government. Writers 
have often correctly pointed out that there can be more legal 
equality under an autocracy than in an aristocratic republic. In 
Europe before 1789 it was also true that the new ideas came nearer 
to realization in m.onarchical than in republican states. "Enlightened 
Despotism," which in a limited degree aimed at the same things as 
the French Revolution later, bore its fruits primarily in monarchies. 
Two events, however, made this no longer true henceforth. The 
first was the establishment of the United States of America, which 
for the first time proclaimed the complete equaUty of all the citizens 
of the Union. The second was the fact that the monarchy in France 
proved unable to carry through the reforms which it had inaugurated 
and which were only completed under the First French Republic. 
To be sure, a little later the introduction of the new ideas did not 
depend on the continuance of liberal forms of government; as is 
well known, the spread in Europe of the new French legal arrange- 
ments, so far as it took place, was as much due to the campaigns 
of Napoleon as to those of the Republic. But the first impression 
remained the permanent one. It was two republics, the American 
and the French, which first established legal equality; the example 
of Napoleon could not be cited to the contrary, because the 
Corsican Emperor was always regarded as an illegitimate upstart 
by the representatives of the old poUtical way of thinking. 



CHAPTER V 
THE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION" 

The reason that the same people who regarded Napoleon as an 
illegitimate ruler were also the people who feared and hated the 
republican revolutionary movement will become clear only if one 
takes into consideration the intellectual as well as the material re- 
sults of the French Revolution. 

No event in European history ever caused such a change in the 
political thought of the ruling classes as did the French Revolution. 
In this respect even the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth 
century was of less importance. It was the first time that conscious 
conservatism became a ruling dogma. 

To understand this, it is not enough to study merely the history 
of the French Revolution itself. Much rather must one seek the 
solution of the problem in the theory according to which the Revo- 
lution was explained and in the consequences which were drawn 
from the course of its progress. 

Two ideas were particularly important. The first was the con- 
nection which the adherents of the Old Regime thought they saw 
between the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century and 
the political revolution. Because some French writers had brilliantly^ 
set forth anti-ecclesiastical ideas about the Law of Nature, and be- 
cause the reformers of French finance did not hesitate to confiscate 
church property, the ruling classes thought that the real source of 
revolutionary tendencies was to be sought in the writings of the 
enlightened philosophers about religion. 

The attitude of the ruling classes in church and state toward 
education and culture therefore became radically altered. While 
formerly they had welcomed the new intellectual ideas and more 
than once defended them against the fanaticism of the middle class, 
henceforth the contrary became the rule. Poets and essayists who in 
the eighteenth century had been entertained at the courts of princes 
and given important offices, were now at best merely tolerated and 
everywhere regarded with suspicion. Henceforth, it was usually only 
the fine arts which flourished in these states, for the fine arts did 
not deal with the great problems of the age and showed a preference 

i6 



rrHE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION" 17 

for pre-revolutionary forms. Especially in countries where those in 
control thought they ought to protect themselves against revolution- 
ary attempts, the view prevailed that the state ought to restrict if 
possible, or at least direct, intellectual movements. The split which 
took place between the state and culture has continued in many 
countries to the present day. 

This governmental attitude in many states was given its special 
character by the fact that the "age of innocence" had passed. Rulers 
might still think it advisable from political motives to uphold the 
church and religion, and block anti-ecclesiastical movements. But 
the old naive faith, such as was still by no means uncommon among 
rulers of the eighteenth century, could no longer be aroused. The 
conviction that the wrath of heaven would smite the prince who 
tolerated heretical beliefs in his territory, the belief in the existence 
of witches who made compacts with the devil to injure their fellow- 
men — all these and many other superstitions which had political 
importance had disappeared forever. The most important teachings 
of the Age of Enlightenment had gained much greater currency 
even among people of strong religious faith than in the eighteenth 
century ; at least the statesmen who advocated religion for the people 
usually did so, not so much from conviction of the innate truth of 
the church's dogmas, but because the maintenance of the Christian 
religion seemed to be for the general good. As a famous English 
statesman was leaving the House of Commons after a strong speech 
in favor of the claims of the church, he remarked to a colleague: 
"Well, after all, it's a curious thing that we have both been voting 
for an extinct mythology." 

Perhaps this decline in faith was not after all a great difficulty. 
Statesmen who urged a religion in which they no longer believed 
might meet with few practical obstacles; but they could not always 
hold logically to their policy. Since a training in the new natural 
sciences was indispensable for industry and war, even conservative 
statesmen had to approve their advancement. This contradiction 
was obviated by allowing students of natural science a free hand so 
long as they stuck closely to their subject, and by persecuting all 
scholars who tried to draw from their science general conclusions 
which were incompatible with church dogma. 

The second idea which the representatives of the old order re- 
garded as proved by the history of the French Revolution concerned 
the attitude which the French monarchy had taken toward revolu- 
tionary demands. The conservative governments were convinced 
that it was only the monarch's excessive willingness to yield that 



i8 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

was to blame when the movement went so far. Only by heading 
off the danger at the outset could success be secured; if the reins 
were once loosened there would be no stopping until there was a 
complete upset. This was equivalent to a condemnation of a great 
part of the work of the Enlightened Despots. Proposals for political 
reform, which had been discussed calmly before the Revolution and 
even initiated by royal ministers, were now regarded as unacceptable 
because they might open the gate to revolution. Even harmless 
notions now awakened a kind of panicky fear. The only salvation 
lay in the principle of legitimacy and conservatism, that is, in con- 
serving what existed simply because it existed. Better to preserve 
what was incomplete than introduce what was new; for who knew 
whether reform would stop with its first success — whether it would 
not shove aside what had been treasured from the past? 

Naturally this principle was not put completely into practice. 
Aside from the fact that nearly all office holders had been brought 
up on the teachings of Enlightened Despotism, the revolutionary 
wars made it necessary to reorganize so many institutions, both 
political and non-political, that serious breaches in the existing order 
were unavoidable. But the principle was not without influence just 
the same; especially in foreign policy (as will be shown in detail 
in Book II) there was the very important conviction that govern- 
ments owed it to their common interest to protect one another 
against revolutionary conspiracies. 

Like every panicky movement, this fear of revolution lasted only 
a relatively short time in its extreme form. It reached its height 
after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and during the following years. 
The panicky feeling was also more sharply marked in those coun- 
tries where none of the revolutionary demands had been accepted 
than in those where few had been rejected; for instance, more 
sharply in Austria than in England or America. On the other hand, 
the fact must not be overlooked that the effects of these tendencies 
were visible for a long time afterwards, in fact even up to the 
present. Here is an intellectual influence which has stamped itself 
on the whole period. 



CHAPTER VI 
HUMANITARIANISM 

While the political and religious tendencies of the Age of Enlighten- 
ment were regarded with disfavor in governmental circles, as a 
result of the French Revolution, another of its tendencies spread 
almost without opposition. The humanitarian feeling, the compas- 
sion for the suffering of human beings without regard to their race, 
religion, or social condition, now became a political factor. The 
attitude of wide groups of people on political questions, both foreign 
and domestic, was determined by the expectation that the victory 
of this or that party would advance the cause of humanity. Min- 
istries were not free from this kind of influence; and even if they 
did not embody it in practical legislation, they did not dare deny 
the principle that the demands of mankind ought to be given con- 
sideration. 

Humanitarianism is generally regarded as a child of the eighteenth 
century. This view is undoubtedly correct so far as its birth isi 
concerned. But its full strength did not develop until the nineteenth 
century, when there came into power the men who had grown to 
regard the novelties of the Age of Enlightenment as self-evident 
truths. In the eighteenth century only a small minority had pro- 
tested against the horrors of the criminal law, the gruesome execu- 
tion of witches, slavery, and similar inhuman practices; it was only 
by forceful measures that reforms in these matters could be effected. 
But during and after the French Revolution these views came to 
be shared by all cultivated persons in Europe. They gained greatly 
in influence from the fact that they were taken up by religious 
societies. Whereas in the eighteenth century, humanitarian doc- 
trines had been chiefly preached by anti-ecclesiastical or at least 
non-ecclesiastical groups, and had often been opposed in strictly 
religious circles, now many religious groups, especially those out- 
side the established church, adopted propaganda for humanitarian 
laws and reforms as part of their platform. Sects which in the 
eighteenth century were chiefly concerned with the salvation of 
souls now turned with even greater zeal to the salvation of society 

19 



20 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

by prison reform and the abolition of slavery. Naturally the hu- 
manitarian movement thereby became far stronger than at a time 
when it was advocated only by a few aristocratic writers. It had 
also rid itself of all revolutionary and anti-religious taint. 

In this field of humanitarian reform, therefore, there was less 
of a restoration of old conditions after 1815 than in any other field. 
Conservative ministries might debate the re-introduction of primo- 
geniture; but they no longer discussed the revival of torture and 
the barbaric forms of the death penalty. Where barbaric penalties 
were not actually abolished by law, they were no longer applied in 
practice. Even humane forms of capital punishment came to be 
regarded more and more as a terrible penalty which ought not to be 
imposed except in extreme cases ; for instance, in England, the death 
penalty, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was still 
enforced for minor infractions of the law, was now reserved for only 
the most serious crimes. Condemnation to corporal punishment 
came now to be regarded as an evidence of a lower civilization, and 
one of the reasons why Russia was felt to be a barbarous country 
was the fact that she had done so much less than other countries 
in the matter of humanitarian reform. In order to realize the tre- 
mendous changes in attitude which had taken place one must not 
forget that the worst excesses of Russian criminal law were really 
humane in comparison with the horrors, for instance, which still 
existed in French legal practice in the eighteenth century. 

In many ways the new humanitarianism iniluenced practical pol- 
itics. To it must be attributed some of the political hostility with 
which Turkey was regarded in many countries. Its influence was 
most successful in the abolition of slavery. In this matter the Age 
of Enlightenment had taken the first step and asserted in the face 
of ecclesiastical opposition the "natural rights of man." During the 
French Revolution for the first time a European nation (France) for- 
bade slavery in its colonies. Great Britain soon followed the example 
of France; in 1807-8 the slave trade was abolished by Act of Parlia- 
ment. The example of France and England was often followed in 
the course of the nineteenth century, until finally it had been 
imitated by all Christian countries. The movement toward the abo- 
lition of slavery also affected the relations of European nations with 
peoples of other races outside of Europe, as, for instance, in the well- 
known case of Africa. 

This struggle against slavery is a particularly characteristic evi- 
dence of the power of humanitarianism, inasmuch as it was not at 
all due to material motives in the ordinary meaning of the word. 



HUMANITARIANISM 21 

In fact, England's abolition of the slave trade was hurtful from the 
point of view of British commerce; it was justifiable only on ideal- 
istic grounds. 



^1 



BOOK II 

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 
AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES 



CHAPTER VII 

THE SOLIDARITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONSERVATISM 

The Great Powers which had led the struggle against Napoleon 
had fought not only for an increase of territory, but also for a po- 
litical principle. Although one of the Allies (Prussia) had been 
somewhat permeated by French Revolutionary ideas, and another 
(England) had already adopted many of them, the governments of 
all the Allies were selfishly interested in many of the institutions 
of the Old Regime, and the war against France was therefore re- 
garded as a war for eradicating the international revolutionary 
movement. 

It was natural that the Alliance outlasted Napoleon's defeat and 
banishment. In the first place, the revolutionary movement had 
not been rooted out. In France itself, which for several decades 
had been regarded as a hot-bed of subversive tendencies and upon 
which an almost foreign dynasty had been imposed, the danger of a 
new outbreak seemed constantly imminent; and each of the Allies 
was aware that in such an event the consequences would not be lim- 
ited to France alone. A second motive holding the Allies together 
was their desire to keep their newly acquired territories. All the 
Great Powers, except France, emerged from the Napoleonic Wars 
with large increases of territory, acquired to a slight extent at the 
expense of France, but mainly at that of little states, like the aris- 
tocratic city republics and the bishoprics which were secularized. 
The best way to preserve these acquisitions was for the coalition 
which had conquered them to hold together to keep them. Finally, 
the reorganization which took place at the Congress of Vienna, at 
least so far as it concerned Europe, had created a balance of power 
among the large states which was regarded as a guarantee of peace. 
Now since none of the Great Powers had any inclination for another 
great war after the Napoleonic upheaval, it was to the interest of 
them all to conserve the existing balance which had been created 
at the Congress of Vienna. 

With this in view the four greater Allied Powers, Austria, Russia, 
Prussia and Great Britain, signed a treaty on November 20, 1815, 

25 



26 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

"for the safety of their governments and for the general peace of 
Europe," to prevent the possibility that "Revolutionary Principles 
might again convulse France and endanger the peace of other coun- 
tries." This had been preceded on September 26, 181 5, by the Holy 
Alliance, which was in keeping with the new religious and political 
tendencies described above in chapter v; proposed by the Tsar, 
and then signed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, 
its mystical formulas aimed at the preservation of absolutism at 
home. 

It was characteristic of the new Alliance that it did not at first 
include France, the feared home of revolutions. Only after a con- 
siderable period of probation, and after the withdrawal of the army 
of occupation which the Great Powers had left in France to secure 
the execution of the treaty, was France at last, in 18 18, admitted to 
the league for the solidarity of conservatism. Great as was the de- 
sire of the Allies to raise the prestige of the government which they 
had restored in France, still greater was their feeling of anxiety lest 
some new disturbance might burst forth from France. 

It would, of course, be quite incorrect to assume that this prin- 
ciple of the solidarity of conservatism always completely controlled 
the foreign and domestic policy of the European nations. The old 
aspirations and sources of agitation had not been suppressed. Even 
in the six or seven years following the Congress of Vienna, that is, 
in the period when the policy of international conservatism may 
be said to have been at its height, there were at work among mem- 
bers of the Alliance tendencies which were in contradiction with the 
idea of joint action against the forces of revolution. But it would 
be equally incorrect to deny that the conservative program of 
those days exerted practical influence. The idea of a common fight 
against the spirit of revolution acted as a gigantic brake on the 
wheels of progress. 

At this point, in order to avoid repetition later, a theoretical ob- 
servation may be inserted parenthetically. — There is one conception 
of history according to which all events may be traced back to 
ideas; the past, as well as the present, is regarded as being a war 
of great ideas; struggling groups, like nations or political parties, 
merely embody general tendencies. Opposed to this first conception, 
which might be called the idealogical conception of history, stands 
another, commonly known as the "great man" or "hero" conc^- 
tion; this completely denies the effective influence of such ideas; 
ideas are merely a bait which must be thrown to the stupid masses ; 
no statesman ever takes their big phrases seriously. A sensible 



SOLIDARITY OF CONSERVATISM 27 

observer will not admit that either of these extreme conceptions is 
correct. Certainly the first in its strict sense is untenable. But 
is a force without effect because opposing forces prevent it from 
reaching its full development? Does not every joint action unite men 
or groups, who may also be pursuing their own special aims, and is 
not their common purpose a reality? Because selfish interests can 
never be completely gotten rid of, can there be no self-sacrifice for 
general aims? 

This is the point of view from which one ought to judge the 
attitude of the Conservative Powers after 181 5. In the following 
chapters it will be shown in detail that the feeling of conservative 
solidarity was most effective in those countries where it harmonized 
with the special interests of a definite nation or minority; and that 
in other cases it made itself only partially felt. But this does not 
mean it did not exert any influence as a distinct independent force. 

The fact that conservatism could not triumph completely lay in 
an uneven distribution of forces, and in a remarkable connection be- 
tween this circumstance and the new policy of the Allied Powers. 

One can understand that the "Panic of the French Revolution," 
mentioned above in chapter v, was more intense and lasted longer 
in proportion as nations had rejected more completely the equali- 
tarian and the constitutional doctrines of the Revolution. Similarly 
the period of anxiety, caused by the paroxysms of the French Revo- 
lution, was briefest in the United States of America, and longest 
in the state which most completely embodied the Old Regime, namely, 
in Austria. It was likewise quite normal that England should give 
up sooner than the other Great Powers the idea that the first duty 
of all states is to combat the peril of revolution. Although in Great 
Britain, as will be pointed out later in chapter viii, an Old Regime 
had to defend itself against a revolutionary attack at this time, 
nevertheless the social reform movement there had little to do with 
the movement on the Continent; for England had already accom- 
plished in large part what the continental revolutionary party was 
still striving after. Therefore the English were less inclined to sub- 
ordinate their own national aims to the solidarity of international 
conservatism, and the inclination evaporated more rapidly than in 
the other countries. It was more than a mere accident that of all 
the leading monarchs (aside from the Pope) the Prince Regent of 
England was the only one who did not sign the Holy Alliance. 

Now an important consequence of Great Britain's cool attitude 
was the fact that the Conservative Alliance lost the use of the only 
large navy in the world (see ch. ii). In every case where "rebels 



28 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

against legitimacy" could be brought to reason only by the aid of 
a large fleet, the decision whether this should be done depended 
solely on Great Britain. Considering that the two cases of revolt 
which were left unsettled by the Congress of Vienna, the Spanish- 
American and the Greek, depended in last analysis upon sea power, 
it is easy to see the practical importance of this independent policy 
of Great Britain. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 
IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 

The most important of the revolutionary movements against which 
the Conservative Alliance had to stand on the defensive was the 
War of Independence of the Spanish-American colonies. The roots 
of the trouble reached far back. The great example of the North 
American Union — the unheard-of fact that a European colony should 
wrench itself loose from its mother-country and establish itself suc- 
cessfully as a democratic republic — naturally left a deeper impres- 
sion in the New World than in Europe (although even here this 
event was not without a strong influence on the peculiar course of 
the French Revolution). This was necessarily the case, both because 
the Spanish colonies had been much worse treated by the mother- 
country than the English ones, and because Spain, unlike England, 
did not learn any lesson from the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies. 
Both these points need a short explanation. 

One must begin with economic and social facts. The Spanish- 
American colonies, in 1776, were much more profitable to Spain 
than were the English colonies to England. Spain's revenues 
were dependent on the possession and exploitation of her American 
colonies in a way which had no parallel in England. Socially 
also there was a sharp difference. The Spanish colonies con- 
tained a large number of more or less independent natives who con- 
tinued to exist as the lowest social group ; but in the wide areas of the 
North American colonies the remnants of Indian tribes were negligi- 
ble, and the negro slaves in the Southern states, being unfree, did not 
count politically. Owing to these "conditions, the government of the 
Spanish colonies was not exercised by and for the whites settled there, 
but by Spaniards and solely in the interests of the mother-country. 
No Creoles, as white persons born in America were called, were ad- 
mitted into the colonial government. Not the welfare of the colonists, 
but the profit of the home government, was aimed at. In conflicts 
between the Creoles and the natives, the Spanish administration took 
a neutral stand, or was even inclined to protect the descendants of 
original inhabitants against the claims of the successors of the Con- 

29 



30 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

quistadors. This attitude of the Spanish government was seen above 
all in its commercial policy. The trade of the colonies was reserved 
to Spanish merchants as a matter of principle; even Spanish liberals 
did not want to abandon this commercial monopoly; it was indis- 
pensable for the Spanish revenues. 

Furthermore, the revolt of the English colonies in North America 
brought no change in this Spanish colonial system. As is known and 
will be pointed out later in the proper place, the revolt of the Thir- 
teen Colonies made a great impression on the English government 
and led to a complete change in British colonial policy. But in 
Spain nothing of the kind took place. Although Spanish rulers 
might well have said to themselves that the example of the United 
States would certainly awaken similar aspirations in Central and 
South America, and although it was to be expected that a rising in 
the Spanish colonies would have at least the moral support of the 
North American Union, Spain persisted in her traditional attitude. 

At first Spain was strong enough to maintain control over her 
colonies, but there soon came a moment which enabled the Creoles 
to replace the administration of Spain by one of their own. The 
Napoleonic Wars involved the Spanish (and Portuguese) colonies. 

Two circumstances then favored the colonists' struggle for inde- 
pendence. One was that the only nation which was in a position to 
assist the insurgents was also the very nation which had the great- 
est interest in the destruction of Spain's old commercial monopoly. 
Although the English government never appears to have thought 
of replacing the Spanish monopoly by one of its own, nevertheless 
it was significant that, thanks to England's leading commercial po- 
sition, it was the English who would profit most from the establish- 
ment of freedom of trade in Central and South America. It also 
chanced favorably for England that her support of the South Ameri- 
can movement for independence coincided with her general war 
policy; England and the insurgent colonists had the same enemy; 
Napoleon's elder brother, Joseph Bonaparte, had been set up as 
King of Spain by England's French enemy. 

The second circumstance which aided the colonists lay in these 
conflicts in Spain itself. So long as the Spanish government was 
waging a bitter and unsuccessful war in the Peninsula, it was in no 
position to use force against the Creoles. 

How necessary was the combination of both factors — British sea 
power and Spanish-American natives — is proved by the events of 
1806-07. The British attempted to secure a position for themselves 
in the Spanish colonies by attacks on Buenos Aires and Montevideo; 



ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 31 

but these expeditions failed completely; they lacked support from 
the side of the colonists. 

Soon afterwards, however, the Creoles found a leader and an 
opportunity enabling them to achieve complete independence, instead 
of being simply transferred to the colonial empire of another nation. 
The leader was a prominent representative of the old Creole aristoc- 
racy, Simon Bolivar of Caracas. Born in 1783, he now stood in the 
full strength of his manhood. Having absorbed intellectual influ- 
ences in Europe, and being impressed in the United States by their 
great example, he resolved in 1809 to free the Spanish colonies. A 
born hero of freedom, a logical idealist, absolutely unselfish, incom- 
parably energetic, and ahead of his times, he believed it possible to 
free and unite all the colonies immediately. Without hesitation he 
also proclaimed the abolition of slavery. He was no great military 
leader; but he understood how to gather around himself a group 
of able men, and he never gave up hope even in the darkest hour. 

The favorable moment for the colonies to break away came when 
Napoleon compelled the Spanish King, Charles IV, to abdicate; 
this left the colonies also without a ruler. For Joseph Bonaparte, 
who had been set up by the French as the new king, was not recog- 
nized anywhere in America; and the legitimate successor, Ferdinand 
VII, was not in a position to exercise authority. Therefore the 
Creoles established committees, called juntas, "to protect the rights 
of Ferdinand"; only gradually did they dare to proclaim complete 
independence from Spain, the first instance being in 181 1. 

This outcome was in fact promoted by the attitude of the revolu- 
tionary (anti-French) regency in Spain itself. One would have 
thought that the liberal politicians who gathered in Cadiz to build 
up a new Spain would not have adopted the selfish attitude of the 
Old Regime. But they did. The regency answered various revolu- 
tionary acts in Caracas with the severest reprisals and clung fast 
to the old monopolistic system. This made the breach irreparable. 

So long as the war continued in Europe the struggle in America 
turned mostly in favor of the colonists. To be sure, there were 
defeats and the easily understood preference of the original inhabi- 
tants, or "Indians," for Spanish control continually provided the 
royalist leaders with new soldiers. But Bolivar and his supporters 
gained possession of most of the large provinces. Unless troops 
from Spain intervened, the loss of the colonies by the mother country 
was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, it was probable 
that if the revived Spanish government could send enough troops 
to America the insurgents would be outmatched. 



32 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

In this situation everything depended on Great Britain's attitude. 
And it is an extraordinarily significant evidence of the importance 
of the new conservative ideas that the English government at first 
refrained from aiding the colonists. Every English self-interest 
spoke in favor of intervention to secure the independence of the 
colonies. England had everything to gain if the former Spanish 
system of monopoly was replaced by freedom of trade with all 
nations. But considerations of a general political nature prevented 
England for a considerable time from favoring the revolutionists. 
So at first no official support was given by England. 

At the outset, therefore, Spain had a free hand. But this profited 
her little. For what remained of the Spanish fleet sufficed only to 
transport a few troops, and the Russian vessels which were placed 
at her disposal in the interests of conservative solidarity proved 
completely useless. So the revolutionists were able to spread their 
conquests still further. Chili and Colombia were torn from the 
royalists. Peru was the only region over which the Spaniards still 
exercised control. This success of the colonists was partly the result 
of British (unofficial) assistance. It was due to the English naval 
hero, Lord Cochrane, who left the British service in 1818 to take 
command of the newly created Chilian navy, that the Spanish flag 
was driven completely from the Pacific Ocean. An extensive illegal 
trade was carried on by British ships with American ports, a trade 
which naturally furnished the colonists with munitions of war. But 
five years passed before Great Britain openly took sides with the 
insurgents. It was not until the 'Tanic of the French Revolution" 
(see ch. v) was on the wane that England dared to prefer her own 
interests above those of the Conservative Alliance. In 181 7 England 
might still seriously debate Spain's request to the Allies for aid 
against the revolting American colonists and still adopt a passive at- 
titude; but in 1822 at the Congress of Verona, she took a decisive 
stand when the Conservative Allies wanted to adopt a common policy. 
Here the British delegate declared that England felt compelled to 
give a kind of partial recognition to the new governments, that she 
had entered into negotiations with them, and that definite recogni- 
tion must eventually follow this first step. 

This attitude was strengthened the next year by what might be 
called a declaration made jointly with the United States. The 
United States, for reasons easily understood, had recognized the 
independence of these free South American countries somewhat 
earlier. This government did not need to have any regard for the 
European Alliance, which it had never joined, and whose principles 



ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 33 

did not harmonize with its own political institutions; nor was it to 
its interest to support the rule of a great European Power in the New 
World. So it came about that in October, 1823, Canning, the Brit- 
ish Foreign Minister, a typical representative of the younger genera- 
tion in contrast to the earlier panicky conservatives, notified the 
French ambassador of England's limited recognition of the new re- 
publics; then, on December 2 of the same year, President Monroe 
sent his famous message to Congress declaring that he would con- 
sider any attempt on the part of European Powers to extend their 
system to the Western Hemisphere, or to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of American states, as dangerous to the peace and safety of 
the United States. Two years later, in 1825, England formally 
recognized the more important states. 

This closed the door to every attempt by European Powers to 
reduce the Spanish colonies to their old subjection; it also destroyed 
the plans of the French to seek an equivalent in the Spanish colonies 
for the colonial empire which they had lost in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. A further fortunate circumstance in favor of the colonists 
was the fact that the Spanish troops destined for America refused to 
embark, partly because of their own grievances; the hole made in 
Spanish revenues by the loss of the colonies had already begun to 
derange the normal working of the Spanish administration (see be- 
low, ch, xi). 

The interval before recognition by England had not been left 
unutilized by the Creoles. After conquering Ecuador, Bolivar suc- 
ceeded in overthrowing the last bulwark of Spanish power by con- 
quering Peru, taking definite possession in 1824. From there the 
movement, which had hitherto been limited to South America, spread 
also to Central and Spanish North America. 

In Mexico, or New Spain as it was then called, the first revolts, 
which took place at the same time as the risings in South America, 
were the work of the aborigines, or Indians, and the Creoles there- 
fore had at first taken the loyalist side. Not until the Indian re- 
volts had been put down, did the Creoles rise. In 182 1 one of their 
generals, Iturbide, declared Mexico an independent Empire; next 
year he made himself emperor. (His rule lasted only a year; how- 
ever, it was followed, not by a restoration of Spanish authority, but 
by an era of pronunciamentos.) This movement gave courage to 
colonists in Central America; Guatemala deserted Spain in 182 1, 
the same year as Mexico. 

In a similar way Brazil became independent. Here the commercial 
conditions were the same. Portugal exploited her colonies and main- 



34 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

tained a monopoly like Spain. Here also, aside from the interests 
of the colonists themselves, it was the interests of British trade 
which hindered the restoration of the old system. Brazil differed 
in two respects from the Spanish republics: the new freedom of 
commerce in 1808 was not introduced by a republican leader, but 
by the Prince Regent (the later King John VI), who had fled from 
Lisbon to America; and after the later definite separation from the 
mother country in 1825-26, Brazil was established as a monarchy, 
or rather an empire. Quite the same, however, was the part which 
British sailors played. Lord Cochrane, who had commanded the 
Chilian fleet, was put at the head of the Brazilian navy after the 
declaration of independence in 1822. It was chiefly due to him, 
and to many other British naval heroes who served imder him, that 
the military centers which held to Portugal were captured, and 
that the Portuguese ships bringing aid were chased away. 

The states of Central and South America found it difficult in their 
new freedom to establish a firm political organization. As the Old 
Regime had excluded colonists from the administration, they were 
lacking in political experience. Almost the only people to manage 
new affairs were the inhabitants of the towns, who were also the 
people who benefited most by the abolition of the Spanish commer- 
cial monopoly. The aborigines, who had rather lost than gained 
by the revolt, remained indifferent toward these and the later revo- 
lutions, except when they were sometimes drawn into feuds by ad- 
venturers. Thus the conditions were altogether different from those 
in North America at the time of the American Revolution; there 
was also the enormous extent of the territory — the State of Colombia 
alone was about as large as the original Thirteen Colonies — and 
the total lack of means of communication. Under these circum- 
stances Bolivar's dream of establishing a federation of the new in- 
dependent states, which he attempted in a Pan-American congress 
at Panama in 1824, proved premature; in fact, the newly constituted 
states could not even preserve themselves from a further splitting 
up. Other measures which he did accomplish by his idealism, like 
abolition of slavery (in which he outstripped the action of the 
United States, but had no success in Brazil) made such a sharp 
break, however, with the past, that the emancipation of the slaves 
often turned out to be nominal rather than real. The sudden cessa- 
tion of all Spanish administration resulted in very unstable condi- 
tions, and the lack of an effective public opinion led to many a 
coup d'etat, so that for years rulers rose and fell with astonishing 



ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 35 

rapidity — except where thinly veiled military dictatorships were 
established. 

But after all one must not overlook the fact that much of this 
political insecurity was merely symptomatic of a period of transi- 
tion. It did not seriously disturb economic development, particularly 
in the interior, nor did it affect the real significance in world history 
of this South American struggle for independence. For the Euro- 
pean nations the essential importance of this struggle lay in the 
definite abolition, so far as America was concerned, of the old 
monopolistic colonial system. European commerce, and later, as the 
population in Europe increased rapidly, European expansion, found 
here an open field in which merchants and settlers of various coun- 
tries could thrive on equal terms. Also, though the emigrants who 
settled there might be lost to the mother country, still they did not 
swell the strength of any one of the great rival Powers of Europe. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 

Quite similar were the conditions in the Greek War of Independence. 
Here also was a movement which some at least of the Great Powers 
ought to have hailed with joy from the point of view of their for- 
eign policy, yet which they refused to aid because of their regard 
for the solidarity of international conservatism. The revolt of the 
Greeks against the legitimate authority of the Turks was an event 
which embodied two of the objectionable tendencies, the revolutionary 
and the nationalistic; it was therefore in fiat contradiction to the 
principles of the Conservative Alliance. The only mitigating circum- 
stance was the fact that Turkey, being a non-Christian state, could 
not be regarded as a regular member of an alliance which liked to 
lay so much stress on its religious character; though this circum- 
stance, as we shall see, was not without its influence, nevertheless 
at the outset it was subordinated to the policy of conservatism. 

Russia, after pushing forward to the Black Sea under Catherine 
II, naturally aimed to secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean. 
Control over Constantinople and at least the Eastern part of the 
Balkans became henceforth, along with expansion eastward, one 
of the main aims of Russian foreign policy. To Russians a revolt 
of their Greek co-religionists against Turkish authority was most 
welcome. To weaken Turkey was to strengthen Russia. Further- 
more, according to opinion at that time, an increase of Greek power 
would assure the whole of the Balkans to Russia; for the Greek 
Orthodox Church was still closely unified throughout the Balkans, 
and the Greek element was everywhere dominant in it, no matter 
to what nationality its communicants might belong. If a union 
could once be established between Russia and the head of the Greek 
Orthodox organization in Constantinople, it was thought the whole 
Christian population of the Balkans would support Russian policy. 

Even during the Napoleonic Wars one of the most important 
topics in the negotiations between Alexander I and Napoleon had 
been in regard to Russia's views as to Constantinople. But the 
Congress of Vienna put an end for a time to such subversive schemes ; 
it also showed the Greeks that they could not expect the Great 

36 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 37 

Powers to take any initiative in expelling the Turks from Europe. 
For if Alexander and Napoleon had been unable to agree as to the 
disposal of the Turkish capital, there was little likelihood of arousing 
a general crusade in Europe. Theoretical opposition to overthrowing 
a legitimate ruler perhaps might have been overcome, but not the 
divergent ambitions of the Great Powers. Austria, after completing 
with Prussia the partition of Poland, had become more and more a 
rival of Russia, and opposed every extension of Russian power in 
the Balkans. England also was little inclined to tolerate Russian 
expansion, particularly toward the Mediterranean. A Greek rising 
would threaten the Mediterranean outpost which England had se- 
cured by acquiring Corfu and the Ionian Isles during the Napoleonic 
Wars. So the Greeks were left to win their independence by them- 
selves. 

The outlook for an unaided Greek attempt to overthrow Turkish 
rule was not favorable, but still it was not desperate. It was a case 
like that of the Dutch against the Spanish in the sixteenth century. 
The Greeks were as powerless on land against the superior Turkish 
army, as the Dutch against the Spanish infantry. But like the Dutch, 
they enjoyed an invulnerable position on the sea. The Turkish 
government had never raised its navy above mediocrity, and at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century it was nothing to speak of. 
Quite otherwise with the Greeks. Greek tradition was upheld even 
more by the Greek sailors on the i^gean Islands than by the dwellers 
on the Greek mainland itself. They made little more distinction 
between honest trade and robbery on the seas than did their ances- 
tors in the time of Odysseus; like the Greeks of old, also, these island 
Greeks possessed a high degree of seafaring ability, love of liberty, 
and indomitable energy. As they had never fallen so completely 
under Turkish subjection, they now formed one of the strongest 
supports in the War of Independence. 

Those who like to generalize about the philosophy of history may 
see here a specific instance illustrating a general principle: that 
seafaring people and marines never allow themselves to be subjected 
to the same kind of despotic treatment as may successfully be used 
in dealing with land troops. Regular garrison drill, even in time of 
peace, is impossible on the sea; nor can the individual be so com- 
pletely treated as a mere machine as in the case of military forces 
drilled on land. Therefore the naval service has always been re- 
garded as having more of the spirit of freedom than the military, 
and freedom-loving naval powers have always proved stronger than 
absolutist governments. Even the reactionary philosophers of Greek 



38 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

antiquity complained that the shipping trade had hastened "democ- 
racy," using the word in its original sense; since that time few are 
the despotic governments which have accomplished more than medi- 
ocre results in naval matters. It is well known how many revolu- 
tions have originated with sailors, and how the navy, in contrast 
to the army, has always defended liberal movements. 

Be this as it may, it is certain that the Greeks of the islands 
formed the core of the opposition to Turkish rule; to them rather 
than to the Greeks of the mainland is it due that the struggle for 
independence held out successfully during the critical early years. 

On land the situation proved most unfavorable for the Greeks. 
For centuries, one may even say since the fourth century, B.C., the 
Greek center of gravity lay, not in Hellas itself, but in Asia Minor. 
It was essentially as a seafaring and commercial people that the 
Greeks rose to power. After Athens lost her hegemony, the Greek 
centers of wealth and often of intellectual activity were the great 
commercial settlements which had arisen all around the shores of 
the Mediterranean. Under Turkish rule, this situation had remained 
unchanged. In fact, when Greek trade began to revive under Turk- 
ish protection, after the destruction of Italian commerce at the 
close of the Middle Ages, it was almost exclusively the "Levantines" 
who enjoyed it. The rich and cultured Greek was no longer to be 
found in what had been ancient Hellas, but in places like Smyrna, 
Constantinople, Chios, and Samos ; Hellas itself was largely occupied 
by half-civilized and semi-independent bands known as Brigands, 
Klephts, and Palikars. 

To secure the independence of their country, the Greeks began 
to form societies {Hetairiai). They hoped to receive substantial aid 
from Christian peoples in spite of conservative rulers. For public 
opinion was everywhere undoubtedly on the side of the Greeks, 
both because of the enthusiasm for ancient Greek civilization and 
because of the sentiment of the solidarity of Christendom; in fact, 
many of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna did not conceal 
their personal sympathy for the Greek cause. 

Among the European Powers, Russia particularly was regarded 
as the natural ally of Greece. There were reasons for thinking that 
Russia would lend official connivance and at least give as much 
surreptitious support as the English had given to the Spanisli Ameri- 
cans in their wars of independence. And at first it seemed that this 
would be the case. The Russian Black Sea port of Odessa was to 
be the base for the Hetairia. This secret society for the liberation of 
Greece was founded in October, 1815, by three Phanariots (Greeks 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 39 

of the rich "lighthouse" or Phanariot quarter in Constantinople). 
Its leader was one of the Tsar's adjutants, a Greek aristocrat named 
Alexander Ypsilanti. After their plans had ripened for six years, 
so that the friends of freedom were ready for revolt, they planned 
to make a combined attack on Turkey from the North and from 
the South, Ypsilanti himself took command of the force which was 
to march from the North through Moldavia (the northern part of 
modern Rumania). On March 6, 182 1, he crossed the Pruth and 
occupied Bucharest. 

Ypsilanti 's undertaking, however, rested on two vain hopes. He 
had counted on getting the Tsar's approval for what he had done. 
But Alexander I, no matter how much he might personally sympa- 
thize with the movement, declared himself opposed to secret con- 
spirators, partly because of his regard for the solidarity of conserva- 
tism and partly because of warnings from Austria. Ypsilanti's 
second disappointment came from the Rumanians. He had sum- 
moned this Christian population to rise against the Sultan, thinking 
that religious motives would outweigh national feelings. He soon 
learned, like so many others later, that this was a mistake. The 
Rumanians had no intention of placing themselves under a Greek 
leader. Serious quarrels soon broke out between Ypsilanti and the 
Rumanian magnates. Under these circumstances the weak Greek 
force was left without reinforcements, and was easily destroyed by 
the Turks in June, 1821. Ypsilanti had to flee to Hungary where 
he was arrested by the Austrians. 

Much greater was the success of the attack from the South, which, 
to be sure, had the support of the island Greeks. When Demetrius 
Ypsilanti, Alexander's brother, landed in the Morea, as the ancient 
Peloponnesus was now called, he was joined by the Palikars and 
sailor folk of the neighboring islands. The whole Morea was quickly 
cleared of the Turks, and a pitiless war was waged on Turkish ves- 
sels in the Archipelago. The Sultan replied by one of those massacres 
so often let loose afterwards upon his Christian subjects. In the 
Phanariot quarter at Constantinople, as well as in other parts of 
European Turkey, countless Greeks of note (particularly the ecclesi- 
astics who were regarded as the leaders of the Greek nation) were 
assassinated. Therefore, on January i, 1822, the Greeks declared 
their independence and organized a regular government. This only 
encouraged the Turks to further massacres. Particularly infamous 
was their general slaughter of the whole population of the island of 
Chios in 1822. In retaliation the Greeks drove all Turkish vessels 
from the jJ^gean. 



40 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

These massacres were a mistake on Turkey's part; for they almost 
led to intervention by Russia. But again the conservative solidarity 
of the Great Powers triumphed under Metternich's leadership. The 
Tsar finally contented himself merely with breaking off diplomatic 
relations with Turkey. 

In the midst of their difficulties England came to the assistance 
of the insurgents. Canning, the same minister who had stepped in 
to help the cause of independence in South America, was now the 
first representative of a Great Power to recognize the Greeks as 
belligerents. Two reasons led him to do this. One was the strong 
pressure of Philhellenism in England which was hard for the younger 
generation to withstand. The other was the conviction that if the 
Greeks received only Russian support, their emancipation from Tur- 
key would not result in an independent Greek state, but simply in 
an extension of the Russian territory. For Tsar Alexander had 
made no concealment of the fact that he expected autonomous 
Greece to be a Russian protectorate. An increase of Russia's power 
in the Balkans was the last thing England wanted to see. 

What this attitude of the greatest sea power of the time meant 
was soon seen. As emphasized above, the Greeks had been able to 
maintain themselves at first, since they were unconquerable at sea. 
They were now in danger of losing this advantage. Upon Austria's 
advice, the Sultan turned to his half-independent subject, Mehemet 
Ali, the ruler of Eg3^t. He possessed what his suzerain in Constan- 
tinople lacked — a fleet. It was not large, but it would suffice at 
least for the transportation of troops to the Morea. In February, 
1825, a strong Egj^tian army under the command of Mehemet All's 
adopted son, Ibrahim Pasha, landed in the south-west corner of the 
Morea. The Greeks had nothing to match it. In vain they fought 
most heroically; in vain they defended themselves for fifteen months 
on the northern shore of the Gulf of Patras at Missolonghi, where 
they had been joined by Lord Byron. In the summer of 1827 the 
whole Greek mainland again had to submit to the Turks. 

In spite of England's attitude, the situation would have been 
desperate for the Greeks had not a change come in Russia. On 
December i, 1825, a new Tsar and with him a new policy appeared 
on the scene. Nicholas I was as autocratic as his elder brother, 
Alexander I, indeed, even more so; but he was at the same time a 
representative of the younger generation — he was born in 1796, 
Alexander in 1777 — ^and so had not been brought up in circles which 
felt such a panicky fear of all revolutionary movements. Some- 
what like Canning, he pursued a national Russian, rather than a 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 41 

conservative Austrian, policy. After extorting from Turkey by the 
Treaty of Akkerman (1826) the almost complete independence of 
Serbia and a share of the suzerainty over Rumania, he decided next 
year to intervene on behalf of Greece. He communicated with Eng- 
land, and both Powers then demanded from the Sultan autonomy for 
Greece. 

Turkey, on the other hand, again appealed to arguments of the 
Conservative Alliance. But her warning that the Great Powers were 
undermining the principles of the Holy Alliance and legitimacy by 
supporting the Greek insurgents, no longer had the same force as 
a decade earlier. The protectors of Greece, on the contrary, suc- 
ceeded in extending their alliance so as to include France. By the 
Triple Alliance of July 6, 1827, England, Russia and France 
pledged themselves to secure the independence of Greece. 

At first the Turks would not yield. But the superior force of 
the London coalition soon decided the conflict against them. The 
Allies demanded of Ibrahim Pasha a promise to cease hostilities in 
the Morea. Then, by accident, a naval engagement developed be- 
tween the combined Anglo- Franco-Russian fleet and the Egyptian 
ships at Navarino on the west coast of the Morea; and on October 
20, 1827, the Egyptian fleet was totally destroyed. 

This blow robbed Turkey of the only navy which she had left, 
and yet provoked the Sultan to a declaration of war against the 
Great Powers. As there were now no more naval engagements, only 
French and Russian troops came into action; the French operated 
in the Morea; the Russians advanced from the North through the 
Balkans and on the East toward the Caucasus. As the reorganiza- 
tion of the Turkish army, which was to bring it up toward a Euro- 
pean standard, had only just begun, the Allies had an easy time, 
except for some delays at sieges. The French conquered the whole 
Morea and also compelled Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the islands. 
One Russian army pressed forward past Erzerum to the neighbor- 
hood of Trebizond, while the other, for the first time in history, 
crossed the Balkan Mountains and on August 14, 1829, entered 
Adrianople without drawing a sword. The Sultan could do nothing 
but make peace. 

As the war had been won as much by the Great Powers as by the 
Greeks themselves, the direct gains of the latter were not very 
striking. Greece did not receive the islands on the coast of Asia 
Minor, nor Crete, nor even the Greek territory in Thessaly, Epirus, 
and the Ionian Islands. This was all the more grievous inasmuch 
as the new state was deprived of the financial support of the wealth- 



42 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

iest members of the Greek race at the very moment when it had 
to pay the interest on the heavy debt which the war had imposed. 
Considering the exceedingly difficult position in which the new and 
incompletely established state was deliberately placed by the Great 
Powers from its birth, one must regard as unjustified many of the 
depreciatory judgments passed on it by the public opinion of Europe. 
Rather will one be astonished at the progress which the restricted 
country made in spite of the unfavorable circumstances of its birth. 
Any comparison with the Greece of antiquity is wholly beside the 
point. For what would the culture of classical Greece have been 
without the Asiatic Greeks? And were not the true intellectual 
descendants of the Athenian artizans and sailors to be found in 
Constantinople and Smyrna rather than on the European mainland, 
which in the early nineteenth century was largely inhabited by robber 
bands? In addition to all this, the rivalry of the Great Powers 
by no means left to the new state, to which they could not refuse 
independence, an undisturbed development. The general Anglo- 
Russian antagonism resulting from rivalry for influence in Greece 
often sharpened Greek domestic political strife; while Greece en- 
joyed no international authority by herself, it was of little advan- 
tage to her that the Great Powers prevented jealous factions from 
struggling for possession of the kingship by setting up in 1832 as 
their monarch a foreigner — Prince Otto of Bavaria. 

Nevertheless, regarded from the point of view of world history, 
this elevation of Greece to independence (however little real inde- 
pendence there was about it) was perhaps the most successful pro- 
vision of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. All the Christian terri- 
tories which hitherto had been snatched from Turkey had either 
been directly annexed by the victorious Great Powers, or constituted 
merely as protected states. Even in the Treaty of Adrianople this 
was what Russia did with her conquests; various districts south of 
the Caucasus Mountains were incorporated into Russia; Serbia, 
Wallachia and Moldavia were only given autonomy. In Greece, for 
the first time, a new path was opened. A people freed from Turkish 
rule was recognized as an independent state. Here was an example, 
as may easily be understood, which fired all the other Balkan peoples 
with the ambition to make complete independence the final goal of 
their efforts. One may say: henceforth the small Balkan nations 
shared with the Great Powers in the struggle for Constantinople. 

The course of the War of Greek Independence gave rise to a cir- 
cumstance which more than any other greatly prolonged this strug- 
gle. A historian ought never to say that a thing is possible which 



THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 43 

has never occurred, nor to posit the motives which have led to an 
action. But he may venture the assertion that the Russians in 1829 
would probably have had«little military difficulty in taking posses- 
sion of Constantinople. The Turkish army had proved itself so 
little able to resist tlie Russians that it presumably could not have 
withstood the last decisive blow. Now it appears that the Russian 
government counted on Turkey's military weakness remaining per- 
manent, and therefore regarded the establishment of a virtual pro- 
tectorate over the Balkans as more desirable than an occupation of 
the Turkish capital, since this would naturally have led to serious 
diplomatic complications. Therefore, she stipulated for herself in 
the Treaty of Adrianople the right of free navigation of the Black 
Sea and passage through the Dardanelles, but abstained from de- 
manding military guarantees. Count Nesselrode, who at that time 
guided Russian foreign policy, declared that such an arrangement 
better suited Russian interests than excessive conquests or the cre- 
ation of independent states out of former Turkish territory. 

If Russian ministers really thought this, they were certainly fun- 
damentally mistaken. Already, in 1826, the Turkish Government 
had begun systematically to reform its antiquated army. The Jani- 
zary Corps, which had formerly won such great victories simply 
because it was the only standing army, but which had long since' 
become out of date and undisciplined, was abolished (i.e., massacred). 
From the two military powers who had steadily sided with Turkey 
during the Greek War — Austria and Prussia — the Turkish author- 
ities imported experts to train a new Turkish infantry. And this 
reform did not simply remain on paper like pretty nearly every 
other effort to modernize Turkey. After a few years the Ottoman 
Government possessed an army which could cope with the well- 
drilled and well-equipped armies of Europe. Thus the Greek War 
of Independence started "the Balkan Question," and at the same 
time considerably strengthened the Power which naturally would offer 
the most determined resistance to the emancipation of the peoples 
of the Balkans. 



CHAPTER X 

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 

In contrast to these two movements where the Principle of Conserva- 
tism failed to prevail, stand two other movements in which the 
Alliance of the Great Powers did succeed in enforcing their legit- 
imist demands. It is certainly more than a mere accident that in 
both these cases only military operations on land had to be em- 
ployed against the offending states; no negative interference by 
British sea power, therefore, took place. 

The first of these interventions was directed against the liberal 
movement in Italy. 

In scarcely any other country at that time were conditions so 
complex as in Italy, where the conflict between the existing situa- 
tion and the Principles of the Revolution cannot be reduced to a 
simple formula. The contradictory and often overlapping tendencies 
must, therefore, be explained somewhat more in detail. 

Nowhere outside France had the French revolutionary principles 
of equality (see ch. iv) been so completely put into effect as in 
the Italian states. Even before the Revolution in France, various 
Italian governments had initiated social and political reforms ad- 
vocated by Enlightenment, and, even where this had not been the 
case, the French armies of occupation under Napoleon had assisted 
the triumph of French laws. The Code Napoleon had been intro- 
duced, the ecclesiastical foundations suppressed, and a modern sys- 
tem of taxation put into effect with equal rights for all classes. In 
1 815, even in cases where there was a decisive wish to restore the 
old feudal conditions, the financial changes had been too thorough- 
going for their complete restoration. Moreover, it was not in the 
interest of the monarchical governments to revive the old exemptions 
from taxation and the other special prerogatives of noble families. 
The only exception was the States of the Church whose ecclesiastical 
government naturally involved preferential treatment of clergy; but 
even here the economic basis of the Old Regime could not be com- 
pletely restored. 

In Italy, therefore, the struggle against existing conditions was 
not directed, except in certain cases, against class privileges. The 

44 



THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 45 

aim of the revolutionists was rather to put an end to oppression in 
the intellectual field which the Restoration of 181 5 had established. 

Certainly nowhere else was the contrast between the existing con- 
ditions and those of the French occupation, or even of the preceding 
period, so great as in Italy, in all matters connected with the 
Church and theology. There were countries in which the belief 
that political absolutism was bound up with the suppression of re- 
ligious enlightenment (see ch. v) was as deeply rooted as in Italy; 
but nowhere were governments so strongly influenced in their actions 
by this belief as in the case of the great majority of the Italian 
states and provinces of that time. Possibly, just because "enlight- 
ened ideas" had spread so widely among the upper classes, the 
political authorities were especially concerned to see to it that revo- 
lutionary religious views were not made an opening wedge for liberal 
agitation in the field of politics. This was also the only field in 
which one can speak of a regular restoration — a restoration of 
seventeenth rather than of eighteenth century conditions. Although 
the reintroduction of primogeniture was scarcely considered, many 
of the governments undertook a restoration of the monasteries, with- 
out, however, being able to give them back their former rich pos- 
sessions. Almost everywhere education was put under the control 
of the clergy. The censorship of books was reintroduced. In Rome 
even the Inquisition was set up again. Every independent intel- 
lectual movement was regarded with distrust. 

The opposition which arose to this regime, particularly in a part 
of the city bourgeoisie, now connected itself in a peculiar way with 
national and to some extent anti-papal tendencies. 

The connection between the principles of liberty and nationality is 
easy enough to understand. The only period in which Italy had nomi- 
nally, at least, formed a single united national state (the Napoleonic 
period) had been, at the same time, a period of religious freedom and 
government by laymen instead of clergy; even if Italians disregarded 
this fact, they would have seen in the conditions after 181 5 that there 
existed a close inner connection between the two principles. For 
the foreign state, which now controlled directly or indirectly the 
Italian princes, and which alone afforded them the power to carry 
through the principles of ecclesiastical restoration, was at the same 
time the state which was most obstinately opposed to the idea of 
Italian nationality. Austria, because of her own internal political 
interests, was compelled more than any other Great Power to fight 
against the movement for political revolution. Austria, likewise, un- 
less she wished to lose her Italian provinces (the "Lombardo- 



46 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

Venetian Kingdom"), must set herself decisively against the Italian 
national movement. Italians, therefore, who wanted to do away 
with "priest rule" naturally also had to insist on the expulsion of 
the Austrians and of the governments which were dependent on 
Austria. 

Still more complicated were the conditions in another connection. 
What should be the attitude of the Italian national movement to- 
ward the ruler of the Papal States? The Papacy, in its organiza- 
tion at that time, was indeed the "enemy of all progress," — the 
natural opponent of all efforts which aimed at modern government 
by laymen instead of by priests, and, if possible, at constitutional 
forms. But must this be always the case? Was it not conceivable 
that a pope with modern views, who regarded himself as much an 
Italian as an ecclesiastical ruler, might make concessions to the 
political and social principles of the revolution so far as they did 
not threaten theological dogma? And if this should happen, would 
it not be a much better solution than a Utopian effort to bring 
about Italian unity in opposition to the pope? Would not an 
undertaking which was bound to meet with the opposition of all 
faithful Catholics rest on an insecure basis, and necessarily involve 
consequences of a serious moral nature? 

It was quite natural that Italian patriots gave different answers 
to these questions. Many of them, especially those whose feelings 
were not satisfied with the ordinary program of Enlightenment, 
inclined to admit the possibility of reforming the States of the 
Church. This was all the more natural, inasmuch as this idea could 
not be contradicted by the facts of experience. Such an attempt 
had never been made; never had a pope ascended the throne of 
St. Peter who could be regarded as holding modern ideas. 

But although the problem did not present itself at that time so 
sharply as half a century later, nevertheless it already existed, and 
the historian can say of that period that a resolute champion of 
intellectual freedom in Italy should not have hesitated to oppose 
also the Temporal Power of the Papacy. 

At any rate, all the currents of the Italian movement for liberty 
concentrated in an attack on the Church and its privileges. Abso- 
lutism itself was objectionable, primarily because it was inclined to 
support or to protect the claims of the Church. This attitude of 
the liberals was also strengthened by the fact that modern industry 
had as yet found scarcely any entrance into Italy; even the great 
factories which did exist were, for the most part, in the hands of 
foreigners. Although the absolutistic governments were so patri- 



THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 47 

archal and unsatisfactory, they nevertheless did not stand in sharp 
contradiction with economic life, and they did not have to protect 
themselves against a rich and powerful bourgeoisie. 

This statement is true chiefly for the first decades after 181 5. 
The insurrections which took place at that time were due more to 
the anxieties of the moment than to the assertion of principles. 
The first revolutions are particularly interesting because they show 
how insecure was the rule of native princes who could find support 
neither from their nobility nor from their troops; and also because 
it shows how a change in the situation could only be brought about 
through a combined attack on the power of Austria. 

Before further details are given, it may be recalled to memory 
that the territories which made up the geographical expression of 
Italy at that time fell into three groups. The first comprised the 
provinces of Milan and Venetia, the so-called "Lombardo- Venetian 
Kingdom," which was immediately under Austrian rule. The second 
group was made up of the middle-sized and smaller states which 
were ruled by relatives of the Austrian Emperor (Tuscany, Parma, 
Modena) ; to these also must be added diminutive Lucca, ruled by 
a Bourbon prince but united with Tuscany in 1847. Finally there 
were the three relatively indqjendent middle-sized states — Sardinia 
(Piedmont, Savoy, and the Island of Sardinia), the States of the 
Church, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily). 
Not only was Italy split up, but there was no single power in 
the whole peninsula which could in any way stand up as a military 
power against Austria; the Kingdom of Sardinia, which possessed 
the strongest army, had purposely been given unfavorable frontiers 
so that it could not undertake any successful attack upon the ter- 
ritory of Milan. 

It has been pointed out that in 181 5 there did not exist anywhere 
in Italy a powerful opposition party. The liberal bourgeoisie, to 
be sure, rather disapproved the friendliness of the governments 
toward the Church; but their opposition was not important. Much 
more dangerous for the moment were the army officers. The period 
of peace which followed the Napoleonic wars had naturally deprived 
the growing numbers of this class of opportunities to advance; in 
many states, also, preference had been given to officers of noble 
birth, while those who had served under the Napoleonic princes had 
been dismissed or neglected. The officers of the Napoleonic army 
therefore leagued themselves with the liberal bourgeoisie. Since 
there was neither parliamentary life nor freedom of the press their 
joint efforts could take no other form than that of secret societies. 



48 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

The most important of these was the "Carbonari," a society which 
took its name from the "charcoal burners" of Calabria and spread 
from Naples to the other Italian states. Since they had no legal 
means of changing the absolutistic form of government, these so- 
cieties naturally resorted to revolutionary weapons. 

The first impulse to revolt came from events in Spain, of which 
a more detailed account will be given in the next chapter. The suc- 
cess of the Spanish generals who took to politics fired the zeal of 
their Italian colleagues, particularly in the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies, which was closely connected with Spain. Scarcely had the 
revolution in Spain triumphed with a single victory when the Nea- 
politan army rose, demanding a constitution — in fact the very same 
Spanish Constitution of 1812 which had just been put into force in 
Spain. The king was powerless before the insurrection. The Spanish 
Constitution was introduced (July 7, 1820), and sworn to by the 
Neapolitan monarch. The Carbonari took the government in hand. 
Even the Island of Sicily dared offer no resistance, although it 
feared that the centralizing plans of the political reformers would 
put an end to its own special privileges. 

But these revolutionary successes stood in too strong contradic- 
tion to the Conservative Principles of the Allied Powers for the new 
regime in Naples to be permanent. The Congress of Troppau, one 
of the international assemblages which was to fix the common policy 
of the Allies, discussed the question whether it was not their duty 
to restore order by military intervention. But in this case, also, the 
Great Powers were not united. England on this occasion also was 
opposed to interference; Russia and France proposed a middle 
course. But the conditions in this Neapolitan case were much less 
favorable for the revolutionists than those which have already been 
described in the case of South America and Greece. The Power 
which had the greatest selfish interest in upholding Conservative 
Principles was also the Power which was most keenly interested in 
defending the old conditions in Italy; it was also the Power which 
was best situated to make a military intervention. The Austrian 
government succeeded in calling attention to the fact that the 
Spanish Constitution introduced in Naples contained ultra-liberal 
principles which went even beyond the French constitution of that 
day; and so Austria persuaded the two Western Powers (Great 
Britain and France) to consent at least to action on her part. She 
had a still greater success from the fact that the Tsar finally gave his 
direct approval to the principle of intervention. It was at this time 
that the three Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) sub- 



THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 49 

scribed a declaration which contemplated the application of force 
against states which were guilty of illegal reforms. As a preliminary- 
step, the king of Naples and the other Italian princes as well, were 
invited to present themselves at the Congress of the Great Powers 
(which had removed to Laibach). 

King Ferdinand of Naples accordingly came to Laibach and begged 
the Congress to restore the Old Regime. His request was granted. 
Austria received tlie mandate to carry out its execution, the decree 
being signed by the ambassadors of the other Italian Powers with 
the exception of the Pope. 

This sealed the fate of the Neapolitan revolution. The revolu- 
tionary troops offered practically no resistance to the fifty thousand 
Austrian soldiers, and within a short time the whole kingdom was 
occupied by Austrians (March 21, 182 1). There followed not only 
the abolition of the revolutionary constitution and the complete res- 
toration of absolutism, but a systematic persecution of all the par- 
ticipants in the revolt, as well as of the Carbonari in general ; count- 
less persons were condemned to death, to the galleys, or to banish- 
ment. The king created a new army; and in order that he might 
not again be dependent on the favor of his officers, he signed in 
1826 a military agreement with the Swiss for thirty years, taking 
four Swiss regiments into his service. 

Not very different was the outcome of the military revolt in 
Piedmont. 

In the Kingdom of Sardinia the government had proceeded more 
energetically than anywhere else in Italy with the Restoration, or 
to speak more correctly, with the reversal of the laicizing reforms 
which had taken place during the period of French occupation. The 
government did not hesitate at the most unreasonable acts: the 
Botanical Garden in Turin was destroyed because it had been planted 
by the French; the use of beautiful avenues was forbidden because 
they had been constructed at Napoleon's command; and there were 
many other measures of the same kind. In the army the older pre- 
Napoleonic tactics were reintroduced; officers who had served under 
Napoleon were dismissed; and, in general, in appointments prefer- 
ence was again given to persons of noble birth. 

In one point, however, the opposition of the army officers in 
Piedmont differed at the outset from that in Naples. In the rela- 
tively large and richly endowed Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the 
officers had contemplated at first only a reform of their own part of 
Italy; but in the small and less fruitful Sardinian Kingdom, where 
the nobility mostly lived in needy circumstances, the revolutionists 



50 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

had from the outset looked forward to the extension of the rule of 
Savoy over the whole of Italy. Their aspirations could be fulfilled 
only if Savoyard officers and politicians had a greater field of ac- 
tivity than was afforded to them by their own poor country. There 
was also the further consideration that the Sardinian dynasty was 
the only one of pure Italian descent and was therefore best fitted 
to stand at the head of a national Italian state. 

When, therefore, in the year 182 1 (almost a year later than the 
Neapolitan revolt), a military insurrection broke out at Alessandria 
in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the rebels not only proclaimed the 
Spanish Constitution like their brothers in the south, but they also 
adopted the Italian colors (green, white and red), and proclaimed 
the restoration of an Italian kingdom which should embrace the 
whole nation. King and country should be freed from the Austrians, 
and comrades in Naples protected from oppression. 

The revolution in Piedmont, which had many adherents among 
the students, was also successful at first, so far as Piedmont was 
concerned. The king, Victor Emmanuel I, abdicated, appointed as 
his successor his brother, Charles Felix, who was living at Modena, 
and transferred the regency temporarily to a liberal-minded rela- 
tive, the Prince of Carignano. But here, also, the Conservative 
Alliance of the Great Powers interfered. The new king himself, 
who was in no personal danger, called for help. His call did not 
fall on deaf ears. Both Austria and Russia at once declared in 
favor of military intervention. This sealed the fate of the revolu- 
tion. The army of liberals which had attempted to strike eastward 
was easily crushed by the Austrians at Novara, and there followed, 
as in the case of Naples, a restoration with a systematic persecu- 
tion of those guilty of revolt. In only one point did Austria fail 
to secure her demands. France refused to have the guilty Prince 
of Carignano, the presumptive heir to the throne after the childless 
king, Charles Felix, excluded from his rights of succession, because 
otherwise the Hapsburg Duke of Modena (a son-in-law of King 
Victor Emmanuel I) would have become King of Sardinia; that is. 
Piedmont also would have been subjected to Austrian authority. 
However, Metternich knew how to bring it about that the guilty 
prince was compelled to take part in the French expedition to Spain 
(see the following chapter) in order to atone for his liberal princi- 
ples; he was also forced to promise that he would never grant 
his people a constitution. 

In the parts of Italy directly dependent on Austria the isolated 
revolutionary movements had no success at all, as in the case of the 



THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 51 

conspiracy of several young liberals in Milan in 1820 — famous be- 
cause one of the prisoners, the young Piedmontese, Silvio Pellico, 
described his sufferings in an Austrian fortress, the Spielberg, at 
Briinn, in a book which breathed the noblest spirit of gentleness and 
which soon became extraordinarily popular. In Modena a number 
of notable people were arrested who had entered into relations with 
the Neapolitan revolutionists. 

In Italy the Conservative Alliance had triumphed completely in 
its policy of intervention. On the other hand, it had become clear 
to every one that a liberal reform in Italy could be accomplished 
only by the expulsion of the Austrians and the princes dependent 
on them. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 

In Italy, as has been pointed out, some of the principles of the 
French Revolution had already been put into practice in the course 
of the eighteenth century, and others had been introduced during 
the period of French occupation, and could not be completely nulli- 
fied. So the Restoration in Italy resulted less in a change in eco- 
nomic conditions than in a revival of the power of the clergy, which 
limited intellectual freedom on every hand. In Italy the Revolu- 
tionary movement was primarily anti-clerical and nationalistic. 
Quite different were the conditions in Spain. 

In Spain French rule had lasted too short a time to introduce 
legal equality, the secularization of church lands, and other reforms, 
to the same extent as in Italy. Furthermore, less had been done 
by the Old Regime in Spain than in the case of Italy to prepare 
the way for change. 

Even in Spain, however, the Enlightened Despotism of the 
eighteenth century had made some attempts to improve the worst 
conditions, that is, those which were most harmful from an eco- 
nomic point of view. The system of primogeniture had been some- 
what limited (primogeniture in Spain had previously been extended 
to large classes which elsewhere in Europe would have been regarded 
as belonging to the bourgeoisie; it had also been considerably favored 
by the contempt in which all manual labor was held — one of the 
results of the period when Jews and Moors did all the manual work). 
But the result of this eighteenth century reform had been very 
slight. To be sure, many of the larger landed estates which had 
been kept together by primogeniture had disappeared, and the very 
large ones had been somewhat reduced in size; but in Andalusia, 
the rich southern part of Spain and the source of Spanish wealth, 
large landed estates still prevailed everywhere. The land-owners 
were, practically without exception, absentee landlords. They had 
their estates worked by poorly paid day laborers and were unable 
to raise the capital necessary to improve the soil and the methods 
of cultivation. Good means of communication, especially canals 

52 



THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 53 

which are an absolute necessity where there are few good rivers, 
technical education, model factories, — all these were lacking. In 
addition to all this the government, following ancient Castilian tra- 
dition, favored cattle-raising at the expense of agriculture, so that 
the cultivation of the soil was faced with extraordinary difficulties. 
The industries were altogether insignificant. 

All these obstacles to the development of the natural resources 
of the country became the more oppressive as the population grew. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century the population appears 
to have increased rapidly and the means of livelihood (such as 
serving as mercenary soldiers or settling in America) were no longer 
considerable. The revolt of the American colonies (see ch. viii) 
brought the first decisive blow to the Old Regime. That destroyed 
the very foundation of the government revenues. It struck the 
government at the moment when it had to provide for extraordinary 
expenditures. The revenues of the old system would indeed scarcely 
have sufficed for the war against Napoleon ; and now the main source 
of revenue, which had come from the possession of the American 
colonies, was drying up. It is no wonder that the Spanish govern- 
ment, in spite of its dislike of French institutions, seriously began 
to ponder whether it should not lay taxes on the nobility and clergy. 

But here a special difficulty arose from the attitude of the popu- 
lation in the matter of religion. 

Legal equality, or to put it more accurately, the abolition of 
exemption from taxation, could not be carried through without dis- 
turbing the privileges of the clergy. It was impossible to reform 
the finances of the state unless the clergy gave up a part of their 
possessions. For the enlightened politicians of the French Revolu- 
tion this consideration had been no obstacle; but, while even in 
France the secularization of church property had not been exactly 
popular, in Spain any government which attacked the rights of the 
Church would at least have to reckon on the passive resistance of 
the population from the very outset. To put it differently: no reform 
of the Spanish government could take place except in opposition to 
the will of the mass of the people, particularly of the ignorant popu- 
lation in the country. Persons who would help toward modernizing 
conditions — the representatives of the city bourgeoisie and intellec- 
tual classes — formed only a numerically' small fraction of the people. 
This unfortunate situation was offset only by the fact that the great 
mass of those who had conservative ideas were neither organized 
politically nor even, under normal conditions, interested in politics 
at all. They let their opponents do as they wished, or at least could 



54 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

not overthrow them unless aided by extraordinary circumstances. 
So the battle was always fought out between merely small groups; 
and the governing group at elections always won a majority. 

Only in one respect did conditions in Spain resemble those in Italy. 
The Napoleonic Wars had created a large body of officers who were 
regarded with an unfriendly eye by the government, and who there- 
fore joined the malcontents among the liberal civilians. This opposition 
became chronic, because the government lacked the money adequately 
to pay the troops. The kingdom was therefore constantly placed 
before a dilemma: either the government followed its natural inclina- 
tion and clung as tightly as possible to the Old Regime, in which 
case it lacked money to meet the claims of the insurgent officers; 
or, on the other hand, it sought to raise new revenues, in which case 
it was forced to interfere with traditional arrangements. The result 
was what might have been expected: one compromise followed 
another; wide-reaching reforms were decreed which were nullified 
by rebellion, or only partially enforced; there were ineffective hesi- 
tating attempts at modernization instead of a real radical change. 

One other point must be explained to show the difference between 
Spain and the other countries. The national movement, which else- 
where, as in Italy for instance, was closely connected with liberalism, 
was in Spain generally favorable to conservative principles. Aside 
from the fact that the dominant position of the Church seemed to 
the Spaniard a national Spanish characteristic, which had been un- 
justly abandoned by "Frenchifiers" in favor of modern "foreign" 
institutions, the Old Regime seemed to represent national unity and 
absolutistic centralization. Regionalism, that is, the possibility that 
separate regions or provinces might introduce revolutionary reforms 
which the central government could not approve, became therefore 
in Spain a demand made by the Liberals rather than by their 
"servile" opponents. 

Spanish intellectuals had taken advantage of the absence of the 
king and the anarchy of the Napoleonic Wars to put into effect an 
ultra-liberal constitution — the Constitution of 1812, which had been 
accepted by the Cortes at Cadiz. But this Constitution, which 
abolished feudalism and the Inquisition, had been set aside at once 
by the king, Ferdinand VII, after he returned from the exile in which 
Napoleon had kept him. Even the Inquisition was reintroduced, 
and liberal patriots were persecuted in the severest fashion. The 
nobility, the clergy, and the masses of the people, however, remained 
loyal to absolutism; but the soldiery and the officers who had once 



THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 55 

supported the king against the French now began to go over to 
the opposition. 

The first of the insurrections which showed this union between 
officers and liberals took place in 1820. The troops were assembled 
in Cadiz for embarkation to America to suppress the revolting 
colonies. But the soldiers were badly paid and discontented. A 
young officer, named Riego, stirred them up to revolt, and at the 
same time proclaimed the Constitution of 181 2. This was the first 
of the so-called "pronunciamentos" (a Spanish word which may be 
translated by "proclamations"). It was the first time that revolting 
officers had aimed not merely at satisfying personal claims, but at 
bringing about a general political revolution. 

The insurrection at once found a following in the two groups 
which we have indicated as supporters of the reform movement in 
Spain: the army and the intellectuals of several of the larger pro- 
vincial towns, particularly in Aragon and Galicia; Corunna, Ferrol, 
Saragossa, and Barcelona declared in favor of the Constitution, and 
the troops which had been sent by the government against Riego 
went over to the side of the insurgents. The king was as helpless 
as his brother monarchs in Naples and Turin shortly afterwards. 
He therefore yielded everything which was asked of him, declared 
himself ready to accept the Constitution, and summoned the Cortes 
(March 7, 1820). The Inquisition was abolished and the pro- 
French liberals called back from exile. 

The Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers was at first unable 
to intervene. The Austrians first had to suppress the revolution in 
Italy. There were also practical difficulties in the way of direct 
military intervention in Spain. Yet the danger was great. Under 
the pressure of Spanish example, Portugal also had introduced a 
liberal constitution. The Spanish king sent a pressing call for help 
to the Alliance and all his clergy rose up against the liberal innova- 
tions. In Catalonia an "Apostolic Army" was formed, which ap- 
pealed to the people to free the king from the hands of rebellious 
unbelievers. 

At this moment the Allies succeeded in winning the cooperation 
of the French government, though not exactly of France herself; for 
France herself had nothing to win through intervention in Spain, 
and the majority of the French people were decidedly opposed to 
supporting the Spanish priesthood. But the Bourbon dynasty was 
allured by two advantages which might come from intervening in 
Spain: it might rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Conservative 



36 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

Great Powers, who still distrusted France as the mother of revolu- 
tions; and it might increase its military prestige, because if its inter- 
vention was successful, it could point out that it had succeeded 
where Napoleon had failed. 

Accordingly, the French government proposed to the Conservative 
Great Powers, at the Congress of Verona in October, 1822, that a 
French expedition should be sent to Spain to overthrow the revo- 
lutionary government there. The Congress naturally accepted the 
proposal with alacrity. 

The expedition was scarcely more than a military promenade. 
Whereas Napoleon had had to fight against the fanaticism of the 
masses and also against many liberal patriots, now the "Apostolic 
Army" and a great part of the population stood on the side of the 
French. The revolutionary government, which had been unable to 
reform the political system during its brief period of control, and 
which had at its disposal neither money nor troops, was unable to 
organize any defense; without striking a blow, it left the capital in 
company with the king and fled to Cadiz. Here occurred the only 
real military event of the campaign. The revolutionists tried to 
make a stand behind the fortifications of the city; but after a siege 
of three months, when Fort Trocadero, which overlooked Cadiz, had 
been taken by the French (August 31, 1823), there was no alterna- 
tive but capitulation. The Old Regime was again restored. 

There followed a bloody persecution of the insurgents just as in 
Italy, only in a still more brutal fashion. Riego was hanged, and 
many hundred others were beheaded or tortured. 

The Holy Alliance had triumphed. But even in Spain the old 
system could not be completely revived; the Inquisition, for instance, 
was not restored (although "committees of faith" took its place). 
Moreover, as has been already noted, the American colonies were 
definitely lost during the unrest of these last years. This deprived 
Spain of the means, not only of taking her place as a Great Power, 
but also of carrying out effective economic reforms after the fashion 
of the Enlightened Despots. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 
IN FRANCE 

Nowhere is the expression "Restoration" so misleading as in the 
case of France. Nowhere else was there so slight a revival of the 
old system. It is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of 
the dynasty and some unimportant regulations, nothing was rein- 
troduced which specially belonged to the Old Regime. To such an 
extent was this the case that most of the conflicts during the Res- 
toration period in France arose from the very fact that certain groups 
wanted to impose on new France various institutions derived from 
the old monarchy. 

The innovations which distinguished the political and social struc- 
ture of France in 1815 from France prior to 1789 fall into two groups. 

The more important group comprises the changes which were the 
result of the real Revolution. This includes, above all, the intro- 
duction of equality in the division of inheritances, with a rigorous 
insistence on the lawful portion which must be left to each heir ; the 
abolition of primogeniture and of the large landed estates which went 
with it; the secularization of the great Church property (there were 
no longer any rich prelates; the Church was "democratized" finan- 
cially and socially) ; and civil equality, that is, the abolition of 
exemption from taxation and the setting aside of all the privileges 
which had restricted to members of definite classes all admission to 
the higher offices in the army and the government. 

The second group of innovations dates chiefly from the time of 
Napoleon. At the time of the Consulate there had been introduced 
a strictly centralized system of administration which was in part 
simply a continuation of the methods of the Old Regime; this cen- 
tralization left scarcely any local self-government in existence and 
gave to the possessor of supreme power an enormous influence in all 
the details of local administration. 

Both groups of innovations were taken over by the restored 
Bourbon dynasty completely, the second group, in fact, with secret 
approval. The significance of these arrangements will be evident 

57 



58 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

only if they are considered in connection with the social structiire 
of the France of that day. 

The secularization of Church lands and the sale of the posses- 
sions of the dmigres had brought a considerable part of the former 
large landed estates into the hands of free peasants, and thus greatly 
favored the intensive cultivation of the soil. Now, for the first time, 
the productivity of the land could be completely exploited. Although 
Napoleon had stimulated the manufacture of articles of luxury and 
export, still, manufacturing on a large scale had remained relatively 
sUght and could not be at all compared with the English factory 
system. Tillage, viticulture, horticulture, the raising of olives and 
sugar, — in fact agriculture was everywhere the rule, both on the 
small farms and on the great estates. Growers of grain could count 
on a minimum price for their products, thanks to an official sliding- 
scale, which increased the tax on imported cereals when grain at 
home was cheap; grain-growing, therefore, like manufacturing, in 
addition to natural advantages, enjoyed the protection of the state. 

The difference between France and England is seen particularly 
in the fact that France still considerably surpassed her neighbor 
beyond the Channel in the matter of population. In 1815, France 
had about 28 million inhabitants. Great Britain about 18 million. 
The United Kingdom was, therefore, not much more densely popu- 
lated than France, but since many parts of Great Britain did not 
enjoy the same richness and variety of products as France, and since 
there was no opportunity for the development of a large body of 
small peasant proprietors, the English economic system tended to- 
ward manufacturing and the French toward an increase of the 
peasantry. In fact, if contemporary evidence is not mistaken, owing 
to the fact that the available land was still not completely exploited, 
the French peasants were leaving a larger number of descendants 
than in the last years of the Old Regime. 

These conditions were largely reflected in the constitution pro- 
claimed in June, 1814. The right to elect members to the Chamber 
of Deputies became a privilege of the rich. To be an elector one 
must pay at least three hundred francs in direct taxes; to be 
eligible for election, a thousand francs; but there were no qualifica- 
tions depending on birth or the exercise of a trade, and also no dis- 
tinction was made between the new wealthy classes of the Revolu- 
tionary and Napoleonic age and the nobility of the Old Regime. The 
members of the Chamber of Peers, or Upper House, were, to be sure, 
all appointed by the king, but he was not limited in any way in his 
choice. The legislature therefore represented the wealthy classes, 



CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 59 

primarily the large landowners^ but it also included many distin- 
guished persons of the Napoleonic period who upheld the spirit of 
the imperial system of administration. The executive power lay 
wholly in the hands of the king. 

This government would have run almost without friction, except 
for certain obstacles in its way. First, there was the question of 
the imigrSs. The members of the old nobility, who had lost their 
property through leaving France during the Revolution, desired com- 
pensation for their loyalty to the dynasty. But since every change 
in property relations would have incurred the passionate opposition 
of the whole nation, the mere suspicion that the monarchy favored 
this desire would have been very dangerous to itself. The second 
question was the religious one. In France a part of the royalists 
were as convinced as the members of their class in other countries 
that the only sure support of government by conservatives and nobles 
lay in a strengthening of the influence of the Church ; this threatened 
a sharp limitation of freedom of thought, which naturally drove the 
intellectuals into the arms of the Opposition. 

In view of this situation a great deal depended on the attitude of 
the king. If he acted in unison with the great majority of property 
owners and was careful to keep the constitution as it was, he could 
be certain of the support of most of the influential elements in the 
country. The great mass of the bourgeoisie and most officials were 
on his side. On the other hand, if he did as the "Ultras," or extreme 
royalists, wished, and carried out a real Restoration beyond the 
terms of the constitution by a partial revival of the privileges of 
large landowners and clergy, he would have met not only the oppo- 
sition of the liberal bourgeoisie, but also of the small peasant 
proprietors ; the latter were shut out from active political life, but they 
did not want the new property relations in any way disturbed. The 
proletariat was scarcely to be considered. The number of factory 
employees was still small; furthermore, this class possessed neither 
the training, the wealth, nor the ability to assert itself independ- 
ently. 

The internal conflict in France was further sharpened by the atti- 
tude of the Foreign Powers. 

France had to atone for the collapse of the Napoleonic system 
by a partial loss of sovereignty. Not only was she compelled to give 
up a considerable territory and to pay what was for those days a 
large war indemnity (700,000,000 francs in five years), but she had 
to permit the Great Powers to maintain an army of occupation of 
150,000 men until this sum was paid. She was oppressed even more 



6o RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

severely in some respects by the political distrust with which she 
was regarded abroad. As we have often said, France was looked 
upon by the Conservative Powers as the real home of all revolu- 
tionary tendencies and her political doings must be constantly super- 
vised. Only after a considerable period of probation did the Allies 
allow her to join their circle. 

One would be altogether mistaken, however, in thinking that this 
supervision meant that the Great Powers were ready to support 
every action of the French king or every demand of the royalist 
Ultras. Rather was the contrary the case. The Great Powers, and 
particularly the leaders of Russian policy, realized that a restoration 
of the Old Regime was impossible in France. They saw that some 
concessions must be made to liberal demands and they contented 
themselves with satisfying the principle of legitimacy by establishing 
the old dynasty. They wished rather the stability of the new gov- 
ernment than a reaction which would have caused new conflicts and 
so strengthened the revolutionary movement. To be sure, the estab- 
lishment in France of the Bourbon line, which had come to be re- 
garded by Frenchmen as a foreign dynasty, was primarily their work 
and they felt a joint responsibility for its defense. But for this very 
reason they did not wish the French king to identify himself with 
the plans of the Ultras. 

On the contrary, France was expected to prove to the world that 
legitimacy and constitutional freedom could go together. The French 
constitution was extraordinarily liberal for those days, — so liberal, 
in fact, that progressives had nothing to prefer to it except the Eng- 
lish constitution, and even this was outmatched by the French so 
far as the complete introduction of legal equality was concerned. 
To be sure, political rights were limited to the wealthy classes, 
the so-called "pays legal" ; but within these classes, which were 
not barred to people from below, considerable rights were given 
to the king's subjects. There existed, for example, the principle of 
the freedom of the press ; in contrast to most of the European states, 
there was no censorship for periodical publications, although the 
compulsory preliminary deposit of a guaranty sum (cautionnement) 
amounting to 200,000 francs for founding a new newspaper limited 
the enjoyment of this right to the well-to-do classes. The army 
was organized on a popular basis. According to the recruiting law 
of 1818, the larger part of the army (200,000 men) was to be formed 
by voluntary enlistment; the remainder (40,000 men) was to be 
chosen by lot. This method of choosing by lot theoretically affected 
all classes; but in as much as it was permitted to provide a substi- 



CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 6i 

tute, the sons of the rich were practically exempted from military 
service. On the other hand, there were no limitations upon advance- 
ment within the army, and promotion was ordinarily secured by 
rising through the lower ranks (in contrast to the Old Regime where 
the higher positions had been simply handed over to the upper 
classes). 

It was a fortunate circumstance for the French monarchy that 
the first king under the Restoration was thoroughly out of sympathy 
with the aims of the extreme royalists. Louis XVIII, a younger 
brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, possessed marked intellectual 
ability, but he was, perhaps for this very reason, quite untouched 
by the romantic movement of his age and was a true representative 
of Enlightenment and its common sense. He had no intention of 
risking his monarchy by a restoration of the lands of the Church 
and the old nobility. In agreement with his leading minister, 
Decazes, a statesman who had already served under Napoleon and 
who was entrusted by the phlegmatic king with the practical direc- 
tion of affairs, Louis XVIII did not struggle against the Revolution 
during the first years, when the reaction against the Napoleonic age 
was most pronounced among the rich classes; on the contrary, his 
struggle was with the party of the extreme right which controlled 
tlie Chamber of Deputies (the so-called Chambre Introuvable, "a 
Chamber the like of which one would not find again," according to 
the king's own expression). This was the time there arose the ex- 
pression, "Pliis royaliste que le roi." But on the whole, the king, 
with the support of the moderate royalists or "doctrinaires," was suc- 
cessful in his resistance to the Ultras. In vain did the Chamber of 
Deputies give the government unlimited authority to prosecute those 
who had been guilty of taking part in the "Hundred Days"; Decazes 
made only a very limited use of this authority. Napoleon's Concordat 
with the Pope remained in force, although strongly opposed by some 
of the extreme royalists. The lands of the clergy were not restored. 
The state kept control over education. The only concession to the 
Ultras was the abolition of divorce. 

It soon appeared that in all this the government was backed by 
a majority not only of the country people, but also of the propertied 
classes. The new Chamber of Deputies, elected in 1816, had a ma- 
jority of "doctrinaires." 

The Chamber was moderately royalist, but it was not "inde- 
pendent," as the republican party of that day expressed it. So long 
as no changes were made in property relations for the benefit of 
the emigres there was nothing to hinder some concessions desired 



62 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

by the large landowners. The most important measure of this kind 
was the attempt to recreate a regular new nobility out of the class 
of landowners both old and new. This took the approved form of 
primogeniture. In connection with a Napoleonic decree of 1808 an 
ordinance of 181 7 ordered that no one could be appointed a member 
of the Chamber of Peers, which contained both life members and 
hereditary members, unless he had introduced primogeniture into 
the whole or a part of his estate. To be a "duke" one must have 
an estate with an income of 30,000 francs; to be a "marquis" or a 
"count," one of 20,000 francs; to be a "viscount" or a "baron," 
one of 10,000 francs. An exception was made in favor of the clerical 
members of the Upper House. This attempt to create a new heredi- 
tary nobility met with great approbation; up to the Revolution of 
1830, primogeniture was introduced into no less than 440 landed 
estates in France, On the other hand, the proposal of the Ultras in 
the "Chambre Introuvable" that the electoral qualification be re- 
duced to the payment of 50 francs in taxes was not passed; this 
proposal rested on the idea that in elections the members of the old 
nobility could count upon the votes of their peasants. 

Public order was now so quickly restored that the allied troops 
were able to leave France in the autumn of 181 8. To be sure, the 
Conservative Great Powers retained a distrust of France, and even 
in 1818 did not fail to provide military measures against the possi- 
bility of a new revolution. But at any rate their direct supervision 
had now come to an end. 

This peaceful development was soon broken by an unexpected 
event. It was well known that the moderate attitude of the gov- 
ernment depended on the person of Louis XVIII, and that the child- 
less king's younger brother, the Count of Artois, was devoted to 
romantic tendencies, and was the leader of the Ultras. The assas- 
sination of a member of his family resulted in a change in this mod- 
erate policy even before the change of rulers took place. On Febru- 
ary 13, 1820, the Count's second son, the Duke of Berry, who was 
thought to be the only person who would perpetuate the Bourbon 
line, was murdered in front of the Opera House in Paris by one of 
Napoleon's former soldiers. The murderer declared that he had 
intended to extinguish the dynasty; but some months later a 
posthumous son — the later Count of Chambord, or "Henry V" — 
was born to the murdered duke. Although no connection could be 
proved between the crime and the political activity of the mod- 
erates, nevertheless the Ultras took advantage of the affair to declare 
that their opponents, even including the minister Decazes himself, 



CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 63 

were at least morally responsible for the crime. Louis XVIII now 
gave up his opposition to his brother's party. The extreme royalists 
came into power. They used their power primarily in the spirit of 
those religious and political tendencies which we have described 
above in the chapter on the Panic of the French Revolution (see 
ch. v). With the aid of the Jesuits the government tried to trans- 
form the system of education. The censorship of the press was 
introduced again. A new electoral law gave a "double vote" to the 
large taxpayers (those who paid more than a thousand francs) who 
were almost exclusively large landlords and mostly members of the 
old nobility; in this way some 10,000 to 12,000 large landlords con- 
trolled the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. So, in 182 1, the 
Ultras secured a majority, and the leading minister was no longer 
Decazes but Villele, who had already distinguished himself in 1816 
as a leader of the Ultras, 

It was now possible for the government in 1823 to undertake that 
punitive expedition against the revolution in Spain mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. 

With the accession of the Count of Artois, Louis XVIII's younger 
brother, as Charles X, in 1824, the government was protected against 
the possibility of any opposition from the side of the king. Its re- 
actionary attitude now tended to unite all the parties of the left 
(liberals and radicals) into a single group, so that liberal young men, 
representatives of intellectual idealism, and a part of the bourgeoisie 
joined together in opposition to the new reactionary policy of the 
government. Nevertheless, this group formed only a small fraction 
of the nation and did not incline to revolution by force. It rather 
demanded merely the loyal application of the constitution. Its slogan 
was "The Charter of 1814." Isolated revolutionary outbreaks in 
1822, after the fashion of the Italian Carbonari, were neither suc- 
cessful nor imitated by others. The ultra-royalist Chamber of 1824 
also freed itself from political agitation by extending its own period 
of office to seven years. 

As soon as the new government sought to disturb the conditions 
of legal equality established by the Revolution the liberal opposition 
became stronger. In accordance with the new reactionary spirit, the 
government passed a sacrilege law which, among other things, im- 
posed the death penalty for burglary in a church. Next it was pro- 
posed to realize the old desire of the Ultras that the imigres should 
be given compensation. This was practically identical with the crea- 
tion of a nobility unconditionally devoted to conservative principles. 
The government converted the national debt from a five per-cent to 



64 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

a three per-cent basis, and thus saved for the benefit of emigres 
a capital sum reckoned at nearly a billion francs. French bond- 
. holders were thus indirectly taxed in order that the nobles who had 
once fled from France might have the means of buying landed prop- 
erty again. At the same time, also, equally for the benefit of the 
class of large landowners, a measure was proposed for a further 
limited kind of primogeniture, in addition to the law of 1817 which 
established titles for the owners of large estates: landowners who 
paid at least 300 francs in direct taxes were to be allowed to be- 
queath a double portion of the inheritance to the eldest son. This 
proposal, however, was rejected by the Chamber of Peers, in which 
the officials of the Napoleonic Age retained a majority. The Cham- 
ber of Peers also threw out a "Vandal Bill" imposing a crushing tax 
on books and intended to put an end to the agitation of liberal 
intellectuals. 

So the new government was successful mainly only in its clerical 
measures. The ecclesiastical Congregations increased rapidly and by 
the law of mortmain acquired anew considerable property. Teachers 
were placed under the control of bishops. 

This attitude of the Government drove a part of even the prop- 
ertied classes into opposition. The large manufacturers were dis- 
contented because of the favors shown to the old nobility, and the 
Galileans and liberal bourgeoisie disapproved of the Government's 
religious policy. In vain did the Government believe it could secure 
a favorable turn of public opinion by military successes, therein 
making the mistake which has frequently been made in French his- 
tory. The elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which took place 
soon after the victory at Navarino, resulted in a defeat for the Gov- 
ernment. Under these circumstances it made little difference that 
the Villele cabinet shortly before had tried, just previously in 1827, 
to reduce the unmanageable Upper House to obedience by a creation 
of new peers. No policy remained possible except concession to the 
Liberals, 

Accordingly, as soon as Villele had resigned, some real liberal 
measures were undertaken. The seminaries for priests were placed 
under the Universite, that is, under the state system of education. 
In 1828 eight Jesuit colleges were suppressed (the Jesuits were par- 
ticularly disliked by the Galileans as being an "international re- 
ligious Order"), 

The distrust which the Liberals felt toward the king, however, did 
not disappear so quickly. They gave only lukewarm support to the 
new ministry and it soon had to give way to a cabinet formed by 



CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 65 

Prince Jules de Polignac, one of the king's intimate friends, who was 
even more devoted than he to mystical romantic ideas. 

There arose at once the difficulty of trying to make this ministry 
cooperate with the Liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 
This difficult problem, which is never completely soluble — ^how a 
monarch shall exercise an independent right of appointing his min- 
isters and at the same time respect the wishes of the majority in the 
legislature — now had to be faced in France for the first time since 
1814. The situation was complicated by the fact that the king's 
personal policy was opposed not only by the majority in the legis- 
lature, but also by the great majority of his subjects, so that in case 
of a conflict with the Chamber public opinion would certainly be on 
the side of the legislature. Moreover he could not count with cer- 
tainty on the support of the army which, since the time of the Revo- 
lution, did not represent any definite social class. 

In spite of this, the monarch decided to venture on the struggle. 
"I would rather saw wood than be a king like the King of Eng- 
land," he said. The Opposition carried on a lively campaign in 
favor of a change of government, and when the new elections in the 
summer of 1830 gave them a still more considerable majority than 
in the previous legislature, the king declared that it was his duty not 
to yield "like Louis XVI, who by yielding had been overthrown." 
On July 26, 1830, he published in the official Moniteur four 
ordinances (decrees which were effective without the approval of the 
legislature) : a new electoral law virtually restricted the franchise to 
large landowners; freedom of the press was abolished; the Chamber 
just elected was declared dissolved; and elections were ordered for 
a new Chamber. 

But the Opposition Party also now took up the struggle. The 
fact that the Government had just succeeded in brilliant fashion in 
dislodging the nest of pirates at Algiers (see below, ch. xvi), made 
as little impression as the naval victory at Navarino three years 
earlier. Scarcely had the ordinances appeared when several leaders 
of the Intellectuals of the younger generation, led by the youthful 
writer, Adolphe Thiers (who was to prove himself one of the greatest 
French statesmen in the nineteenth century), issued a proclamation 
in which they urged resistance to the government. They were soon 
joined by other elements in the population — former Carbonari, re- 
publican workmen, and students. Everywhere in Paris barricades 
were thrown up. Here the die was cast. Although the barricades 
afforded some defense, considering the relative inefficiency of the 
cannon and the crookedness of the Paris streets, nevertheless they 



66 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

could not have withstood a serious attack by trained troops. But 
the army, which had no feeling of social solidarity with the ruling 
class of old landlords and which was recruited from all classes, re- 
fused to act, not completely but still in part. From the outset 
individual regiments began to go over to the side of the people and 
the loyal Swiss Guard was driven by the insurgents from the Louvre. 
Soon, on July 29, 1830, there floated from the palace of the Tuileries 
the Tricolor, the flag of the Revolution and the Napoleonic armies, 
which had been replaced at the Restoration by the white banner 
of the Bourbons. In the town hall of Paris a Provisional Government 
was set up. 

The insurrection had not been the work of the Extreme Left; the 
Opposition derived its chief strength from the discontent of the 
bourgeoisie and the industrial and commercial classes as well as 
from the Intellectuals. What they objected to particularly was not 
the Constitution of 18 14, but the fact that the constitution had not 
been loyally observed by the Ultras. The leaders of the revolution 
therefore had no thought of a complete overturn, such as the intro- 
duction of a democratic republic, but only of a "restoration of the 
Charter," with guarantees to prevent its being abused either by 
reactionaries or by radicals. The best way to do this seemed to be 
to allow the monarchy to continue, but to place on the throne a 
regent, who, though half legitimist, would be wholly free from legiti- 
mist ecclesiastical influence. A suitable candidate existed in the 
king's distant cousin, Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. His father, 
known as "Philip Equality," had already during the French Revo- 
lution shown an inclination to new ideas and as a youth had even 
fought in the Republican armies at Jemappes in 1792, In a mani- 
festo signed by Thiers and Mignet, the Duke was proclaimed king 
on July 30: "He will accept the Charter as we have always under- 
stood it and wished it." 

The Duke of Orleans assented at once on July 31. At first, how- 
ever, he did not bear the title of King, only that of Lieutenant 
General, because he wished to wait for his formal election by the 
Chamber, as was necessary. The people quickly decided in his favor. 
Since practically all the leaders supported him strongly there was 
nothing for the little group of Republicans to do except to assent 
also. The legitimist king, Charles X, also quickly perceived that his 
cause was lost. He still tried to preserve appearances by abdicating 
voluntarily and by appointing Louis Philippe as regent for his 
grandson, the nine-year-old Duke of Bordeaux. But the Chamber 
refused to countenance this subterfuge. After revising the consti- 



CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 67 

tution as desired by the Liberal Opposition, it invested Louis Philippe 
with the royal insignia on August 9. The new monarch, who had 
already taken a solemn oath to the Charter, called himself "King 
of the French" instead of "King of France," in order to avoid the 
hated phraseology of the Old Regime. Shortly afterwards Charles X, 
who had already fled to Rambouillet on August i, sailed from Cher- 
bourg and left France forever on August 14. 

Although the July Revolution did not result in changes which can 
in any way be compared with those of the great Revolution of 1789, 
nevertheless it marked as striking a break as possible away from 
the conservative principles which were to have been guaranteed by 
the Holy Alliance. Legitimacy had been rudely disregarded. Al- 
though the new king was as much a Bourbon as the fallen monarch, 
still he possessed no direct claim to the throne. More scandalous 
was the fact that Louis Philippe did not at all owe his elevation to 
the fact that he was a Bourbon, but to the will of the people and to 
a revolution. In the amended Charter that part of the preamble 
was suppressed which spoke of the Charter as "issued by the king"; 
the French people were now to be thought of as issuing the Charter 
and as choosing a prince on the basis of it. France, naturally there- 
fore, withdrew from the Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers. 

In home policies there now took place all the changes which had 
been long demanded by the liberal bourgeoisie. These measures fall 
into two main groups. 

The first group comprises all the regulations which aimed to set 
aside the favors which had been shown to the large landlords of the 
old nobility. The Chamber of Peers, to which a large number 
of royalist landlords had been appointed as a result of the new 
creations during the last years of the Restoration, now lost precisely 
these elements because nearly half the members refused to take the 
oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe ; also they were deprived of their 
hereditary character. In 1835 the creation of new landed estates, 
based on primogeniture, was forbidden, so that the two Chambers 
were no longer differentiated from one another by any class distinc- 
tion ; as a matter of fact, henceforth, it was the Chamber of Deputies 
that enjoyed the whole legislative power. This also was freed more 
completely from the influence of the old noble families. The elec- 
toral qualification was reduced from 300 to 200 francs, and the age 
qualification was reduced for voters from thirty to twenty-five years, 
and for deputies from forty to thirty years. The significance of this 
latter provision lies in the fact that it was the generation which had 
lived through the Revolution which was devoted to reactionary ideas; 



68 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

the admission of the younger generation to political life in itself 
now strengthened the Liberal groups. Finally, the Royal Guards, 
the only troops who were bound by a feeling of solidarity to defend 
the monarch, were disbanded. Their place was taken by the Na- 
tional Guard. To this belonged all taxpayers who could furnish their 
own uniforms. 

This last provision is extraordinarily characteristic; it sums up 
in a word the whole essence of the July Monarchy. The mass of 
the people, those who had no property or only the most necessary 
means of subsistence, were still excluded from any participation in 
political life just as before. But between the propertied bourgeoisie 
and the really rich classes there was no longer any distinction. This 
was seen in the membership of the new government. Here were to 
be found only names of members of the well-to-do classes; the 
proletarian masses were not represented. 

The second group of measures resulting from the July Revolution 
aimed to set aside all those provisions which had their origin in 
religious-political romantic doctrines. By these measures the new 
regime pleased both the Intellectuals and the Liberal bourgeoisie, 
which had a horror of strengthening the economic power of the 
church. In the revised constitution there no longer appeared the 
phrase, "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the state." 
The clergy lost its influence on the government. Freedom of the 
press was proclaimed and freedom of instruction introduced. 

So the classes of the population which had grown economically 
strong as a result of the great Revolution now had political power 
in their hands. 



CHAPTER XIII 

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN THE 

OTHER STATES OF EUROPE RESULTING 

FROM THE JULY REVOLUTION 

(BELGIUM AND POLAND) 

Such a severe blow to legitimist principles naturally was not a mat- 
ter of indifference to the members of the Conservative Alliance. The 
first decisive act of the anti-revolutionary combination had been the 
reestablishment in France of the lawful dynasty, and its chief aim 
had ever been to watch over France to prevent revolution. Now its 
efforts had failed in every respect. The legitimist king of France 
had been put to flight. The Revolution had set up a new ruler and 
France was no longer a member of the Alliance. 

Even this was not all. Among the men who had led the Revolu- 
tion of July, 1830, there were representatives of the old international 
Republican propaganda, for whom the king at first, at least, had to 
show some consideration. There was also the danger that the revo- 
lutionary movement might spread into other states, particularly into 
Italy (as Austria asserted). So when in August of this year the 
Belgians revolted against the King of Holland, as will soon be ex- 
plained, it seemed clear that the French July Revolution had created 
a new source of revolution for all Europe. 

But it was less easy to bring about intervention , in France than 
in Naples or Spain. It was impossible to make use of internal con- 
flicts. The Conservative Great Powers would have had to run the 
risk of a regular war, which none of them really wished, least of 
all Austria, which was so weak financially. There was also the 
further difficulty that Great Britain would, under no circumstances, 
cooperate in intervention. The English government, which had long 
since abandoned in practice the principles of the Holy Alliance, now 
made little difficulty in coming to terms with the new regime in 
France, and on September i, 1830, recognized it officially. Indeed, 
it was even to be feared that England would directly oppose a legit- 
imist punitive expedition against Louis Philippe, because military 
complications would presumably be used by Russia to begin her 
plan of conquest against Turkey, in direct opposition to British in- 



70 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

terests. An equally important blow to possible intervention was 
finally given by the new French king himself. Although Louis 
Philippe had had to make some nominal concessions to the Republi- 
can group, he made it perfectly clear from the outset that personally 
he had no intention of spreading revolutionary principles beyond the 
borders of France, after the fashion of the First French Republic. 
Even within a fortnight after the triumph of the July Revolution, 
in the middle of August, he officially informed the other European 
governments that he had undertaken the task of securing the peace 
of Europe against the horrible devastations of war. The ticklish 
Belgian question, which might have provoked a conflict with Eng- 
land, was at once arranged so that the possibility of a French inva- 
sion and annexation of Belgium seemed out of the question. The 
following years also showed clearly that of all the governments in 
France, this government of the bourgeoisie was the least inclined 
to warlike undertakings. In contrast to the Monarchy of the Resto- 
ration, in contrast also to the Second Empire, the July Monarchy 
never sought to overcome difficulties in home politics by a display of 
military prestige abroad. In accordance with the economic charac- 
ter of the new poUtical system, the liberal bourgeois rulers were in- 
clined to the same aims in both foreign and home politics: peace 
and quiet for work and wealth. 

This did not prevent the July Monarchy, however, from exercis- 
ing a great moral influence in considerable parts of Europe, even 
without the active participation of the responsible members of the 
government. The victory which had been won in Paris over the 
legitimist party and the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy, the 
powerlessness of the Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia and Russia) 
in the face of this breach in the Conservative system — all this nat- 
urally tended everywhere to arouse hope in the "party of movement" 
that in other countries also the restored governments would be un- 
able to withstand strong attack. The success of these insurrections 
varied in proportion to the power which the representatives of the 
Old Regime exercised. In Italy, so far as insurrections took place 
at all, as in the States of the Church, in Parma, and in Modena, the 
revolution collapsed anew through Austria's intervention. Twice 
Austrian troops entered the States of the Church, where the inhabi- 
tants, particularly those in the provinces lying at a distance from 
Rome, had rebelled against the government of the Church and its 
notoriously bad administration. The absolutist rule of the Church 
was restored with slight changes, although the Great Powers had 
sought some reforms, particularly in the matter of finance. In 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 71 

Parma and Modena also Austria restored the governments depend- 
ent on herself. The hopes of the insurgents had turned toward 
France, from whose new policy they thought they could expect sup- 
port; but Louis Philippe, in accord with his whole political attitude, 
refused all aid and contented himself with the formal occupation of 
the papal town of Ancona (1832 to 1838). By this he wanted to 
show that France, without interfering in general in Italian affairs, 
did not regard Italy as the exclusive domain of the Austrian gov- 
ernment. 

More successful were the after effects of the July Revolution in 
Switzerland. Here the privileges of the city bourgeoisie were almost 
everywhere set aside. Also in several small and middle-sized states 
in Germany, princes were compelled by the pressure of political 
demonstrations to grant constitutions. 

The two countries in which the July Revolution had the most de- 
cisive effect, however, were Belgium and Poland. In both these 
places its consequences were of great importance in world history. 

The Kingdom of the Netherlands created by the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, from the standpoint of the European policy of the 
Great Powers, was not without a purpose. The idea had been to 
make the territory at the mouth of the Rhine and the Scheldt, which 
had so often been a cause of discord, particularly between France 
and England, into a single large state, which would not sink to the 
position of a mere sphere of influence of one of the Great Powers. 
Accordingly, the former Austrian (Belgian) provinces were united 
with the former Dutch provinces into a single state. This king- 
dom was then entrusted to a descendant of the Orange-Nassau fam- 
ily which had given so many stadholders to the Dutch Republic. 
But the new state included elements which were too heterogeneous 
to permit a peaceful development. To be sure, the constitution had 
provided a certain equality between Belgians and Dutch; the Cham- 
ber of Deputies consisted of an equal number of members from the 
Northern and Southern Provinces; but this really gave an advan- 
tage to the Dutch, because their population numbered only two mil- 
lion as against three million Belgians. Furthermore, the govern- 
ment favored the Dutch at every turn. The Senate consisted in 
large part of Hollanders. Most of the officials came from the Dutch 
part of the kingdom. But above all, different economic interests 
divided the two peoples who had been artificially united together. 
Belgium, an industrial country, inclined toward a protective tariff; 
Holland, an old commercial country, with equal insistence, favored 
free trade, and succeeded in winning the king to its side. 



72 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

Such a clash of interests has long existed in many united states 
and yet not led to any split. But in the Kingdom of the Nether- 
lands it struck particularly deeply into the consciousness of the 
people because it was not counteracted by any common national 
tradition, and also because in addition to the economic conflict, 
which affected only the upper classes, there were sectarian dif- 
ferences. Between Holland, which was mostly Protestant, and Bel- 
gium, which was strictly Catholic, there could be no real feeling of 
sympathy. 

The Dutch government was also blameworthy in that it had too 
little regard for these delicate conditions. It punished severely the 
Belgian prelates who, in harmony with the feeling of their clergy, 
had protested against the constitution. When the whole Belgian 
Opposition, both Catholics and Liberals, united in a single group 
(the "Union"), the king would make them no concessions, so that 
the idea even arose of annexing Belgium to France. 

Into this heated atmosphere now fell the news of the victorious 
revolution in France. There, the work of the Congress of Vienna 
had been overthrown; why should the same thing not be possible 
in Belgium? Within a month of the revolution at Paris an insur- 
rection broke out in Brussels on August 25, 1830, following the sing- 
ing of Auber's revolutionary opera, "Masaniello." The population 
rose and expelled the Dutch officials. An assembly of Belgian nota- 
bles despatched delegates to the king at the Hague to present the 
Belgian grievances. The Dutch government, however, had no inten- 
tion of making concessions to the rebels, and decided to suppress 
the insurrection with a bloody hand. The king's second son started 
for Brussels with an army of ten thousand men, but his advance 
was checked by the obstinate courage of the revolutionists; after 
five days' fighting (September 21-26) he was forced to retreat. The 
revolution had triumphed. On October 4 a Provisional Government 
proclaimed Belgium an independent state, thus going beyond the 
original demand for reforms to a complete separation. This procla- 
mation was confirmed by a National Congress on November 18. 
To indicate that the movement was not at bottom due to revolu- 
tionary tendencies it was decided that Belgium should be a mon- 
archy. 

Theoretically, the situation here was the same as that in Naples 
some years before. In both cases, in a small state, the government 
established by the Great Powers had been overthrown by an unlaw- 
ful rising of the people. In both cases, again, the question whether 
the new government could maintain itself depended in last analysis 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 73 

upon the decision of the European concert, for it was clear that the 
Belgian insurgents could not successfully defend themselves against 
the united intervention of the Great Powers. In another connection, 
to be sure, the situation in Belgium was quite different from that 
in Naples in 1820. Not only could the Conservative Powers not 
count upon the cooperation of one Great Power (France), but there 
was even a danger that this Power might make common cause with 
the insurgents, — might indeed even take advantage of the opportunity 
to increase its own territory. A French party was already active 
in Brussels and was agitating for a more or less veiled annexation 
by France. In this difficult situation both the independence of Bel- 
gium and the peace of Europe were saved by the diplomatic clever- 
ness of the new French monarch. (He had at once recalled from en- 
forced exile the experienced professional diplomatist. Prince Talley- 
rand, and sent him as ambassador to the government whose attitude 
was most important, namely to England.) The peace-loving bour- 
geois government offered as compensation for Belgian independ- 
ence the promise of its own complete disinterestedness. This plan 
succeeded completely. So soon as the English government was con- 
vinced that France did not intend to take advantage of the Belgian 
revolution to advance to the mouth of the Scheldt, there was no 
longer any danger that the British would depart from their policy 
of non-intervention. In vain did the King of Holland call attention 
to the treaties of 18 14 and warn the Great Powers of their duty 
to have a care for their observance. In vain were military prepara- 
tions undertaken by Tsar Nicholas I (the only monarch who could 
have despatched an army at once). On October 15 France and Eng- 
land signed a convention to exclude any kind of interference by the 
Great Powers except a peaceful one. Since Great Britain's inter- 
vention could not be counted on, the other Powers were compelled 
to abandon military measures against the Belgian revolutionists. 
Within a short time Austria and Prussia gave their official approval 
to a plan of leaving the solution of the Belgian question to a con- 
ference of ambassadors in London. 

The later agreements were, one may say, merely the logical conse- 
quences of this first convention between the two Western Powers. 
On December 20, 1830, the Conference declared Belgium to be an 
independent state. Then, chiefly in order to prevent a possible in- 
tervention by France, the newly- founded state was declared neutral, 
and thus prevented from combining with a Great Power. When, in 
spite of this, the Belgian Congress chose the Duke of Nemours, the 
second son of Louis Philippe, the latter refused. Thereupon the 



74 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

Belgians chose a German prince who was in no way connected by 
blood with the French royal family, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (June 
4, 1831). 

As far as the Great Powers were concerned the Belgian question 
was thus settled for the most part. But not for Holland. William 
of Orange, the king, refused to recognize the decision of the London 
Conference, and sought to reconquer Belgium by himself by force 
of arms. He invaded Belgium and won considerable successes in 
August, 1 83 1, but the Western Powers did not thereby allow them- 
selves to be shaken in their decision. France secured in London per- 
mission to enforce the decision of the Conference by military meas- 
ures. A French army which thereupon entered Belgium naturally 
brought the Dutch advance to a standstill. Then, when the Dutch 
government, notwithstanding considerable concessions which the 
Powers were ready to make, still refused to give up Belgium and 
evacuate Antwerp, England and France used force. A British fleet 
blockaded the Dutch coast, and a French army besieged Antwerp 
and forced it to surrender in a relatively short time in December, 
1 83 1. The passive resistance which Holland still maintained for 
years (until 1838) against the decisions of the Conference was with- 
out practical effect. Belgian independence and neutrality, solemnly 
guaranteed in 1839 by the five Powers, France, Great Britain, Prus- 
sia, Austria, and Russia, was already a reality in 1831 and remained 
such. 

The manner in which Belgium secured its separation from Holland, 
and the fact that the new state was supported by the two liberal 
western Powers, while the Conservative Powers (Prussia, Russia, 
and Axistria) assumed at first, at least, an unfriendly attitude, nat- 
urally made contemporaries regard the dissolution of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, which the Congress of Vienna had established, as 
a step forward in the triumphant progress of liberalism. However 
close to the truth this was, it would nevertheless be a mistake to 
estimate the historical importance of the Belgian revolution merely 
from this point of view. For the whole of Europe it was of great 
iniportance that the relatively strong Kingdom of the Netherlands 
was destroyed and replaced by two weak small states. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, as disputes between the European 
Powers were again decided more and more by wars and armaments, 
it became clearer and clearer that this Belgian Revolution of 1830 
had created between France and the new Prussian- German state a 
kingdom which could exist only with the assistance of the Great 
Powers. However, there was no actual infringement of the guaran- 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 75 

teed neutrality until 19 14, when Germany opened war against 
France by marching through Belgium. 

The second important result of the July Revolution was the de- 
struction of the state in which part of the Polish people had re- 
ceived a half-independent political organization. In 1795, when 
the old Polish Republic was totally effaced and the last bits of it 
partitioned among the three neighboring Great Powers, the Polish 
nation was destroyed as a factor in politics only in appearance but 
not in reality. In no country, at that time, was the feeling of 
nationality so strong as in Poland. It was fostered even by the 
aristocratic character of the former "Republic." While in other 
countries it was chiefly the middle class which supported nation- 
alistic tendencies, in the hope that more liberal institutions would be 
possible in a national state than in tiny despotisms, in Poland the 
conditions were just reversed. Here the idea of a revival of inde- 
pendence was identical with the restoration of the rule of the old 
nobility. How could it have been otherwise in a country where there 
was practically no middle class in existence (except the Jews), and 
where the peasants, only recently emancipated from serfdom, lived 
under primitive conditions? In Poland, national autonomy simply 
meant that interference of foreign bureaucrats, who were independent 
of the Polish nobility, would cease, and the native magnates would 
again be given charge of the administration. 

Nowhere, therefore, did the national movement rest on such strong 
economic support as in Poland. In many other countries large land- 
owners gladly took the side of the conservative anti-national move- 
ment; in Poland, just the opposite was the case. Here all the land- 
owners, that is, the whole wealth of the country, stood behind the 
national cause. Any government which should follow the doctrines 
of the Restoration and seek to favor the aristocratic elements would, 
in Poland, simply strengthen its own enemies, that is to say, revo- 
lution. In general, the governments which had annexed parts of Old 
Poland recognized this danger; it is well known, for example, that 
Prussia afforded greater advantages to the agricultural day-laborers 
in her Polish districts than in the regions where the landlords were 
of German nationality. 

The one exceptional Polish region that existed after 18 15 was 
that part of original ancient Poland which formed the bulk of 
the genuinely Polish territories added to Russia, the so-called 
"Congress Poland," with the capital at Warsaw. Tsar Alexander I, 
thanks to his education by the Swiss, La Harpe, was rather 
more strongly inclined to liberal ideas than the rulers of Austria and 



76 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

Prussia, and was also perhaps somewhat influenced by his friendly 
relations with Polish aristocrats; he was the only one of the 
three partitioning princes who had taken seriously the decree of the 
Congress of Vienna by which the three Powers had held out to their 
Polish subjects the expectation of "representative government and 
national institutions." Alexander I, supplementing an arrangement 
which Napoleon had made for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, 
gave the Poles a regular constitution on November 27, 181 5. By 
this, "Congress Poland" acquired not only complete national au- 
tonomy but also even parliamentary institutions, that is, more than 
was enjoyed by the subjects of the three neighboring Great Powers. 
At the same time Poland was connected with Russia merely by a 
"personal union"; the Tsar ruled Poland only as a constitutional 
king. The viceroy, his representative, and the imperial commissioner 
were the only foreigners (Russians). All the other officials in civil 
and military service must be Poles. Even the army had its own 
special uniform. Polish was the only official language. The Roman 
Catholic clergy in Poland retained their endowments and privileges. 
Not only did the constitution provide for the establishment of a 
legislature or Diet, which should meet every two years, with open 
sessions; but a preponderant influence in both chambers was prac- 
tically assured to the large landlords, because the right to vote and 
to be elected was dependent on the payment of a high tax. It was 
inconceivable that the Russian government would oppose the land- 
owning nobility by any alliance with the peasant population. Still 
stronger, if possible, was the preference given to the nobility in the 
creation of judicial and administrative boards. 

In spite of all this, the regime established in 181 5 did not succeed 
in becoming popular. From a material point of view there was an 
undeniable prosperity during the fifteen years that Poland existed. 
In Lodz there even began to be established large industries which 
found a profitable market in the purely agrarian districts of Russia. 
Possibly also the emancipation of the peasants, which had taken 
place during the French period (1807) and which could not be un- 
done, had a beneficial effect, although the peasants still remained 
economically dependent upon the landlords as before; at any rate, 
the population increased by more than a million and a half. The 
deficit in government revenues disappeared, and the years 1820- 
1825 even showed a surplus. 

But the contrast between small "Congress Poland" and the great 
Polish state of former times was so striking that the Polish nobles 
of the new kingdom could not be content with what they had been 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 77 

given. They regarded their autonomous kingdom simply as a step- 
ping-stone to the restoration of ancient Poland, and were particularly 
anxious to win back at least a part of the districts which had for- 
merly been annexed by Russia. To be sure, White Russia and the 
Ukraine were out of the question; but there was the former Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania lying to the north-east. For centuries, Lith- 
uania had belonged to the Polish Republic. Although it was already 
evident that the foreign peasant population there was opposed to 
Polish nationalism, nevertheless the nobles of that region regarded 
themselves absolutely as a part of the Polish aristocracy and were 
regarded by their fellow nobles in Congress Poland as brothers in 
exile. Polish magnates, like Prince Adam Czartoryski, long the 
trusted friend of Tsar Alexander I, used their position in the Lith- 
uanian educational district of Vilna to win the native population 
for the Polish cause and so prepare for their later incorporation in 
Poland. 

Even before 1830, therefore, the Russian government had found 
it necessary to restrict several of the liberties granted by the Con- 
stitution of 181 5. No actual conflict broke out until the July Revo- 
lution in Paris roused enthusiastic hopes in Poland. As a result of 
the French events, the Revolutionary party, mostly young men and 
students, the so-called "Reds," got the upper hand over the aris- 
tocratic clerical party of opposition (the "Whites") who did not 
wish to overstep the bounds of legal opposition. The Polish army 
summoned to service by Nicholas I against France and Belgium 
now turned against Russian authority. As the whole administra- 
tion was in Polish hands any local opposition was out of the ques- 
tion. The government buildings in Warsaw were occupied by the 
students of the Polish military school, and Constantine, the viceroy 
and elder brother of the Tsar, left the country with his Russian 
troops in December, 1830. 

The "Whites" at first sought to bring about a compromise with 
the Tsar in order to avoid war. But when St. Petersburg insisted 
on absolute subjection they were swept away by the "Red" war party, 
and the fiction was exploded that the revolution was directed merely 
against the Tsar's representative and not against the Tsar himself. 
The Polish Diet not only declared that the Romanov dynasty was 
deposed, but also that Lithuania was indissolubly united with Po- 
land (January, 183 1). 

Although the Poles had at their disposal considerable troops and 
the support of the regular administrative machinery, and so were 
much more favorably situated than, for example, the revolutionists 



78 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

in Naples or Belgium, still it was clear that in their case also the 
final decision lay in the hands of the Great Powers. The Polish 
revolutionists, thanks to their stronger means of support, might be 
able to maintain themselves for a longer time than insurgents else- 
where; but, unless they were supported by the Great Powers, they 
could not count on withstanding the overwhelming power of Russia 
for more than a certain time. The new Polish government therefore 
despatched official representatives to the Great Powers who had 
guaranteed the decree of the Congress of Vienna. But though the 
cause of Polish independence was very popular everywhere (even 
outside France and England), there was small prospect of help com- 
ing from outside. The French government believed it unwise either 
to risk a war or to compromise itself by protecting an international 
revolutionary movement, in spite of the very strong pressure of 
public opinion; it therefore rejected the appeal of the Poles. Eng- 
land, without the support of a Continental Power, was in no position 
to act against the military forces of Russia; the British cabinet 
therefore contented itself with the official (and formally correct) 
reply that the Congress of Vienna had not guaranteed the Polish 
constitution. 

This meant that the war was already lost for the Poles in spite 
of their heroic courage. Since their army had been the first to 
mobilize, they did indeed secure some victories at first and occupied 
some districts on the Lithuanian frontier. But as soon as the Rus- 
sian army approached in an overwhelming majority — 120,000 men 
against 45,000 — the Poles had to retreat to the Vistula. After five 
bloody battles the Russian armies pressed on to Warsaw. The 
Russian general offered the insurgents an amnesty and the restora- 
tion of the constitution; but in spite of the advice of their military 
experts the offer was rejected by the "Reds," who had compromised 
themselves too far. The Russians thereupon bombarded the capital, 
which soon capitulated in September, 1831. The remnants of the 
Polish army now fled to foreign lands. Along with them went also 
many members of the Polish nobility, who settled chiefly in France. 

There now happened what the moderate "Whites" had feared 
when they had opposed the extreme measures of the "Reds." The 
independence of Poland was totally destroyed. An imperial ukase 
decreed that henceforth Poland should be incorporated with Rus- 
sia to form a single nation. The constitution was abolished, and 
the administration put into the hands of a Russian governor and 
Russian officials. The Russian language became obligatory for all 
officials. The University of Warsaw was closed. A military die- 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 79 

tatorship was introduced, which was also intended to weaken in the 
future the economic strength of the Polish magnates. Not only were 
about three hundred emigres condemned to death, but their lands 
were confiscated and divided among Russian generals of the Orthodox 
Greek faith. Virtually nothing of old Poland was left except the 
Church; and even here were not lacking all sorts of chicanery and 
despotic interference. All other instruction was put completely un- 
der the control of the Russian Minister of Education in 1839. How- 
ever, Polish opposition was not broken by all these measures. The 
Russian government did not succeed in destroying the economic 
strength of the Polish nobility. Not even the feudal privileges of 
the landlords were taken away. After the death of Nicholas I, in 
1855, when the Russians allowed a somewhat looser rein, Polish 
friends of freedom associated together in an Agricultural Society, 
which, under cover of non-political activities, really pursued national 
aims. There resulted another insurrection in 1863, which was fol- 
lowed by a much severer reaction and by the total destruction of all 
administrative institutions peculiar to Poland. Above all, the lands 
of the Church were secularized in 1865 and the administration of the 
Polish Catholic Church was placed under an ecclesiastical board in 
St. Petersburg. At this time also the peasants were given the own- 
ership of the land which they had been occupying and freed of all 
servile obligations, so that the Polish nobles lost about half of their 
existing income. Also Poles were forbidden to acquire land in 
Poland. 

Although these measures, whose decisive effect is still felt to the 
present day, took place about a generation later, the whole develop- 
ment was already foreshadowed in the years following 1830. It 
became evident how fundamentally illusory were the hopes of 
Poles that an autonomous position within the Russian Empire could 
be used as a stepping-stone toward a restoration of national inde- 
pendence. There remained only one suggestion of Polish indepen- 
dence — the Republic of Cracow, created in 181 5. But naturally 
the hopes which the Kingdom of Poland had awakened could not 
rest on this tiny free state. Furthermore, in 1836 Cracow was 
occupied for a short time by the troops of the three protecting 
Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and then placed under Aus- 
trian police supervision; finally, in 1846, it was completely incor- 
porated in Austria. 

So there was nothing left for the Polish patriots to do but look 
around for help from some other direction. This is the point which 
gives the Polish insurrections a wider importance in the history of 



8o RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

the nineteenth century than that of mere incidents in the internal 
development of Russia. After it had once been shown that the 
Polish friends of independence had nothing to hope from Russia, 
and that even the Russian revolutionary parties would not assist 
them, and since Prussia was known to be uncompromisingly opposed 
to all Polish aspirations, the only possible ally left was Austria. 
There was the further fact that the Polish landlords had nowhere 
kept such complete power over the agricultural population as in the 
Austrian province of Galicia. The national spirit of the Poles in 
Congress Poland remained as strong as ever, in spite of all the Rus- 
sian measures of oppression; but, as a political factor, the only 
Poles of primary importance were now the Galician magnates; and 
since these exercised a considerable influence on Austrian policy, 
owing to the political-social composition of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy which will be explained later in detail, these conditions 
contributed not a little toward sharpening the opposition between 
Russia and the Danubian monarchy. To the old disputes which 
related to the Balkans, there were now added elements of conflict 
resulting from the nationalist and religious policy of the Galician 
Polish nobility. 

But in the early years contemporaries regarded the suppression 
of the Polish Revolution merely as a defeat of Liberalism. The 
contrast between Eastern and Western Europe became now more 
sharply marked than ever. In Belgium not only had the work of 
the Conservative Congress of Vienna been overthrown, but the newly 
established kingdom had also been able to adopt a constitution which 
even surpassed the French in the concessions which it made to liberal 
demands. In order to vote it was sufficient to pay what, according 
to the ideas of the time, was a very small tax (forty-two francs). 
The constitution had expressly proclaimed the responsibility of min- 
isters to the Chamber of Deputies, and this was interpreted to mean 
that the cabinet must have the support of a majority in the Cham- 
ber. Also, the Senate was not appointed by the King, but chosen 
by the same electors as the Chamber. Freedom of the press, of 
public meeting, of education, and of religion, was introduced. Even 
the Church was wholly withdrawn from the supervision of the state 
(without in general losing any of its privileges). The establishment 
of the Belgian Kingdom was, from the standpoint of liberal doc- 
trines, an even more complete victory than the setting up of Louis 
Philippe's government. 

In the East it was quite otherwise. Though Tsar Alexander I 
during his liberal phase may have perhaps played with the idea 



BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 8i 

of making Poland a model parliamentary state which might even 
serve as an object lesson for the Russian Empire, and although he 
also, by creating this kingdom, recognized the justice of the na- 
tional Polish demands, all these plans were now proved to be Uto- 
pian. It was not Poland which served as the model for Russia, but 
Russian absolutistic institutions which were imposed on Poland. 
The source from which some kind of free institutions might have 
spread in Eastern and Central Europe was destroyed. 

It was thus that the fate of the Polish rising appeared to con- 
temporaries, and this explains also why, at that time, and for a 
long time afterwards, the sympathies of liberal circles, without re- 
gard for the possible national aspirations of Poland, turned toward 
the Poles and away from the Russians. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 

The July Revolution, which made so many old institutions on the 
Continent totter, was also not without its effect north of the English 
Channel, There, also, it hastened a transformation in existing condi- 
tions and gave reformers new zeal. But the Old Regime in England, 
which was overthrown two years after the events in Paris, was so 
absolutely different from the conservative systems of government on 
the Continent that the bloodless English revolution of 1832 deserves 
special treatment, even if the importance of the nation in which it 
took place did not make such special treatment inevitable anyway. 

"English freedom," which had been so often held up as a model 
to the continental countries by French reformers in the eighteenth 
century, in spite of many misconceptions about it by its admirers, 
was no empty dream. The praises which they bestowed on it were 
not usually regarded as exaggerated, because the writers who glori- 
fied it wrote from the standpoint of the propertied bourgeoisie. The 
demand for legal equality had been met as completely in England 
as any representative of the middle class could wish. No English 
law made any distinction between noble and commoner. No posi- 
tion in the government, the army, or the Church, was reserved for 
members of a special class. To be sure, in the case of landed prop- 
erty there did exist the system of primogeniture, and peers had cer- 
tain legal political privileges. But even these privileges did not ap- 
pear oppressive, and the class which enjoyed them was not closed 
against others, but was open to any new wealthy person. Although 
socially also there were certain distinctions in favor of the "Old" 
nobility, and although scions of distinguished families were given 
preferences over sons of parvenus who had become rich in India, when 
appointments were made to profitable positions in the government, 
the army, or the Church, nevertheless there was no legal claim in 
favor of younger sons of nobility; descendants of rich merchants 
who had only recently risen in the world often secured the highest 
appointments. There was besides no question about equality of 
birth. Daughters of rich middle-class families could marry into the 
circles of the large landowners without having to fear that their 

82 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 83 

children wc ild have a legal position inferior to that of the husbands. 
Even in the matter of religion, where English legislation least 
closely approached the ideals of the Revolution, there was no great 
contrast between English practice and the ideals of Enlightenment, — 
less at any rate than in almost any other European country in the 
eighteenth century. Members of any other sect than the two Estab- 
lished Churches were, to be sure, excluded from positions in the 
government, in administration, and in public instruction; church 
taxes had to be paid by every one, no matter to what religion he 
belonged. But these were the only privileges enjoyed by members 
of the Established Churches. No pressure was exercised by the state 
upon Dissenters. England had been, and remained, the country of 
"toleration" in the old technical sense of the word; and at the be- 
ginning of the nineteenth century practice went even further than 
legislation, aside from the fact that government regulations were 
sometimes vexatiously or maliciously enforced. 

In business, manufacturing, and commerce the new revolutionary 
doctrines also found less to attack than in other countries. To be 
sure, the old guild regulations still existed, and also some privileged 
trade corporations, but there was nowhere any trace of oppression. 
For a long time, thanks partly to the complete pacification of the 
country accomplished by the Tudors, the textile industry, the most 
important industry of England next to the metal industries, had 
grown up in the country districts, beyond the reach of guild regula- 
tions; and, when the new factories sprang up with steam machinery 
and therefore dependent on the coal mines, the new industrial cities 
near these mines were completely free from the old restrictions. The 
manufacturer who wanted to modernize his plant was restricted 
neither by guild regulations nor by the patrician oligarchy in the 
old town. 

Although the English system offered little ground for attack from 
the standpoint of the "French ideas," and although it had survived 
unshaken during the storms of the revolutionary period, it was fall- 
ing into sharper and sharper contradiction with the new economic 
development of the country. There was, however, no class econom- 
ically strong which was shut out from the government, as in many 
states on the Continent, or which was subordinated legally to the 
capitalists of the older sort. If one disregards the fact that certain 
noble Catholic families and certain rich Dissenters were unable to 
share in political life, one may say that Great Britain at that time 
was a plutocracy with all the advantages of stability which goes with 
such an organization. An opposition to the existing system by 



84 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

propertied people was inconceivable; for almost every wealthy per- 
son belonged to the favored classes himself. To be sure, there were 
not lacking divisions within the capitalistic circles. The great land- 
owning aristocracy, thanks to the old franchise system, still dom- 
inated in politics over the representatives of the rising factories, and 
the financial policy of the government was adapted more to the 
needs of the growers of grain than of manufacturers, but nowhere 
were real obstacles placed in the way of the new business activities. 
On the other hand, the ever-increasing class of those without prop- 
erty, particularly the factory workers, was treated as practically 
almost without legal rights, and with severity. But before any ac- 
count is given of this class, and of the economic structure of Eng- 
land in general, attention must be called to two circumstances which 
made possible the survival of so many old-fashioned institutions in 
the British Isles. 

The thing which most differentiated England politically at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century from the continental countries 
was what has been misleadingly called ''self-government," but which 
might better be described as "government by local magnates and 
an absence of independent government bureaucrats." - As in the 
Middle Ages, the exercise of countless activities which elsewhere 
were in the hands of the state (police, collection of taxes, fixing of 
wages, etc.) lay in the hands of the rich, particularly outside the 
towns. They exercised this authority as a matter of honor, but also 
naturally in the interests of their own class. As almost everywhere 
else prior to the Revolution, the division of power between the 
classes was the same in the army as in the civil service ; that is, the 
same propertied classes who as justices of the peace, for example, 
ruled the agricultural day laborers and the factory workers in their 
districts, were also those who secured the expensive places in the 
army; and the same proletarians, from whom were recruited the 
masses of workmen for the fields and the factories, also furnished the 
rank and file of the armies. How was it possible that this situation 
should have been able to survive in England in contrast to the Con- 
tinent? 

No historian can answer this question with a single phrase. Too 
many factors combined to bring about this phenomenon for any 
single explanation. But if the observer leaves aside all the less im- 
portant influences, two reasons of prime importance may be noted. 

One reason, which was particularly important after the personal 
union of England and Scotland in 1603, lay in England's insular 
position. The pressure for military centralization and for the crea- 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 85 

tion of a unified body of military officials did not exist in England, 
so the creation of a bureaucracy was not necessary. No less im- 
portant, perhaps, was the other reason. The main influence in mod- 
ernizing administration, that is, in replacing unreliable feudal ad- 
visers by dependable state officials, has, as is well known, always 
been the financial need of the state, — particularly the necessity of 
making the capital of the citizens quickly available for armaments 
or for carrying on war. There was no greater obstacle for govern- 
ments in this than survivals of the "feudal system": the privileges 
in the matter of taxation enjoyed by the propertied classes and the 
right of granting taxes enjoyed by the "estates," which were usually 
identical with the propertied classes. Most of the "reforms" in 
state administration have arisen from this financial need, and it is 
well known that financial bankruptcy was the immediate occasion 
of the French Revolution. 

Now, England possessed a double advantage: on the one hand, 
the revenues of the state could be largely increased without aban- 
doning the old self-government; and, on the other hand, her insular 
position made it safe for her not to create means for carrying on 
war. Although there existed countless well-paid sinecures, and al- 
though the state revenues were very loosely administered, England 
was, nevertheless, the most powerful country financially of the time. 
The soil was more productive of wealth than that of its rivals among 
the Great Powers, although with the exception of Prussia it was 
the smallest state in area and population. (Great Britain with Ire- 
land had, at the time, 16,000,000 inhabitants; France, over 27,000,- 
000; Austria, about 23,000,000.) This financial strength depended 
primarily on the economic prosperity of the British Isles and this 
economic prosperity could be made available, because the same 
classes who amassed wealth were also those who enjoyed political 
power, who were most directly interested in having the state ma- 
chine function properly, and who therefore, did not try to evade 
taxation. 

The Industrial Revolution (see ch. iii) now enormously accen- 
tuated this situation, — the practical rule of the rich based on the 
exploitation of the poor, who, ever since the rise of the domestic 
textile industry in the second half of the sixteenth century, could 
be forced to work and receive wages fixed by the state. The develop- 
ment of industry on a large scale, the lengthening of the hours of 
labor made possible through steam and water power, the smaller 
need for physically powerful workers, and the resulting increased 
employment of women and children in the factories — all these fac- 



86 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

tors which have been sketched in that chapter — were taking place 
in England about 1815. The gulf between "the poor" and "the 
rich" was now enormously widened and the number of the "ex- 
ploited" extraordinarily increased. In place of separate families 
who worked scattered through the country, there now grew up whole 
new cities. The wages of the workers were, in general, not much 
smaller than formerly, but the living conditions were incomparably 
worse. Huddled together in primitive, hastily constructed rows of 
buildings, without care and without education, financially dependent 
upon the will of the factory owner, who also often represented the 
authority of the state — such was the life of the mass of population, 
and the more manufactures increased the more agriculture decreased. 

Were there any legal remedies for this? Did the much-praised 
British constitution afford any possibility that parliamentary legis- 
lation might interfere in the interests of humanity, at any rate for 
the benefit of the unprotected women and children? 

Whoever considers the franchise which at that time controlled 
elections to Parliament can answer this question only in the negative. 

The House of Commons, that is, the body which usually deter- 
mined the make-up and the policy of the executive, was elected 
mainly by the propertied classes. A majority (467 members) were 
elected in boroughs where the candidates of the richest landlords 
of the neighborhood or of the city patricians were almost always 
chosen without a contest. Many places which had once had the 
duty or the right of sending members to the House of Commons 
either no longer existed or had sunk to a few miserable buildings, 
owing to the extension of sheep-raising at the expense of agriculture. 
In these "rotten boroughs" and "pocket boroughs," the election of 
members of Parliament was in practice simply the unquestioned 
property of the owner of the soil on which the place happened to be. 
Even in the county elections, in which the small freeholders had a 
share, the influence of the most powerful local magnate was, in most 
cases, decisive. This lay partly in the fact that elections were public, 
and the elector had to have his vote registered publicly. The only 
really popular elections were those which took place in a few of the 
great city electoral districts, particularly in the London district of 
Westminster; because there pressure by landlords was impossible. 

The prospect that the new class of factory employees could ever 
get any considerable number of representatives of their own into the 
House of Commons was therefore very slight. There remained only 
three possibilities by which their demands and those of the philan- 
thropists might secure a hearing. 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 87 

The first possibility was that the class of those who were discon- 
tented and shut out from political activity should seek the support 
of one of the two great parties in order by a combination of strength 
to drive the opposition party from power. The conditions were not 
unfavorable for such a combination. For a long time power had 
shifted back and forth between two groups — the Tories and the 
Whigs. The two rival parties did not differ from one another through 
any difference in class interests; they both represented a group of 
propertied citizens, but their adherents within the electorate were 
not equally strong. The Whigs were originally a group of higher 
nobles who were liberal-minded opponents of strong royal power, 
since it tended to weaken their own strength. They were not exactly 
loved by the great body of small land owners, who were strongly 
conservative in religion and politics. These latter belonged, for the 
most part, to the Tory party, and, thanks to the franchise system of 
the time, formed a majority of the voters. This naturally had the 
result that the Whigs gladly inclined toward reforms which would 
increase the number of those likely to vote for the Whig party, as, 
for example, the Dissenters in the towns. Indeed, the whole middle 
class, the manufacturers and large merchants, were more favorably 
inclined to the Whigs than to the Tories, because the Tories put 
the interests of agriculture too much in the foreground. Since the 
old franchise, which antedated the modern factory system, gave 
privileges to the class of grain producers in the south of England, 
instead of to the new group of manufacturers in the coal districts 
in the west, it was reasonable to expect that the Whigs would favor 
an extension of the suffrage beyond the classes who already enjoyed 
it. And if a breach were once made in the old exclusive system, 
workingmen might hope that their wishes would be given more 
consideration than hitherto. There was the further fact that the 
panicky fear of political innovations which seized England as a 
result of the French Revolution had taken much less hold in the 
enlightened circles of the Whigs than on the feelings of the Tories. 

The second possibility lay in the fact that workingmen might com- 
bine in organizations and attempt by extra-legal demonstrations and 
revolutionary attacks to force from their opponents what they could 
not secure by political means from Parliament as it was then con- 
stituted. This method was tried along with the first, but combina- 
tions of workingmen, as a result of their precarious financial posi- 
tion, had so little power that the support of one of the two great 
parties was absolutely indispensable. 

A third possibility for the improvement of conditions lay in the 



88 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

humanitarian movement, which was everywhere growing stronger 
(see ch. vi). It was precisely in England that the movement was 
most influential. This was not only due to the strength of religious 
influences, which were changing, as a result of Enlightenment, more 
and more into philanthropic channels; nor was it due only to the 
misery, greater in England than elsewhere, because in no other 
country did the Industrial Revolution dominate economic life to 
nearly so great an extent; it was rather on the favorable economic 
situation that the strength of these humanitarian tendencies in Eng- 
land rested. Although the close of the Napoleonic Wars and the 
new commercial policy of the Continental states disturbed inexperi- 
enced manufacturers in many ways, and resulted in many periods 
of industrial crisis after 1815, nevertheless the supremacy of British 
industry was so well established that it could bear financially the 
luxury, so to speak, of interference in the interests of humanity. 
The best example of this is the prohibition of the slave-trade shortly 
before the period of which we are speaking, an act which was bound 
to injure exclusively British trade, but which was nevertheless passed 
because the traffic in negroes was repugnant to the newly awakened 
feeling concerning the rights of man. 

At this point some general observations in regard to English 
economic life may be inserted. At this time, and often afterwards, 
the English were called a nation of shopkeepers, and their whole 
policy was interpreted in the light of "commercial interests." Who- 
ever talks in this way neither understands English policy nor knows 
what a nation of shopkeepers is. The very thing that has made for 
the strength of Great Britain has been that its people have not de- 
voted themselves exclusively to commerce, as, for instance, the 
Dutch or the Venetians were compelled to do. Certainly English 
commerce is not insignificant, and in negotiations with foreign coim- 
tries a regard for this branch of the nation's activity has certainly 
played a considerable part. But this was partly due precisely to 
the fact that British commerce, being relatively the weakest branch 
of English economic activity, was most in need of state protection. 
As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth century and 
for centuries earlier, the prosperity of the British Isles had rested 
more on manufacturing than on commerce, and domestic policy was 
more determined by care for the interests of growers of grain than 
of merchants. The very fact that England was not restricted nar- 
rowly to one branch of economic activity gave her policy a certain 
grandeur and made it independent of disturbances in particular 
branches of economic life. 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 89 

Much the same thing may be observed as to the condition of 
internal politics. There, also, the position of the plutocracy was 
so firmly established that no observer can deny to the system a cer- 
tain trait of greatness. Freedom of discussion existed to an extent 
which was unthinkable in any other country. So long as there was no 
suspicion that revolution was advocated as a fundamental principle, 
the government did not interfere by force in discussions. Intellectual 
activity, particularly if it was in the interests of the upper classes, 
was well paid and generally highly regarded. Even the "abuses" 
of the old system were often favorable to talent. Gifted and am- 
bitious young men without wealth who gladly put their abilities at 
the service of a party found it easier even than in France to take 
part in political life. How many a young man had reached the high- 
est positions in the government by means of a "pocket borough," 
as the young Whig Macaulay rose to the dignity of cabinet minister 
and civil governor of India ! It was also one of the ancient practices 
of the British system that service of the state was by no means 
always poorly paid. Men of talent but not of means were not 
compelled to renounce a political career because a civilian salary was 
insufficient to live on unless it were eked out by some side occupa- 
tion or by forbidden methods of graft. The only name to designate 
the old English system is "plutocracy." ( The word "aristocracy" I 
shall avoid here and wherever possible; such a conception, which 
was precise in ancient times, is no longer accurate, since it is ap- 
plied to modern institutions which are only superficially analogous, 
and since it is also applied to matters outside the field of politics.) 
So England at that time may be called a plutocracy; but it would 
be a mistake to conclude from this that money alone, and not intel- 
lectual preeminence also, counted for something and brought results 
in pontics. 

At the beginning of the period here treated, in the years imme- 
diately following the Congress of Vienna, England was still under 
the influence of the "Panic of the French Revolution" (see ch. v). 
The idea of Conservatism as a fundamental principle, which was 
caused by the reaction from the French Revolution, had already been 
formulated in England ; to this was now added the further fact that 
the British Empire had been in almost unbroken bitter conflict with 
the country where the new ideas originated. The revolutionary 
movement also appeared even more dangerous than thirty years 
before. The Industrial Revolution had become more widespread in 
its consequences, and the commercial crises after 181 5 had increased 



90 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

the misery and the discontent of the wage-earners. The neglect of 
internal affairs, natural during the war, still continued; in fact, it 
was greater, inasmuch as the upper classes no longer continued the 
patriotic sacrifice which they had formerly been making (in the 
shape of the payment of income taxes). The Tories had almost 
uncontested power. 

But now great changes were perceptible, both within the ruling 
classes and in the new class of industrial workingmen. The Whigs 
soon lost their fear of any change in the traditional system; they 
even sought the help of the discontented to drive their opponents 
from power ; and along with them many of the ruling classes desired 
reforms from humanitarian motives. On the other hand, the work- 
ingmen began to combine together by public demonstration and by 
agitation in the press, in order to make Parliament yield to their 
wishes. 

It is not surprising that the Whigs succeeded sooner than the 
workingmen; their efforts were less in conflict with the economic 
interests of the ruling classes than were the workingmen's demands. 
Accordingly, particularly in the years following 1820, when the 
younger generation among the Tories had acquired greater influ- 
ence, there was passed a whole series of reforms in accordance with 
the French ideas of equality and of humanity. The extraordinarily 
severe criminal laws were modified and brought nearer to Continental 
ideals. The penalty for poaching or for stealing a purse was no 
longer death. The tariff was lowered; above all things, the 
importation of wheat was permitted when the price stood at sixty- 
six (instead of eighty) shillings; that is, the profit which grain 
growers had been extorting from consumers by high bread prices 
was lowered. The exceptional laws against Protestant Dissenters, 
such as their exclusion from all public office, were abolished in 1828. 
In the following year Catholic Emancipation placed the Roman 
Catholics also on a footing of legal equality. 

Many of these innovations were due to the divisions within the 
Tory party, which often gave the Whigs an opportunity to carry 
through their plans. But there was still lacking the decisive act 
which should open the way for radical reform. This did not take 
place until the workingmen had been able to call attention to their 
claims more effectively. 

Immediately after the Treaty of Vienna there had begun a public 
agitation against the existing regime. The agitators were made up 
of workingmen thrown out of employment by the commercial crises. 
They were led by a few writers of small circumstances who did not 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 91 

stand in with the plutocracy and who demanded a reform of the 
existing system "from the roots upwards" — called therefore "Radi- 
cals." They adopted "French ideas," particularly the idea of uni- 
versal suffrage. The ablest journalist in this movement, a peasant's 
son named Cobbett, reduced the price of his paper to what according 
to the notions of the time was the extraordinarily low price of two- 
pence, because he wanted "all the wage-earners and workers of Eng- 
land" to be roused for the fight for electoral reform. (For reasons 
which have been explained, this reform in England would mean a 
change in the system of government.) 

So in 1 81 6 and the following years there were public meetings to 
protest against the abuses and the misery of the workingmen. The 
government at first adopted an absolutely unconciliatory attitude. It 
refused to consider the demands of the demonstrators, and broke up 
their meetings by military force. Parliament voted strict regulations 
against "incendiary writings" and their authors. 

But the agitation was not put down by such methods, and when, 
in 1819, a new commercial crisis set in, the revolutionary agitation 
began anew. This time it had its center in Manchester, that is, in 
the heart of the new manufacturing district. It was characteristic 
of the class character of the movement that it aimed particularly at 
the abolition of the corn laws, as well as at the political measures 
which have already been mentioned — universal suffrage, the secret 
ballot, pay for members of Parliament, etc. Since there were prac- 
tically no independent small peasant proprietors in England, the in- 
terests of the consumers were practically identical with those of the 
poor in the matter of the corn laws. Again the government used 
troops and broke up a great meeting at Peterloo, near Manchester, 
which aimed at strengthening the demands of the Radicals, New 
and greater powers for the suppression of revolutionary agitation 
were conferred upon those who exercised police jurisdiction, such as 
the justices of the peace. 

It was only gradually, and thanks to the influence of the younger 
generation, that certain concessions were made. In 1825 Parliament 
gave the workingmen at least a limited right of combination, although 
combinations for certain purposes, such as the abolition of piece- 
work, were still forbidden. Their first great success, however, was 
the reform movement after 1830. 

It was, indeed, not the July Revolution alone which led the Oppo- 
sition to victory. To be sure, the fall of Charles X stirred the dis- 
contented elements in England, no less than in other countries. In 
various industrial centers there were formed political associations of 



92 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

workingmen, and attempts were made to unite these hitherto scat- 
tered organizations into one national trade-union in order to force a 
minimum wage. But to this revival of agitation there were added 
two new factors which alone enabled reform to succeed. 

One of these was the industrial prosperity which was becoming 
more and more apparent after the economic readjustment following 
1815. The period of sharp alternations between overproduction 
and unemployment had passed. The opportunity for marketing 
goods was enormously extended by the use of the steam engine for 
transportation on land. (In 1825 was opened the first railway for 
the transportation of goods between Manchester and Liverpool.) 
English industry could now bear without injury certain burdens and 
limitations on the freedom with which capital had exploited labor. 
But at the same time the misery increased, corresponding to the 
increase in the number of people without the means of livelihood 
who could be sent to work in the factories and compelled to serve 
as apprentices. In 1827 it was estimated that almost two million 
people received state aid. It was less and less possible to ignore the 
demands of humanity. 

The other factor which aided the Radicals came from one of the 
great middle-class political parties. The Whigs were no longer 
afraid of joining with the workingmen in order to overthrow the 
Tories. Monster meetings could now be held undisturbed. There 
were even threats of violence against manufacturers and opponents 
of reform; there were even the rumblings of a general insurrection. 
Under this pressure Parliament at last gave in and accepted the Whig 
Reform Bill of 1832. This passed the House of Lords, where the 
rich classes had a larger representation, by a small majority merely, 
and even then only after the Whig ministry had threatened to force 
the passage of the bill by the creation of new peers. 

There can be no doubt that with the Reform Bill of 1832 the Old 
Regime in England was definitely set aside. But it would be a de- 
cided mistake to think that the bill replaced at once the old pluto- 
cratic government by a constitution of a French revolutionary nature, 
or that it erected a new government from top to bottom. The 
Reform Bill worked out as one might have expected from the com- 
position of the victorious coalition and the legal form in which the 
change took place: it was a compromise and indeed a compromise 
in which the stronger partner, that is, the Whigs, carried away the 
lion's share of the booty. But this need not blind one to the 
importance of the fact that a reform in the sacred British con- 
stitution had been brought about owing to the demands of Radicals. 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 93 

The way was now open for further reform, even for the complete 
adoption of the "French" system, and every reform in the fran- 
chise, that is, in the composition of the highest political authority, 
made the next reform easier. Furthermore, thanks to the bloodless 
and legal character of the political change, no reactionary tendency 
survived in active political life. Naturally there were not lacking 
Tories who were as much opposed to the Reform Bill after 1832 as 
before, but no practical politician could blink the fact that it would 
be impossible to restore afterwards what could not be rescued at 
that time from the attack of the Radicals. Never, therefore, has 
any attempt been made to go back on the step taken in 1832. The 
friends of reform had to encounter opponents who did not want to 
go any further, but never those who made reactionary restoration 
a part of their program. It is not necessary to explain more fully 
how much easier this made the task of further political reform. 

After these general observations, the most important innovations 
of the Reform Bill and its consequences may be mentioned. 

In the first place, the privileges of the large landowners were de- 
cidedly curtailed. To be sure, polling in public remained, but the 
polls were to be kept open for only two consecutive days. Above all 
things, the little boroughs in which members had been nominated 
exclusively by the landowners were now abolished. These "seats" 
were now redistributed and given particularly to the great cities 
which had arisen as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Further, 
the franchise was no longer bound up with possession of the soil 
(as had hitherto been generally the rule). Although persons who 
were quite poor and those who had no home of their own did not 
receive the vote, nevertheless householders who paid a rental of £10 
annually were placed on the same footing in the boroughs as owners 
of houses. 

This meant not only a considerable increase in the number of 
voters (one person in twenty-two instead of one in thirty-two), but 
also the inclusion of new classes in the ranks of those who exercised 
political power. The small bourgeoisie and the class of leaseholders 
now shared in the election to the House of Commons. The cities in 
the industrial regions of the north and west received parliamentary 
representation. On the other hand, the majority of the workingmen 
were still excluded from the franchise. In some towns whose popu- 
lation, owing to economic changes, consisted only of workingmen, 
the workingmen even lost a political advantage because such decay- 
ing boroughs were now deprived of representation in Parliament. 

But it would be a mistake to conclude that the Parliament elected 



94 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

on this new basis was as opposed to reform in favor of the work- 
ingmen as the old Parliament. An official investigation brought to 
light such frightful conditions among the working classes that the 
government stepped in and in 1833 through Lord Ashley's efforts 
passed the First Factory Act. Since people still held the doctrine 
that adults were in a position to look out for themselves, this Fac- 
tory Act was aimed primarily at the protection of children, who had 
hitherto been exploited in the most pitiless fashion. Children under 
the age of ten could now be employed only eight hours a day, chil- 
dren from thirteen to eighteen years of age only twelve hours at the 
utmost. Night work for children was absolutely forbidden. To 
watch over these regulations, factory inspectors were created — the 
first invasion of the unlimited authority which manufacturers had 
exercised. The so-called truck system was also forbidden, that is, 
the abuse by which workingmen were paid in goods instead of in 
cash. 

Ten years later this quite inadequate law was followed by another. 
In addition to children, women were now protected by the state, and 
the employment of small children was forbidden altogether. The 
mining law of 1842 put an end to the employment of women and 
of children under ten years of age in the mines. (It had been dis- 
covered that children only five years old were working twelve hours 
a day in the mines along with convicts.) A law of 1844 forbade the 
employment of children under nine years in the textile industries, 
and at the same time introduced compulsory attendance at school. 
A final step in this movement was the law of 1847, which established 
everywhere a ten-hour day for women and children. This law was 
all the more important because, owing to the character of the fac- 
tory system, many adult male workers also now enjoyed the ten- 
hour day. 

Supplementary to these laws was the Poor Law of 1834, which 
did away with the discretionary authority of the overseers of the 
poor, and for the first time placed in power paid officials who were 
independent of the local aristocracy. A central poor-law board was 
established which was given compulsory powers against the local 
magistrates. Similarly, care was taken for the improvement of sani- 
tation and the maintenance of highways (which, in England, had 
been left to private initiative, as England was a country which was 
not open to military attack). The number of sinecures which had 
been parcelled out among the propertied classes was considerably 
reduced. In the towns the privileges of the "old families" were 
abolished and all taxpayers enjoyed the same rights (1835). In the 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 95 

Established Church the bishop's pay was fixed at a definite sum 
(still very high) and the surplus was put in a fund out of which the 
hitherto badly paid parsons were to be supported. 

All these measures, in accordance with the policy of the Whigs, 
were compromises. Nothing was overturned anywhere except what 
was necessary. Crying abuses were done away with, but nowhere 
was there an attempt at systematic construction. This, in general, 
gave satisfaction. There was compensation and advantage in that 
over-hasty changes were avoided, although the workingmen found 
themselves cheated in the outcome of the reform movement to which 
they themselves had given the impulse. It has been pointed out 
that the Parliament elected on the basis of the Reform Bill of 1832 
was not wholly untrue to its program and passed a number of laws 
for the protection of women and children. But practically nothing 
had been done for the adult male workingmen, and the new fran- 
chise gave them no more share in the government than the old. 
The formation of a labor party or even of a strong radical group 
in the House of Commons was still as unthinkable as before. The 
workingmen had the feeling that they had been betrayed by the 
Whigs and they returned to their old policy of demonstrations. 
They also began to form purely class organizations. Under the 
leadership of the cotton manufacturer and philanthropist, Robert 
Owen, who for a long time had devoted himself to the cause of 
social reform, there was founded in 1833 (the year after the Reform 
Bill) the National Consolidated Trades Union. This aimed at "a 
new moral world" and proclaimed the eight-hour day as part of its 
program. Parliament was to be forced to give in by a general strikp. 

But the workingmen were still too poor to carry through such an 
imdertaking. Not only did the manufacturers unite together in an 
opposing association the same year and agree to lock out all mem- 
bers of the workingmen's association, but the government also de- 
nounced Owen's association as an "unlawful conspiracy," and con- 
demned several guilty persons to deportation. The government 
proved itself stronger than the poorly-paid workingmen, who were 
not able to carry through their strike. After only a year, the idea 
of a general strike was dropped as hopeless in 1834. 

The result was much the same when shortly afterwards the radical 
party again began to act with the workingmen. This new phase of 
the movement is distinguished at bottom from the old only by the 
fact that, thanks to the intellectuals, the demands of the working- 
men were set forth in a precise program called The People's Charter. 
This was the name given to the petition which was drawn up in 1838 



96 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

and soon presented to Parliament. The Charter — whose advocates 
were known as "Chartists" — true to the principles of radicalism, 
laid the emphasis on demands of a political nature, that is, upon 
changes in the composition of Parliament, because it was expected 
that a Parliament elected by universal suffrage would at once fulfil 
the wishes of the workingmen (an expectation which was natural in 
England where there were practically no small peasants). 

The agitation was now mainly carried on by the same methods 
as prior to the Reform Bill, that is, primarily with the aid of mass 
meetings, demonstrations, and occasionally revolutionary threats. 
Just as in the earlier period, the strength of the movement rose 
and fell; when trade was good, the agitation declined. In another 
connection, on the other hand, times were changed: the new Lib- 
eral government of the Whigs, which the Reform Bill had brought 
into power, did not attempt any measures of suppression. 

The success of the Chartists was, however, no greater. The peti- 
tion for the introduction of universal suffrage, which was presented 
to Parliament in 1839, was not even discussed by the House of 
Commons. Threats of violence were ineffective, though some isolated 
outbreaks did actually take place. The attempt at a general strike, 
which was to force Parliament to accept the Charter, had no better 
success (1842). A last effort of the Chartists in 1848, occasioned 
by the February Revolution in France, was nipped in the bud, 
partly with the aid of the bourgeoisie who came forward and volun- 
teered as special constables. 

Even before this, in 1845, the Trade Unions had separated from 
the Chartists and adopted a new policy which for a long time con- 
stituted the peculiarity of workingmen's conditions in England: 
agreements with separate employers were reached by means of arbi- 
tration or peaceful settlement; and, on the other hand, workingmen 
abstained from regular political activity and merely sought protec- 
tive legislation from Parliament. The success of this policy was so 
great, that for more than a generation the revolutionary socialistic 
movement came to an end in England. Naive observers, who 
thought that they could draw a general conclusion simply from the 
experience of one generation, believed that English workingmen had 
some mysterious trait in their character which simply spoiled them 
altogether for becoming socialists. As a matter of fact, this cessa- 
tion of socialistic agitation was due to quite other reasons. Here 
only the most important may be mentioned. 

In the first place, the steady growth and prosperity of English 
industry contributed essentially to an improvement in the condition 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 97 

of workingmen. The more the market was extended for giant fac- 
tory production, as a result of technical inventions and increase of 
purchasing power, due in part to the general increase in population 
and the establishment of colonies of Europeans (in America), — the 
more the market was extended in these ways, just so much more 
could better wages be offered to English workingmen without any 
misgivings lest the employer would really suffer in his profits. For- 
eign competition did not exist at all until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. 

Thanks to the liberal provisions in the United States for poor 
immigrants who wanted to work (see below, ch. xv), the English 
workingman found on the other side of the ocean people of his own 
language and stamp and was able to rise and become independent 
without the economic system being in any way changed in his home 
country. In the 1830's there began to flow into the United States 
a great stream of English immigrants, which drained out of Eng- 
land precisely the elements which would have actively supported a 
revolution. 

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the English government, 
after the system of conservatism had been broken in 1832, began to 
take up perhaps a passive, but by no means a hostile, attitude to- 
ward the workingmen. Parliament no longer laid obstacles in their 
way. Furthermore it did not demand of them any direct sacrifice 
for the state, such as universal military service. Therefore, so long 
as economic conditions remained relatively favorable, there could 
not develop any hatred against the system of government, which, as 
will be pointed out later (in ch. xxxii), was even ready to make 
further political concessions. 

From the point of view of world history, perhaps this first phase 
of the English workingmen's movement is of most importance from 
the influence which it exercised upon the origin and form of in- 
ternational social-democratic doctrines. As is known, Engels and 
Marx drew their deductions primarily from the reports which were 
made by English official commissions into the conditions of the fac- 
tory employees. Now it was quite natural that the critics of the 
capitalist factory system drew their examples mainly from English 
conditions; for Great Britain was the only country which had been 
fundamentally changed in character by the Industrial Revolution. 
It was also quite natural that they generalized from certain English 
phenomena, such as the fact that the Whigs as well as the Tories 
were a plutocratic party; this seems to have given rise to the 
Marxian phrase, "the reactionary mass." But more than this, certain 



98 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

specific English conditions were conceived of in a wholly incorrect 
way, as if they prevailed everywhere. To mention only one mis- 
conception: it was maintained that economic development in agri- 
culture tended toward the creation of great landed estates, just as 
it tended toward large scale production in manufacturing, a view 
which from the outset was applicable only to England and which 
involved a disregard of the question as to what attitude Socialism 
was to take toward a system of small peasant proprietors. Another 
example, perhaps, is the fact that the problems of military organi- 
zation and of national defense find little place in the socialistic 
theory; these were questions which in Great Britain were not live 
questions, or, to put it more accurately, had no direct connection 
with the demands of the English workingmen. 

Finally, it may have helped to bridge over the gap between the 
workingmen and the upper classes that the reform party at last 
won a complete victory in the matter of the Corn Laws. Here, 
in closing the chapter, therefore, an account of this must be given, 
because it prepared the end of the economic Old Regime in England. 
Although the tariff on imported grain had been somewhat lowered 
(see p. 90), it was still in existence. The Corn Laws had two advan- 
tages. One benefited a definite class, the owners of the soil, since 
the tariff guaranteed the growers of grain a minimum profit. The 
second advantage affected the nation as a whole: the fact that 
domestic agriculture was protected seemed to make England inde- 
pendent of imported grain in case of war. Both these arguments, 
but especially the first, were, however, most strenuously combated 
by a group of manufacturers. It was not permissible, they said, to 
impose high bread prices on industry and particularly on the work- 
ingmen, simply to give a good profit to Tory landlords; as for war, 
there was no better way of preventing that than by general free 
trade. How many international conflicts had arisen from disputes 
about trade and tariffs ! If only these restrictions upon international 
commerce were abolished, they said, then wars in general would 
become impossible; and then the last reason for the Corn Law 
system would disappear. 

As is evident, the free trade movement did not merely aim at the 
abolition of the Corn Laws. It aimed at an establishment of a new 
world order based on peace in general. It naturally had its center, 
therefore, in Manchester, and the greater part of its advocates were 
in the circles of large manufacturers and merchants, but not exclu- 
sively so. With these classes were associated also numerous repre- 



COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 99 

sentatives of liberal, pacifistic ideas. By the side of the chief propa- 
gandist in favor of free trade, the idealistically-minded cotton mer- 
chant, Richard Cobden, there stood a typical representative of 
radical doctrines, the Quaker, John Bright. It goes without saying 
that the Anti-Corn-Law League gradually won the approval of the 
workingmen, who were the very ones who suffered most directly from 
the Corn Laws. 

Many of the theories of Cobden and his companions may be un- 
tenable as general propositions, but one can scarcely deny that they 
were thoroughly in harmony with economic conditions in Great 
Britain at that time. Now since the population of England had 
enormously increased as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the 
country had scarcely any other choice except to devote itself whole- 
heartedly to modern industry. To maintain the Corn Laws was to 
halt halfway ; they made food dear without guaranteeing an adequate 
domestic production of food. If all the restrictions on industry and 
trade which had been imposed for the advantage of other classes 
were abolished, then these two branches of economic activity, on 
which the welfare of the British treasury finally rested, could flourish 
to their full extent. In addition, there was the uncontested supe- 
riority of English manufactured goods, which made competition of 
foreign factories still impossible; the English manufacturer needed 
no protective tariff for his products; likewise the English govern- 
ment needed no tariff for revenue, since its other financial resources 
were sufficiently productive. Finally there was the view, widely 
prevalent at the time, that the period of great European wars had 
gone by — that the period of peace, beginning in 181 5, was the advent 
of an age free from war. 

Under these circumstances Cobden's agitation was sure of success 
in the end. The Conservatives, that is the landlord party, sought at 
first, to be sure, to break the attack of the free-traders by compro- 
mises. In opposition to the rigid right wing of his party, the neo- 
conservative minister, Peel, lowered the tariff on grain in 1842; later 
he completely abolished the bounties on exports and reduced the 
duties on imports. But the famine of 1845 showed that the British 
Isles already had too great a population for even a limited system 
of protection on grain. The domestic production was no longer suf- 
ficient under any conditions. 

In addition to this came a hitherto unknown potato rot in Ire- 
land. Even if potatoes could have been used as a complete substi- 
tute for wheat, there was no guarantee that they would suffice to 
feed the population. Thousands died of hunger in Ireland at this 



100 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE 

time. After this calamity, it was impossible to delay longer the 
final act: a majority of the Conservatives did indeed vote to retain 
the Corn Laws, just as formerly; but a seceding minority was strong 
enough, in combination with the Liberals, to secure a majority for 
the cause of free trade in the House of Commons. The Corn Laws 
were abolished in 1846. 

The economic basis of the old Tory Party was thereby definitely 
destroyed. The Liberal Party of large manufacturers and merchants 
won the upper hand over the class of large landlords. To be sure, 
landowners retained their social prestige, but agiiculture in England 
was no longer profitable. The possession of great estates became 
more and more merely a social luxury for families who drew their 
wealth from other sources. The military situation in the islands 
became much more precarious. As population increased and agri- 
culture declined, the ultimate decision in a war with one of the great 
European Powers would now be determined exclusively by the ques- 
tion whether the British navy could assure the importation of the 
necessary food supply. By her lack of military preparation, Eng- 
land was forced more and more to adopt a policy of peace in Europe, 
and to avoid any European war. 

But for the moment, the most important problem of English in- 
ternal policy seemed to have been satisfactorily settled. Only one 
trouble remained, which, instead of losing its bitterness, became 
steadily more serious: the Irish question. For the sake of the clear- 
ness of the narrative, no account of it is given here, but it will be 
considered in a separate chapter below (ch. xx). Before this, it is 
convenient to explain the results of the Industrial Revolution which 
have been of most importance in world history: the settlement of 
Europeans outside the old continent, and in this connection the 
colonial policy of the European nations and its consequences during 
the first half of the hundred-year period which we are considering. 



BOOK III 
FROM THE OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO THE NEW 



CHAPTER XV 

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 

If the over-population of many European countries, which resulted 
chiefly from the Industrial Revolution and which necessitated the 
importation of food from abroad, found an outlet during the com- 
mercial crises in the first decades of the nineteenth century (as has 
been pointed out in the preceding chapter in connection with Eng- 
land), this was primarily due to the fact that the United States of 
America, with its still unsettled areas, offered the immigrant as ideal 
a land as could be imagined. 

The geographical conditions were as favorable as the political ones. 

The mighty area commonly known as the Mississippi Valley, 
which, during the first half of the nineteenth century and even down 
to the i88o's, stood open for settlement, was endowed by Nature 
with all the advantages which could attract settlers who were with- 
out property, but able and industrious. Already Alexis de Tocque- 
ville, the great French writer, in the book which he published in 
1835, had recognized clearly the possibilities of westward expansion 
for the population of the United States. He pictured the Mississippi 
Valley as the most beautiful home which God had granted to man- 
kind. Especially in the northern parts, that is, where slavery did 
not exist, the climatic conditions were quite tolerable for Europeans, 
although the ranges of temperature were sharper than in the cor- 
responding latitudes in Europe. The main things, however, were the 
exceeding richness of the soil, the climate which was favorable to 
agricultural development, and the easy accessibility of the region, 
thanks to the great rivers and the flatness of the land which made 
the construction of railways very easy. No mention is here made 
of the wealth of coal and iron, because these were scarcely consid- 
ered by the immigrants. 

Now in the year 181 5 the western part of this vast region was 
not settled at all, and even the part east of the Mississippi only to 
a very slight extent. There stood at the disposal of European im- 
migrants a region which seemed endlessly available, judging by the 
rate at which population had grown hitherto. But the fact that this 

103 



104 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

opportunity could be, and was, used so abundantly was due to the 
political and social conditions no less than to the geographic. 

Let us mention first the less important. One was the circumstance 
that the immigrants, who in the first decades came chiefly from 
Great Britain, found the same language, familiar customs, and 
similar laws; and even those from the central part of Europe found 
little that was strange in speech and custom. Then there was the 
fact that complete religious freedom existed; the settler nowhere 
needed to feel isolated because of his religious faith. But these 
conditions, however important they might be, were less so than the 
two decisive factors which first made the United States a regular 
paradise for fugitives from the economic bonds of Europe. 

One of these factors was of a political, the other of an economic, 
nature. 

The political factor consisted in the complete position of equality 
which was accorded to a colonist after a relatively short residence. 
He had a position of equality not only as compared with the natives 
and the older settlers on the newly cleared land, but also with the 
citizens of the United States in general. 

It is necessary to digress a little to make the significance of this 
fact clear. 

Possessors of land which has to be cleared for agriculture have 
naturally always tried to attract colonists by favorable conditions. 
Since the soil yields a profit only if it is cultivated, and since no par- 
ticular motive exists for the hard work of preparing it for agricul- 
ture, this must be accomplished by offering rewards. Very often, 
therefore, colonists have been endowed with extraordinary privi- 
leges, even those who have been induced to settle by absolutist gov- 
ernments. 

But in all these cases there was one simple calculation at bottom. 
Governments which forsook a part of the profit from newly-won 
soil hoped to be richly compensated through the profit which would 
come from bringing it into cultivation. But who would guarantee 
that when the work was once accomplished the promises which had 
had been made as an attraction would be lived up to? The privi- 
leges which the ruler had given to colonists were exceptional, and 
must in the course of time come to be regarded as anomalous. They 
were also often of merely relative value; they might be preferable 
to the heavy obligations put upon the ruler's other subjects, but still 
not sufficient to secure real independence to the colonist. 

Now the American system was absolutely different. The United 
States was the first government in the world to abolish all legal 



EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 105 

distinctions among all (white) settlers, so that not even the fran- 
chise was dependent upon property; this system of legal equality 
was then simply extended to the colonized areas in the west. As 
the Constitution of the United States recognized no distinction be- 
tween old and new families, nor between landowners and merchants, 
so there was also no superiority as between the original thirteen 
colonies and the new states which were to be created. The so-called 
Ohio or Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, has been called one 
of the most important laws of the United States (from the point of 
world history it is perhaps even the most important). It provided 
that every "territory" (colonial land which was given a provisional 
status preparatory to full statehood), so soon as it had a definite 
number of free inhabitants (60,000), should be incorporated into 
the Union as a state on equal terms with the others. Thus the prin- 
ciple was abandoned that the welfare of colonies ought to be subordi- 
nated to that of the mother country; rather was the principle estab- 
lished that colonies which are settled by a people are to be regarded 
as an extension of the mother country and are to be put on an 
equal footing with it in every respect. 

To this wholly new principle was then added still another: that 
the law of possession in the newly settled land should be on the 
basis of small peasant proprietorship. From the outset (1785) Con- 
gress decided that the land west of the Alleghanies should not be 
held on a quit-rent or lease, but sold outright, free of obligations; 
this provision, which theoretically would have permitted the growth 
of large estates, was later (1820) made more democratic by lowering 
the minimum price of the soil and reducing the minimum quantity 
which should be sold to a single individual. The result was that any 
man with only a hundred dollars could acquire a half quarter-section 
(eighty acres) of public land, and even this purchase price, which 
requires a small sum of hard cash in addition to what must be laid 
out for buildings and stock, was soon declared no longer necessary. 
Although the law provided that settlements should take place only 
on surveyed land, that is, on the basis of a title derived from the 
state, nevertheless, in the years 1830- 1840, a preferential purchase 
was accorded to the so-called ''squatters," that is, persons who had 
settled on United States lands without any kind of legal formality. 
A man, therefore, who had cleared a piece of primeval forest could 
not be dispossessed by a speculator when his work was finished 
simply on the claim that the speculator had been the first to offer 
the purchase price for the land to the government. A generation 
later, the government went further. It has always been in accord- 



io6 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

ance with liberal political conceptions in the United States that in- 
dustry and ability on the part of settlers shall take precedence over 
wealth, and the more democracy made its way the more the pur- 
chase price of land was lowered. The influence of the plutocratic 
South, however, steadily prevented taking the last step of giving the 
land to the settlers without any charge at all. But when the War 
of Secession took place between North and South, which will be 
discussed in another connection (in ch. xxiv), consideration for the 
plantation owners in the slave states was abandoned, and even this 
principle was given recognition. Scarcely a year after war had been 
declared, the so-called "Homestead Law" was passed in 1862. This 
permitted every adult man who was a citizen of the United States, 
or who expressed the intention of becoming one, to settle simply by 
payin>g a small fee. The settler promised to cultivate the soil. If 
he did this and cultivated his land uninterruptedly for five years, 
he acquired without cost full possession of his "homestead." 

The result of these laws was that the United States attracted into 
the great Mississippi region not only a large number of industrious 
farmers, but also a permanent stock of small proprietors who grew 
up with the soil and who formed the strongest kind of a counter- 
weight to proletarian influences from the manufacturing districts. 
This development was also favored by the circumstance that because 
of the enormous extent of vacant ground there were no agricultural 
day laborers, such as are necessary for farming a large landed estate. 
The elements in the population which in other countries would have 
belonged to this class, in America received land of their own. The 
extraordinary fertility of the soil demanded only a very small outlay 
of capital at the beginning. The possibility of having complete con- 
trol over the soil, "which resulted from the laws of the Union being 
extended over the whole territory, and especially from the lack of 
laborers just mentioned, further brought it about that measures were 
taken at the outset to provide for the marketing of the products. 
The period of settlement on a large scale coincides with the intro- 
duction of railways in the United States and the federal govern- 
ment quickly paid much attention to this new invention. Enormous 
areas of public land were provided with highways, canals, and above 
all with railways. So, one may say, from the very outset, farmers 
could reckon on a relatively developed transportation system, pro- 
viding a market for their products. Similar, though perhaps with- 
out such great consequences, were the arrangements which the gov- 
ernment made for education. The federal government, in fact, in- 



EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 107 

sisted in the beginning that a relatively large part of the cleared 
land should be reserved for the benefit of common and agricultural 
schools. At first one, and later two, thirty-sixths of each "town- 
ship" (each block of thirty-six square miles), into which the land 
was surveyed, had to be reserved for educational purposes. If one 
considers that the farmers settled almost exclusively on separate 
farms, instead of being grouped in agricultural villages, and that 
every small farmer working by himself felt personally responsible for 
the economic development of his land, then one can easily appreciate 
the significance of this care for systematic education. 

The colonization of the North American continent was thus pre- 
pared by the United States in the very best way possible; but the 
fact that it took place with such unheard-of rapidity was, neverthe- 
less, not due to the Americans themselves. In the first years of the 
nineteenth century the westward movement beyond the Alleghanies 
was already relatively strong. Both the farmers of New England 
and the southern "poor whites" (white inhabitants in the Southern 
states who had only a very few slaves or none at all) gladly sought 
the fertile soil or the more favorable conditions of life in the Mis- 
sissippi Valley, As far as numbers go, this migration was moderate; 
it suffices to point out that in 1800 the United States had about 
five million inhabitants. But so soon as the Industrial Revolution, 
and also the period of peace after 181 5, began to show results in an 
increase of population, there set in an ever-increasing immigration 
from Europe. Now began to be felt the full force of the circum- 
stance that no other country offered settlers such favorable geo- 
graphical, social, and political conditions as the United States. The 
number of European immigrants, which in the decade 1821-1830 
numbered 143,000 (scarcely more than in the preceding decade), 
rose suddenly in the following ten years to almost 600,000. Still 
more striking was the increase in the next decade, 1 841- 1850: during 
this period 713,000 immigrants arrived. The same increasing ratio 
is seen in the numbers who arrived year by year: 1842 was the first 
year in which the immigrants numbered more than 100,000, but in 
1847 more than 200,000 entered the United States. 

It has already been explained why the United States did not ex- 
perience any difficulties of the kind that most of the European coun- 
tries faced. It was pointed out that, thanks to the complete legal 
equality which was assured to the new settlers, there were no fun- 
damental conflicts between them and those who had been already 
long established; never could the immigrant have the feeling that 



io8 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

his economic interests were sacrificed or subordinated to those of the 
"mother country." But the complete political Americanization of 
the immigrant population was favored by still other circumstances. 
Some of these have been already mentioned, such as the fact that 
they were provided with land of their own; the school system may 
have helped to some extent, although it would appear that this in- 
fluence has often been exaggerated. But there came the accidental 
advantage to America that the first crowds of settlers were made up 
of elements which could be fairly easily assimilated. The great 
majority of the immigrants came naturally from the over-populated 
countries of Europe in which the propertyless classes were blocked 
either by the existence of large landed estates or by the fact that 
the soil was already completely occupied. These were the condi- 
tions which prevailed in the 1830's and '40's, primarily in the 
British Isles, and especially in Ireland. From 1829 to 1879 more 
than half the immigrants (53 per cent) came from Great Britain and 
Ireland, and during the first decades of this period the percentage 
was a good deal larger still. The great majority of the new settlers 
were therefore at least acquainted in speech and in thought with the 
older colonists; they quickly felt at home. And though they did 
not lose their love for their old home, still they thought of them- 
selves primarily as Americans. The second great stream of immi- 
grants which began to flow in the 1850's from Germany (34 per 
cent of the total immigration in the years 1820-1879) also proved 
accessible to American influences. In speech and custom they dif- 
fered from the Yankees more than the settlers from England, yet 
on the other hand they were attracted still more strongly by certain 
peculiarly American institutions. Not a few of them had left their 
Fatherland precisely because they missed there the equality before 
the law which they found in the United States ; especially the numer- 
ous immigrants from the eastern provinces of Prussia, who had wit- 
nessed the failure of the Liberals to overthrow the power of the 
Junker landlords, were extraordinarily impressed by the contrast, 
and as a result were notably contented with the more favorable 
conditions in America. The same is true of the immigrants from 
Scandinavia, though their numbers were not large (three per cent); 
with them the main motive was the fact that the infertile soil of 
their mother country could not support a large number of inhab- 
itants. 

Still it would be a mistake to say that the origin of the immi- 
grants was the dominating factor. It is not impossible that America 
would have had the same good success with immigrants from other 



EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 109 

parts of Europe, for, aside from the beneficial laws, the enormous 
extent of vacant soil and the general economic organization of the 
United States were of prime importance. At the time of the great 
immigration between 1830 and i860 America was still predomi- 
nantly an agricultural country; large scale manufacturing was as 
yet inconsiderable. The immigrant therefore not only had an oppor- 
tunity to acquire fertile land for almost nothing, but he was not 
enticed away by the rival attractions afforded by industrial estab- 
lishments. There had not yet grown up the great factories seeking 
cheap foreign labor. It was therefore natural and dependent little, 
if at all, upon the nationality of the immigrants, that in these early 
decades they did not congregate in the great cities and manufac- 
turing districts as they did later, but settled down on the soil as 
free peasant proprietors. No impartial judge, therefore, can say 
it is inconceivable, or even improbable, that in case the Italian 
immigration had been as large in the years 1830- 1860 as it was later 
(in the years 1903-1906 when it formed 24 per cent of the total 
immigration), these Italians would not have made just as good 
farmers as the English, Irish, and Germans. One has only to think 
of the Argentine Republic, where agricultural colonization has been 
almost wholly in the hands of the Italians. 

Be that as it may, it is a fact that the settlement of the Missis- 
sippi region took place under circumstances which were extraor- 
dinarily favorable to the United States, and that the rapid growth 
of the Union as a Great Power is due primarily to the large immi- 
gration from Europe. The North American Union of 1800, accord- 
ing to European ideas, was only a small state, if judged by its 
population of 5,306,000 (the later Belgium at this time had a popu- 
lation of three million); but by the year 1850, that is, before the 
immigration had passed the high point, the United States had already 
outstripped states like Prussia and had caught up with Italy (which 
indeed was only a geographical expression) ; and at the end of the 
century she was larger than any of the European countries (without 
their colonies), except Russia. 

These are figures with which every one is familiar. But it has 
been less generally observed what an important consequence this 
rapid development had for the internal life of the European nations 
during the nineteenth century. In connection with English condi- 
tions it was pointed out above how the possibility of emigration to 
America lessened the discontent due to economic crises. The same 
is true of other countries. The United States was regarded as the 
Promised Land which gladly received those who were discontented 



no FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

with their own country. It is naturally incapable of proof, but it 
is very probable, that the relatively peaceful course which the in- 
dustrialization of Europe took in the second half of the century is 
in good part due to the safety valve which America afforded. To 
this was added the fact that the agricultural development of America 
made it essentially easier to provide food for the greatly over- 
populated countries of Europe; that is, precisely because the immi- 
gration from Europe led to the rapid colonization of the United 
States, Europe had increased supplies of food placed at its disposal. 
How favorable the conditions were for the new settlers is shown 
by the fact that the number of those who were discontented or who 
voluntarily went back to Europe was extraordinarily small. To be 
sure, people who could not bear hard work and the other hardships 
of primitive frontier life were winnowed out without mercy. It was 
natural, also, that European intellectuals did not feel altogether com- 
fortable in the midst of a population which was concentrating its 
whole effort in developing the soil and which gave little opportunity 
for urban culture in the European sense of the word. But if 
a melancholy poet, like Lenau, gladly bade farewell to the uncon- 
genial atmosphere of America, he was simply the exception who 
proved the rule as to the great majority of the immigrants. This 
American pioneer territory (in contrast not only to Europe, but also 
to the older settled parts of America itself) was evidently of such 
a character that oiily practical work was highly regarded and 
achieved success. Because this is often overlooked in Europe, or 
because these transition conditions have been identified with Ameri- 
can life in general, people have been led into the mistake of denying 
to the inhabitants of die New World any appreciation of spiritual 
and intellectual values. In his excellent work on "The United States 
of America," Paul Darmstadter rightly observes: *'One can only 
rightly understand American history in the nineteenth century if he 
regards the opening up of the continent as the true task of the 
American people at this period, a task which was so colossal that 
the people had to concentrate all their strength upon its accom- 
plishment." 

There was only one obstacle to the free settlement of Europeans 
at the beginning of the period of great immigration (1830-1860). 
This was the slave system in the South. It has been already pointed 
out that one of the most important laws favoring settlement on 
homesteads could not be passed until after the secession of the 
Southern States. The opposition between the North and the South, 
however, was almost the only serious source of conflict which greatly 



EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES in 

influenced the history of the United States in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. But an account of this conflict and its suc- 
cessful conclusion must be postponed until it can be considered in 
connection with its significance for world history. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE FOUNDING OF A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 
IN NORTH AFRICA 

Of a quite different kind, but equally sui generis and novel, was the 
French colonial empire which was founded about the same time in 
northern Africa. Brought about almost by chance, carried on origi- 
nally not nearly so systematically by the government as the settle- 
ment of the Mississippi Valley, pursued under much more difficult 
conditions because the land was already occupied, — nevertheless the 
French colonization in North Africa affords many analogies with 
America. It stands in no less sharp contrast to the old colonial 
policy and methods of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries than does the American system of pioneer settlements. 

The importance in world history of the French conquest of Algiers 
and the neighboring lands may be considered under three heads: 
the abolition of the danger from piracy in the Mediterranean; the 
creation of a new French colonial empire in the place of the one 
which had been almost totally destroyed in the eighteenth century; 
and the extremely novel and on the whole successful attempt to 
form out of natives and European settlers a new people, unified 
economically and in part politically, which should not stand in the 
relation of colonists to the mother country but which should be a 
part of France itself. This last point will be considered in detail 
later; the first two points, however, must be explained before the 
regular narrative begins. 

First, as to the question of the "Barbary Pirates." 
Economically and politically, as is well known, the northern shores 
of Africa belong much more to Europe than to Africa. Scarcely 
anywhere else do the lands around an inland sea form such a definite 
unity as in the case of the Mediterranean countries. The regions 
of North Africa which are cut off by the Sahara Desert from the 
main part of the continent are economically and geographically 
connected exclusively with the countries of Southern Europe. For 
centuries, therefore, there has been a close contact between Syria, 
the Balkan Peninsula, Italy, Spain, and Africa from Egjrpt to 
Morocco; even the split into two areas with different religious 

112 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 113 

creeds resulting from the Mohammedan conquest was not able to 
put an end to this close connection. Nevertheless it did help to 
bring about an altogether one-sided kind of separate development. 
It was natural that after a great Mohammedan empire grew up in 
Asia Minor and Constantinople, the followers of Islam should join 
it rather than the Christian nations of Southern Europe, with whom 
they had formerly been in the closest touch. So it came about that, 
at the beginning of the period which we are considering, all North 
Africa, with the exception of Morocco (which, however, did not 
belong to any European power), stood under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan of Turkey. 

This situation had extraordinarily serious consequences for the 
Mediterranean countries of Europe. It was not merely that the 
northern regions of Africa which were in part very fertile, such as 
Algeria, were withheld from exploitation by Europeans, nor that the 
harbors best adapted for trade with Northern Africa had been sub- 
jected to foreign rule and arbitrary practices; but it was the fact 
that the African shores, being beyond European control, created 
conditions which were positively harmful to Southern Europe. From 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, Mohammedan piratical 
princes had established themselves not only in Algiers, but also in 
Tunis and in other lairs along the coast. These pirates laid waste 
the shores of Spain and Italy and continually endangered the safety 
of commerce in the Mediterranean. No European traveller who 
risked embarking in the Levant for Italy or France could be sure 
that he would not spend the rest of his days in slavery in Algiers, 
Everywhere along the shores watch-towers had had to be built to 
warn the fisherfolk of Italy, Spain and France of the approach of 
the African corsairs. To be sure, the danger was no longer so acute 
as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but still there were 
innumerable cases of robber attacks upon peaceful passenger and 
merchant vessels. The reader need be only reminded of Hebel's 
well-known story, "The Clever Merchant" {Der Listige Kaujherr), 
to be convinced that the fear of slavery in Algeria was not a mere 
fantasy of the imagination on the part of sailors a hundred years 
ago. Even Napoleon at Elba trembled at the thought of attacks 
by corsairs. 

Now how should this be remedied? Unquestionably the only 
way to eradicate the evil was a permanent occupation of the places 
on the coast. Mere demonstrations or bombardments (such, for 
instance, as was made by the English against Algiers in 18 16) were 
useless. For how could the Dey of Algiers ever seriously assist in 



114 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

the suppression of his country's chief industry? Supposing perma- 
nent occupation was agreed upon, who should be given the task of 
carrying it out? The country to which the Great Powers would 
have preferred to give such a mandate, and which was in the best 
geographical position to carry it out, namely Spain, was in no 
position to do so. If Spain had been unable to conquer Algiers in 
the sixteenth century (doubtless largely because the country was 
deflected from its proper national aims by its connection with the 
conglomeration of territories under the Hapsburgs), it was now still 
less in a position to undertake any considerable military expedition 
(see above, p. 53). Still more impotent were the little Italian states. 
There remained, therefore, action only by some, or all, of the Great 
Powers. 

But here at first the obstacles loomed larger than the conviction 
that something ought to be done. Joint intervention by the Great 
Powers was first rendered impossible through Austria's opposition. 
Prince Metternich was of the opinion, which was not without justice 
from the point of view of his own country, that an attack on the 
nominally Turkish territory of Algiers and Tunis would injure the 
prestige of Turkey, and would, therefore, indirectly benefit the 
Balkan policy of Austria's rival, Russia. England was interested 
in the commerce of the Mediterranean only to a small extent, be- 
cause, prior to the building of the Suez Canal, the sea-borne trade 
with India went around the Cape of Good Hope. England, again, 
like the other powers, was opposed to any increase of the generally 
feared French state, and therefore refused its approval of any 
possible French mandate. To all this was added the general neces- 
sity for peace after the Napoleonic Wars and the desire to avoid 
all actions which might disturb the balance of power among the 
Great Powers which had been established with such difficulty. So 
it came about that the problem of the Barbary Pirates was indeed 
often discussed at the congresses of the European Powers, but armed 
intervention, which was the only way of putting an end to the evil, 
did not take place. Even the fact that the pirates sometimes ex- 
tended their depredations to the North Sea brought no change in 
the political situation. The European Powers contented themselves 
with unheroic and awkward measures, like demands upon Turkey 
and the exaction of damages, as a means of checking the seizures 
made by the pirates. 

Now, as to the other influence which the Algerian expedition had 
on world history: the founding of a new French colonial empire. 

France had once equaled, if not surpassed, Great Britain in im- 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 115 

portance as a colonial power. In North America, as well as in 
India, considerable regions had once been under French control. 
These settlements had by no means been without success. Since 
France, being the country which was then the most densely popu- 
lated of all the Great Powers, was in a position to send peasants 
overseas, French Canada, at least, had enjoyed a prosperity which 
in its way can be matched by little in the old colonial history. But 
France was not strong enough in the eighteenth century to play 
the part of a Great Power both on the continent and in the 
colonies. Such a double policy was bound to fail on account of 
the weakness of the navy which had determined French foreign 
policy for a whole century and even under Napoleon. France had 
to give way everywhere before her rival, England, who often 
allied herself with France's enemies on the continent (as, for in- 
stance, in the Seven Years' War). So one piece after another of 
the French colonies was lost. Canada came under Great Britain; 
in India the French retained only a few coast towns, which could 
not serve as a base for the creation of a French colonial empire; 
and the vast Louisiana Territory had to be sold by Napoleon to 
the United States to prevent its falling into the possession of the 
hated English enemy. Thus^ in 1815, the French colonial posses- 
sions had shrunk to small remnants on the north coast of South 
America, in the West Indies, on the Senegal River, and in India. 
What remained not only was of small importance in itself, but was 
in no way capable of extension. 

There seemed small prospect that France would ever again be 
a colonial power on a great scale. In her foreign relations she was 
limited in all military action by the distrust with which she was 
regarded by the other European Powers. As far as over-population 
was concerned, she had no need to acquire new territory for settle- 
ment. The French Revolution, which had provided the peasants 
with land and legal equality, had brought so much free soil under 
intensive cultivation that, as has been already pointed out (p. 58), 
the French peasants had even less fear than in the eighteenth cen- 
tury of having too large families. And the advantage of colonial 
possessions in providing raw materials for manufacturing, which was 
so much emphasized later, was at this time scarcely mentioned. 
France, little industrialized, would scarcely have allowed herself to 
be moved in favor of colonial undertakings by such arguments. 

So the only motives which remained were military prestige and 
the desire to banish from the world the scandal of the Barbary 
Pirates who were so hurtful to French commerce. As will be 



ii6 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

pointed out, the Algerian expedition was actually undertaken merely 
from these motives; any thought of colonization or even of a con- 
quest of the whole area did not exist originally. 

The Algerian undertaking is one of those historical events which 
are greater than their originators could suspect. If any one had 
asked an experienced historical and political thinker on New Year's 
Day, 1 83 1, which event in France during the past year appeared 
to him the most important, he would certainly have answered, "The 
July Revolution"; and on the basis of what he then knew he cer- 
tainly could not have answered otherwise. The historian, who has 
the advantage of looking back on what has happened since, will 
probably come to a different opinion, and even if he were inclined 
to attribute to the fall of Charles X an importance equal to that 
of the conquest of the town of Algiers, he would scarcely dispute 
that the latter has brought in its train historical consequences as 
great as the former. The whole foreign policy of France in the last 
fifty years, and with it the policy of the other European states, has 
been turned into new paths by the fact that France again became 
one of the great colonial powers. This was solely due to the expe- 
dition against the North African pirates. 

Before the consequences of this expedition are explained, the 
course of the events themselves must be given. First, a few words 
as to the internal conditions in Algeria and the nature of the 
country. 

In 1 81 5, Algiers, as has been said, was nominally under the 
Sultan of Turkey, but the connection with Constantinople had al- 
ways been a loose one, and no change had occurreu in this respect 
hitherto. Economically Algeria was independent of Turkey. The 
piracy upon which the ruling classes in Algeria lived was no part 
of Turkish policy and in fact was often inconvenient to Turkey. 
Practically, appointments in the government in Algiers were made 
independently of Turkey to suit the Algerians themselves. The 
main power was exercised by a kind of body of Janizaries, called 
"Odschaks," whose leaders chose the Dey. The Sultan of Turkey 
merely confirmed the choice. With the Odschaks the Christian 
states were unable to come to any peaceful agreement, for they 
simply lived by piracy. The Turkish Janizaries had often been 
dangerous to the peace of Europe, because they were personally 
interested in war; but in the case of the Odschaks, the situation 
was much worse. Their very existence depended upon piracy. The 
Turkish government of the time might contemplate annihilating the 
Janizaries (see above, p. 43), but the Dey of Algiers would have 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 117 

overthrown the very foundation of the Algerian system of govern- 
ment, if he had attempted to curb the Odschaks. Under these cir- 
cumstances it was also equally out of the question to attempt to 
develop the natural wealth of the country. Yet an ordered govern- 
ment and systematic cultivation of the soil afforded the attractive 
prospect of great profits. About two-thirds of the strip of coast 
lying north of the plateau region, an area about the size of South 
Germany, is suited to intensive cultivation. Cereals, vegetables, 
olives, and grapes grow abundantly. The plateau itself affords ex- 
cellent pasture for cattle raising and even the grass in the waste 
stretches to the South proved itself in later decades an excellent 
material for making paper. 

But all this wealth lay unavailable under the rule of the pirates. 
Highways were lacking; above all things, irrigation systems were 
lacking. Without these nothing could be done; for the great danger 
which threatens the cultivation of the soil in Algeria is drouth. 

Now, as to the history of the French conquest itself. 

The first decision to undertake an expedition against Algiers is 
to be found in the desire of the French government to make a dis- 
play of military prestige in order to draw the attention of the public 
away from domestic troubles. This was the same motive which led 
to French participation in the Greek War of Independence (see 
above, p. 64). The government of Charles X evidently believed, 
as did so many other statesmen within and without France, that it 
is possible to make people forget the errors of the government at 
home by military successes — a view with which they can hardly be 
reproached when one considers how often this mistake has been re- 
peated since then. In no other lands have genuine liberals and in- 
tellectuals been so little inclined to allow themselves to be deceived 
as to the errors of internal policy by military glamour. The First 
Napoleon was not popular in his day in France; Charles X was not 
helped by his expedition to Algiers; and under the Third Napoleon 
the intellectuals with few exceptions remained to the end in oppo- 
sition. Be that as it may, the government of Charles X decided to 
achieve an easy triumph for French arms in Africa, and at the same 
time destroy the home of the pirates. 

When this decision had once been reached in Paris, it was easy 
to find a pretext for intervention. In the commercial relations be- 
tween France and the Dey, friction had not been lacking. The 
Algerian government demanded that the French should pay a higher 
sum for the permission to fish for corals at La Calle, to the east 
of Bona. It also demanded that two Jewish bankers, who had for- 



ii8 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

merly delivered grain to the French Directory, should immediately 
pay all that they owed. In the negotiations over this matter, an 
unfortunate diplomatic incident occurred: on April 30, 1827, the 
Dey of Algiers hit the French consul with the handle of his fly- 
flapper. A more serious breach of diplomatic etiquette followed. 
When, upon the request of the consul, some French ships appeared 
in the bay of Algiers to demand apologies from the Dey, one of 
the boats bearing the envoys was fired upon on August 3, 1829. 
Paris at once answered by sending an expedition to Algiers. ^ 

The preparations for this expedition, which took place during the 
last months of Charles X's reign (May to July, 1830), went forward 
smoothly and rapidly. A large army was landed near the capital, 
and before a month had passed Dey Hussein had to capitulate. 
Algiers was occupied and the Dey himself was shipped away to Asia 
Minor along with his harem, his ministers, and twenty-five hundred 

Janizaries. . • i j 

Then the question arose as to what should be done with this land 
without a ruler. As has been indicated the French originally had 
no idea of conquest and still less any intention of making Algeria 
into a French colony. Although, even in the first years, some 
people insisted that Algeria might become for France what India 
was to Great Britain, still the government remained hostile to such 
views. And even if it had wished to lend an ear to the plans of 
conquest suggested by army officers, it would at first have been 
frightened by the many obstacles which stood in the way of annex- 
ing Algiers. So long as the July Monarchy was not firmly estab- 
lished (see above, p. 70), the new regime could not afford to come 
into conflict with the peacefully inclined public of France; nor 
could it come to a breach with England, which, from the outset, very 
strongly disapproved of this Algerian undertaking by its rival. 
Nevertheless, events eventually proved themselves stronger than the 
intentions of the government, and in the course of a few decades 
Algeria was not only completely conquered by France, but was even 
settled in part by Frenchmen. Military and economic motives had 
worked together. The military motive had been decisive in the occu- 
pation of the country, and the economic motive in carrying out the 
settlement and the social reforms. 

For the sake of clearness in the narrative these two movements 
will be considered separately, although they mostly took place at 
the same time. First, so much as is necessary in regard to the mili- 
tary events. 

The original and very beneficial idea had been to put an end to 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 119 

the piracy along the Algerian shores. This program was at first 
closely followed. After capturing the town of Algiers, the French 
did not press on into the interior, but contented themselves with 
occupying a number of places on the coast, in order to get control 
of all the little retreats from which the North African corsairs had 
been a^-customed to conduct their attacks in the Mediterranean. 
But it soon appeared that this was only half the task. The French 
quickly saw that the places which they occupied would have to 
be regarded as unsafe unless they got control of the hinter- 
land, or adjacent region in the interior. The Kabyle and Khroumir 
tribes on the plateau had accustomed themselves to the presence of 
the pirate kings who were of the same Mohammedan religion; but 
they were unwilling to tolerate Christians in possession of their 
coasts. The neighborhood of the coast towns was continually at- 
tacked by tribes which undertook raids against the French from 
the region of the plateau. Soon it was a question, not merely of 
regular robber attacks such as had often taken place in the time of 
the Dey, but of an organized resistance. The attack was made from 
both sides: from the west Abd-el-Kader, the Emir of Mascara 
(southwest of Oran) opened hostilities; from the east, Hadschi 
Achmed, Bey of Constantine. 

The most dangerous and important of these two enemies seemed, 
at first, to be Hadschi Achmed, because he ruled over the rocky 
fortress of Constantine, which was regarded as impregnable, and 
also because he raised a claim to the coast town of Bona, which the 
French had occupied. So at first the French followed the plan of 
making concessions to Abd-el-Kader, in order to concentrate their 
main attack with such moderate forces as they had upon suppressing 
Hadschi Achmed. 

But precisely this policy compelled the French gradually to throw 
in larger forces. For the two leaders opposed to them were not to 
be easily overcome; and while in general it was not desirable to leave 
them wholly alone, such a policy was still less to be thought of 
after French prestige was at stake on account of defeats due to 
underestimating the strength of the enemy. This was true of the 
attack from the west as well as from the east. 

Abd-el-Kader, Emir of Mascara, was the kind of military hero 
that one only meets with in half-civilized regions and in novels. 
A young man (about twenty-five years old), and a perfect type of 
Arab, he united all the qualities which go to make up the ideal 
military leader in the Orient: supple body, light complexion, broad 
forehead and eagle nose. He was a bold horseman, at the same 



120 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

time as holy and learned as he was warlike; a poet and a prophet who 
knew how to interpret the Koran, and who, in spite of his youth, 
had already made one pilgrimage to Mecca. Scarcely had he 
ascended the throne on the death of his father, when he summoned 
all true believers to a "Holy War," and opened hostilities in the 
neighborhood of Oran. 

The French government, which, as has been said, did not want to 
undertake a regular war, tried at first to come to some friendly 
agreement with the Emir. They did not suppose they need 
fear him, because one of his attacks on a coast town shortly before 
had failed. So, on February 26, 1834, General Desmichels signed 
a treaty with Abd-el-Kader by which the Emir merely promised to 
recognize French rule over three coast towns to the west, while the 
French government recognized Abd-el-Kader as owner of "the whole 
west," — that is, accorded him supreme power over various tribes 
which had hitherto been independent. But the Arab hero did not 
live up to the terms of the treaty. On the contrary, he extended his 
robber attacks still further, and even dared to come in person close 
to the city of Algiers. Becoming ever bolder, on June 28, 1835, ^^ 
risked an attack upon regular French troops, near Oran. In this 
he was successful. The little French force was beaten and forced 
to leave a number of their wounded in the hands of the enemy, who 
maltreated them most cruelly. This catastrophe now stirred the 
French government to more energetic action. A regular army was 
despatched against the Emir's capital at Mascara. Abd-el-Kader 
was naturally not able to face such an attack. His capital was 
occupied and in part destroyed. Then the French troops retreated 
at once to the coast, because for the present they wanted to wage 
war only to the east. 

There, as has been stated, Hadschi Achmed, Bey of Constantine, 
who had formerly been under the Bey of Algiers, was now seeking 
to establish an independent kingdom at Bona. Treacherous natives 
hinted to the French that the Bey's capital could be easily 
captured. The French commander-in-chief. General Clauzel, put 
faith in these suggestions and with a small army (8-9,000 men) 
undertook an advance against Constantine. But the hints of his 
informers proved absolutely false. The city resisted in a way for 
which the French were not at all prepared. Soon the French army 
had to begin to retreat again to the coast. It was only with diffi- 
culty that it succeeded in reaching the protecting walls of Bona. 

This failure demanded more energetic intervention by the French, 
if they did not want to risk endangering their occupation of the 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 121 

coast towns. Once more the French government signed what was 
for them a very unfavorable treaty with Abd-el-Kader, in order to 
have peace on the west. At the same time they dismissed Clauzel 
and organized an army against Constantine which was equipped for 
a regular siege. Naturally the Mohammedans could not resist such 
a serious attack. Bravely as the Arabs defended themselves, Con- 
stantine was captured after a few days of bombardment on October 
13, 1837, and the rule of Hadschi Achmed came to an end. 

The conquests in the eastern parts of Algeria were thus made 
secure. But in the west the enemy still remained. Abd-el-Kader 
proved himself an increasingly dangerous opponent. He had used 
the interval of the attack against Constantine to create a small force 
of soldiers drilled in the European fashion. As has happened so 
often since then, he united with the kindred folk in Morocco further 
west. In order to have a base and also a refuge from the French, 
he had made an alliance with the Sultan of Morocco and become 
the latter's vassal. With the honored burnous which he received 
from the Sultan, he was now ready to proclaim a Holy War in an 
even grander style than before. 

Abd-el-Kader used a real or alleged infringement of the Treaty 
of 1837 as a pretext for declaring war on the French in 1839. ^^- 
mediately afterwards he made a sudden attack on the village of 
Mazagran where a hundred or so French riflemen had intrenched 
themselves. The attack failed, thanks to the heroic defense of the 
French (February, 1840), but it made a great impression, and there 
was everywhere the feeling that Abd-el-Kader could be rendered 
harmless only by being systematically crushed. Now, for the first 
time, the method of improvised separate actions was replaced by a 
careful and well thought out plan. The whole military organization 
and equipment was modified to suit the conditions of African war- 
fare. The new aim was the continuous pursuit of the enemy into 
all his retreats, — a steady offensive. For this purpose the creation 
of new troops. Zouaves or Spahis, was necessary. For these even 
natives were recruited. The uniform was made more convenient; 
the little kepi took the place of the shako; the heavy buffalo-leather 
belts disappeared; and in place of wagons, mules were used. The 
French officers who had almost all now received a training in Al- 
giers accustomed themselves to a kind of tactics different from what 
was necessary in Europe. Since it was not intended to undertake 
wide-reaching strategic operations against the fugitive Kabyles, it 
mattered little that the intelligence service between the separate 
corps was very poor, and that every officer went ahead in his own 



122 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

district on his own hook, without bothering himself about the march- 
ing routes of the others. In this way French generals lost the train- 
ing in operating against an enemy who thought out his plans, as 
proved fatal in the later wars of Europe, particularly in the War 
of 1870. Finally, it may be noted that the new Governor, Bugeaud, 
now had for the first time at his disposal a really large army (about 
100,000 men). 

With such preparations as these it was not difficult to overcome 
the natives. Abd-el-Kader was quickly driven out of the region 
south of Oran where lay his capital. Mascara. Soon the French 
pressed forward to the high plateau. There, near Taguin, a small 
body of troops under the Duke d'Aumale captured the Emir's whole 
Smala (the tents and the entire military equipment). The most 
important towns in the plateau, like Biskra, fell at once into the 
hands of the victors. A small force even dared to push forward to 
the Sahara Desert, so that the plateau could be regarded as having 
been pierced from north to south. 

Only one discordant note marred the success. The elusive Abd- 
el-Kader had again escaped. He had fled into Morocco, a neigh- 
boring state which was hardly friendly to the French. Algeria was 
now troubled by invasions of Moroccan tribes. The Sultan refused 
to expel Abd-el-Kader. Thereupon the French bombarded the two 
most important ports in Morocco, Tangier and Mogador. At the 
same time. General Bugeaud advanced by land. The large but un- 
trained Moroccan army was easily destroyed at the river Isly, which 
formed the boundary. The Sultan had to give in, although en- 
couraged by the English who were afraid of having the French get 
a foothold in Morocco. On September 10, 1844, the Moroccan gov- 
ernment signed the treaty of Tangier, in which it promised to expel 
Abd-el-Kader and to recognize French authority over all Algeria 
within what had been the Turkish boundaries. 

After he was thus cut off from any support from Morocco, Abd- 
el-Kader's fate was regarded as sealed. To be sure, thanks to his 
superhuman cleverness, the brave chieftain succeeded for three years 
in evading the French in the mountainous region to the south of his 
former capital. He even inflicted some bloody attacks upon his 
enemies. But his situation was hopeless. On December 23, 
1847, he begged for mercy and surrendered. He was then interned 
at Pau, in Southern France; later he moved to Damascus. Algeria 
could now be regarded as wholly in the control of the French. What 
followed was more in the nature of police than military measures. 
In the 1850's they succeeded in bringing even the tribes south of 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 123 

the plateau and north of the Sahara to recognize French rule. The 
warlike Kabyles south of the city of Algiers were subdued by Mac- 
Mahon in 1857. But these undertakings were of secondary impor- 
tance in comparison with the work of colonization which then began, 
and which will now be described. 

In accordance with the program with which the French had un- 
dertaken the expedition against Algiers, the colonization of the land 
was undertaken very timidly at first. The conditions were far from 
being so favorable as in America. On the one hand, Algeria was 
already a settled country; on the other, it was out of the question 
for the French to force the natives into a position of slavery or 
serfdom, and make them work for the victors, as the Spanish had 
once done in South America. The French, who had already for- 
bidden the slave-trade and in 1848 had even abolished negro slavery 
in Algiers, could not go back to this form of exploitation. A certain 
difficulty also lay in the fact that France, not being over-populated, 
would have to hold out relatively large advantages in order to attract 
Frenchmen to settle in the region. 

But it was equally certain that nothing but colonization with gen- 
erous state support could transform Algeria into a valuable posses- 
sion. It has already been pointed out that the natural resources of 
Algeria could not be made available unless public works were under- 
taken on a large scale. The mere occupation of the coast and the 
establishment of a few trading establishments, even though provided 
with privileges favoring French trade, would have brought in prac- 
tically nothing ; the cost would presumably have exceeded the finan- 
cial returns. The country first had to be put in a condition to yield 
up its products. And for this, besides settlement by European la- 
borers, state support was necessary. 

It was, however, a long time before the French government could 
make up its mind to this. It was not in accord with Louis Philippe's 
prudent parsimony to become involved in weary undertakings where 
profits were uncertain. Adolphe Thiers was almost alone for a long 
time in advocating expenditures on French colonization. After a 
governor-generalship had been established in 1834, the Mole min- 
istry finally adopted a compromise in 1838. They renounced the 
idea of making all Algeria into a French colony at one time. Their 
program was a gradual occupation, supported by the building of 
towns and highways. They proclaimed: "France is going to revive 
Roman Africa." 

This program was undertaken at once and carried out systemati- 
cally. Not only were highways laid down, but a great deal was 



124 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

done in the way of irrigation and afforestation. It now became 
possible to exploit the fertility of the soil. The more industrious part 
of the population, which under the Deys had been scarcely more 
than an object of exploitation by the state, was now given legal 
security and could engage in commercial undertakings without being 
disturbed. The native Jews who had always controlled the trade of 
the country were raised to French citizenship and given an interest 
in the rule of the foreigners. 

Somewhat later colonization proper was taken up. The govern- 
ment insisted that their efforts for the improvement of agriculture 
should not benefit the native population merely. European settlers 
ought to be attracted both to serve as a body of reliable dependents 
and as centers for spreading European influence. 

The undertaking did not seem easy. Neither was there as much 
land available as in America at that time, nor was it to be expected 
that a country which first had to be improved by public works 
would be sought out by classes which were forced to emigrate, that 
is, by those who had no property. 

But the government knew how to overcome these difficulties. In 
the matter of the land they were aided by circumstances. Through 
the expulsion of the Dey the government had come into possession 
of considerable land, altogether about as much as the former Grand 
Duchy of Baden or the State of Connecticut; these were lands which 
had been formerly Turkish military colonies and also leased lands 
in possession of Beys. In addition to these, there were added in the 
following years numerous estates, confiscated because their own- 
ers had participated in insurrections led by Abd-el-Kader and others ; 
and many lands were taken which had no owner or heir. 

These state domains were then rounded out through purchases 
made in the ordinary commercial way or by expropriation, so that 
they could serve as centers of colonization for the settlers. Settle- 
ment then took place by villages as was necessary for safety. The 
government saw to it that every village formed an independent eco- 
nomic unit. There were not only peasants, but also artisans. The 
size of the parcels of land which were given to the settlers varied 
according to their occupation: an artisan received a smaller plot 
than a tiller of the soil. The more important industries had to be 
established in each village; black-smithing and carpentry were 
obligatory occupations. In each village some common land was 
reserved. 

It was more difficult, as has been said, to attract European settlers. 
Here the government itself had to give assistance. And here also it 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 125 

accomplished its task to the fullest extent. At first the state took 
over a considerable part of the initial expenditures. It was the 
state that built streets in the new villages, saw to it that there was 
drinking water where Nature did not provide it, and undertook the 
erection of public buildings and schools. Indeed, it occasionally 
went further and provided the necessary working capital to conces- 
sion holders. During the first period (i 841- 1860), and again 
later (i 871- 1883), the soil was placed at the disposal of the colonists 
without charge. The settler merely undertook to cultivate the land, 
plant trees and so forth, and settle there for a considerable time (five 
or nine years). The system was therefore similar to that in America 
where, however, the conditions in general were much more favorable. 
As in America, up to 1870 non- French persons were also admitted — 
numbers of Germans, Italians and Spanish. 

Nevertheless, all these efforts, at a time when America stood open 
to immigrants without limit, would not have succeeded in attracting 
a sufficient number of settlers to the Algerian soil unless other means 
had come to the aid of the government. Among these were industrial 
crises, like that of 1848, when some two thousand workingmen were 
shipped away from Paris to Algiers. Fortunate, from this point of 
view, was Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871; 
numerous Alsatians preferred to emigrate to Africa rather than 
fall under German rule. But the government found its most regular 
and, so-to-speak, normal colonization material in the numerous sol- 
diers who, during their long years of war against the natives, had 
come to regard Algeria as a second home. Noteworthy is the fact 
that the government took care that these soldiers, who were usu- 
ally unmarried, should remain Frenchmen, and not become fathers 
of a mixed race. In the 1840's (that is, at the time when Algeria 
did not yet afford much attraction to civilians), soldiers who had 
served out all but two years of their time were sent home for the 
purpose of choosing and bringing back a French wife. They were 
then relieved of the remainder of their military service and were 
given a piece of land with the necessary means for its settlement. In- 
deed, the government even became to some extent a matrimonial 
agency. In Toulon there was opened a regular marriage market; 
soldiers on leave who had been unable to find in their home town any 
fair companion for life could go to the ''Depot for Marriageable 
Girls" which was established under the chaperonage of the best 
women in this naval port; there each could choose a wife very 
quickly. Since the African army did not afford a large enough 
number of colonists, the French minister of war summoned dis- 



126 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

banded soldiers who were living in France to go and settle in Algeria. 

It is significant that the colonists were able to remain French- 
men in the full sense of the word. Just as the frontiersmen in the 
American Middle-West had just as full political rights as the citizens 
in the older states in the East, so complete political equality was 
established between Frenchmen who settled in Algeria and those of 
the mother country. As far back as 1848 the Second Republic 
divided the colony up into departments on the model of those in 
France, and gave the colonists the right to elect deputies to the 
French legislature. Three years later, in 1 851, all tariff barriers be- 
tween Algeria and France were removed. The colony, both polit- 
ically and economically, was to be simply "an extension of France." 
Although in the later years of the Second Empire (particularly 
after i860) there was a reaction against this liberal regime, the 
colonists being deprived of their parliamentary franchise and the 
natives given larger rights, this was merely a brief episode. After 
1870 the Third Republic again gave the settlers their franchise. 
Furthermore, the nationalistic Arab uprising which broke out as a 
result of the French defeats in Europe, as well as from the change 
in administrative principles and the favors shown to Jews, hac this 
favorable result for colonization, that large areas of land became 
available. The lands of the Kabyles who had taken part in the insur- 
rection were confiscated, and their estates, which were among the 
most fertile in Algeria, could be assigned to new colonists (for ex- 
ample to the Alsatians who have just been mentioned in another 
connection). The importance of this was seen clearly later when 
available land began to be rare. The colonists even urged expro- 
priating the lands of the native tribes, but the French government 
was never willing to adopt such a measure, although the difficulty 
of extending the land occupied by Europeans was essentially in- 
creased by their refusal. 

There was one defect, however, which all these regulations had 
not been able to overcome: the relatively insufficient number of 
French colonists. The measures of the French Government had re- 
sulted in Algeria being gladly sought by settlers from other European 
countries; but where was France to find the surplus of peasants 
needed for Algeria? Being a coimtry of frugal, small peasant pro- 
prietors, who limited the number of their children in order to prevent 
a partitioning of inherited land and property, France was not ordi- 
narily in a position to afford settlers for Africa; and other immi- 
grants than peasants could be made use of only exceptionally, 
as, for instance, in the case of the factory employees sent out 



FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 127 

from Paris in 1848, who had not turned out well. Thus the 
European immigration was by no means insignificant, but it took 
place almost wholly from countries where large landed estates pre- 
vailed and where there was less prudence in the limitation of families 
than in France; that is, chiefly from Spain, from which three-fifths 
of the non- French immigrants came, and from southern Italy, which 
sent two-fifths. The French "immigration" (i. e., new French set- 
tlers) consisted almost exclusively of descendants of Frenchmen who 
had already settled in Algiers. Now the law of 1889, that every one 
born on French soil is a Frenchman, applied to Algeria also, accord- 
ing to the principle of the legal equality of the two countries. And 
although the sons of the immigrant Spaniards, (who settled mostly 
in the western parts of the colony near Oran), and of the Italians 
(chiefly in the east near Constantine) were thus made legally French- 
men, nevertheless they did not lose their original national sympathies, 
especially in the rivalry Which arose between Italy and France over 
the possession of colonial territory in Africa. And in view of Italy's 
slight possession of territory available for settlement at that time, 
this circumstance proved of considerable importance in foreign 
politics. 

So it is not easy to form a judgment as to the success of the 
French colonial experiment in Algeria. From an economic point of 
view the undertaking has certainly been a success. The export of 
agricultural products of all sorts, which was very slight before the 
expedition of 1830, has increased to an extent of which the French 
may be proud. It is profitable chiefly to France, which has monop- 
olized the shipping trade between Algiers and the mother country, 
so that the growing prosperity of the colony has also been of ad- 
vantage to the French merchant marine. The restoration of good 
order in the interior, which involves a continuance of military rule 
only in the south, and the building of highways and railways by 
state support, has permitted the cultivation of regions in which agri- 
culture had not been profitable since the days of the Romans. Piracy 
has totally disappeared from the Mediterranean. But from the 
political point of view, these are advantages which have benefited 
the subjects of other states more than those of France. To be sure, 
the law declares children of foreigners to be Frenchmen, and one 
may perhaps see in this an advantageous artificial increase of the 
French population. But these foreigners have come in such large 
numbers that it has not been possible to assimilate them, and inter- 
vention by foreign states is not absolutely out of the question for 
all future time. 



128 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

But aside from this problem, which is not at present acute, the 
occupation of Algiers by the French has been of the very greatest 
importance in its influence upon world history and upon the relation 
of the European states to one another in the second half of the nine- 
teenth century. France has come into a wholly new relation to the 
other European states by becoming again a colonial power. If she 
wished tc maintain the external and internal safety of her African 
possessions, she was obliged to round out her colony, or at least to 
strengthen it, by spheres of influence in the East and West, so that 
she would neither have to fear an attack nor be subject to native 
insurrections that would be supported by tribes of kindred race or 
religion in Tunis or Morocco. French policy, therefore, came to be 
opposed by all Powers which had a claim to either of these lands. 
Indeed, any action looking toward the preservation of the inde- 
pendence of Tunis or Morocco was regarded by France as dan- 
gerous to French interests; for here independence meant the 
possibility that the almost unceasing revolts and "Holy Wars" of 
Arab tribes in Algeria would be secretly supported by their neigh- 
bors. Details in regard to this must be reserved for treatment in 
another connection (in ch. xxix). But here it may be pointed out 
that the importance to France of controlling Tunis has for a long 
time been a determining factor in French relations with Italy; and 
the necessity of securing Morocco for the sake of Algeria has had a 
powerful influence on her relations with Great Britain and later 
with Germany. 

The other results of the Algerian expedition can be touched upon 
only very briefly. The technical military consequences of the colo- 
nial wars have already been mentioned (see p. 121). A result of a 
different kind is the influence which the successful occupation of 
Algiers later had upon the conquest of the Sudan. There can be 
no doubt that scarcely anything has contributed so much to the 
new national spirit which gradually developed in France after the 
catastrophe of 1870, and to the reawakening of a certain self-con- 
fidence and optimism resulting from positive successes accomplished, 
as the participation in the victorious undertakings which have so 
extended the bounds of Algeria to the south. All these military 
events would, however, have been unthinkable if it had not been 
for the expedition of 1830. 



CHAPTER XVII 

RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN ADVANCE IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN ASIA 

Russia's colonial activity in Asia, at least in the first decades of the 
period we are treating, was of an altogether different kind. Here 
the idea of settlement was decidedly subordinate; and many of 
the conquered regions were in fact little suited to settlement. As 
for the most important colonial territory, namely Siberia, the prepara- 
tory work of conquest had already taken place in earlier centuries; 
by the end of the eighteenth century the main part of the territory 
was in the firm possession of the Tsars. Finally, Russia had even 
less need than France perhaps to find free soil for an excess popu- 
lation. 

Nevertheless, the conquering expeditions which Russia undertook 
about the middle of the nineteenth century and later to round out 
and extend her Siberian possessions toward Central and Eastern 
Asia must be considered from the point of view of world history 
^nd of the extension of European rule throughout the world. 
Through coming into conflict with hitherto independent Asiatic 
empires, of which the greatest was China, the Russians not only 
extended the territory where Europeans prevailed, but they also 
gave a practical proof that the Asiatic empires under existing condi- 
tions could not possibly offer a permanent resistance to the new 
forces at the disposal of the European Powers. Asiatics were brought 
to see that they could make a stand against their oppressors only 
in case they appropriated as their own the technical improvements 
which Europe had made. Otherwise, little states would disappear 
altogether; and great ones, like China, would at least have to con- 
sent to humiliating sacrifices. The expeditions of the Russians 
have contributed to the "Awakening of the Far East" in the same 
way, though perhaps less publicly, as the English attacks on China, 
which will be spoken of in the next chapter. 

The fact that Russia at that time had no need of free soil for 
settlement was due to several reasons. The most important of these 
was that the mother country, European Russia, still had room for 
an increased population. The Russian empire was so thinly settled, 

129 



130 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

the cultivation of the soil was of so primitive a nature, and trans- 
portation was developed to so slight an extent, that a denser popula- 
tion would not have been harmful, but positively beneficial. A 
greater number of agricultural laborers would have meant more 
intensive cultivation of the soil, better means of transportation, and, 
consequently, increased agricultural production, without the owners 
of the soil having to pay individually any more for the support of 
their laboring population. That this is true can be best illustrated 
by the history of the system of large patrimonial estates in Russia. 

One difference in development between Russia and Western and 
Central Europe is seen in the Russian legislation and custom which 
never accorded the right of primogeniture to the nobility. In Russia 
feudalism always remained unknown, and so the old law of inheri- 
tance was retained; noble estates (which meant simply all the es- 
tates, since only nobles could hold land) were divided equally among 
male descendants, without the eldest son, or any son, being given 
a preference. When attempts were made to Europeanize Russia, 
some Tsars, to be sure, attempted to acclimatize in Russia an exotic 
growth like primogeniture. Peter the Great made a short-lived 
attempt of this kind; and, during the time of which we are speaking, 
Nicholas I made a new effort to establish a land-owning aristocracy 
on the West European model. A ukase issued in 1845 g^ve every 
noble the right to found one or more landed estates based on primo- 
geniture. The Tsar had evidently observed that in Western Europe 
large landed estates formed the strongest barrier against liberalism. 
As war against liberalism was his life task, and as he wanted to 
erect a similar dam in Russia against revolutionary floods for the 
present and future, he planned the founding of large landed estates 
with at least two thousand peasants and twelve thousand rubles 
income. But his scheme had only small success. Russian traditions 
proved too strong an obstacle. There was lacking the pressure of 
military necessity, which in Western Europe had formerly given 
rise to the institution of primogeniture — an institution foreign to 
Roman, as well as to German, law. Only a few such estates were 
founded, and there is no evidence that they in any way modified 
the political development of Russia. 

The full significance of this fruitless effort on the part of the 
autocratic Tsar is seen only when one considers that in spite of it the 
great estates in Russia have not been divided up into small parcels, 
nor has the basis been shattered on which the existence of the Rus- 
sian great seigneurs rests. While in Western and Central Europe 
the free partition of estates led either to the destruction of large 



RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 131 

landed estates or to the impoverishment of the nobility, this was not 
the result in Russia. This was not due to any artificial attempt to 
limit the birth rate. Infant mortality even among the leading families 
in Russia was indeed greater than in other countries of Europe. But 
even if what seems to be a large percentage of the children died 
before becoming of age, Russia was far from reaching a "one-son 
condition," which in other countries of Europe was generally the 
only way to obviate a dividing up of the paternal inheritance. The 
reason that large landed estates did not cease to exist lies 
simply in the fact that there was an enormous extent of territory 
available in Russia, and that the more intensive cultivation which 
has been spoken of made it possible for a piece of the paternal in- 
heritance to yield as much as all the family land had formerly pro- 
duced. "In many parts of the empire," observes A. Leroy-Beaulieu, 
"the produce of the soil for a long time increased so rapidly that 
estates were often doubled or trebled in value in twenty or thirty 
years, indeed, sometimes became even ten times as valuable. It 
might happen that two or three sons who had divided a paternal 
inlieritance would each become as rich as his father had been when 
he was at their age." 

Clearly Russia had no need to seek out new colonial lands. Only 
when these conditions are taken into consideration is another insti- 
tution seen in its right light. One might be inclined to regard serf- 
dom as an obstacle to Russian colonization. One is tempted to say 
that the lack of excess agricultural labor is due to the fact that 
Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century had no free 
peasants ; that the mujik was bound to the soil and could scarcely get 
permission to depart from his master's land, leaving it uncultivated, 
and emigrate to Siberia. But such a way of looking at the matter 
does not go to the bottom of the question at all. Even if Russia 
had already been over-populated, one does not see why the landlord 
should have refused to permit unemployed laborers to emigrate if 
they paid some compensation in money. That this would have been 
possible is shown by the fact that there were numerous serfs who 
plied a trade in the country districts or in the towns instead of culti- 
vating the soil to which they were bound by law. Indeed, it was a 
common practice to have the obligatory work in the fields (three 
days a week) replaced by an annual substitute payment in money, 
the so-called Obrok. This practice was particularly common in the 
less fertile regions; the peasant remained, to be sure, under the 
authority of his master and could be called back to the fields at any 
time; meanwhile, however, he devoted himself to some occupation 



132 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

in the town. Why could not some similar arrangement have been 
made for the benefit of the serfs who might have wanted to leave 
Russia, if it had really been over-populated, and seek free soil in 
Siberia? 

Moreover, serfdom and the law forbidding any one to leave Russia 
without a pass had not even at that time been completely effective 
in preventing emigration to Siberia. Already forces similar to 
those which had once encouraged the Puritans in their expedition 
to New England were driving many peasants to seek out regions 
beyond the Ural Mountains. Much of the oppression which 
made life in Russia hard for the individual was unknown in 
Siberia. Beyond the Ural Mountains there was no recruiting for 
military service; there was no serfdom; above all, there was no 
religious compulsion for the unorthodox, because the power of Rus- 
sian governing boards was often merely nominal, owing to the great 
distance. It has been asserted that in the case of many Russians 
the desire to move out east to the land of freedom was so strong that 
they committed a crime on purpose, in order to be exiled there. At 
any rate, in 1850 and the following years, the voluntary emigration, 
at least to the nearer districts, was not insignificant. 

The great majority of the immigrants into Siberia, however, were 
naturally made up of those who were condemned to exile. When one 
speaks of them one thinks ordinarily of criminals (in part political 
offenders) condemned to work in the Siberian mines or at other 
hard labor. One often overlooks the fact that crime was often 
punished by mere banishment, and that in this case deportation 
was simply like compulsory settlement. Punishment under these 
circumstances occasionally might almost be regarded as a favor, 
and it was beneficial, at any rate, not only to the individual, but 
to the state as a whole. In fact, a Russian author writing at the 
time of Nicholas I, though not at all favorably inclined toward the 
existing regime, had to admit: "Simple exile to Siberia does not 
frighten people who have no occupation or property. Peasants 
there receive land in abundance and the country is not everywhere 
uninhabitable. The harsh treatment during and after transportation 
alarms only more or less cultivated people," that is, the class which 
scarcely came into consideration at all as regular colonists. Further- 
more, the peasants who were banished to Siberia were treated as free, 
and often possessed many privileges not enjoyed by people of their 
class in European Russia; for three years, they were free of taxes; 
and only after they had been settled for twenty years were they 
liable to be recruited for military service. 



RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 133 

However, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the settle- 
ments had been, on the whole, relatively small. By that time, a firm 
basis had been laid in Siberia for a Russian peasant population, but, 
for reasons which have been explained, no intensive colonization 
had yet taken place. On the other hand, Russian political control 
had been extended further and further in Siberia, so that the coun- 
try came to have a greater value as a place for future settlements. 
Through these great extensions of territory the Russian government 
succeeded in connecting her Asiatic possessions much more closely 
with the trading centers of the world than heretofore. 

In this connection the conquest of the Amur region, which gave 
Russia an excellent access to the Pacific Ocean, is especially note- 
worthy. This extension of Russian territory took place under Count 
Muraviev, who was governor general of Eastern Siberia after 1847. 
Scarcely had he been appointed to his post when he proceeded sys- 
tematically to secure the region by military means and also by the 
acquisition of the Amur Province, which lay to the south and be- 
longed to China. In 1850 he built the port of Nikolaievsk at the 
mouth of the Amur. In the following years, he undertook a series 
of expeditions into Chinese territory, and founded there various 
towns which should serve as points of support for a Russian occu- 
pation. The Chinese Empire, as will be explained in detail in an- 
other connection, was too weak at the time to defend itself against 
such usurpations. In 1858 the Chinese government had to sign the 
Treaty of Aigun, in which the whole territory north of the Amur 
was recognized as Russia's. For Russia this success was only the 
first step in her advance to the Pacific Ocean. Two years later, 
in i860, the new acquisition of territory was extended by the Treaty 
of Peking, which gave to the Tsar the whole Maritime Province 
from the Amur down to the boundary of Korea. This extended 
Russian territory so far to the south that the tip of it now lay oppo- 
site Japan. Here, at this tip, the Russians constructed a new port, 
Vladivostok, "The Conqueror of the East," both as a symbol and 
as a point of departure for the further extension of Russian rule. 
The fortress projected like a wedge into the sea to the south. This 
expansion was enlarged further by the acquisition of the Island of 
Sakhalin, which lay off the Amur territory and was acquired from 
Japan by purchase or exchange in 1875. 

How largely all these annexations had been brought about by the 
desire to improve Russian transportation and commerce in Siberia 
is clearly seen from the wording of the two treaties of Aigun and 
Peking. The Russians were by no means content with the mere 



134 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

acquisition of territory. They also secured for themselves wide com- 
mercial privileges. The navigation of the large rivers of the region 
was reserved for Russian and Chinese vessels so that the ships of 
other nations were excluded. Russians acquired the right to travel 
freely and trade throughout all China. They were freed from 
tariff duties in Mongolia; caravans could come and go unhindered 
between Kiakta in Siberia and Tien-Tsin in China. China had to 
agree to the installation of a permanent Russian embassy in Peking, 
which was to watch over the execution of these provisions. In Urga, 
the most important city of Mongolia, a Russian consulate was es- 
tablished. 

Somewhat less successful were the Russian attempts to get control 
of a new approach to Peking from the west. In the Upper Tarim 
Valley in Turkestan there had arisen in the i86o's the independent 
state of Kashgaria. This inclined to Russia, in order to have pro- 
tection from China, from which it had separated itself; it was later, 
however, again subjected to the Chinese (1877). North of this 
the Kuldja territory, after likewise revolting from China (1865), 
finally came completely under Russia (1871). China, however, 
protested. The Russians felt compelled to hand back at least the 
eastern part of their new acquisition (1881), but they retained the 
western part as a new gate for entering China. This was the upper 
Hi Valley, through which the hordes of Jenghiz ELhan had begun 
their march upon Europe in the Middle Ages. 

From an economic point of view, the Russian conquests in Eastern 
Siberia were the most important gains of territory that the Tsar 
made in Asia. But as far as area is concerned they were overshad- 
owed by the acquisitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Here, 
by slow and sure advances, the whole, so to speak, of Turkestan 
was conquered; that is, the whole region between European Russia 
and Siberia on one side, and Persia and Afghanistan on the other. 
Thus, with the exception of China, the only two independent states 
left were Persia and Afghanistan, and these owed their independence 
merely to the fact that the British as possessors of India were op- 
posed to their absorption by the rival power of Russia. 

The Russian wars in this region fall into two series of actions 
independent of each other. The more romantic, but less important 
in itself, was that in the west, which led to the complete subjection 
of the whole Caucasus region. Even at the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century Russia had attained a firm footing south of the 
Caucasus Mountains and along the eastern shore of the Black Sea. 
At that time the Tsar of Georgia had made the Tsar of St. Peters- 



RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 135 

burg his heir. But the eastern part of the Caucasus region — Dagh- 
estan, which lies north of the mountains along the Caspian Sea — 
was still in the possession of mountain tribes who opposed Russian 
rule because of their Mohammedan faith. If the Russians wanted to 
overcome these mountain peoples, they saw that they had a task 
somewhat similar to that of the French in Algeria, in gaining control 
over the region of the high plateaus. Here, also, there was 
a national hero who played the part of Abd-el-Kader. Schamyl, 
the leader of * the mountaineers of Daghestan, like the Algerian 
prophet, was both a prophet and a warrior. He was full of devices 
and for a long time could not be captured. It was decades before 
the Russians destroyed his power. Apparently less efficient than the 
French in Algeria, the Russian generals spent their efforts for almost 
thirty years — from 1830 to 1859 — ^^ vain attempts to get this bold 
enemy into their power. Nearly two hundred thousand men had to 
be sent against him, and still Schamyl always succeeded in escaping. 
In 1839, the Russians thought they had captured him, when they 
took the fortress of Akulscho in which he had been shut, but again 
the leader escaped, and his sister, Fatima, cast herself into 
the water to escape falling into the hands of the Russians. The 
Russians even suffered some defeats. In 1842, the Russian army 
under General Grabbe which tried to capture Schamyl's main fort 
at Dargo was completely routed in the woods nearby. Dargo was 
not taken until three years later (1845). Even then Schamyl did 
not give up the game as lost, but entrenched himself on an inacces- 
sible mountain height where he held out for fourteen years. It was 
not until 1859 that some Russian volunteers scaled the plateau 
where he was hidden, drew up after them their comrades by ropes 
which were fastened to crevices in the rocks, and succeeded in sur- 
rounding him. A desperate fight took place. Almost all of his fol- 
lowers were slain. He himself took refuge in a cave. The Russian 
general started a fire to smoke him out, and Schamyl surrendered. 
He was treated in the same way as Abd-el-Kader: the Tsar saw 
to it that he should have a peaceful old age at Kaluga, south of 
Moscow, until his death on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1871. 

These conquests not only brought the Caucasus completely under 
control, but enabled the Russians to make strategic use of the re- 
gions already won to the south and east. Now, at last, the terri- 
tories which had been ceded to the Russians either by native princes 
or by the Sultans of Turkey, were open for military operations 
(see above, p. 42). Russia's approach to Persia was unhindered, 
and this empire was further reduced to the position of a vassal 



136 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

state. The Persians had previously felt the superior force of their 
Russian neighbors. The wars which had broken out on account 
of the transfer of Georgia to Russia had led to a series of defeats 
for Persia, and finally to the treaty of Turcomanchai, by which 
Persia had to cede the provinces of Erivan and Nakitschivan in the 
Southern Caucasus. With the exception of the province of Kars, 
which did not become Russian until 1878, all the territory between 
the Black and Caspian Seas was now in Russian hands. 

Still more wearisome and long drawn out were the wars which 
established Russian rule over Turkestan. Here the first region to 
be conquered was that between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of 
Aral and the lands to the east of the Sea of Aral. 

There existed conditions in this region which might be compared 
with the piracy in North Africa. The vast Steppes between the Ural 
region (Russian since the eighteenth century) and the kingdoms of 
Khiva and Bokhara were mostly occupied by nomad peoples who 
lived by capturing slaves. Every year they were accustomed to 
ride westward into the Ural region, or even to the Volga, and seize 
Russian subjects whom they carried away and sold in the slave 
markets of Khiva or Bokhara. In much the same way the Turco- 
mans of the Steppes to the south plundered the Persians. The only 
way to get rid of this pest was to occupy the region where the 
plundering nomads lived. The difficulties, however, were enormous, 
and infinitely greater than in the case of the Barbary Pirates. Thou- 
sands of kilometers of desert lay between Khiva and the nearest 
Russian city of Orenburg. Not even the passable routes through 
this wilderness were known. The native rulers used all their 
power to prevent foreigners from getting access to them. The 
merchants who dared to risk it were flayed alive or impaled. The 
difficulty of advance in this region is best shown by the expedi- 
tion which the governor of Orenburg made in 1839 with a particu- 
larly well-equipped corps. Although he had paid especial regard to 
the great extent of the steppes over which he was to press forward, 
had collected an enormous number of camek (over ten thousand), 
and had hired Kirghiz guides, the expedition was a total failure. 
Almost all the camels, and a considerable part of the men, died of 
cold, and in 1840 the army had to retreat before reaching its ob- 
jective at Khiva. 

The resources for overcoming this difficulty were not found until 
about twenty years later. Russian generals in Siberia, who usually 
went ahead on their own hook and bothered little about the new 
Anglo-Russian agreement which made Iran and Turkestan a neutral 



RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 137 

zone, now sought to attack the kingdom of Klhiva from behind. 
Having found that it was unattackable from the front, they went 
around the steppes, east of the sea of Aral so as to attack from much 
further east in the Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) region. They also aban- 
doned all large expeditions and attempts to crush the enemy at a 
blow, and went forward step by step. First they gained control over 
the Kirghiz hordes in the regions bordering on Siberia. Then Gen- 
eral Perovski founded on the border between Siberia and the Syr- 
Darya region of Turkestan the fort which bears his name (1853). 
This became a base from which to make further advances. The Rus- 
sians were now in a region where they could get food and fodder 
for their troops. 

From this point the conquest of the land took place by regular 
steps. British protests were ignored, or at most heeded only to the 
extent that the Russian government dismissed disobedient generals 
but retained the conquests of war. The first city to fall into the 
power of the Russians was Holy City of Hasred, known to-day as 
Turkestan. This resulted from expeditions in 1864 directed from 
the north to the south and later also to the south west. In this and 
the following years, Chimkent and Tashkent were captured. These 
two successes, the second of which gave the largest city in Turkes- 
tan to the Russians, were due to General Chernaiev, the "Lion," as 
he was called by the Turcomans. He was the leader who disregarded 
the command which his government, owing to English protests, had 
sent him, and in spite of it occupied Tashkent, paying for his patri- 
otic deed by the loss of his position. No change in Russian policy, 
however, was brought about by this. General Romanowski, who 
succeeded the dismissed "Lion," pushed south from Tashkent, after 
repelling an attack by the ELhan of Bokhara. In the following year, 
1868, Samarkand fell into the hands of the Russians. So the Rus- 
sians acquired the great city of the Zarashan region, formerly the 
capital of Tamerlane, whose grave is still there. The "moral effect" 
of this success was enormous. The ELhan of Bokhara gave up 
all further resistance. He recognized the Tsar as suzerain and de- 
clared that he was ready to pay a large war contribution. On the 
eastern side the Russians had now pressed forward from Turkestan 
to the neighborhood of the Afghan frontier, that is, as far as was 
possible without coming into direct conflict with British claims. 
For at that time Russia admitted that Afghanistan lay outside her 
sphere of influence. 

Western Turkestan, including Khiva, was still independent. This 
was precisely the region from which the plundering attacks of the 



138 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

nomads were made. Then, as ever, it was impossible to come to 
any terms with the Khan. He refused to deliver up either the 
Russian or the Persian slaves. But Russia's new conquests now al- 
lowed her at last to get the better of these trouble makers. A con- 
centric attack was planned. Khiva was to be approached both from 
the west and from the north-east. The forces coming from the west, 
that is, from Orenburg and the Caspian Sea, did not even this time 
reach their goal, but again suffered terrible losses in camels. On 
the other hand, the contingent coming from the east, that is, from 
the east of the Sea of Ural, pressed forward without great difficulty 
to the capital at ELhiva. The Khan had to give in to the Russian 
demands. Thirty thousand captives were set free, the whole north- 
ern territory of the Amu-Darya (Oxus) region was ceded to Russia, 
and Russian merchants were promised freedom of trade. A Mo- 
hammedan insurrection against these concessions was crushed by 
the Russian army. So Khiva, as well as Bokhara, now became a 
vassal state of Russia. The country retained only a few troops of 
its own, and the command over these was given to Russian officers. 
Henceforth, no one could enter either of these states without a Rus- 
sian passport (1873). 

The only country which remained to be brought into subjection 
was the strip of territory left between the Caspian Sea and Bokhara. 
This task also was soon taken in hand by the Russians. There, 
north of Persia, lived Turcomans, who gained a living in the same 
way as the nomad tribes of Khiva. They were robber bands of 
horsemen who hunted down Persian peasants and carried them 
away as slaves. They had tried to protect themselves against hos- 
tile attacks by building forts in their oases. 

Ever since 1867 the Russians had tried to conquer the Turcomans, 
and had succeeded to some extent in driving them back. Their 
final strongholds, however, were not taken until General Skobelev 
carried out a systematic campaign against them (1880). His ef- 
forts culminated in the capture of the strongly fortified capital Gok- 
tepe, where thirty-five thousand Turcomans had entrenched them- 
selves. Skobelev wanted to go further and unite with Afghanistan 
against British rule in India, but the English got ahead of him with 
an expedition to Afghanistan (1880), and Skobelev died soon after- 
wards. 

After all these intervening areas had been occupied, Russians 
finally approached Afghanistan. In 1884-5 they occupied the Merv 
region and the Oasis of Pendjeh lying to the south of it. Both 
territories lay east of Persia and within the Afghan zone. The 



RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 139 

English government protested and it almost seemed as if war would 
break out. But on this occasion, also, a peaceful solution was 
found, as always, because England gave way on the main point: the 
Russians retained their conquests. 

In the eastern parts of Turkestan, in the region between 
Bokhara and Chinese Turkestan, Russia and England agreed upon 
a new Russian boundary. After long negotiations the Pamir terri- 
tory finally fell to Russia in 1895, and could be staked out in such 
a way that a relatively narrow strip of territory was left to the 
Afghans between the Russian possessions and the region to the north 
of India which became British at this time. This barren zone, 
occupied by Mohammedan warrior tribes, was intended to be a bar- 
rier to any great military operations either from the north or from 
the south. 

Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, with the exception of 
Persia and Afghanistan, no independent native kingdoms were left 
in Central Asia. This vast part of the continent had been subjected 
to two European Great Powers. Persia and Afghanistan retained 
only a nominal independence, not because they were stronger than 
Bokhara or Khiva, but simply because neither of the two European 
rivals was willing to concede this booty to the other. China, too, 
had suffered a considerable loss of territory to the north. The fate 
of Asia, almost like that of Turkey, was being determined mainly by 
the policy of these two European powers, though France finally 
joined in with England and Russia. 

Before any account is given of the consequences of this situation, 
mention must be made of the European colonial policy which formed 
both the supplement and the counterpiece to that of Russia in Siberia 
and Central Asia: the establishment and extension of British power 
in India. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA AND COLONIAL WARS 
WITH CHINA 

While the Russian expeditions in Siberia either led to settlement or 
prepared the way for it later, British expansion in India was in 
accordance with colonial policy in the old style. India was not 
sought out as a place for settlement for an overflow population, nor 
would such settlement have been conceivable. The land was not 
vacant, and was hardly suitable as a permanent place of residence 
for European families. Colonization here could take place only in 
a purely commercial way. Europeans who settled in India aimed 
to secure a monopoly of the export of Indian products and the im- 
port of European manufactures in exchange. Altogether secon- 
dary was any political idea in regard to population, that is, the idea 
of caring for or improving a propertyless population which was pre- 
vented from reaching economic prosperity at home. The number 
of persons who could profit by this was not very large, nor could 
one expect permanently to relieve the mother country from over- 
population by a temporary emigration. Service in the British East 
India Company afforded an excellent military and political training 
and Great Britain owes many of her distinguished generals and 
statesmen to the fact that India gave members of poor families a 
much wider field of action than was possible at home. But India 
could not be at all regarded as any place for settlement, such, for 
instance, as Algeria. 

The history of English colonization in India, both before and 
after 1815, is in accord with these conditions. The British never 
had any idea of a systematic conquest of the country. Their original 
purpose, which was adhered to for a long time in principle, was 
simply to obtain control of the coasts and the more important ports 
of India in order to get the trade of the peninsula into their hands. 
The fact that the possessions of the East India Company were ex- 
tended widely into the interior from Bengal was simply due to the 
circumstance that the coast places could only be regarded as safe 
if the native warlike kingdoms were destroyed. A policy of con- 
quest was at first prevented by the character of the British system 

140 



ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 141 

of control. India was not exactly a British possession, or to speak 
more accurately, it was not exactly under English rule. It belonged, 
so far as it did not consist of states which were nominally or act- 
ually independent, to the East India Company. This was a trading 
corporation which had, to be sure, some powers of government; it 
maintained its own army and navy and officials, but it did not con- 
stitute a state and it did not pursue national aims. The East India 
Company, which up to 18 13 had a monopoly of trade in Asia, was 
naturally guided in its policy, not by the interests of England, but 
by those of its stockholders. To shrewd calculating financiers noth- 
ing appeared more expensive than warlike expeditions, which, even 
if successful, resulted in only very moderate immediate gains. 
However, every extension of territory also brought an increase in 
the Company's revenues, for the Company usually took over the 
rights of the deposed native princes and so acquired the latter's 
land rents. Thus the Company had become a great landowning 
corporation, and the revenue which it drew from its lands finally 
exceeded the profits which came from its commerce. But it is easy 
to see that a good part of the money that came in in this way had 
to pay the costs of the military conquest of the land. 

The East India Company, however, was not the only ruler in 
India. Competition on the part of other European nations was in- 
deed out of the question after the French attempt in the eighteenth 
century to establish a colonial empire in India had definitely failed. 
The French and the Portuguese possessed merely a few modest 
places along the coast. But the more the East India Company 
developed, the more the English government began to interfere by 
appointing the Governors- General of India and by establishing a 
Board of Control over the Company. This Board of Control was by 
no means opposed to wide-reaching military operations. They re- 
garded it as desirable to undertake wide conquests, although the 
newly won territory might be a financial burden. In cases, for 
instance, where this was the only method of protecting the life and 
property of British subjects from the plundering raids of neighbor- 
ing native tribes, the first Marquis of Hastings, who was Governor- 
General of India in 181 6, was given express permission to make 
such conquests. So in the decades after 181 5, before India became a 
British vice-royalty, and even before the Company's charter had been 
essentially limited by the state, the East India Company's policy 
was no longer inspired purely by commercial motives. This change 
is especially evident in two respects. 

The first relates to the policy of territorial expansion. In 181 5, 



142 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

the possessions of the Company were very irregularly distributed 
over India; though considerable in the northeast (Bengal) and in 
the south (Madras and Ceylon), in the west they were limited to a 
few coast towns. The important commercial city of Bombay had 
no hinterland. Moreover, in the northwest was the largest native 
state, the Mahratta Empire formed of Hindu warriors. This state 
stretched also far to the east, and gave a point of support to robber 
bands of Pindaris. These often attacked the British territory of 
Madras in a fearful fashion. Just as in the case of Algiers or of 
Khiva, there was no permanent remedy for this, unless the British 
ceased to limit themselves to merely defensive measures against the 
native plunderers. Here public safety and conquest coincided. 

An occasion for such intervention was afforded by a particularly 
brutal Pindari raid in 1816, which laid waste northern Madras. 
The English opened war from the east and the west, and in scarcely 
half a year (October, 1817-March, 1818) the natives were subdued. 
The Mahratta army was destroyed, many native princes were de- 
posed, and others were compelled to recognize British suzerainty 
which placed them under the control of a British "resident." Bom- 
bay acquired a hinterland immediately dependent on the Company, 
and all of India with the exception of the Punjab, that is the terri- 
tory between China and Afghanistan, was brought under either the 
direct or indirect rule of the East India Company, 

The conquests in Burma took place somewhat later. Burmese 
troops had attacked native princes who stood under British protec- 
tion; thereupon the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, declared war 
on Burma. After relatively protracted operations (1824-26), the 
British army succeeded in compelling the King of Ava to cede his 
whole Burmese coastal territory with the exception of the central 
Pegu strip, British control was thus extended over India and 
Burma up to the frontier of Siam. 

The second respect in which a change of policy was evident is 
seen in the humanitarian and educational activity of the Indian ad- 
ministration. The East India Company as such had no interest 
in improving the civilization of the native population or in intro- 
ducing European institutions. On the contrary, it aimed to keep 
Christian missionaries out in order to avoid unrest. The representa- 
tives of the British Government, on the other hand, placed political 
and social reforms in the foreground. They sought to apply the 
new humanitarian ideas at least to the most objectionable Indian 
customs, even where these customs rested on religious beliefs. As 
early as 1802, Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, had 



ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 143 

forbidden the practice of throwing children to the sharks or drown- 
ing them in the Ganges. In 1829 the British went further still. 
Governor- General Bentinck forbade widow burning. He expressly- 
declared that religious practices would be tolerated only so far as 
they did not conflict with the fundamental demands of justice and 
humanity. In 1832, the Governor- General declared illegal the slave 
trade between the British districts, and finally, in 1843, slavery was 
totally forbidden. In education, European methods began to be in- 
troduced and a break was made in the traditional Oriental culture; 
Persian was definitely abolished in 1837 ^s the language of the law 
courts, and for it was substituted either English or one of the native 
dialects. 

All these tendencies, however, could not be fully developed so 
long as the old charter of the East India Company, which had to 
be periodically renewed, was still in force. The basis for more fun- 
damental reforms was therefore not laid imtil the Reform Bill of 
1832 had overthrown the conservative regime in the mother country 
(see above, p. 93). It happened that in the next year (1833) the 
charter had to be renewed. The new Liberal cabinet used this op- 
portunity to give effect to most important demands for modern- 
izing India. As almost always, what was old was not completely 
swept away, but some compromise was found. Still, as a matter 
of fact, the East India Company's new charter signified the end 
of the Company's commercial policy, and virtually brought India 
into the class of British crown colonies. Henceforth, the Company 
was little more than a mere agent for the English government. The 
administration of India had essentially passed over into the hands 
of the British Government. 

The first results of this new relationship were seen in the change 
of policy adopted toward the territories in the north (Sindh, Punjab, 
Beluchistan). The Board of Control in London looked further into 
the future than the directors of the East India Company, and re- 
garded it as necessary to get ahead of Russia. Instead of 
being content with administering the territories already won, the 
English government undertook to create a series of buffer states 
to protect India against a Russian invasion. They inaugurated the 
policy which was to determine almost exclusively their attitude 
toward other powers for more than half a century. Henceforth, their 
chief care was to make their Indian possessions safe against Russia; 
the main aim of British foreign policy, therefore, was to hinder 
Russia from becoming too strong, not only in Asia, but also every- 
where else. 



144 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

In order to realize the full significance of this attitude, the reader 
must keep in mind the forces on each side. England maintained in 
Europe an army which was small in view of her international rela- 
tions; and it was only her insular position and her superior fleet 
which prevented this neglect of armament from bringing about her 
downfall as a Great Power. In India this military weakness might 
have much more serious consequences. England's army, which 
was so small according to European notions, but which had won her 
battles in India, might indeed suffice to keep the native princes in 
order; but it was in no position to contend with a European military 
power. Furthermore, English rule could not depend on her own 
colonists for defense. India was not at all a settlement colony like 
Algeria, and no active assistance was to be expected from the na- 
tives, if English authority were once threatened. In fact, the nu- 
merous native soldiers (Sepoys), out of which the British armies in 
India were for the most part recruited (in 1857 the proportion of 
Sepoys to British troops in India was eight to one), could not be 
regarded as thoroughly reliable. So if Russia, the greatest military 
power of the time, should succeed in advancing against India, the 
colony would simply have to be counted as lost. Neither was Great 
Britain so organized that she could send out an army as strong as 
Russia's, nor would her superiority at sea be of any advantage in 
this case. So there was just one thing left to be done: to create 
dependent states in the border territory between India and the 
Russian possessions in Asia, These dependent states could bear the 
first brunt of Russian attack, and make a Russian expedition to 
India a more difficult affair. It became also part of England's 
policy to weaken Russia in general, b)'' means of international com- 
binations, of which the alliance with France in the Crimean War is 
the best known (see below, ch. xxii). 

Under these circumstances, one can understand what a great im- 
pression was made by Russia's systematic advance in Central and 
Eastern Asia as described in the preceding chapter. As early as 
the eighteenth century the East India Company had sought to es- 
tablish close relations with Persia. Later Napoleon had thought 
of attacking England by way of Persia. But now the Empire of 
the Shah had fallen completely under Russian influence, and Persian 
rulers were being instigated by Russian agents to undertake regular 
attacks against India. Russia's first attempt was made against 
Herat in Western Afghanistan. This stronghold lies in an oasis 
and controls the caravan route from Turkestan to India, but could 
not venture to make any independent resistance unaided; for the 



ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 145 

little principality of Herat was one of the numerous divisions which 
had survived after tlie splitting up of the empire of the Great Mogul, 
and was so small in area that it could not think of venturing into 
competition with Great Powers. But at this first attempt of Rus- 
sia's it appeared that the opponents of her policy of expansion in 
Central Asia could count on British help. The support which the 
English gave to Herat was indeed quite insignificant, consisting only 
of a single artillery officer in the service of the East India Company, 
but this young man conducted the defense of the city so cleverly, 
and understood so shrewdly how to inspire the garrison with unfail- 
ing courage, that the Persian army, in spite of the Russian officers 
who accompanied it, failed to take the city after a ten months' 
siege (1838-39), and had to retreat. Herat thereupon was again 
reestablished by the English as an independent state, that is, as a 
buffer between Persia (which was regarded as already lost and 
under Russian influence) and India (although a part of India which 
was not British territory). 

At the same time the Tsar undertook a similar step against the 
larger and more important kingdom of Afghanistan. In 1837 t^^ 
Russians had sent an agent to the Emir there and sought to prepare 
the way for the same kind of underhand vassal relationship as in 
Persia. The British in India replied to this by despatching an army 
of six thousand men to Cabul in order to depose the Emir who was 
friendly to Russia and to put in his place a pretender who was 
devoted to themselves and who had fled to India under English pro- 
tection (1839). The expedition was carried out without difficulty 
so long as it was merely a question of fighting a way through the 
country; the British army quickly seized the strongholds and occu- 
pied Cabul. But the deposition of the preceding Emir resulted in a 
general insurrection of the Afghans; they cut off communications 
with India and destroyed almost to a man the British army in its 
forced retreat (1842). This blow to British prestige was not left 
unavenged. The very same year a large army was fitted out and 
again occupied Cabul. But this time the British did not remain in 
the city. They were satisfied when the preceding Emir, whom they 
had released, declared himself to be their ally. So the much feared 
preponderant influence of Russia over Afghanistan was destroyed, 
for the moment at any rate. 

This precarious success was not the only consequence of the 
Afghan war. More important was the fact that by it the English 
were driven to conquer the whole northern part of India, particu- 
larly the Indus basin. Communications with Afghanistan were not 



146 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

regarded as secure so long as the intervening territory between it and 
British India remained in foreign hands. In fact, it was not pos- 
sible to control Russian intrigues unless the English became mas- 
ters of the Punjab. Even during the Afghan war a British con- 
tingent in the Sindh region, near the mouth of the Indus, had been 
severely dealt with (1839). 

Accordingly the Governors-General of India took the conquest of 
these territories systematically in hand. The struggle was not easy. 
The Punjab was, and is, occupied by the warlike Sikhs, who made 
a most obstinate resistance to the English, The wars lasted for 
seven years (1842-49); it was not until 1849 that the British could 
proclaim the annexation of the Punjab. In 1856 there followed the 
annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh on the upper Ganges in north- 
eastern India; this included Lucknow, which was regarded, so to 
speak, as the Brahmin Holy Land. All India was now in posses- 
sion of the English. The districts which were directly dependent 
upon the Governors- General formed a ring of territory around the 
native princes who still exercised a nominal authority. And it 
seemed likely that the directly dependent lands would be extended 
still further, as the English claimed to inherit principalities for which 
there was no legitimate heir, declaring them to be British pos- 
sessions. 

Similarly the British control over Burma was rounded out. There 
the Kingdom of Pegu, which had once been left under a native 
ruler, was annexed in 1852. In this way the whole of the territory 
in India and Burma lying on both sides of the Bay of Bengal came 
under British control. 

But this capstone nearly brought the whole structure to the 
ground. For a long time the proportion between the East India 
Company's British troops and the native Sepoys had been a dan- 
gerous one. As mentioned already, there were about eight Sepoys 
to one British soldier. The self-confidence of the Sepoys had been 
greatly increased during the recent wars. The British had made 
important concessions to them; many of them who were recruited 
from the fertile and densely populated territory of Oudh, which 
had been recently annexed by the British, suddenly acquired in 
their home territory an unusually privileged position. The unlucky 
course of the first Afghan campaign had also not been forgotten 
by the Sepoys. A wound to their religious sensibilities finally threw 
the spark into the powder magazine. Unfortunately, the new wea- 
pon introduced at this time into the Indian army, the so-called En- 
field rifle, horrified both the Hindus and Mohammedans. The 



ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 141 

cartridges that the soldiers had to bite off were greased with the fat 
of the cow, which is sacred for the Hindus, and with lard from the 
pig, which is abhorred by Mohammedans. So, in 1857, the year 
after the annexation of Oudh, part of the Sepoys mutinied. 

The revolt broke out in Delhi, northwest of Oudh. The Sepoys 
refused to obey their European officers, slew a number of them, and 
placed a successor to the Great Mogul on the throne. He soon 
succeeded in capturing Cawnpur in Oudh; the English there were 
mostly massacred. Rajah Nana Sahib, who had led the mutiny, 
was able to begin the siege of Lucknow. The whole upper Ganges 
region for the moment was lost to the British. 

But the rebels remained isolated; the Sikhs and the Gurkhas 
remained true to the British. This sealed the fate of the mutiny. 
General Havelock was able to make the Punjab his base of opera- 
tions. From there he quickly re-occupied Delhi, where the Great 
Mogul committed suicide, and then captured Cawnpur. It was 
somewhat longer before he was able to regain Lucknow in 1858; 
but timely reinforcements had been sent into the besieged city. A 
year later (1859) the whole mutiny could be regarded as suppressed. 
The speed with which the Sepoy mutiny had been put down was no 
more remarkable than the consequences which resulted from it. The 
assassination of British subjects had made an enormous impression 
in England. Public opinion ascribed the blame to the defective 
military system and especially to the defective government of the 
East India Company. The demand for a reform, that is for the 
transfer of administration from the Company to the British Govern- 
ment, could no longer be resisted. In 1858, the East India Com- 
pany ceased to rule, the Governor-General became a Viceroy, and 
the King of England undertook the immediate responsibility for 
the government of India. A principle already contained in the 
Company's charter of 1833 was also given increased emphasis: 
natives, no matter of what race or religion, were to be admitted 
so far as possible to official positions for which they were fitted. 
At the same time all the rebels, except those who had been guilty 
of murdering British subjects, received complete amnesty. 

India was now given a special official in London, the Secretary of 
State for India, whose duties were separated from those of the 
Colonial Secretary. The expenditures for the country were consider- 
ably increased. The Government established numerous schools for 
the natives, undei-took irrigation systems, and constructed a net- 
work of railways throughout the country. Vast measures were 
taken to prevent famine. The promise to admit natives into the 



148 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

administration was fulfilled to the extent that at least subordinate 
offices were given exclusively to natives; Indian notables were also 
admitted into the elective city councils; the higher positions, how- 
ever, which really controlled the administration, were reserved ex- 
clusively for the British until very recently. But to secure appoint- 
ment to these well-paid offices, persons had to pass a civil service 
examination in London, which guaranteed the possession of definite 
knowledge, especially in languages. In contrast with conditions 
under the East India Company, care was taken that the appoint- 
ment of high officials should not be made according to seniority; in 
general, Anglo-Indian Civil Servants were not compelled to come up 
through the lower grades of the service in India. 

The effect of the Sepoy Mutiny is most clearly seen in the reform 
of the military organization. After it had been shown how dangerous 
an army was in which the native element predominated, the propor- 
tion of European soldiers was materially increased. The artillery, 
which was important and which could not be improvised by the 
natives in case of a mutiny, was left wholly in the hands of Euro- 
pean troops. In the infantry and the cavalry the proportion of 
natives to Europeans was to be two to one in Bengal, and three to 
one in Madras and Bombay. Only subordinate positions in the 
army were open to natives. Ordinarily the standing army in India 
was to consist of 80,000 British and 160,000 Sepoys. The success 
of these changes has been complete; not only has there been no 
further mutiny of native troops since 1857, but Indian regiments 
which formerly used to refuse to fight in Burma, because they had a 
superstitious horror of crossing the ocean, could now be used with- 
out fear even on distant fields (such as Africa). 

Two problems, however, still remained to be dealt with, both of 
such a nature that a satisfactory solution was scarcely possible. 
One concerned the economic structure of the country, the other the 
population question. 

The connection with England resulted in a strict division of 
labor. India, which had formerly been a flourishing textile manu- 
facturing country according to Oriental notions, became reduced to 
a country producing chiefly raw materials. Her muslin manu- 
facture could not stand competition with English industries, and was 
almost ruined. In its place, the cultivation of the soil was strongly 
stimulated. The financial interests of the British government, which 
drew one of its most important sources of revenue from the opium 
monopoly along with the land tax and salt monopoly, tended to 
coincide with those of the new railway systems, which, for instance, 



ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 149 

made advantageous the growing of wheat in the Punjab. The culti- 
vation of tea in Assam rendered the English partially independent 
of China for one of their favorite luxuries. But it became more and 
more evident that the too dense population of India could not be 
fed, and the excellent administration was not one of the least influ- 
ences which tended to aggravate this evil. The complete pacification 
of the country, the measures to prevent periodic famines, the ameli- 
oration of the barbaric legal practices and religious customs, the 
introduction of modern means of communication — all these had the 
result that the population grew beyond measure, without being auto- 
matically checked as formerly. Under these circumstances nothing 
but India's manufactures could have remedied this evil to some ex- 
tent; and in fact some efforts of this kind were undertaken, but they 
were very moderate, and employed only a small part of the popula- 
tion. And a great development of Indian textiles was scarcely 
desirable from the point of view of the English export trade. Only 
the emigration of numerous coolies to the African or West Indian 
colonies succeeded in ameliorating a little the evils of Indian over- 
population. 

But this refuge did not apply to the upper classes, a circumstance 
which was all the more serious because their position in the 
Anglo-Indian state created a difficult problem — the second com- 
plicated task which faced the British administration. The oppor- 
tunity of acquiring European culture, which was liberally afforded 
by the government, was creating in India a large ''educated prole- 
tariat," that was much more dangerous than the corresponding 
groups in Europe; because, although in Europe the number of can- 
didates who had passed an advanced examination, was greater than 
the number of positions to be filled, in India the prospect of rising 
to the highest positions in the civil service scarcely existed for the 
natives at all. On the other hand, these intellectuals, like their 
European brothers, had become virtually useless for any other prac- 
tical economic activity, and so formed an evergrowing class of In- 
dian declasses. 

The opposition to British rule, which derived its strength chiefly 
from these groups, also began to assume ever more dangerous forms 
in another connection, directly as a result of this unlimited oppor- 
tunity for acquiring a European education. The safety of British 
rule had rested largely on the fact that hitherto there had been no 
unified Indian national feeling. In fact, there could not be any, 
so long as civilization in India rested on religion. The Hindu felt 
himself further removed from the T.Iohammedan than from the Eng- 



150 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

lishman, who usually did not disturb him in his religious practices. 
The Sepoy Mutiny had been unable to spread, in good part owing 
to the fact that the Sikhs would not support a revolt led by Nana 
Sahib, whom they regarded as a Mohammedan. But now precisely 
this contact with European civilization wakened new ideas among 
the intellectuals. They were freed from the intellectual bondage of 
their religious communities, so that Hindus and Mohammedans 
found themselves standing on the common national foundation of 
European ideas. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the im- 
partial and absolutely honest justice administered by the English 
was already regarded as a thorn in the flesh by the hitherto ruling 
classes, because it protected the lower classes against the traditional 
exploitation of the rich, it is easy to see that all the advantages which 
British administration afforded the natives gradually turned against 
the benefactors, at least so far as concerned the "babus" or Indian 
university graduates. 

Thus was established the Indian Empire, which lasted for more 
than half a century without any essential modifications. It was 
merely a change in form when the name "colony" was dropped, and 
India began to be thought of as a state imited to Great Britain 
through personal union. This was the purpose of the measure by 
which the "Empire of India" was proclaimed in 1876, and the Queen 
of England took the title "Empress of India." Since tliat time 
King George V and Queen Mary have assumed the imperial dignity 
formally, and in 191 1 the city of Delhi was again raised to the 
position of imperial capital. The King of England is likewise 
the successor of the Great Mogul (who also had his capital at Delhi) 
and no longer stands as the ruler of a subordinate people. 

Much more important for the future than these external changes 
is the fact that England by her control of India was led into a new 
political policy in regard to Eastern Asia, and was provoked into 
one of the most important events of the nineteenth century — the 
Europeanizing of the Far East. 

The partial transfer of political power from the East India Com- 
pany to the British government in 1833 had influenced relations 
with China. The Company had permission, as is well known, to 
carry on trade in Canton — the sole Chinese port open to trade — 
though only at definite times and under strictly regulated conditions. 
Now in 1834, when the commercial agents of the Company were re- 
placed in Canton by the official representatives of the British govern- 
ment, and when the British envoy, Lord Napier, desired to be re- 
ceived on equal terms by the governor of Canton, a conflict arose. 



COLONIAL WARS IN CHINA 151 

The Chinese government declared that they had provided only for 
the admission of commercial agents, and the viceroy refused to enter 
into any relations whatever with Napier. In 1834 the English repre- 
sentative, who had no forces at hand, thereupon withdrew to the 
neighboring Portuguese settlement of Macao. 

In spite of this, the English government at first refrained from 
forcible measures. To Lord Napier's complaints, it replied that it 
wanted to restore commercial relations only bj^ friendly means. Pos- 
sibly this policy would have lasted a long time if the English cabinet 
had not been compelled to regard the special wishes of the Indian 
administration. 

Since the end of the seventeenth century opium smoking had 
developed in China. The new luxury had spread so rapidly and 
caused such disastrous results that it was forbidden in 1729 except 
for medical purposes and later, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
forbidden altogether. This prohibitory legislation stood in direct 
conflict with the interests of the East India Company, which 
had a monopoly of the opium trade in India. Since it was impos- 
sible to get the Chinese prohibition annulled, much smuggling went 
on by way of Canton. The smuggling business increased more and 
more, even after the political power was half transferred from the 
East India Company to the British Government. Further induce- 
ment to increasing the prohibited importation of opium into China 
lay in the fact that in 1830 the cultivation of the poppy plant in 
India was permitted to every one, which naturally materially in- 
creased the supply of goods to be smuggled. Over this matter quar- 
i^els arose between the Chinese government and the British repre- 
sentatives. The Chinese sought to destroy the smuggling by force, 
that is, by confiscating the opium. The English government de- 
manded compensation (1839). ^^ order to give force to its demands 
the London cabinet despatched a number of ships and troops to 
China. As the Chinese still refused to give in, reinforcements were 
sent out and a number of coast towns were occupied without great 
difficulty. Finally, the British forces advanced up the Yang-tse 
River as far as Nanking. The Chinese government perceived that 
further opposition was hopeless, and in scarcely a week their dele- 
gates signed with the British the Treaty of Nanking (1842), 

The Treaty of Nanking marks the opening of political relations 
between China and Europe. The Middle Kingdom, which shortly 
before had only admitted the envoys of European Powers like de- 
spised slaves, now had to concede to the English equality of treat- 
ment and in many respects even superiority. After a supplementary 



152 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

treaty of 1843, ^^^ English received the exclusive right to punish 
subjects of their own who committed crimes on Chinese soil. Eng- 
land was assured the most- favored-nation treatment. In another 
treaty it was stipulated that British goods should pay no higher 
transit duties than those already in existence. These commercial 
privileges were all the more important in that the Treaty of Nan- 
king gave to the English full possession of the island of Hong-Kong 
(at the entrance to Canton), and five other coast towns (including 
Shanghai) were also opened to trade. In addition, China had to pay 
a considerable war indemnity, to grant an amnesty to all Chinese 
who had dealt with the British government, and to promise expressly 
that Chinese officials would treat the British on a footing of equality. 

This was the way in which the opium question was solved at first. 
But it was more than fifteen years before the Chinese government 
was ready to recognize officially the importation of opium; not 
until 1858 did it agree to the collection of an import duty. But 
since importation in the principal ports was practically controlled 
by the English, the smuggling could not be stopped, and trade 
statistics show that from 1845 the importation of opium steadily in- 
creased. India, which marketed the greater part of its opium in 
China, believed its profits secure; and nothing was left for the 
Chinese to do except to plant the poppy themselves in a steadily 
increasing quantity, unless they wanted to let the "foreign devils" 
have all the profit. 

The Opium War had still another result of enormous importance 
for world history. Now for the first time there was established 
direct and untrammeled trade between Europe and Asia. The Far 
East was opened to exploitation by the trade and modern factory 
production of European countries, backed by all the new means of 
communication made possible by modern inventions. It was evident 
that the old means of defense were inadequate to check this new 
invasion. The giant state of China, which for centuries had never 
had to fear attack from any of its neighbors, and which had felt 
secure in its self-sufficiency, was now compelled by a relatively small 
military force to open its doors to a trade that it recognized as hurt- 
ful to itself. The despised foreigners, Russians and English, had 
not only forced China to cede important territories, but had also 
received the right to interfere in her internal financial policies. All 
this had taken place without the sufferer having been guilty of any 
barbaric act which could have given Europeans good grounds for 
interference. In China there were neither robber bands nor pirates 
rendering neighboring territories unsafe. The country desired nothing 



COLONIAL WARS IN CHINA i53 

but to be left in peace. Nevertheless, the invasion had taken place. 
Europeans no longer permitted a market to be closed against them- 
selves, and they had the military force to impose their will even on 
their strongest opponent in Eastern Asia. 

The reaction, to be sure, was not long in coming. Peoples whose 
political organization was too different from that of Europe to per- 
mit their inferiority in fighting strength to be quickly remedied, had 
indeed little prospect of being able to avoid exploitation by Euro- 
peans. On the other hand, the nations of Eastern Asia were too 
advanced politically not to try to adapt their institutions success- 
fully to those of Europe. 

The first case of this kind will be explained in the following 
chapter. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF A NON- 
EUROPEAN PEOPLE (JAPAN) 

The Chinese Empire was so vast and its power was still so great, 
in spite of the commercial concessions wrung from it by Europeans, 
that the Treaty of Nanking and similar agreements which followed 
with England and other European nations made no catastrophic im- 
pression upon the organization of the state, and in fact passed almost 
unnoticed by considerable parts of the Empire. There followed, 
to be sure, a few small reforms in the nature of an adaptation to 
European customs, but all such efforts left the structure of the Old 
Regime untouched. It was quite otherwise with the little neighbor 
for whom it was a question of life or death whether she could so 
make herself over as to resist European armies. 

Japan had sought to secure herself from interference by foreign 
states in much the same way as China, or if possible, even more 
strictly, so that she was shut off completely from foreign countries. 
She was an example of an isolated state with a pure civilization of 
its own. All commercial relations with foreign countries were for- 
bidden; the only trade permitted was that along the coast. For- 
eigners were admitted into only one harbor (Nagasaki). Even there 
they could only land on an artificial island and had to submit to 
humiliating ceremonies; and the only foreigners tolerated were the 
Chinese and the Dutch, who were harmless both from a political 
and military point of view. 

Japan had no need to make any change, either within or without 
the country, so long as no European Great Power became interested 
in Eastern Asia. The only state which in earlier centuries might 
have forced an opening of the country, namely China, desired no 
commercial relations with foreigners; and it woud not have ac- 
corded with the modern pacifistic policy of the Middle Kingdom 
to use military force against a peaceful neighbor. 

Even at the end of the eighteenth century a few far-sighted Japa- 
nese had recognized that, owing to the extension of European ocean 
commerce, danger was approaching from the fact that Japan's 

154 



FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 155 

military equipment was wholly inadequate judged by European 
standards. Even at that time, a Japanese reformer arose who urged 
that at least defense against foreign ships be modernized. He in- 
sisted that the coasts ought to be fortified and the law forbidding 
foreign trade be repealed. But his program was much too prema- 
ture. The man who proposed these innovations was thrown into 
prison and his efforts were ruined. Practically none of his sugges- 
tions were carried out, except that some attention was given to the 
defense of the coasts. Even the cruel treatment of foreign ships 
was not given up, although Japanese might well have feared foreign 
countries would use this as an argument for intervening. Even in 
1825, the Japanese government ordered that every foreign ship 
should be fired upon forthwith; it was not until 1842 (that is, after 
the Opium War) that the law was modified so that an exception 
should be made at least in favor of vessels in distress. 

The first serious attack on this system was made when the Eng- 
lish war against China ended with the defeat of a great power which 
had hitherto been regarded as unconquerable. Reformers could 
point to this as a warning which any one ought to understand. In a 
petition to the Shogun, the highest authority in the country, they 
declared that Japan would suffer the same fate as China unless she 
changed her armament. 

Important as these demands may have been in preparing public 
opinion for the later revolution, the foreign warning was still not 
sufficient to bring about a change. The Japanese first had to realize 
in their own country what military weakness meant in the eyes of 
the European Great Powers before their Ancien Regime could be 
overthrown. To be sure, in some respects, their military system was 
modernized; the government imported guns from the Netherlands, 
and, in a very limited way, trained troops in the European fashion. 
It also intended to continue these efforts. It listened attentively to 
the warnings of the Dutch that it would be better to open the har- 
bors voluntarily, while this was still possible, without waiting to be 
forced to do so by the Europeans. 

The decisive impulse which led Japan to abandon her isolation 
policy came in the end from a nation which was not a European 
power. Japan was too distant and too poor to have the European 
Great Powers take such an interest in her as they did in China. It 
was otherwise with the United States. The inhospitable attitude 
of the Japanese government toward foreign vessels affected American 
shipping particularly. It often happened that American whaling 
ships were driven onto the Japanese coast. The greater proximity 



156 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

made commercial relations more attractive than in the case of Eu- 
rope. So it happened that in 1846 an American admiral desired 
admission ; when his request was refused, the government at Washing- 
ton discussed sending an expedition against Japan. 

Then in 1848, as a result of the war with Mexico, the United 
States acquired California and the harbor of San Francisco, Her 
interest in the opening of Japan became greater than ever. She 
was no longer content with platonic requests. In 1853 Commodore 
Perry appeared in the Bay of Yedo (now Tokio) with four warships 
and requested the Mikado, the nominal ruler of Japan, to open his 
harbors. At the same time he handed to the Japanese government 
as a gift two hitherto unknown examples of modern science, — models 
of the telegraph and the railway. 

In this first visit Perry succeeded only in having his letter handed 
to the Mikado, though this was contrary to Japanese law. The 
means at his disposal did not permit him to go further. He there- 
fore returned the following year (1854), but with twice as many 
warships and four thousand soldiers on board. The Japanese, who 
saw foreign steamers and guns for the first time, quickly perceived 
that they must yield. They decided first to make concessions in 
order to avoid a military conflict and thus gain time to reorganize 
themselves. So Perry succeeded in having two harbors opened to 
foreign trade, in having the tariff for American goods placed at a 
very low rate, and in establishing an American consul who should 
exercise jurisdiction over Americans. 

Thus Japan had to make essentially the same concessions as 
China; and these were made, not to the Americans alone, but to 
all the other European nations, for the treaty with Perry in 1854 
served as a model for numerous others. In the following years sim- 
ilar treaties were made with Russia, Great Britain, Holland, afid 
France. Three harbors were finally opened to trade. The tariff 
was declared applicable to all Europeans. The European Powers 
received the right not only to establish consuls with their own juris- 
diction, but also to be represented by ministers to the Shogun, 

Japan seemed to have fallen into a position of greater dependence 
than China, But the country had made these concessions, as has 
been said, only in order to gain time to Europeanize her organization 
undisturbed. Consequently, she set to work to adapt her military 
system, which hitherto had been wholly neglected, to European 
standards. This movement was essentially aided by the course of 
the so-called Second Opium War in China (1858-60), which showed, 
even more clearly than the First, the weakness of the East Asiatic 



FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 157 

states compared with Europe, and also the serious consequences for 
a state which did not adopt European methods. 

The thing which gives the revolution in Japan world historic im- 
portance was not merely the fact that her military institutions were 
modernized, as also happened finally in China, but that the whole 
social and political organization of the nation was revolutionized. 
The main interest, therefore, does not lie in the less important tech- 
nical innovations which Japan copied from Europe after 1854 (she 
engaged military instructors from Holland, received a steamer from 
the Dutch as a gift, and established an iron foundry), but in the 
fundamental transformation of the constitution of the state. But 
before this change is described, a brief account must be given of the 
Ancien Rigime in Japan. 

The mountainous Japanese islands, where only fifteen per cent 
of the soil is fit for cultivation, had always remained a relatively 
poor country. Neither in industry nor in intellectual life had the 
Japanese shown such an independent and wide development as the 
Chinese. While the giant empire of China had always devoted 
itself to the arts of peace, Japan had remained under the domination 
of the warrior class. Although in other respects Chinese culture had 
been slavishly copied (to such an extent that Japanese writers even 
wrote their books in the Chinese language), in military matters 
Japan had by no means modeled herself after her great neighbor. 
Nominally, to be sure, the Japanese population was divided into the 
same classes as the Chinese: there was the division into scholars, 
peasants, artisans, and merchants; but in Japan "scholars" meant 
the feudal nobility, the Samurai or warrior caste. There was no 
merchant code of honor as in China; notions of honor were of a 
feudal nature and were derived from loyalty to the overlord. 

The most powerful of these feudal overlords, the Shogun, was 
the actual ruler of the country. The nominal emperor, or Mikado, 
lived a totally secluded shadow existence in Kioto; he was 
carefully watched by the Shogun and was powerless against him 
because he controlled only insignificant possessions. The Shogun in 
Yedo (Tokio), on the other hand, was the richest man in the coun- 
try. He did not rule exactly in cooperation with the other great 
feudal lords (Daimios), but with the help of his own vassals. 

All the power in general lay in the hands of this hereditary aris- 
tocracy. The 268 Daimios, who had about 400,000 armed servants 
(Samurai) in their pay, controlled all financial and political power. 
But in spite of their military veneer their warlike spirit had de- 
parted. The long years when Japan was threatened by no enemy 



158 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

had allowed soldier virtues to decay. Knowing nothing of business 
and brought up according to strict etiquette, the Daimios lived an 
idle existence, whether on their country estates or at the court of 
the Shogun. The Samurai were still equipped with armor and swords, 
but modern weapons were scarcely known. There were not even 
the beginnings of a navy. 

Now if the Japanese wished to create a defensive system of a 
European nature, their first task was to break the privileges of the 
military caste. The most natural way to do this seemed to be to 
restore the old empire by endowing the Mikado again with the 
political power, as he had become merely an object of religious 
veneration, and by playing him off against the Daimios. 

The Europeans themselves aided the reformers in Japan. Since 
the high Japanese officials, being feudal lords, were the most de- 
cided opponents of every innovation, such as opening of the ports, 
the Americans had at the very outset appealed to the Mikado, 
and later British diplomats adopted the same policy. So it was the 
Opposition Party itself which helped bring it about in 1867 that 
power was restored to the new Mikado, Mutsu-Hito, who died 
in 1912. 

When Mutsu-Hito ascended the throne he turned out to be a 
monarch who was ready to undertake the reforms advocated by the 
Europeans and the Japanese and even by a part of the magnates 
themselves. Old Japan was quickly transformed. In this same 
year (1867) the last Shogun had to resign, and the next year the 
Japanese government began to make voluntarily the concessions 
which the Europeans shortly before had been wringing from them 
by interfering in their affairs. Ports were opened, ambassadors were 
admitted to direct intercourse with his Imperial Majesty, and the 
royal residence was transferred to Yedo which was now named 
Tokio; thus the Mikado henceforth lived at the former seat of the 
Shoguns. In 1869 the Mikado took an oath to the constitution. 

The most important change was the abolition of the old feudal 
system. The execution of the treaties which had been made before 
1868 had been rendered possible only by the fact that the Mikado 
had allied himself with the foreigners against the conservative part 
of the Japanese nobility ; a permanent modernization of Japan could 
only be brought about if the sworn adherents of the Old Regime 
were rendered powerless forever. Accordingly, in the years 1871-75 
the Mikado's enlightened despotism put a complete end to feudalism ; 
the nobles were either pensioned or bought off. The clans were 
dissolved. Local government was handed over to prefects after 



FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 159 

the French fashion. In imitation also of Napoleon I's government, 
an advisory senate was established at the Mikado's side. The war- 
rior caste of Samurai was completely abolished, and in its place 
universal military service was introduced (1873). In the preceding 
year (1872), as a necessary forerunner to it, compulsory education 
was adopted. Banks and stock-companies were established like 
those of Europe. 

Going beyond these economic and political measures, the new 
government even dared to deal with religion. In 1858 the Ameri- 
cans had secured by treaty freedom of worship for their citizens. 
Now Japan, of her own accord, went further and annulled all the 
edicts which had been made against Christianity. Buddhism and 
Shintoism were no longer to be regarded as religions of the state 
(1880). Distinctly Christian institutions, like Sunday rest and the 
Gregorian calendar, received official sanction. Foreigners of other 
religions were called in considerable numbers as teachers in the 
new state schools, particularly in the universities. English was 
made obligatory as the language for students. The proposition was 
even considered of introducing a simplified English as the language 
of daily life. 

The New Era was particularly manifest in the field of education. 
The state overlooked no means by which the people could be made 
quickly acquainted with European science and technical progress. 
The system of education was put under state supervision. Four 
universities and several technical schools were established, modeled 
on those of Europe. Travelling fellowships were provided for 
teachers who wanted to seek the fountains of knowledge in Europe. 
In all this there was no question of slavish imitation, at least not 
in the branches of knowledge which were not of a technical or 
scientific nature. Thus, the religious instruction of European schools 
was replaced by general ethics, and by courses in jurisprudence in 
the secondary schools. 

The speed with which this Asiatic people without, so to speak, 
any preparation understood how to assimiliate all the inherited ac- 
quisitions of Eiu-opean culture must ever remain one of the most 
astonishing facts in world history. Scarcely had a decade passed 
when Japan was able to use against another East Asiatic state the 
very methods which the European countries had adopted only a 
little while before against her. The Emperor of Korea, that is the 
ruler of the peninsula which lies directly opposite Japan, was afraid 
that his country might be contaminated by the example which 
Mutsu-Hito had given; in 1873, therefore, he had broken off rela- 



i6o FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

tions with the "renegades" in Tokio; and two years later a Japanese 
warship was fired at from a fort on the Korean coast. Thereupon, 
Japan immediately despatched a fleet and compelled the Emperor 
to sign a treaty opening a number of Korean ports to foreign trade. 
This was exactly a repetition of the step which the Americans had 
taken in dealing with the Japanese in 1853. 

The Japanese were no longer afraid to attack the mightier power 
of China. In numbers they were much weaker than the Chinese, the 
population of Japan being about one-tenth that of China. But this 
disadvantage was more than equalized by the training which the Japa- 
nese army and navy had received. While the Japanese forces had 
been fundamentally modernized, the Chinese had left their armaments 
on the old basis. To be sure, a number of European officers had 
been employed in China after i860 and some war vessels had been 
built on European models, but the change was not so thorough-going 
as in Japan, where every remnant of the old military conditions 
disappeared, after the last resistance of the Samurai had been abso- 
lutely crushed by the newly trained European troops. Even the 
right of carrying two swords, which had formerly distinguished 
Samurai from other people, was now taken away. Officers, to be sure, 
were still appointed to a large extent from the nobility; but mem- 
bership in a class was no longer sufficient; training in a technical 
school was necessary. This training was put into the hands of foreign 
experts, French in 1866, but German after 1885. 

What could China oppose to this military equipment? Japan's 
intervention in Korea was in a sense an invasion of Chinese rights, 
because Korea, according to Chinese views, was under the suzerainty 
of Peking. In 1876 Japan annexed the Liu-kiu islands lying south 
of her. China protested strongly, but had to give in without striking 
a blow. 

A military conflict between the two countries was henceforth 
inevitable. It would also decide whether Eastern Asia would be 
permanently Europeanized or not. China clung to the hope of being 
able to destroy her troublesome neighbor without having to Euro- 
peanize her own military system. It seemed possible so to increase 
China's naval forces as to secure an undisputed superiority over 
Japan. If the Mikado could be taught a lesson in this way a reac- 
tion was sure to follow in Japan. Japan was not a rich country; 
the enormous military expenditures were a heavy burden for her 
population, and if it should turn out that in spite of them the 
Japanese army was not superior to the Chinese forces, the Japanese 
reform movement was bound to collapse quickly. 



FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS i6i 

Such was the reasoning of the Chinese statesmen whose intel- 
lectual and political leader was Li-Hung-Chang. The Chinese 
wished that the coming struggle for Korea should take place quickly, 
and they made their preparations for it. But the Old Regime in 
China, which was not adapted to war, least of all to a war against 
modern European weapons, proved itself incapable of taking in 
hand even the naval reforms demanded by Li-Hung-Chang. It was 
not money and men that were lacking, but energy; and there was 
no strong central government to guide the careless provincial gov- 
ernors in a strict, uniform policy. China's natural superiority in 
resources of all sorts could not be made available. 

So it came about that the Japanese triumphed by land and by 
sea in the war which broke out over Korea (1894-95). The im- 
mediate occasion of the war came from the fact that the Japanese 
sank a Chinese transport which was carrying troops to Korea. 
When hostilities began the Chinese warships were larger and more 
numerous than those of Japan, but the crews lacked European 
training and the advantages of recent technical inventions. The 
Japanese ships had greater speed, their officers had been trained by 
British experts, and their crews had also been given excellent drill. 
So the Japanese were able to win the war at sea before their land- 
armies came into action, and to these the Chinese could then oppose 
no equivalent force. 

Without the Chinese navy being able to prevent it, the Japanese 
landed troops in Korea and drove the Chinese out of the peninsula. 
They were soon able to extend their operations further west toward 
the Gulf of Pe-chili and Peking, and to advance into IVIanchuria, 
where they captured the Chinese naval bases of Ta-lien-wan and 
Port Arthur. Then they gained a firm footing on the opposite coast 
in Shantung by storming Wei-hai-wei, which controls the entrance 
to the Gulf of Pe-chili from the south as Port Arthur controls it from 
the north. The entrance to Peking now stood open, and the Japa- 
nese were already preparing to land another army in order to ad- 
vance from Taku (the port of the Chinese capital) against the city 
of Peking. There was nothing to stop them. All the Chinese war 
vessels had either been destroyed or fallen into the hands of the 
Japanese. 

The Chinese government then saw that its cause was lost and 
declared itself ready to make peace. On April 17, 1895, ^^^ Peace 
of Shimonoseki was signed. This satisfied all the claims of the 
Japanese. The independence of Korea was recognized; that is, 
China abandoned her suzerain rights and handed the country over 



i62 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

to Japanese influence. The Liao-tung Peninsula, with Port Arthur 
at its southern point, as well as Formosa and the Pescadores 
Islands, were ceded to Japan. China paid a large war indemnity, 
and as a pledge of payment left Wei-hai-wei in the hands of the 
enemy. She also accorded Japan various commercial privileges. 

It will be pointed out in another connection (see below, ch. 
xxx), how Japan was deprived by the European Powers of a con- 
siderable part of the fruits of her victory. At this point we can 
only make clear the importance which the Japanese success had 
for world history. This importance was not affected by the fact 
that a number of the European Powers checked Japan for the mo- 
ment. The war had shown that an Eastern Asiatic country could 
so completely appropriate European methods of conducting war as 
to accomplish as great results as their teachers. It was evident that 
China would soon follow Japan's example, and that the time was 
coming to an end when European powers could regard Eastern Asia 
as a booty to be divided up among themselves at will. The yellow 
races themselves would soon have something to say, and, at any 
rate, the European Powers would have to share their claims with 
the new power of Japan. An English author rightly observed, "If 
Li-Hung-Chang and his system had triumphed and if Mutsu-Hito 
had been defeated in the war with China, one might have expected 
that the Far East would have been partitioned among the European 
and American Powers without delay." 

All this was now avoided through the victories of Japan, and one 
of the first causes of dispute between the Japanese and the Euro- 
pean Powers was Japan's demand that the integrity of China be 
respected. But the consequences of this dispute, which eventually 
led to war between Japan and Russia, will be treated, as has been 
said, in another connection. Here attention can be called only to 
the consequences which Japan's progress had for Japan herself in 
her relations with foreign powers. 

About the same time as the war with China, Japan succeeded in 
setting aside the treaties which she had been compelled to sign in her 
time of weakness and which had restricted the Empire of the Rising 
Sun to the position of a second-rate state. Japan was now able to 
bring about a revision of her commercial treaties. She secured the 
same freedom in fixing her tariff rates as European states. The low 
import duties which had been established for the benefit of foreign 
merchants were abolished. A final step in this direction was the 
annulment of special consular jurisdiction for foreigners (1899). 
Foreigners now had to seek justice in Japanese courts of law in the 



FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 163 

same way as in European countries; this was aided by the fact that 
in 1898 a Japanese civil code was put into force, modeled after the 
new German civil code; in 1880 a modern criminal code, drawn up 
by a Frenchman, had also been adopted. 

Finally, it meant a complete break with tradition that the Mikado 
gave his country a constitution on the European model in 1889. 
To be sure, a regular parliamentary system was not introduced. 
The constitution was patterned after that of Prussia. Of the two 
chambers, the House of Peers was composed of nobles appointed 
by the Emperor for life. The House of Representatives was not 
elected by universal suffrage; the franchise was dependent upon 
the payment of a land tax of about seven dollars and a half. The 
cabinet was not dependent for power upon a majority in the 
House of Representatives. But if one considers that, according to 
the notions of Old Japan, the Mikado was descended from the gods, 
and that the government had formerly been exclusively in the hands 
of irresponsible feudal princes, he will see that the revolution was 
significant enough. A complete adoption of the system of parlia- 
mentary government would also have been opposed to the social 
structure of the country. The Japanese had, indeed, attempted to 
introduce European manufacturing on a large scale. In 1872, when 
the first railways were built, coal mines were opened and cotton 
and silk mills established. But they had not resulted in developing 
a well-to-do middle class as in Western Europe. The population of 
the extraordinarily densely settled islands remained poor. The 
great mass of the farmers gained a scanty living by rice culture, and 
the military development of the country was chiefly noticeable in 
the increase in the cost of living which it caused. So it was natural 
that the descendants of the former warrior nobility, even after they 
had lost their privileges, retained a privileged position. They were 
the persons who were usually appointed as prefects and ministers, 
and these representatives of the large landed estates often paid 
little attention to the members of the House of Representatives. 
Also the introduction of local self-government in 1899 turned out 
chiefly to the advantage of the landlords. Similarly the officers in 
the army and navy came in large part from the nobility. But this 
did not alter the fundamentally important fact which resulted from 
Europeanization, — the establishment of a strong central government 
upon whose favor even the nobles were dependent. 

After Japan had gone so far, it could be only a question of time 
when China also would Europeanize herself. From the outset, one 
might say, if this change could have been brought about with- 



i64 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

out endangering the unity of the enormous empire, the European 
Powers would have found in the Middle Kingdom a still more dan- 
gerous rival than in Japan, not only because of the vast extent of 
the country, but also in view of the great efficiency of the people. 
The Chinese had always given evidence of an intellectual ability 
.which was quite strildngly different from that of the Japanese. Now 
if the inhabitants of the Land of the Rising Sun had been able 
within such an astonishingly short time to prove pupils who were 
beginning to surpass their teachers, — what were the Europeans soon 
to expect from the Chinese? 



CHAPTER XX 

THE OUTCOME OF AN ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 
IN EUROPE. (THE HISTORY OF IRELAND 

IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY) 

The history of Ireland, since 1815, is so closely connected wiih 
the general population problems which determined the new colonial 
policy in the nineteenth century, and has developed in so peculiar 
a fashion, that it is best considered at this point; furthermore, the 
older history of Ireland offers a remarkable contrast to modern 
attempts at colonization. It is also desirable to explain the 
development of Irish conditions apart from those of England. 
Though events in Ireland are so often and so decisively interwoven 
with English history, nevertheless neither can the history of Ireland 
be rightly understood if it is given merely piecemeal in the narra- 
tive of English events, nor can its fundamental importance for the 
development of Great Britain be correctly seen. 

For centuries, ever since England became a powerful state at 
rivalry with France, it has been Ireland's fate to be held in a 
dependent position by the neighboring stronger and richer kingdom 
for strategic reasons, without the English Crown, however, being 
able actually to subdue the whole country. It was vital to England 
not to allow this close-lying island to fall under the control of 
France or to be occupied by French troops; yet any colonization by 
English citizens, which was the only way of making the country 
really a part of England, was out of the question. The Emerald 
Isle, little suited to agriculture, and consisting almost wholly of 
pasture lands, was at an early time sufficiently populated in view 
of conditions existing there. There was no land vacant in such 
a way that it could be occupied and divided among colonists. 
The English government, therefore, contented itself, at first, with 
merely occupying the little territory around Dublin, the so-called 
*Tale," which at least might protect England against a direct 
attack. Even this measure was satisfactory only from a military 
point of view; the parts which had been settled by the Norman 
nobles had been quickly Celticized under the influence of the 
overwhelming native population. From the middle of the sixteenth 

165 



i66 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

century the relations between the nominally subject Irish population 
and the English Crown had grown much worse^ as it had proved 
impossible to extend the Protestant Reformation to the Celtic 
parts of the island. This relation between British and Irish threat- 
ened to become even more bitter, because it was anticipated that 
the stricter rule of the Tudors would put an end to the liberty of 
the Irish chieftains; to this was then added religious hatred, which 
made the breach irrevocable. It was out of the question to think 
of incorporating the Irish population into the English system of 
government. If the English Crown wanted to make the island in- 
disputably obedient, the only way to do it was to drive out the 
natives by force, and to settle Scots and English in their place. 
This accordingly was the method which was employed in the six- 
teenth and seventeenth centuries by the Tudors and earlier Stuarts, 
and with a special brutality by Cromwell. The Irish were driven 
out of a considerable part of the island (especially in the east) ; 
their land was given to English and Scots, mostly in the shape of 
large landed estates. 

But though this ''settlement" was often carried through without 
consideration for the Irish, it did not succeed in its purpose at all. 
On the contrary, it created one difficulty more. At first it was 
naturally impossible to destroy the native population altogether, or 
even to drive it away completely from the regions which were as- 
signed to British settlers. The bitterness between Anglo-Saxon set- 
tlers and Irish natives continued just as before. Still further 
complications were added. Ireland no longer formed a unit as 
formerly. It was occupied by two populations who were sharply 
divided by clashing religious creeds. Furthermore, the interests of 
the Anglo-Saxon settlers were often not wholly identical with those 
of the English in the mother country; so that here also groups were 
often opposed, and even from the English point of view one claim 
often demanded as much attention as another. Particularly com- 
plicated were the conditions in 1800, — again under the fear of a 
French invasion, — when Ireland was formally united with Great 
Britain and the Dublin Parliament was dissolved; this gave Ire- 
land's representatives a seat and voice in the English Parliament 
itself. 

It is well known with what bitter satire Swift exposed the misery 
of the Irish people during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Since then, conditions had grown no better. The continuance of 
peace, and still more the restoration of good order brought by the 
English government with a cessation of the former clan feuds, had 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 167 

allowed the population to grow greatly, without any corresponding 
increase in the means of livelihood. As Ireland was less well situated 
than England, because it was little suited to agriculture, so it hap- 
pened also that she could not make the same transition into a great 
manufacturing state. Ireland possessed only a little inferior coal 
and a scanty supply of wood, so that the considerable amounts of 
iron could not be used. Manufactures had been allowed to develop 
only to an extent that would not injure English manufacturing, 
and Irish Catholics were often excluded from employment in fac- 
tories. The Irish lacked also the capital to develop new industries. 
In short, Ireland suffered all the disadvantages of the English 
system of large landed estates; these disadvantages were further 
sharpened by national and religious hatreds, by the smaller produc- 
tivity of the soil (the population lived largely on potatoes and 
milk), and by the absence of large industries, which in England and 
Scotland saved from destruction the population which could no 
longer be nourished from the soil. 

The result was that a large emigration, or rather an internal migra- 
tion, of labor took place earlier than in other countries. Even at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century many poor Irish became 
migratory laborers, going later to England for agricultural employ- 
ment. Conditions in Ireland were so different from those in Eng- 
land that at the Union in 1800 it was impossible simply to transfer 
the English system to the neighboring island. Nevertheless, English 
institutions remained in force, and, under the changed conditions, 
were much more oppressive to the Irish Catholics than to their co- 
religionists in England. 

In England the Catholic Church was merely tolerated and tithes 
had to be paid to the established Protestant Church by every indi- 
vidual, no matter to what religion he belonged. But in England, 
where Catholics formed only a small part of the population and 
by no means the poorest part, this privilege of the Established Church 
was of much less importance than in Ireland. Here the mass of the 
natives, who were Catholic almost without exception, beside having to 
support their own religion, to which the state contributed nothing, had 
also to pay taxes to support the foreign clergy of the Anglican 
Church. Since 1832 tithes were no longer collected from the pas- 
ture land, that is from the large estates in the hands of the English 
landlords, whereas the tilled land, that is the farms of the poor peo- 
ple, were left to bear the burden. Also the regulation by which all 
public activity, such as sitting on juries and appointment to city 
offices, was reserved for Protestants, naturally bore much harder in 



i68 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

Ireland than in England. From a purely political point of view, 
on the other hand, the Irish Catholics were somewhat better off 
than their religious brethren in England. The Irish parliament, 
during the last years of its existence, had taken advantage of the 
state of war with France to get a number of the exceptional laws 
against Catholics annulled; the English government did not dare 
to revive the old regime. Irish Catholics could vote for members 
of the English House of Commons, but they could not be 
elected to it. They might vote, but their representatives must be 
Protestants, and the franchise was much lower than in England, so 
low, in fact, that all peasants, so to speak, could vote. Also the num- 
ber of representatives in the House of Commons assigned to Ireland 
once for all in 1800 was not small; they numbered 100, whereas Scot- 
land, for example, was represented by only 45 members. In 1800 and 
afterwards, therefore, Ireland exercised a considerable influence in 
the English Parliament. 

One point peculiar to Irish economic life has not been mentioned: 
the so-called "absenteeism" of the landlords. In England large 
landed estates prevailed; but there the lord usually lived on his 
estate. The Irish gentry, on the other hand, spent the larger part 
of their existence in London or Dublin. They were, therefore, de- 
pendent upon receiving rent from their estates, and neither had they 
any personal contact with their tenants nor were they inclined to 
forego a temporary profit from their estates in order to draw a 
larger rent later. Rightly does M. J. Bonn observe, "If the Irish 
landlord (that is, the landowner of English origin) had seriously 
aimed at the improvement of agriculture, he ought to have lived 
in the midst of his tenants. Either he ought to have cultivated his 
estate on a large scale basis, employing and training the small 
tenants as day laborers, or he ought to have been content to receive 
his rents in the form of produce of the soil. In either case he would 
have had to live primarily from the produce of his estate and he 
would only have had to make small outlays in money. The cash 
profits from his estate he would have paid out in the shape of wages 
or used for improvements. If he preferred leasing his land, he 
would have had to leave the cash profits from the leased land to 
the leaseholders and content himself with payments in kind and 
services. In this case the tenant could have saved capital and would 
have had an inducement to more intensive agriculture." 

In all this, be it observed, there was no clash of nationalities in 
the modern sense of the word. In preceding centuries, to be sure, 
the English government had attempted by force to supplant Irish 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 169 

customs and even the Irish language by that of England. But such 
efforts had ceased long ago, because they had very little point. 
To be sure, Gaelic had survived among a part of the population in 
the purely Irish districts of the west; but a majority of the in- 
habitants had learned English, and even adopted it to such an extent 
that they had completely forgotten the Irish dialects. The com- 
plaints of the Irish never rested on attacks against their language; 
so far as Gaelic was still a living language, no obstacles were placed 
in its way by the English government. Ireland's grievances were 
wholly of a religious and social character. 

So long as the laws against Roman Catholics were still in force 
in England (see above, p. 90), Irish agitation was chiefly directed 
to religious questions. Here their first leader was the Catholic 
barrister O'Connell, who founded the Catholic League in 1823 and 
sought the abolition of the laws against his Catholic brothers in 
England. O'Connell was the first Catholic who was elected to the 
House of Commons (1828), and it was apparently thanks to his 
election that in the following year (1829) Catholic Emancipation 
was passed in England. 

This brought little advantage to Ireland, for, at the same time, 
the electoral qualification, which was extraordinarily low according 
to English conceptions, was increased in Ireland about five-fold, so 
that the poor Irish peasants were now excluded from the franchise. 
Thus the Irish farmers lost their former privilege, and since they 
formed a much more numerous part of the population than the 
farmers in England they were relatively worse off than the latter. 

The Reform Bill of 1832 (see above, p. 92) made no direct 
change in conditions in Ireland; it was of importance only in that 
it broke the rigid conservatism of the Old Regime and so prepared 
the way for reforms. The English workingman's movement scarcely 
touched Ireland at all, since the country was so little industrialized; 
Irish Chartist leaders like O'Connell and O'Brien spent their energies 
in England. In Ireland, as ever, the Church problem stood in the 
forefront; here agitation could work freely, now that the Catholics 
had been given political and legal equality. Daniel O'Connell, a 
great orator and political organizer, to whom the Catholics owed in 
good part the removal of the religious restrictions, understood how 
to gather about himself all the aspirations of the Irish. He united 
into a single party the mass of the Irish peasants who had hitherto 
remained apart from political life; this party aimed at religious as 
well as social reform, or rather at both at once, since disestablish- 
ment of the Anglican Church in Ireland would at the same time 



I70 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

bring economic relief to the Catholic farmers. It was not O'Connell's 
idea to replace the Protestant Church by a Catholic one; for he 
wished to deprive the English government of all ecclesiastical influ- 
ence. He merely wanted freedom and equality for the Irish Church, 
that is, simply the abolition of all the privileges enjoyed by the 
Anglicans. Previous to 1832 he had even dallied with the plan of 
securing this by a return to the conditions before 1800. He founded 
a league for home rule in Ireland, which should bring about a repeal 
of the Act of Union made at the beginning of the century. But 
after 1832 he cherished exclusively the aim of improving the con- 
dition of the Irish Catholic population within the existing political 
organization. 

His most important demand was the abolition of the tithes, that 
is, of the taxes for the support of the Protestant Church. In this 
connection the Irish for the first time began to adopt the revolu- 
tionary tactics of open opposition to the law, which have been so 
often imitated since tlien. The Irish Catholics refused to pay the 
tithes. A number of tithe proctors were murdered. Instead of 
£104,000 only £12,000 were collected. In the face of this opposi- 
tion the English ministry gave way. It would not, indeed, hear of 
a complete abolition of the tithes; but, according to its usual prac- 
tice, it sought to arrange a compromise. First, the number of 
Anglican bishoprics in Ireland was decreased (from 22 to 12), and 
the taxes for the maintenance of the church buildings were abolished, 
which considerably reduced the payments which Irish Catholics had 
to make. Later, payment of tithes was transferred from the tenants 
to the landlords, that is, from the Irish to the English. At the 
same time a poor-law with public support for the needy was intro- 
duced. But the Irish regarded these concessions merely as partial. 
Their agitation was helped by the fact that during their struggle 
for the abolition of the tithes they had been able for the first time 
to exercise a decisive influence on the parliamentary situation. By 
his skill in organization, O'Connell had succeeded in forming such 
a strong group about himself in the House of Commons that the 
majority, and hence the decision as to which of the two English par- 
ties should control, was dependent upon his will. O'Connell at that 
time assured control to the Liberals by uniting with them against 
the High Church Tories. 

Just because the Irish question was apparently primarily a re- 
ligious one, the Irish had little hope except from the Whigs, since 
the Tories stood even more strongly in defense of the privileges of 
the Anglican Church than for the maintenance of the landlord sys- 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 171 

tern. The conflict, therefore, became much more bitter when the 
Conservatives again came to power in 1841. O'Connell returned to 
his effort to secure the repeal of the Act of Union of 1800, and began 
an agitation hke that of the Chartists. Monster meetings were held 
demanding autonomy for Ireland, that is, a restoration of the 
Catholic government in the island. 

This movement found extraordinarily favorable soil in the in- 
creasing misery of the Irish people. Since 1800 the population of 
Ireland had been continuing to increase without any corresponding 
means for its support being afforded by the establishment of new 
industries or by a more intensive cultivation of the soil. In 1825 
the population of Ireland was 6,000,000; in 1836, 7,760,000; in 
1841, 8,770,000; the average density of the population per square 
mile in 1840 was 93; that is, it was almost as high as in England 
(105), which had industries and was much more fertile; three times 
as high as in Scotland (ss), which, however, was largely hilly; and 
higher than the average of the three countries put together (86); 
it was also much higher than fertile France (62), or Germany 
(61). The misery of the people grew in proportion to this increase 
in their numbers. The soil was divided up into tiny parcels; the 
farmers lived in miserable huts without windows, often along with 
the cattle, and clothed only in rags; and they subsisted ordinarily 
only on potatoes and water. In short, there was unquestionably 
terrible suffering. The official commission of inquiry was the last 
to deny these facts. The only question was how they should be 
remedied. 

The Irish naturally laid the blame on the landlords and par- 
ticularly on the insecurity of their tenancy. How could one expect 
the peasant to labor to improve his land if, at any moment, he might 
be evicted by the landlord, and have to leave the soil he had been 
cultivating without being paid any compensation for the improve- 
ments which he had made? The tenant ought, at least, to be guar- 
anteed against summary eviction without compensation for his im- 
provements. 

Justifiable as many of these demands were, one must not overlook 
the fact that they were only one of the roots of the evil. This is 
clear from all the reforms which have since taken place, which have 
gone far beyond the first demands of the Irish. It was also clear 
to contemporaries at that time. Lord Dufferin, one of the largest 
landlords in Ireland, wrote in 1869, that the tenants of the exces- 
sively divided soil would never be economically better off, even if 
they were regarded as tenants for life. "The rents of Ireland are 



172 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

comparatively low: to transfer, therefore, the power of exaction 
created by competition from the landlord, against whose interest it 
is to enforce it, and to hand it over to the tenant, who will never 
fail to enforce it, would hardly be a change to the better. Yet you 
will hear the same person who would vehemently denounce a land- 
lord for insisting on a rack-rent, detail with complacency the enor- 
mous sums of money which some one has obtained for his tenant- 
right from a successor to his farm, whom he has skinned by the 
process and left stranded for life on the barren acres. From the 
foregoing considerations it is apparent that competition is an ir- 
repressible force; if stifled in one direction, it will burst out in 
another." 

Thus the conditions were such that even if the Irish had secured 
all their demands these alone would not have improved the situa- 
tion. But they did not even secure all of these. To be sure, 
O'Connell stirred up a great agitation; mass meetings, where a 
quarter of a million people were supposed to have come together, 
voted for the restoration of the Irish parliament (1843). ^ut the 
movement broke down when the government resorted to force. 
O'Connell was declared by a Protestant jury guilty of an attempt 
at conspiracy, and although the penalty was not imposed, his health 
was impaired, and he withdrew from political life. The situation 
in Ireland, however, demanded ever more insistently some remedy. 
To all the existing suffering there was now added a new calamity. 
The potato rot suddenly appeared in Europe. No country suffered 
so much from it as Ireland, where the very means of existence 
began to fail. Thousands died of hunger. 

This was not one of the least reasons which determined the 
English moderate "Conservative prime minister, Peel, to abolish the 
Corn Laws (see above, p. 99). Since one could no longer count on 
potatoes, grain again became, as formerly, an indispensable food. 
The English government went further still. By concessions of a 
different kind it sought to win the Irish, or at least to undermine 
the Irish movement. O'Connell's withdrawal from public life had 
had dangerous results. The great leader had always made use of 
legal methods and had worked hand in hand with the Catholic 
clergy, which would give no support to revolutionary methods. But 
now there had arisen a "Young Ireland" party which wanted to 
abandon this policy. It was composed of young lovers of freedom 
to whom religious ideas were foreign and who laid all their emphasis 
on democratic social demands, as in the case of the victorious 
February Revolution in Paris a little later in 1848 (see ch. xxi). 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 173 

They broke off, so far as they were concerned, all connections with 
the clergy, and played with the idea of fighting for Ireland's in- 
dependence with weapons in their hands, if need be. 

The English government naturally sought the support of the 
priests against this new movement. Peel did not disdain to break 
with the system which had given state support only to the Protes- 
tant Church; he granted from the English treasury to Maynooth 
College, the seminary for Irish Catholic priests, the sum of £26,000 
instead of only £900. He brought it about that in the future the 
Roman Catholic Church in Ireland could also legally receive perma- 
nent bequests. In addition to Dublin University, which was strictly 
Protestant, there were founded three new colleges, which were 
neutral in religion and therefore open to Catholics, But practically 
nothing was done in regard to agrarian conditions. Peel had indeed 
sent a commission of inquiry to Ireland, and brought in a bill which 
was intended to guarantee to the peasants greater security of tenure 
and compensation for improvements of the land; but the law was 
thrown out in the House of Lords in 1848, thanks to the opposition 
of the Irish landlords. Under these circumstances there was only 
one remedy, — the remedy which had already been followed with 
success in England and for which the way had been prepared so 
excellently by legislation in the United States (see above, ch. xv), 
namely emigration. The Irish began to leave their country in 
great numbers, some going to England and Scotland, but many more 
to America. Perhaps never since the world began have such 
a vast number of people changed their homes at one time. In 1845, 
the last year before the terrible famine which began in 1846 and 
continued through 1847, the population of Ireland numbered about 
8,300,000; it had fallen in 1851 to less than 6,600,000; that is, in 
the course of six years it declined a million and a half, or more than 
a fifth. The suffering was so great that many of the emigrants died 
on shipboard, or soon after their arrival in America, from bodily 
weakness. 

Since then this movement has gone on almost unbroken. The 
enormous figures of the first years were naturally never equaled 
again; but still the emigration was always so considerable that the 
population of Ireland has steadily declined ever since. In 1881 it 
numbered only 5,100,000; in 1891, 4,700,000; and in 1901, 
4,456,000. To be sure, this decline is not exclusively due to emi- 
gration. Since the peasantry are somewhat better off and the civili- 
zation of the people has improved, the earlier unlimited natural 
increase has been limited even in Ireland. Taken absolutely the 



174 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

number of emigrants has, perhaps, declined, but so also has the 
birthrate. 

This great shift in population has had consequences in the de- 
velopment of the Irish question which are by no means limited to 
social conditions in Ireland itself. In the first place, the unheard- 
of rapidity with which the Mississippi Valley was settled was brought 
about by nothing so much as the Irish immigration. Then the Irish 
movement for independence acquired a support which it had never 
known before: the large masses of Irish who settled in America 
remained true to their former home. The Irish in America could 
work up to prosperity quickly, and give aid to their countrymen 
whom they had left in the Emerald Isle. In America revolutionary 
plans could be laid without disturbance from the English govern- 
ment; America cared nothing about these intrigues; in fact, many 
Americans rather favored them, owing to their old grudges against 
England, and the compact groups of Irish voters formed an impor- 
tant political factor. Thus the Irish problem is closely connected 
with the colonial history of the nineteenth century. 

For the moment, this emigration did not relax essentially the 
tension in political life in Ireland. The island was so frightfully 
over-populated that the flight of masses in the years after 1846 re- 
sulted in an economic improvement; similar famines have never 
occurred since then. But the agrarian and social difficulties were 
not removed for those who remained in Ireland. The English gov- 
ernment attempted some further palliative measures. Only one of 
their proposals, however, was carried through: the Encumbered 
Estates Act of 1849, passed to facilitate the sale of properties which 
were too heavily encumbered with mortgages. The tenants received 
no guarantee against eviction; just as before, they could be driven 
off the soil, and they then contented themselves with acts of 
vengeance. On the other hand, "Young Ireland" made some regular 
attempts at rebellion. In 1848, when revolution triumphed in 
France, the Irish Nationalists sent the Provisional Government in 
Paris a memorial asking for support. But the English government 
answered this new attempt to ally with France by coercion laws; a 
hundred and eighteen of the leaders were arrested. The armed 
rebellion was suppressed and the leaders deported. 

Though political agitation in Ireland was paralyzed for a time in 
this way, it did not put an end to the Irish movement. The au- 
thority of the English government did not extend to America; from 
there a new nationalist society was organized in Ireland. Since open 
opposition to the Epglish government was impossible, it took the 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 175 

form of a secret society called the "Fenians," a name taken from 
one of the old Irish legends. They continued the "Young Ireland" 
policy, that is, they pursued revolutionary and republican aims, un- 
supported by religion; they wanted to found an Irish republic by 
means of armed rebellion. The leaders hoped to get the necessary 
troops from Irish soldiers who had been in arms during the Civil 
War in America, and also from Irishmen who had been in English 
military service. 

But these projects did not rest on any sound basis. To be sure, 
the English government could not crush the heart of the revolu- 
tionary party; though the secret printing press of the Fenian news- 
paper in Ireland was confiscated and the leaders of the movement 
arrested (1865), the organization still remained untouched in the 
United States. But in spite of all their efforts the Fenians accom- 
plished only some isolated and fruitless acts of violence. The reck- 
less attempt to attack England by way of Canada failed, as was 
to be expected; the Irish forces who invaded Canada from the 
United States were driven back without much difficulty (1866). No 
better success attended a number of Irish American soldiers who 
landed in Ireland and attempted to rouse a general rebellion. In 
England itself, the Fenians limited themselves to more or less fan- 
tastic plots: one gi-oup attempted to seize the arsenal at Chester; 
another blew up a prison in London to aid the flight of Fenians 
imprisoned there (1867). 

All these crimes, to be sure, had the result that public opinion in 
England was again drawn to the Irish question. Those who had 
thought that the emigration and the coercion measures of the last 
decade had established quiet in Ireland were now convinced that 
this was not so, and that no improvement in conditions could be 
brought about except by reforms undertaken by the state. It was 
the great Liberal minister, Gladstone, who undertook to translate 
these convictions into law. Like his predecessors, he did not start 
by making concessions to the republican Nationalists, but sought 
to win the peasants and clergy. 

First he abolished the hated privileges of the Anglican Church in 
Ireland. The Church was disestablished; persons who did not 
belong to it no longer had to pay tithes to it. Its enormous lands 
were partly taken for other purposes; many of its domains were 
assigned to the other churches, — to the Catholics and Presbyterians; 
other domains were devoted to the support of hospitals and asylums. 
The Anglican Church still remained very rich; but after 1871 it was 
nothing but a private corporation. 



176 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

In 1870 Gladstone passed the Irish Land Act for the benefit of 
tenants: tenants were protected against arbitrary eviction, and so 
enjoyed the same tenant-rights as the Protestants in Ulster; 
henceforth landlords could not evict them, except by giving them 
compensation for disturbance and for improvements made on the 
land. 

At the same time, a Peace Preservation Act was passed which 
placed Ireland under exceptional laws; by this the English gov- 
ernment hoped to hold revolutionary groups in check. 

These measures were far from solving the Irish question; but at 
any rate they brought quiet for some years. The Catholic clergy 
was now satisfied. The failure of the last effort at rebellion had 
shown that nothing was to be accomplished by opera-bouffe revo- 
lutions. But before a decade had passed the movement flamed up 
anew. Under existing conditions the Land Act of 1870 afforded 
the tenants insufficient protection. So long as the amount of land 
was so restricted and the number of peasants so large, it was im- 
possible to prevent landlords from taking advantage of their stronger 
position, so long as their right of possession remained untouched. 
And the law had not dared to take this extreme step. 

This last concession was at length forced from the English Parlia- 
ment by the new tactics of the Irish opposition. 

The Irish party at first refrained from revolutionary methods and 
aims. They no longer worked for a rebellion, although they did 
not object to criminal acts by individuals. They no longer de- 
manded the establishment of an Irish republic, but merely Home 
Rule for Ireland, with a parliament and an administration of their 
own. This was to be secured, not by illegal means, but by a grant 
from the English Parliament according to the forms of law. 

The first difficulty which the Irish party met with lay in the 
character of English parliamentary life. The influence and power 
necessary to pass these unpopular measures was possessed only by 
the two large parties which shared parliamentary power, but not 
by the little Irish group which could never get a majority in the 
House of Commons. Favorable party situations or sensational 
events in Ireland might for a brief time bring about an alliance 
between the Irish members and one of the ruling parties; but ordi- 
narily the English Parliament could not only reject, but even ignore, 
Irish grievances. 

The man who determined to put an end to this was Charles 
Stewart Parnell, who may be regarded, next to O'Connell, as the 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 177 

second great organizer of the Irish movement. By birth Parnell did 
not belong really to the Irish. He was a Protestant landlord in the 
Irish county of Witlow, and by position and religion belonged to 
the Protestant English landlords. But in conviction he was wholly 
on the side of the Irish, and he had grown up in a family which 
nourished irreconcilable hatred against England. By using new 
parliamentary tactics, he now planned to compel the English House 
of Commons to discuss and fulfil Irish demands. He intended to 
make it practically impossible to govern Ireland from England and 
from the standpoint of the large English parties. 

This result could not be reached in any normal fashion. The 
Irish group in the House of Commons formed a hopelessly small 
minority, and it was out of the question for him to think of chang- 
ing the opinions of his opponents. But the liberal rules of proce- 
dure in the English Parliament, which dated from a time when the 
members (who were not professional politicians) had no great in- 
terest in lengthening or shortening the sessions, made it possible 
for a very few members to block parliamentary activity. There 
was no means of restricting the length of time that a member 
might speak; any member could propose an amendment to every 
word of a proposed law; he could demand a vote on every amend- 
ment; he could propose an adjournment after every vote; he could 
demand to know whether a quorum was present, and so forth. If 
there were present a number of members who were systematically 
intent on "obstruction," the majority had no legal means of stop- 
ping them. 

Even the English parties had occasionally used this means, when 
one of them was in the minority, in order to prevent the passage 
of measures which were particularly objectionable. Now under 
Parnell's leadership the Irish adopted these tactics systematically. 
They not only arranged among their members cooperation by which 
one endless speech should follow another, but they obstructed the 
activity of the English Parliament in general. They intended that 
the English legislative machine should be absolutely prevented from 
working until it listened to Ireland's grievances. In 1877 harmless 
measures which had nothing to do with Ireland, such as a law in 
regard to South Africa, were subjected, as we should say, to "sabo- 
tage." There were sessions which lasted for more than forty-eight 
hours. It has been reckoned that in one single session, one Irish 
member spoke five hundred times and another three hundred and 
sixty-nine times. So great was the scandal that the House of 



178 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

Commons finally authorized the presiding officer, or speaker, to 
expel from the hall members who systematically attempted obstruc- 
tion. 

But success at first was on Parnell's side. He had succeeded in 
bringing the Irish question again to the forefront of public interest; 
at the same time the Irish movement had again found a leader 
around whom it could rally. Success came quickly. What was left 
of the Fenians in Europe and America now joined Parnell, Parnell 
made a great propagandist tour through the United States, was 
received by Irish patriots there as the official representative of their 
cause, and collected over $360,000. 

At the same time Parnell joined with the party of the Irish 
tenants. A former Fenian had founded the "Land League," which 
aimed to protect tenants from eviction by the landlords. The aims 
of the League were: (i) that no tenant should be evicted so long 
as he paid his rent, (2) that he should be free to sell his tenant- 
right, and (3) that the landlord should not be able to fix a higher 
rent than was fair. These were the three aims which were known 
as "the three F's": "fixity of tenure," "free sale," and "fair rent." 
The Irish tenants were thus to be transformed into free peasant 
proprietors, who would have full control over their land except that 
they would have to pay the lord a definite but moderate rent. 
Parnell advised the members of the League to force landlords to 
make these concessions by passive resistance. If a tenant was 
evicted, he was advised to stick on his ground just the same, and 
leave the landlord to force him out with the aid of the police. He 
was told that he could reckon on the support of the League. Fur- 
thermore, members of the League showed their common interest with 
evicted tenants by declaring that none of themselves would take 
the place of the evicted tenant. 

Such were the conditions in 1880 when the open parliamentary 
struggle in regard to Home Rule began. The Liberals at that time 
had again secured a majority in the House of Commons; that is, 
the party was again in power which wanted to satisfy the Irish as 
far as possible. In addition to former concessions the new ministry 
was ready to give the Irish tenant financial support from the state 
in economic transactions. The ministry brought in a law by which 
henceforth a tenant who was evicted was to be compensated by the 
state, the amount of compensation to be fixed by a special agrarian 
commission. But the Irish opposition party, which had just indi- 
cated its preference for extreme measures by choosing Parnell as its 
president, declared that these concessions were inadequate; in fact, 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 179 

every improvement in the situation of the Irish tenants would weaken 
the pressure for Home Rule. The party demanded the complete 
abolition of landlordism and of large landed estates in Ireland, and 
the granting of national independence. Following the revolutionary 
tactics of Parnell, they did not hesitate to adopt against their oppo- 
nents a regular system of terror. Not only were frequent attacks 
made upon landlords, but there was invented the method which has 
made famous throughout the world the name of the unhappy Cap- 
tain Boycott. By this method the Land League broke off all com- 
munications with their opponents: no Irishmen might speak with 
a person who had been outlawed by the League; no workingman 
or servant could take a position with him; no dealer would sell 
him anything; in short the enemy was "boycotted," to use the 
word which came into practice from the first victim against whom 
it was applied in November, 1880. 

By this means the Land League at first accomplished its purpose. 
The condition of the Irish landlords became unbearable. It even 
came about that a deputation of one hundred and five landlords 
betook themselves to the English Lord-Lieutenant at Dublin and 
begged him for protection, at the same time requesting him, how- 
ever, to keep their names secret so that they might not be delivered 
over to the vengeance of the members of the League. 

But how could the British government give security of person 
and property in the face of such an organization as Parnell's Land 
League? The Liberal IMinistry, indeed, did secure the passage of 
a coercion law for Ireland; and Irish obstruction in the House of 
Commons was gotten rid of by the adoption of new rules under 
which a qualified majority could put an end to debate. Also, 
several leaders of the Irish movement were arrested; but all 
this availed nothing, since the Irish clung as closely to their radical 
demands as before. Equally without avail were the efforts to im- 
prove the economic condition of the tenants. In vain did the Glad- 
stone ministry bring in a bill according to which the fixing of the 
rent was no longer to lie in the hands of the landlords but in those 
of a special impartial court which should fix rents for fifteen years. 
In vain also did he advocate that the state should use government 
money to help poor tenants buy land of their own. A "national 
convention" of the Land League in 1881 declared, in spite of this, 
that Ireland's only salvation lay in putting an end to "foreign rule" 
by granting Home Rule. 

The demands of the two parties now stood in such sharp oppo- 
sition that no peaceful solution was possible. However much Glad- 



i8o FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

stone wished to make concessions to the Irish, there were two points 
on their program to which he would not consent: the tearing up of 
the connection between England and Ireland, and an interference 
with the rights of property. Even an attack on the leader of the 
Irish had no success: the English government might indeed arrest 
Parnell; but he gave out orders that no more rents were to be paid 
so long as the British cabinet adopted terrorism; he declared that 
military power would be helpless before the passive resistance of 
the whole people. So the situation was worse than before. Equally 
without effect was the Government's declaration in 1881 that the 
Land League was dissolved. Its activity continued under another 
name, or the agitation was transferred to England where the law 
did not apply. 

The ministry soon realized this, and made a compromise with 
the Irish leaders whom it had just arrested. The imprisoned men 
were set free again and the ministry promised not to demand a full 
payment of the rents which were in arrears. 

For the moment, the situation seemed to be somewhat less critical. 
But then a group of Irish extremists interfered. In spite of his 
revolutionary aims, Parnell had always advocated a somewhat 
statesmanlike moderation, and in general had refrained from attacks 
on people's life. He knew that nothing would so stir up English 
public opinion as crimes of this kind. But for this very reason he 
was regarded by the hotheads of the party as not going far enough. 
He was reproached with adopting a weak compromise policy by a 
group of revolutionists who called themselves the "Invincibles" and 
who held the traditions of the Fenians; Ireland, they said, must be 
freed by armed revolution. When these politicians saw that 
the situation was becoming somewhat more peaceful, they deter- 
mined to make all reconciliation impossible by a crime. 

On May 6, 1882, in broad daylight, they murdered in Phoenix 
Park, Dublin, two distinguished persons, the Secretary for Ireland 
and the Under-Secretary, who, even from the Irish standpoint, were 
guilty of nothing except representing English rule in Ireland. The 
English government could only answer this crime, which created 
enormous excitement in England, by proclaiming martial law in 
Ireland and by establishing courts which were not composed of 
jurymen, that is, which were not subject to attempts at intimida- 
tion by the local populace. But the Irish extremists thereupon ex- 
tended their field of activity still further, making use of the fact 
that they could organize secret societies undisturbed in the United 
States. They undertook a terrorist campaign after the Russian 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 18 1 

fashion against the English government in England itself. Dynamite 
was to be their chief weapon of destruction. There were explosions 
in an office occupied by an English minister and in the Parliament 
Buildings at London, but without fatalities, as it chanced. 

One cannot say that these tactics were crowned with success. 
Even if one assumes that these crimes made the English Liberals 
more inclined to concessions , to Ireland, the fact nevertheless re- 
mains that the brutal violence of the Irish extremists roused an 
irreconcilable opposition in England, which was horrified at the idea 
of yielding to the movement. Gladstone's party of Liberals, indeed, 
still stood on the side of the Irish, but it found it increasingly 
difficult to meet the opposition within its own ranks. 

For the moment, the Irish succeeded only in persuading the Con- 
servatives, who were the party in power, to refrain from renewing 
the coercion measures. The Liberals, on the other hand, promised 
to give them as much independence as was compatible with the unity 
of the British Empire. Since this did not satisfy the Home Rulers, 
Parnell advised the voters to vote neither for the Liberals nor the 
Conservatives. His advice was justified by the result in 1885, inas- 
much as the Liberals, though they had a majority over the Con- 
servatives in the new House of Commons, were reduced to a minority 
if the Irish made a coalition with the Conservatives. Gladstone, 
therefore, had to bargain with the Irish; being the leading English 
minister, he adopted their demand for Home Rule, but this led to a 
split in his own party. A section of the Liberals believed, probably 
incorrectly, that establishment of Home Rule in Ireland would be 
nothing more or less than the first step toward complete separation; 
since they were unwilling to support this attack upon the ''union" 
of the two countries, they seceded and formed a special group within 
the party known as the "Liberal Unionists." Among their leaders 
was the man who later became so famous as colonial secretary, 
Joseph Chamberlain, Member of Parliament for Birmingham. 

The secession of this group became final when Gladstone laid 
his Home Rule Bill before Parliament. The Liberal prime minister 
intended to give the Irish complete Home Rule with a parliament 
and executive of their own; only in matters which concerned both 
countries was the decision of the English cabinet to be decisive. 
This secession of the right wing of the Liberals was not the only 
result of Gladstone's proposed Home Rule Bill. Public opinion in 
England was very much opposed to his plan of separating Ireland 
and England; and it was opposed also by the party of the English 
setders in Ireland. The Protestants in Ulster, which was largely 



i82 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

settled by English colonists, feared that they would be handed over 
to a Catholic majority, and therefore joined together in protest and 
founded an Anti-Home Rule League. They even began to arm and 
declare that they would rather die with arms in their hands than 
allow themselves to be ruled by an Irish Parliament. They called 
themselves "Orangemen," in memory of William of Orange who 
once had restored English rule in Ireland after driving out the 
Stuart king, James II. 

This united opposition compelled Gladstone to drop the Home 
Rule Bill in 1886. A majority in the House of Commons voted 
against it, and when the prime minister appealed to the people by 
dissolving Parliament and calling for a new election, the result was 
a disaster for the Liberal party. The Conservatives, who had 
fought the election on the issue of the unity of the empire, won such 
a majority that they were independent of any coalition between 
Gladstonians and Home Rulers. 

Naturally, the Home Rule plan was thus dead for the moment. 
In Ireland open war broke out again between the landlords and the 
tenants. The Government did, indeed, try to interfere in favor of 
the farmers; but it was unwilling to touch property rights and so 
the interference lacked practical effect. Little could be accomplished 
merely by voluntary sales of land by landlords. The landlords were 
not a little burdened by the extraordinarily high taxes for the sup- 
port of the poor, which was one of the results of the over dense 
population. "The landlord's position was tolerable only," writes 
Bonn, "where he was able to pay taxes and interest without de- 
pending on his rents, that is, on hard cash from his land." Toward 
the end of the 1870's, when improved communications shortened 
transportation between Europe and the overseas countries, and when 
the price of agricultural products began greatly to fall, the obliga- 
tions of the landlords no longer permitted them either to reduce the 
rents or to make improvements. To induce them to make financial 
concessions to the tenants it was not enough to appeal to humanity, 
or to their own interests, which they understood well enough; com- 
pulsion had to be used; and since the Conservative government had 
no idea of doing this, Parnell's party undertook to do it. In 1886 the 
Land League compelled peasants to cease paying rents to landlords 
who did not accept the rents fixed by the official land commission. On 
the contrary, the tenants of every landlord were to form a company 
to which they would pay the rents and which would then negotiate 
in their name with the landlord. The English government declared 
this plan illegal, but the Land League again replied with passive 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 183 

resistance: tenants who were evicted refused to leave their land; 
landlords had to drive them out by using the police. In Ulster 
there was even civil war on a small scale. Juries refused to con- 
vict the leaders of the Irish movement. In the House of Commons 
the Home Rulers, who were allied with Gladstone's followers, again 
adopted obstruction, so that there finally had to be applied "guil- 
lotine methods" of the American sort, which made it possible to fix 
beforehand the date on which a debate should close. 

In spite of this, the ministry proceeded in the direction of making 
concessions. A land law was passed which was intended to trans- 
form Irish tenants into peasant proprietors. But the conflict went 
on just the same, so that the Government finally had to declare the 
Land League a menace to the state and arrested its leaders as 
common criminals. 

At this moment, the crisis was relieved somewhat for a short time 
owing to two new factors. One of these was the split which took 
part among the Irish Nationalists; the other was the attitude of the 
Catholic Church, 

Since the days of "Young Ireland" and the Fenians, the Irish 
opposition had not depended on religious support, although it had 
drawn a good part of its strength from the antipathy with which 
Irish Catholics regarded Protestant landlords. In spite of this the 
clergy and the politicians had hitherto worked in harmony together. 
Now a change came: the terrorist tactics of the Land League and 
the use of dynamite in the Russian fashion were ways of fighting 
which the Catholic Church could not officially tolerate. So in 1888 
the Pope issued an encyclical condemning the Land League's so- 
called "plan of campaign." This meant that henceforth the Irish 
clergy had to refuse their support to Parnell's party. Furthermore, 
Parnell was compromised personally in 1890 by being charged with 
adultery; though this affair caused only small excitement in Ireland 
itself, the scandal was all the greater among the Puritanically- 
minded Liberals of England. The Scotch-English Dissenters, Pres- 
byterians, Methodists, and Quakers, who formed the basis of the 
old Liberal party which had remained true to Gladstone, declared 
that they would break off all relations with the Irish Nationalists 
if they kept this adulterer as their leader, and Gladstone himself 
broke off openly with Parnell. The Irish party was thus embar- 
rassed; some of the party, in order to keep up their connection with 
Gladstone's followers, chose a new leader; but a minority remained 
true to Parnell. The anti-Parnell majority was also supported by 
the clergy who, as one may imagine, had never been much inclined 



i84 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

toward Parnell who was a Protestant. So the Irish party, which 
had hitherto formed a solid organization, spHt into two groups which 
were most bitterly hostile to one another: the anti-Parnellites, who 
had the mass of the voters behind them and worked with relatively 
peaceful means; and Parnell's party, which no longer had to exer- 
cise any restraint on itself and which included the extreme revolu- 
tionary Nationalists. When Parnell died soon afterwards in 1891, 
the party still remained split for a time. 

Meanwhile political conditions in England brought it about that 
the Liberals under Gladstone again came to office in 1892. This 
time his party succeeded in securing in the House of Commons a 
majority in favor of their leader's Home Rule bill, although it was 
somewhat emasculated as compared with the earlier measure. It 
was adopted there after a debate lasting eighty days. But it did 
not became a law after all. The Upper House, in which the landlords 
and the Anglican Church was much more strongly represented than 
in the House of Commons, had been scarcely affected at all by the 
change in feeling which had taken place in voters in Scotland 
and Ireland. So the House of Lords rejected the bill by a large 
majority of 419 to 40. Gladstone thereupon resigned. For the 
moment his Irish policy could not be realized. The Liberals per- 
ceived that they could not undertake radical reforms in Ireland until 
they had revised the English constitution, — by putting an end to 
the equality between the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament. 

Still, this did not mean that in the meantime reform legislation 
for Ireland was wholly neglected. Though the Conservatives were 
unwilling to agree to Home Rule, they attempted to satisfy the Irish 
people in another way. They adopted the old polic}^ of the Liberals: 
the Irish Nationalists were to be deterred from pursuing their effort 
to break up the unity of the empire by improvements which were to 
be made in the material welfare of the Irish population. How serious 
the situation was is seen by the fact that the Conservatives, although 
the party representing order, did not hesitate at serious interferences 
with the rights of property. In 1903 the Conservative majority in the 
English Parliament passed a new land act for Ireland. This aimed 
at transferring from the landlords to the tenants within a reason- 
able time all the salable land in Ireland. The state advanced money 
at two and three-fourths per cent interest to the tenants to enable 
them to buy the land. The sale was arranged by an official land 
commission so that there was no possibility of the landlord's taking 
advantage of the tenants. In contrast to England, where the gov- 
ernment never interfered in the relations between landlord and tenant 



OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 185 

and where the laws favored the maintenance of large estates, the Irish 
peasants were now given favorable treatment. The English govern- 
ment supported their efforts to make themselves self-supporting by 
placing at their disposal no less than £100,000,000 for the purchase 
of land. 

It would have been contrary to Irish policy for the Home Rulers 
to cease agitation after this. Far from declaring themselves satisfied 
by the Land Purchase Act, which they had supported, they regarded 
this merely as a partial concession. Now, as before, they continued 
to demand an Irish Parliament and a responsible Irish ministry. 
But it was only after ten years of struggle and after the reform in 
the House of Lords demanded by the Liberals (the limitation of 
the House of Lords to a mere suspensive veto) that they were able 
to carry through their purpose. In 19 12 the Upper House was 
deprived of its hitherto unlimited veto, and in 19 14 the new Home 
Rule Bill was adopted. Its bitterest opponents were now no longer 
the Unionists and the Conservatives, but the Protestant English 
settlers in Ulster. The Ulsterites adopted Irish methods and threat- 
ened civil war. But the majority in the House of Commons, never- 
theless, held fast to their plan, which, moreover, provided for a 
transition period during which Ulster would not be subjected to an 
Irish Home Rule government. This Home Rule Bill would have 
gone into effect if the European war had not broken out in the 
summer of 19 14. This suspended the application of Home Rule, 
and when the war was over circumstances had so changed that a 
new law was regarded as necessary. 

The Irish problem thus belongs to the many unsolved questions 
which the last century has left for the future. Any settlement of 
the conflict between the claims of England and the Irish Nationalists 
which shall even be partially satisfactory seems more difficult than 
ever. No matter how far one might make concessions, political 
and social, to the Irish opposition, all these reforms could not get 
rid of the fundamental economic difficulty due to a large popula- 
tion settled upon an insufficient soil. To be sure, the great emigra- 
tion has improved conditions essentially. There has been no repeti- 
tion of the famine of the 1840's, and the living conditions of the 
Irish tenant have considerably improved. But this has made the 
struggle even more dangerous for England: the stronger the Irish 
Nationalists are economically, the better they are able to oppose 
English rule. On the other hand, the plan of making Ireland into 
a half sovereign state within the British Commonwealth of Nations 
and of thus taking the first step toward setting aside the abnormal 



1 86 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW 

suzerainty of Great Britain over the overseas Dominions (see ch. 
xxxi) is apparently bound to fail on account of the Ulster problem. 
Because the English justly feel that there is no limit to the aims 
and methods of Irish agitators, who allege that the British govern- 
ment is responsible for things for which it is not to blame — for 
these very reasons, the English hesitate to hand over men oi 
their own race and religion to the spiteful rule of Irish Nationalists. 
The Protestant Anglo-Saxon province of Ulster is the only one 
which has hitherto managed to settle the land question satis- 
factorily; and not one of the least reasons for this is the fact 
that, in contrast to the purely Irish districts, it has been able to 
develop large manufactures in modern fashion. Ought this region to 
be allowed to fall under the control of a majority which is hostile 
to it, and which, economically at least, is in a more primitive state 
of civilization? The very fact that the Irish refuse to accept a 
compromise which would withdraw Ulster from their control, and 
insist instead upon ruling the whole island, is another fact which 
makes the English government seriously hesitate. This attitude on 
the part of the Irish seems to show that they have no intention of 
allowing the Orangemen in Ulster to enjoy their special advantages. 
Among the Irish now there is an extreme republican party, the so- 
called Sinn Fein, which has triumphed over the Nationalists who 
favored Home Rule. 

Be that as it may, events during the World War showed that 
Ireland must be regarded by the British Government as a land 
which cannot be looked upon as forming a single permanent unit 
with Great Britain, like Scotland. In England and Scotland, uni- 
versal military service was introduced during the war, but not in 
Ireland. This was not due to the fact that the Irish sympathized 
with England's enemies. The attempt made by the Irish extremist. 
Sir Roger Casement, to rouse a rebellion against England with Ger- 
man help resulted, in 191 6, in a merely insignificant local success. 
And there were not lacking numerous Irish volunteers. But in the 
English government there evidently prevailed the feeling that it 
would not be safe to put Irish patriotism and self-sacrifice to too 
severe a test. Though the Irish had no desire to exchange British 
rule in favor of some vassal relation to Germany, still their inclina- 
tion toward Great Britain was not so great that they could have 
been compelled to fight for her. And it is not to be forgotten that 
this system of universal military service was just as strange for 
England as for Ireland. Here again was a case in which Ireland 
was given privileged treatment. 



BOOK IV 

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE AND 

THE FORMATION OF NEW NATIONAL STATES 

IN EUROPE 



CHAPTER XXI 

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 

The July Monarchy (ch. xii) had satisfied all the wishes of the 
French middle class by whom and for whom the Great Revolution 
of 1789 had been made. Any restoration of the Ancien Regime, 
with its privileges for inherited wealth and for the clergy, was hence- 
forth forever out of the question. Practically unlimited freedom of 
thought prevailed; neither schools nor writers were subjected to 
ecclesiastical influence any longer. At the head of the administra- 
tion stood statesm.en who knew how to care skilfully for the welfare 
of the bourgeoisie. In foreign politics, they avoided war and only 
continued the struggle in Algiers because no other course was pos- 
sible; and in internal affairs they devoted their careful attention to 
the economic progress of the country. And this attention was richly 
rewarded. Never before had France been able so completely to 
develop her natural resources for creating wealth as during the reign 
of Louis Philippe. Neither external nor internal obstacles any 
longer stood in the way of unlimited economic activity. The inten- 
sive cultivation of the fertile soil was assured by the mass of small 
peasants whose number was correctly proportioned to what the soil 
could produce. Manufacturing, protected against foreign competi- 
tion by protective tariffs, could appropriate unchecked the results 
of the "Industrial Revolution"; everything aided it: the excellent 
technical training which was afforded by the state and was free from 
all clerical control; and the systematic building of railways as a 
result of the law of 1842, Guizot, who is rightly regarded as the 
embodiment of this regime and who was at the head of the 
Foreign Office, was only speaking the truth when he once assured 
the Chamber of Deputies, "Let us not talk about our country having 
to conquer territory, to wage great wars, to undertake bold deeds 
of vengeance. If France is prosperous, if she remains free, rich, 
peaceful, and wise, we need not complain if we exercise only a small 
influence in the world abroad." 

The bourgeoisie who had made the July Revolution were cer- 
tainly thoroughly pleased with it. How indeed could they have 
refused their approval to a government which, from their point of 

189 



I90 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

view, was regarded as an actual paradise, and which also satis- 
fied all their old demands as to the form of government? The ideal 
of the middle class had been reached: order, peace, quiet, the exclu- 
sion of the Church from government, intellectual liberty, and the 
possibility for every industrious and ambitious young man with some 
property to rise in the world. The administration was in the hands 
of honest, industrious, cultured men. Ministries were formed cor- 
rectly according to the parliamentary system, and so the bourgeoisie 
had an opportunity to share in politics. 

But this government had three groups of opponents. The clergy 
was opposed to this system which was built up on a Voltairean 
basis. By the overthrow of Charles X they had lost the pre- 
ponderant position which they had enjoyed before 1830. The so- 
called "University of France," which centralized all instruction and 
placed it under the supervision of the state, was retained by the July 
Monarchy, but the clergy were excluded from it. Now, when the 
clergy perceived that the cause of the Legitimists who followed the 
older Bourbon line overthrown in 1830 was hopeless, they sought to 
win back their former influence upon education through freedom of 
instruction. Their newspapers no longer appealed to the throne. 
They merely desired that clerical teachers should be given the same 
permission to conduct schools as was given to teachers officially 
approved by the state. To secure this, the clerical opposition began 
a very vigorous campaign against the "University," accusing it of 
systematically corrupting the youth. Then they turned their attack 
against the government, which would not yield, but which instead 
closed several Jesuit institutions in 1845. A large part of public 
opinion was thus made hostile to Louis Philippe's government. To 
be sure, the attacks of the clerical press made small impression upon 
the bourgeoisie, who, for the most part, were followers of Voltaire, 
like the king himself; and even when the government itself wanted 
to make concessions, the Chamber of Deputies flatly opposed them. 
On the other hand, these attacks by religious agitators left deep 
traces outside the pays legal, that is, among the classes of the people 
who were not represented in the Chamber of Deputies, especially 
among the rural population. 

The second group opposed to the government were the working- 
men. The proletariat had no representation at all in the Chamber 
of Deputies, and yet they stood in no less need of protection than 
their fellow-workingmen in England. The exploitation of human 
labor due to machinery aroused in France the sympathy of a much 
smaller part of the population than in Great Britain. It was not 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 191 

until 181 5, much later therefore than in England, that the 
iron and steel industries had begun really to develop in France and 
much the same was true of the textile industries. It was not until 
1840 that any reports were published in France concerning the 
injuries to health resulting from the factory system. The main in- 
dustry of France, now as before, was the growing of grain and the 
making of wine. The happy results of the French Revolution were 
clearest here. As the large landed estates had been broken up in 
considerable parts of France, there grew up a class of small peasant 
proprietors, who were able to acquire a high standard of living for 
themselves and to produce more food for the industrial population 
of the cities. The birth-rate declined somewhat, but so, also, did 
the death-rate. The wheat harvest increased steadily from the Res- 
toration to 1848; the same was true of barley, corn, potatoes, and 
so forth; 1846 has been called a "famine year," but the harvest 
yield of this year was larger than the annual average of the Resto- 
ration era. 

Although the factory system affected only a relatively small part 
of the population, this did not make the condition of those who were 
affected any better. Among the classes who had no legal means of 
improving their condition there began to develop a bitter revolu- 
tionary feeling. One ought to read the classic reports which Heinrich 
Heine wrote from Paris at that time (1842) to the "Augsburger 
Allgemeine Zeitung" — perhaps the cleverest newspaper correspond- 
ence which has ever been written. "Everything is as quiet as a 
winter's night after a new fall of snow. But in the silence you hear 
continually dripping, dripping, the profits of the capitalist, as they 
steadily increase. You can actually hear them piling up — the riches 
of the rich. Sometimes there is the smothered sob of poverty, and 
often, too, a scraping sound, like a knife being sharpened." And 
in another passage Heine prophesies more in detail: "To-day, when 
I visited some of the factories in the Faubourg Saint-Marceau and 
discovered there what kind of reading matter was being spread 
among the workingmen, who are the most powerful element among 
the lower classes, I thought of Sancho's proverb. Tell me what you 
have sown to-day, and I will predict to you what you will reap 
to-morrow.' For here in the workshops I found several new edi- 
tions of speeches by old Robespierre, Marat's pamphlets at two sous 
a copy, Cabet's History of the Revolution, Cormenin's poisonous 
little works, and Buonarroti's Babeufs Doctrine and Conspiracy — 
all writings which smell of blood. The songs which I heard them 
singing seemed to have been composed in Hell and had a chorus 



192 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

of the wildest excitement. Really, people in our gentle walks of 
life can form no idea of the demonic note which runs through these 
songs. One must hear them with one's own ears, for example, in 
those enormous workshops where the metals are worked and where 
the half-naked, defiant figures keep time to their songs with the 
mighty blows which their great iron hammers strike upon the ringing 
anvil. . . . Sooner or later the harvest which will come from this 
sowing in France threatens to be a republican outbreak." 

This last observation is particularly important; for it points to 
the circumstance which was to lead the social movement to success 
— at least for a moment. If the French workingmen had stood 
alone, they could hardly have accomplished anything but a fruitless 
attempt at insurrection. It is probable that their agitation would 
have aimed at less than the Chartist movement. They lacked 
leaders and politicians who could have successfully expressed their 
aspirations to the political authorities. 

But leaders of this kind were now provided by the government 
of Guizot through his neglect of the so-called capacites — persons 
of intellectual capacity but not of property. 

So the third group of persons opposed to the government was 
made up of the young intellectuals, the men who had carried on the 
spiritual traditions of the Great Revolution, and who had never 
become thoroughly reconciled to the July Revolution. They had 
regarded the deposition of Charles X merely as a step forward. 
Their republican ideals were not satisfied by the bourgeois mon- 
archy of Louis Philippe, which put control into the hands of the 
wealthy middle-class. At first the opposition of this group was 
insignificant, because almost all of the intellectual leaders of the 
younger generation who had prepared the way for the July Revo- 
lution had been given office under the new government. But the 
more the new regime became solidified, the greater became the gulf 
between it and the republican idealists. The government devoted 
its attention almost exclusively to material aims; it was not at all 
inclined to endanger the prosperity of the country for the sake of 
humanitarian reforms or idealistic motives. The administration be- 
came more and more a closed caste. Since there was no longer any 
strong opposition within the pays legal, and since the voters held to 
the same materialistic aims as the ministry, the capacites had no 
means of taking part in political life. The government had no need 
of the support of these able intellectuals and writers. Its only con- 
cern was to retain its majority in the Chamber of Deputies; to do 
this it had only to grant concessions to persons whose material in- 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 193 

terests coincided with the government's policy, that is, to the wealthy- 
bourgeois. Many of the deputies themselves were also government 
officials, financially dependent upon the government; others could 
be won over by being given a share in public works and so forth. 
Why should a government have bothered itself about groups who 
possessed no political power under the existing franchise? Particu- 
larly as this system was benefiting the country no less than the 
ruling bourgeoisie? By 1840 the ministry had acquired a stability 
hitherto unknown; the general well-being was improving, and there 
prevailed, as Heine had once observed, "the greatest quiet." There 
were not lacking some scandals, but the fact that guilty ministers 
who had been making money by graft were strictly punished in the 
courts showed that the government was not inclined to tolerate dis- 
honest practices. In scarcely any other government have there been 
so few cases of "corruption," using the word in the ordinary, though 
not in a rigorously ethical, sense, as in that of the puritanical doc- 
trinaire, Guizot. 

But, as has been said, this system had nothing to offer to the 
steadily increasing class of idealistically-minded intellectuals in 
France. In fact, it seemed to them to be the very enemy of prog- 
ress, if one regards the improvement of the condition of the Fourth 
Estate as one of the tasks of the time. As had been the case in 
England a little while before, the opposition was convinced that 
what was needed most of all was a change in the franchise. They 
believed that the government would only pay attention to the de- 
mands of the workingmen when the property qualification for voting 
had been done away with, and the wealthy middle-class thus de- 
prived of its monopoly of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 

"Electoral and parliamentary reform" became the slogan of the 
republican party. In 1843 ^ formal fusion took place between the 
republicans and the socialists, when the leaders of both groups 
founded a joint newspaper, "Reforme." Among its influential edi- 
tors were both socialists, like Louis Blanc, and partisans of political 
democracy, like Ledru-Rollin and Godefroy Cavaignac. Their pro- 
gram had quite a socialistic tinge. It was drawn up by Louis Blanc 
and contained such phrases as the following: "Formerly working- 
men were slaves; now they are wage earners; they must be ele- 
vated to the rank of partners (associes). It is the duty of the state 
to bring about industrial reforms which will enable the workingmen 
to reach this position. Citizens able to work have a right to work. 
Only a democratic system of government can bring this about. 
No government is democratic unless it rests on the sovereignty of 



194 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

the people and universal suffrage, and gives realization to the for- 
mula, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." 

At first, therefore, this party of liberal opposition set up merely 
political demands. They insisted that officials ought no longer to 
be members of the Chamber of Deputies, that the franchise quali- 
fication ought to be reduced to a hundred francs, and that the 
capacites ought not to be restricted by any property qualification, 
that is, that even intellectuals without property ought to be eligible 
to the Chamber of Deputies. 

But all these demands were met with an absolute refusal both by 
the government and by the majority in the Chamber. Thereupon, 
the opposition, following English example, determined to arrange 
giant demonstrations on the part of people not represented in Par- 
liament. A national petition, which set forth the reforms demanded 
by the liberal socialistic group, was to be signed b}^ thousands of 
persons and presented to the government. In order to win support 
for this there was organized in 1847 th^ so-called "banquet cam- 
paign": banquets were held everywhere at which speakers for the 
opposition (including also some moderate liberals) set forth the need 
for a revision of the constitution and asked for signatures to the 
petition. At these banquets purely political and socialistic desires 
were intermingled, or rather the political reform was represented 
as being the first step toward social reform. In July, 1847, at 
one of these banquets in Paris, a health was drunk to the improve- 
ment of the workingmen's condition. Other speakers glorified the 
Great French Revolution in the way that Heine had already 
noticed, and led cheers for the National Convention of 1793. 

The government, however, declared that it would not allow itself 
to be intimidated by this agitation outside Parliament. 'The min- 
istry will not yield one step," it was said in the Chamber in January, 
1848. The authorities even went further. They determined to put 
an end to the movement altogether, and forbade the ''reform ban- 
quet" which was to be held in Paris on February 22. This led to 
the outbreak of revolution. At first there were only some harmless 
demonstrations in which students and workingmen took part; but 
soon, on February 23, 1848, barricades began to be thrown up in 
the workingmen's districts in Paris. The government thereupon 
called out the National Guard ; but this was hostile to Guizot's gov- 
ernment and made demonstrations in favor of reform. Louis 
Philippe then began to feel that his system was tottering. He forced 
Guizot to resign and promised to form a new ministry favoring 
reform (February 23). 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 195 

The cause of reform seemed to be victorious and assured of a 
further peaceful development. But on the evening of this same day 
occurred an unfortunate incident. In the very heart of Paris, on 
the Boulevard des Capucines, gunshots were exchanged between the 
promenading masses of people and a number of troops who were 
standing guard outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The troops 
killed twenty-three of the crowd and wounded thirty others. Among 
the dead were women and children. General rage seized the people. 
They cheered for a republic, and on the next day all Paris was filled 
with barricades. Louis Philippe now intended to make further con- 
cessions than on the night before; he accepted a ministry composed 
of men from the opposition in the Chamber, and promised a new 
election. But these concessions came too late. The leaders of the 
insurrection declared that he deserved the same fate as his prede- 
cessor, Charles X. The King abdicated in favor of his grandson, 
and fled from the Tuileries. The crowd thronged into the palace 
and demolished the throne. The Chamber at first attempted to give 
effect to the wish of the fallen monarch and proclaimed his grand- 
son, the Count of Paris, as king. But the crowd pressed into the 
Chamber, crying, "Down with the monarchy!" The republican 
deputies used this opportunity to establish a provisional republican 
government. This government then fused with one which had al- 
ready been formed by republican politicians at the Hotel de Ville 
in Paris. With the enthusiastic approval of the people of Paris, 
the Republic was proclaimed on February 24, 1848. 

As one sees, the February Revolution in Paris was exclusively 
an urban socialistic movement. The country people who had indi- 
rectly shared so much in the July Revolution and whose interests 
would have been so severely injured by a reestablishment of the old 
Restoration Monarchy and landlord nobility had neither taken part 
in this revolution nor did they even regard it with any real sym- 
pathy. In many respects their opinions were directly opposed to 
those of the new men who had assumed power. This was particu- 
larly true in the matter of religion: the revolutionary leaders were 
hostile to the Church, believing at best in a kind of humanitarian 
pantheism; but the French peasant of that day still clung closely to 
his religion. So the new government, from the outset, did not har- 
monize with the will of the majority of the people. It was com- 
posed of representatives of tendencies which had triumphed in the 
February Revolution. In it were leaders of the republican opposi- 
tion under Louis Philippe, like Ledru-Rollin and Dupont de I'Eure. 
The socialistic movement was also represented by some socialist 



r 



196 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

republicans put forward at the Hotel de Ville, of whom the best 
known was Louis Blanc. 

At first, however, there was general enthusiasm in the country. 
No class, except the higher bourgeoisie, had any real enthusiasm 
for Louis Philippe's government. The clergy, as has been shown, 
had no reason to grieve for the government which had fallen, 
and the liberty-trees which were planted in the villages were blessed 
by the priests. Furthermore, the new government had no intention 
of replacing the former class-rule of the bourgeoisie by a new class- 
rule in favor of the Fourth Estate. The members of the Provisional 
Government were honest democrats and held fast to their ideals, 
even when these seemed to benefit their opponents. They prob- 
ably cradled themselves in illusions as to the political views of the 
majority of Frenchmen; but even if they had known the real feeling 
in France, they would not have renounced their convictions. They 
therefore arranged at once for the election of a national constituent 
assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, thus handing over the 
sovereign parliamentary authority to the peasants and not to the 
intellectuals and workingmen who had brought about the revolu- 
tion. At the same time, unlimited freedom of the press and of public 
meeting was introduced, and the ranks of the National Guard were 
thrown open to all citizens, even to workingmen. The decrees of 
the National Convention abolishing slavery in the French colonies 
were renewed. 

Thus the great mass of the citizens who had hitherto been excluded 
from political life, and who, in good part, had insufficient education, 
now acquired at one stroke a share in political and military power; 
as E, Driault says, they now had "the ballot and the gun." News- 
papers developed enormously (the stamp tax being abolished), and 
were read by wide groups of people. Workingmen took part in 
political debates and joined the National Guard by thousands, so 
that its membership increased in a few weeks from fifty thousand 
to two hundred thousand. But in accordance with the social struc- 
ture of France, the citizens who were admitted to this new political 
activity belonged much more to the peasant than to the proletarian 
class. 

From the government's point of view, this was all the more dan- 
gerous, inasmuch as the socialistic ministers, who had had to be 
included as a concession to radicalism, were not at all inclined to 
leave the people time to become accustomed to the new conditions. 
The socialistic demands which Louis Blanc set forth, such as "the 
right to work," were to be realized at once. Although a majority 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 197 

of the Provisional Government consisted of Republicans, who be- 
lieved that political reforms were sufficient, and who held fast to 
the tricolor, they were compelled, nevertheless, to make concessions 
to their radical comrades; the latter had hoisted the red flag and gave 
the republican government the appearance of favoring a social revo- 
lution. They supported a measure which appeared to meet a demand 
formerly made by Louis Blanc, and organized National Workshops 
(Ateliers Nationaux). They recognized the "right to work," — the 
duty of the state to furnish employment to every citizen. They also 
created a Labor Commission, led by two prominent socialist min- 
isters. This commission heard delegates from various branches of 
industry and economists of various views; it voted in favor of a 
ten-hour day "in view of the fact that too much manual labor ruins 
the health of the workingman and destroys the dignity of man by 
preventing him from developing his intellectual possibilities." The 
antagonism which existed within the Provisional Government came 
to light more sharply in this incident than in any other. The re- 
publicans wanted to use this occasion to prove the impracticability 
of the socialist theories, and made only a pretense of accepting 
Louis Blanc's demands. The Labor Commission was given no real 
power, and the "National Workshops" were so organized by the 
minister of commerce, Marie, that they were bound to be a fiasco. 
Instead of giving work to the unemployed in workshops supported 
by the state, and instead of taking into consideration the working- 
man's particular aptitude, as Louis Blanc had desired, the republican 
minister had about 100,000 laborers set to work digging in the 
Champs de Mars in Paris. They were also given military organiza- 
tion which made them more dangerous still. But the worst of it 
was that this expensive experiment, in which the laborers cost much 
and produced nothing, came at a period of economic depression. 
The revolution had naturally caused a commercial crisis and the 
income of the state had somewhat declined. Now, in addition to 
the ordinary expenditures, there was added the outlay for the Na- 
tional Workshops. The government was compelled to increase the 
taxes by about one-half, adding an extra tax of forty-five centimes 
for every franc paid in taxes. This aroused the first serious irrita- 
tion among the peasants who had the feeling that they had to raise 
money so that workingmen who produced nothing might receive pay. 
So the popularity of the republic declined quickly, particularly 
among the masses who had been recently admitted to the vote and 
who were not yet trained for responsible participation in politics. 
Soon other incidents took place which created an unfavorable im- 



198 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

pression in the republic, because they seemed to show that the only 
salvation against the socialist danger was the strong hand of a 
military dictatorship. 

The National Constituent Assembly which met on May 4 was 
very far from being socialistic. As it represented the people who 
had just expressed themselves through the new universal suffrage 
it contained very few supporters of Louis Blanc: of its 900 mem- 
bers, about 800 belonged to the republican party, and were opposed 
to social revolution. In the Executive Committee, which was estab- 
lished in place of the Provisional Government, not a single socialist 
was given a seat; in it, beside Ledru-Rollin, Lamartine, Arago, and 
other decided Republicans, there sat the Minister of Commerce, 
Marie, who had tried to destroy the National Workshops by what 
we should nowadays call "sabotage." But this attitude on the part 
of the Executive Committee caused an open conflict. The work- 
ingmen believed that they had been deceived, and attempted an 
insurrection. On May 15 a great crowd pressed into the hall of 
the Assembly, declared it dissolved, and proclaimed a purely so- 
cialist government, of which Blanc and Blanqui were members. But 
the insurrection failed. The National Guard dispersed it. Blanqui, 
among others, was arrested, and Louis Blanc fled into exile. There- 
upon the minister, Marie, ventured to declare the National Work- 
shops abolished (June 21). But the labor movement was not 
crushed by tliis. After Marie had rudely turned away a deputation 
which came to protest against the closing of the National Work- 
shops, a regular insurrection broke out. The methods of the Febru- 
ary Revolution were used again, but this time only by members of 
the Fourth Estate. In the eastern districts of Paris and in other 
parts of the city occupied by the poor, barricades were thrown up. 
A body of 70,000 workingmen united under the cry, "Liberty or 
Death!" So great was the danger that the committee established 
by the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and all executive power 
was placed in the hands of Cavaignac, the Minister of War. A mili- 
tary dictatorship had to be established in order to suppress the 
workingmen 's insurrection (June 24, 1848). 

Naturally, there could be no doubt as to the outcome of the 
struggle; the workingmen could not hold out against a regular mili- 
tary attack. Nevertheless, great efforts were necessary before the 
government troops were able to reconquer the parts of the city oc- 
cupied by their opponents. The troops were able to advance only 
step by step, and at the cost of heavy sacrifices. A number of 
generals were killed. But on June 26 the entrance to the Saint 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 199 

Antoine suburb, the real workingmen's quarter, was finally forced. 
The rest of the workingmen's army, 11,000 men, surrendered to 
the victor. 

How severe the struggle had been is shown by the fact that after 
the suppression of the insurrection, peaceful conditions were not 
restored at once. It appeared necessary to leave the executive power 
for the time being in General Cavaignac's hands, and in Paris the 
state of siege was continued until the end of 1848. For newspapers 
a cautionary deposit of money was again required; many failed 
because they were unable to raise the large sum demanded. Who- 
ever had taken part in the last revolt could be summarily deported; 
about 4,000 persons were arrested and packed off to the colonies. 
No amnesty was proclaimed for others not punished. 

Henceforth, the Republic had to reckon with the unrestrained 
hatred of the socialists, without being able to acquire the good will 
of the conservative elements. For the majority of the population 
did not think that the government had mastered the insurrection 
quickly. They only remembered the unheard-of phenomenon of a 
"red" revolt, and got the impression that nothing but a military 
dictatorship could prevent a return of those terrible days. 

The idealistic republicans also made the mistake of giving 
into the hands of their numerous opponents the very weapons to 
cause their own fall. On November 12, 1848, the National As- 
sembly adopted the new constitution which gave the president an 
altogether extraordinary amount of power. As in the United States, 
the president was to be chosen for a four-year term and to appoint 
his own cabinet. The executive power was therefore wholly inde- 
pendent of the single chamber which was given legislative power. 
True to the old republican program, the constitution also emphasized 
the duty of the state to care for general education, for the establish- 
ment of equality between workingmen and employers, and for the 
provision of opportunities to work, so far as was possible. 

So far, indeed, little objection could be made to the new constitu- 
tion from a republican point of view. The fact that the president, 
as in America, was made independent of the changing parties in 
the legislature, might even be regarded as an advantage, since in this 
way the executive would give the republic greater stability. But as 
conditions then were, the election of the president ought, at least, 
to have been in the hands of the legislature, the only body 
which was thoroughly in favor of the republic. This was also the 
view of distinguished parliamentary leaders. One of them, Jules 
Grevy, even went so far as to wish to give the legislature not only 



200 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

the right to elect, but also to recall, the president. But here again 
the fatal voice of the poet, Lamartine, carried the day; just as he 
had attempted to discredit Louis Philippe's government, by his 
grotesque phrase, "France is bored" — as if it were the duty of those 
in authority to entertain the people with theatrical phrases or with 
useless warlike undertakings, — so now the poet again threw a new 
phrase into the discussion which did not fail to produce a great 
effect upon the republican idealists. After he had explained that it 
was in accordance with the principles of democracy for the presi- 
dent to be chosen directly by the people, he added, "God and the 
people must decide. We must leave something to Providence." This 
decided the matter. Not even the limiting clause was approved that 
no member of a family which had formerly reigned in France could 
be elected president. The Assembly decided, by 602 votes to 211, 
that the president should be chosen on the same basis of universal 
suffrage, on which it, itself, had been elected. 

What this meant was soon evident. In addition to conditions 
which gave the French president a wholly different position from 
the American one — a centralized administration and a large army 
at his unlimited disposal — there was added the peculiarity already 
mentioned, that the masses of the people, who had hitherto been 
excluded from the suffrage, were unable to make a choice among the 
candidates on the basis of real political experience. They easily 
voted, therefore, for a candidate who had done practically nothing 
to deserve election, but who bore a familiar name. This was the 
Bonapartist pretender, the nephew of Napoleon I; named Louis after 
his father, the former King of Holland, he had already attracted 
general attention by his adventures during Louis Philippe's reign. 

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, born in 1808, was by inheritance the 
legitimate claimant to the Napoleonic imperial throne. Twice under 
Louis Philippe he had attempted to make himself successor to his 
famous uncle. Both times the undertaking had failed, under cir- 
cumstances which were simply ridiculous, so ridiculous in fact, that 
the imperial pretender was thought of as scarcely more than an 
inexperienced dreamer. The first time, when he attempted to over- 
throw the July Monarchy by a military insurrection in Strasburg, 
he was easily arrested and shipped off to America (1836). Four 
years later, when the pretender landed from England and tried 
to seize Boulogne, he was again taken prisoner. He was condemned 
by a court to life-long imprisonment. He spent six years under 
arrest in the fortress of Ham until 1846, when he succeeded in 
escaping to England disguised as a workman (the name of the stone- 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 201 

mason, Badinguet, whose overalls he borrowed, clung to him as a 
nickname long afterwards). Scarcely had the February Revolution 
broken out in France when he returned to Paris and at once opened 
an active political propaganda. His popularity grew rapidly. At 
by-elections for the National Assembly in the summer of 1848 he 
was elected in no less than five departments, including Corsica. He 
had the great advantage that he had not compromised himself with 
any party, and so had on his side all the opponents of the 
new Republican government, who preferred an unknown person 
to politicians who were disliked. Moreover, the hazy humanitarian 
socialistic ideas which he had developed in his previous writings may 
have won for him some of the socialists, who had not broken wholly 
with the February Republic. So at the election on December 10, 
1848, Louis Napoleon won an enormous majority in the popular 
election. Those who voted for him included both the peasants and 
the anxious bourgeois who saw in him the only savior from the 
"reds," many workingmen who had learned to hate the republican 
government, and also many republicans who disliked Cavaignac's 
military dictatorship. General Cavaignac, who had triumphed over 
the Paris workingmen in the fighting at the barricades in the July 
Days, was the only other candidate who had any chance of success 
against the Bonapartist prince. He received, in fact, nearly a mil- 
lion and a half votes, while Ledru-Rollin got only 370,000, and 
Lamartine only 18,000. But Cavaignac's vote was all the smaller 
'hen one considers that Louis Napoleon was elected by no less than 
nearly five and a half million votes. 

On December 20, Louis Napoleon took the oath to the Constitu- 
tion, and in doing so expressly condemned any attempt to change 
the form of government by illegal methods. But he began at once 
his policy of uniting all the conservative elements into a bloc which 
should prepare the way to the throne for him as the preserver of 
order. The panic of the socialist revolution had drawn together the 
conservative groups which had hitherto been so hostile to one 
another: many republicans even approached the standpoint of the 
Orleanists who supported the July Monarchy; Legitimists who sup- 
ported the older Bourbon line, clericals, and Orleanists, all faced by 
the common danger which threatened property and religion, which 
was regarded as the protector of property, now joined together in 
a great 'Tarty of Order." The president at once declared himself 
of the same mind. He even allowed a conflict to take place with 
the republican majority in the Assembly. Quite characteristically 
he first made concessions to the neo-conservative party in a religious 



202 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

matter. Under the influence of the February Revolution in Paris, 
reformers had risen in revolt in the Papal States and proclaimed a 
Roman Republic. It would have been wholly in accord with the atti- 
tude of the new, free-thinking, democratic government in France, if 
French troops had supported this movement which could not suc- 
ceed without aid from the outside, and the National Assembly passed 
a vote in favor of such action. But the president paid no attention 
to this vote. He knew that the "Party of Order" would never 
pardon any weakening of the Pope's authority. He therefore sent 
an army to Italy under General Oudinot, with orders to support, 
not the Roman Republic, but the Pope; and he carried through his 
purpose. In vain did republican leaders, Jules Grevy and Ledru- 
Rollin, insist that the president ought to be impeached for disre- 
garding the vote of the National Assembly. The Assembly did not 
dare to go to such lengths, and Pope Pius IX was able to return to 
Rome under the protection of French troops, and so restore at once 
his old system of government in 1849. 

Louis Napoleon took a still more decisive step when the new elec- 
tions for the Legislative Assembly gave a majority to the groups 
on which he was resting for support. The Constituent Assembly 
had naturally been dissolved after it had accomplished its task of 
making a constitution for the country. In 1849 the new elections for 
the Legislative Assembly gave anti-republican tendencies full oppor- 
tunity to express themselves. Under the panicky impression caused 
by the socialist insurrection,, for which the republicans were held 
responsible, a complete change had taken place in the electorate. Of 
the 750 deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly about 500 be- 
longed to the "Party of Order"; barely a third of the deputies, there- 
fore, represented the party which had had the majority in the Na- 
tional Constituent Assembly. 

Under these circumstances any opposition in the Legislative As- 
sembly to the president's Roman policy had much less chance of 
success than in the Constituent Assembly. In vain did Ledru-Rollin 
again insist that the president ought to be impeached; in vain did 
he appeal to Article V of the constitution, which expressly forbade 
the use of French troops in the suppression of the liberty of another 
people. His proposal was voted down. Two days later Ledru-Rollin 
answered by stirring up a demonstration in one of the eastern suburbs 
of Paris, but this disturbance, in which several hundred National 
Guards and workingmen took part, was easily suppressed by the 
military authorities, and only served as a legal pretext for breaking 
up the republican organization. Ledru-Rollin had to flee to London; 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 203 

other leaders were arrested; the republican newspapers were sup- 
pressed; and Paris was placed under martial law. 

The way was now open for a new reactionary policy. In 1850 two 
decisive laws were passed which marked not only a departure from 
the ideals of 1848, but even a retrogression to the period before 
1830. 

Louis Philippe's government had differed from that which pre- 
ceded it before 1830 largely in that it had withdrawn public education 
wholly from the control of the Church (see above, p. 190). Laymen 
who were essentially Voltairean in their way of thinking had been 
given charge of public instruction. Although the bourgeoisie had 
not experienced any new convictions of religious truth, they 
now determined on political grounds to place the youth again under 
the influence of the clergy. Their idea was that a strengthening 
of religious influences was the only way to secure protection against 
the socialist ideas in favor of social revolution. As M. Falloux said, 
when introducing the new education law, "Lay teachers have made 
the principles of social revolution popular in the most distant ham- 
lets." It was therefore necessary, he said, "to rally around religion 
in order to strengthen the foundations of society against those who 
want to divide up property." The Legislative Assembly agreed with 
him, and so in 1850 was passed the so-called "Falloux Law" which 
again introduced clerical supervision over the schools. The "Uni- 
versity" was divided into eighty-six departmental academies, at the 
head of which were rectors who were elected from outside the "Uni- 
versity"; that is, they were chosen from ecclesiastical institutions and 
were placed under the direction of the prefect and the bishop. The 
higher schools {colleges) were supervised by an administrative 
council which was usually presided over by the bishop. Teachers in 
primary schools were placed under the local priest and had to teach 
the Roman Catholic Catechism, 

Another old wish of the clerical party was also satisfied, inasmuch 
as instruction in all grades was now made "free," that is, open to 
any one. The religious "congregations" were now able to enter into 
unchecked competition with the public schools, and ecclesiastical 
schools of every kind quickly sprang from the ground everywhere. 
The bourgeoisie, who were anxious that the coming generation should 
be protected from the dangerous doctrines threatening the system of 
private property, could now not only send their children uncon- 
cernedly to public schools; they could also send them to religious 
educational institutions which devoted themselves directly to com- 
batting the doctrines of social revolution. 



204 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

The second law in favor of the new conservative tendency was the 
electoral law of May 31, 1850. The 'Talloux Law" of March 25 
had indeed roused some fear among the people at large, and some 
by-elections had indicated a slight strengthening of the republican 
feeling. To prevent a revival of socialist opposition in the Legisla- 
tive Assembly the electoral law was changed. The Legislative As- 
sembly was not able, and perhaps did not wish, completely to do 
away with universal suffrage; but it determined to exclude the work- 
ingmen in good part from it. The new law declared that henceforth 
in order to vote one must have resided three years in the same dis- 
trict and have one's name inscribed on the list of taxpayers. These 
were conditions which were easily met by the peasants, who were 
regarded as a conservative element and were therefore gladly pro- 
tected by the Legislative Assembly in their political privileges. The 
workingmen, on the other hand, could only meet these conditions to 
a slight extent, and so it came about that some three million citizens, 
chiefly workingmen, were robbed of their share in choosing the leg- 
islature. The formation of a socialist party in the legislature was 
therefore out of the question. Perhaps even more important was the 
fact that the French chamber had now shown that an extension of 
the suffrage may not only work in the direction of conservatism, but 
may even be a regular protecting wall against revolutionary tend- 
encies. 

But this "reactionary" electoral law contributed essentially to the 
downfall of the legislature. The Republican and Socialist opposi- 
tion feared the new regime would be nothing but a poor imitation 
of the July Monarchy, or worse, because the rule of the bour- 
geoisie would be strengthened by placing education in the control 
of the clergy. 

The president, who was aiming at personal power and also at more 
or less hazy humanitarian ideals, made use of this discontent in the 
Republican and Socialist groups to pose as the true friend of tlie 
people in opposition to the Legislative Assembly. He proceeded sys- 
tematically toward restoring the Empire by manipulating public 
opinion and by subjecting the army and the administration to his 
control. He got rid of the Orleanists whom he had at first had to 
take into his cabinet out of regard for the feeling in the Legislative 
Assembly. He removed generals from office who opposed the Bona- 
partist propaganda in the army. He asked the Legislative Assembly 
to repeal the new electoral law and introduce again complete uni- 
versal suffrage; and when it rejected his request by a small majority 
he declared, "When I wanted to do good by improving the condition 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 205 

of the lower classes of the people, the Legislative Assembly refused 
to cooperate with me." 

The only problem which remained for him was whether it 
would be possible to restore the monarchy in some legal way, that 
is, whether public opinion, which was favorable to Louis Napoleon, 
could compel the Legislative Assembly to submit to his wishes. This 
was what the president at first attempted. Two things especially 
must be accomplished if he wanted to introduce personal govern- 
ment again. He must be provided with sufficient revenues to main- 
tain a court, and the clause in the constitution which declared the 
president ineligible for reelection at the expiration of his four-year 
term must be repealed. The president and his party attempted to 
secure both these things in the legislature; but both were rejected, 
though with relatively small majorities. The proposal for increasing 
his "endowment" by 1,800,000 francs was refused by a vote of 
386 to 294. The more important proposal, revising the constitution 
so that the president could be reelected, secured on July 26, 185 1, 
an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, but not the three- 
fourths majority required by the constitution. 

Besides this the president was faced by the further difficulty that 
he had no legal means of appealing to the people against the legis- 
lature. The constitution, like that of America on which it was 
modeled, had created the executive and legislative powers co-equal 
(an arrangement which has often brought a political deadlock in the 
United States) ; it withheld from him the right to dissolve the 
Assembly and order new elections. If he wanted to make himself 
"democratic autocrat" there was nothing for him to do but use 
force. 

Accordingly, he soon used force. With the aid of the army and 
the police, the president succeeded in carrying out smoothly the 
coup d'etat of December 2, 185 1. The chief leaders of the Repub- 
lican and Orleanist parties, like Cavaignac and Thiers, were arrested 
and thrown into prison, and the legislative hall was occupied by 
soldiers. One of the president's natural brothers, named Morny, was 
made minister of the interior, so that Louis Napoleon at once had 
all the prefects in his control. The coup d'itat took place under 
the guise of saving the republic. The president not only declared 
in his proclamation that it was his intention to overthrow the men 
who had already ruined two monarchies, to nullify their plots against 
the republic, and to appeal from them to the only sovereign whom 
he recognized, namely to "the people"; but he also placed before 
this people for popular vote (plebiscite) the draft of a new con- 



2o6 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

stitution which repealed several reactionary decisions of the Legis- 
lative Assembly (particularly the limitation of universal suffrage), 
and which also extended the president's term of office for ten years 
more. But the Republicans naturally did not allow themselves to 
be deceived by these words. Although deprived in good part of their 
leaders, they organized themselves for resistance and appealed, ac- 
cording to the constitution, to the supreme court {Haute-Coitr) to 
condemn the president's high treason. The court met, acknowledged 
the apparent guilt of the offender and invited him to defend himself. 
A "Committee of Resistance," consisting of men like Victor Hugo, 
Hippolyte Carnot, and Jules Favre, posted up placards calling people 
to rise in armed revolt against Louis Napoleon who had made him- 
self an outlaw. The opposition succeeded in winning over several 
hundred workingmen to their side. Once more the eastern suburbs 
of Paris were torn up for barricades. 

This defensive action against Louis Napoleon did not seem alto- 
gether hopeless. Both in Paris and in the provinces the coup d'etat 
met with lively disapproval and the first attack on the barricades 
had relatively little success. If the president had been willing or 
able to use no more means than stood at the disposal of Charles X 
or Louis Philippe, his coup d'etat would probably have failed; but, 
in contrast to the preceding monarchs, he had the army firmly in 
his grasp and he was not afraid to make a thorough and, if need 
be, brutal use of it. Louis Napoleon had the troops attack the 
barricades and clear the Grands Boulevards with frightful fusillades. 
Although there was no organized resistance here, the troops opened 
a systematic fire on the crowds and neighboring houses, and 
the streets were covered with the bodies of old men, women and 
children. In the provinces the president went ahead in the same 
way; after several local attempts at revolt, he placed thirty-two 
departments under martial law and established military commis- 
sions with discretionary power which were given authority to con- 
demn all suspicious persons by a kind of court-martial. 

"Suspicious persons" were not only those opponents of the new 
regime who were suspected of armed opposition, but, in general, 
all persons who favored by conviction a republican form of govern- 
ment. So it came about, that although the opposition to the coup 
d'etat was quite limited, no less than 100,000 persons were arrested; 
1545 were exiled, or fled voluntarily, like Victor Hugo. About 
10,000 were deported to Algiers and 239 to Cayenne. More than 
5,000 were placed under official surveillance and about 3,000 in- 
terned in France itself. The republican party, as such, was de- 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE , 207 

stroyed; there were still some republicans, but they were unable to 
act in common. 

Thus Louis Napoleon appealed from the intellectual elite, who 
had hitherto been in control, to the masses of the bourgeois, who 
were worried about the safety of their property. Shortly after- 
wards, as he had promised, the plebiscite was held (December 14, 
1851). It showed that the president had not acted against the 
wishes of the majority of the population: the new constitution was 
approved by about seven and a half million votes to 650,000. But 
the conflict between the intellectual, influential classes and the 
coup d'etat government still continued, and doubtless contributed 
eventually to the fall of the Second Empire. For no matter how 
much the president, and later emperor, attempted to win public 
opinion by military glory and by increasing the prestige of France 
abroad, French intellectuals, who are probably less likely to be 
blinded by military glamor than those of any other country, re- 
mained steadily hostile to him. Even the French Academy adopted 
a decidedly unfriendly attitude down to the end of the Second Em- 
pire. The brutal treatment of innocent bystanders on December 4, 
and the equally brutal procedure against the intellectual leaders of 
France, was never pardoned by his opponents. 

At first, Louis Napoleon was in full possession of power in both 
foreign and domestic matters. What the constitution of 1848 had 
denied to him was now granted by the new one of 1852, adopted by 
the people upon his proposal. It differed primarily from the pre- 
ceding one in that it sharply limited the powers of the legislative 
body, which had formerly been coordinate with the president; and 
at the same time it extended the authority of the president and also 
(theoretically, at least) that of the people. The president, who 
henceforth was to be elected for ten years, was made sole executive ; 
he appointed all officials, signed all treaties, and had the right to 
declare war and proclaim martial law. The Legislative Assembly, 
which was reduced in membership by two-thirds, could only discuss 
IsLV/s which were laid before it by the president, and so lost all power 
of initiative. By its side there was established a Senate whose mem- 
bers were appointed for life by the president; this body had the 
task of preserving the constitution. The president was responsible 
neither to this nor to the Legislative Assembly, but merely to the 
people. This did not mean, however, that the electorate was given 
a regular share in the government by anything like a referendum. 
The share which the people had in politics was limited to the extent 
that voters might vote "aye" or *'no" in the so-called plebiscites 



2o8 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

whenever the president laid any measure before them for decision, 
such as the adoption of a new constitution, or the making of war 
or peace. Elections to the Legislative Assembly were still to be by 
universal suffrage; however, the president had the right to propose 
official candidates and thus influence the elections very strongly. 

After this first step, it was a mere formality for the president to 
complete his imitation of the First Napoleon by assuming shortly 
afterwards the imperial title, and by declaring the imperial dignity 
hereditary in his family. After the first elections to the Legislative 
Assembly, which took place under the system of official candidates, 
had given him an overwhelming majority (the opposition got only 
three seats), he sought to allay the fears that he would take up his 
uncle's war policy by declaring in his Bordeaux speech, "L'Empire, 
c'est la paix," — "The Empire means peace, my conquests must be 
of an economic nature." After all this, the Senate decided to lay 
before the French people a plebiscite as to whether the Empire 
should be restored. This resulted in an enormous majority in favor 
of the proposal (7,839,000 ayes to 253,000 noes). Accordingly, on 
December 2, 1852, on the anniversary of the coup d'etat, the new 
Emperor took his seat in the Tuileries, the old palace of the kings. 

The Emperor's peace pronouncement was more than a mere phrase. 
Although he was drawn into military adventures more than once, for 
reasons which will be explained in another connection, he by no 
means forgot the peaceful economic activity which he had promised 
in his Bordeaux speech to undertake. And in contrast to Louis 
Philippe's government, he sought, as far as possible, to look out for 
the interests not only of the upper bourgeoisie but also of the peas- 
ants, the workingmen and other consumers. The Credit Fonder 
was established; agricultural societies were multiplied; the construc- 
tion of railways was greatly pushed; rivers were improved so that 
the harvests should not be injured by floods; forests were planted; 
and swamps were drained. All this was of advantage to the work- 
ingmen, for all these extended undertakings needed a large supply 
of labor. In addition to the activities mentioned, one of the most 
important in this connection was the systematic rebuilding of the 
capital, which was begun in 1854 under Baron Haussmann, the pre- 
fect of the Seine. At one stroke Paris was transformed from an 
old-fashioned city into a modern capital. The narrow, crooked 
streets disappeared; great buildings were laid out with plenty of 
space in front of them; and broad approaches led to the railway 
stations. This was done not only in the interests of hygiene and to 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 209 

give employment to workingmen, but also, in case of rebellion, to 
make easier the movement of troops. The construction of countless 
new railway lines, the establishment of better overseas trade-routes, 
the consolidation of the French rule in Algiers (see p. 124), — all this 
aided the development of industry under the new regime. Still the 
Emperor by no means favored exclusively the interests of the great 
manufacturers as the July Monarchy had done. How little this was 
the case is shown especially clearl}'' in the so-called free-trade treaty 
which he signed with Great Britain on January 22, i860, in which 
one of the negotiators was the well-known free-trader, Cobden. By 
this France renounced all her prohibitory regulations against foreign 
imports. In their place were established import duties which were 
not to be more than thirty per cent ad valorem. In return, France 
received the right to export to England free of any duty various 
products, chiefly agricultural, and English duties upon French wines 
and spirits were lowered. This was an innovation which could only 
have been brought about by the fact that the Chamber of Deputies 
did not have to be consulted ; now, as before, protectionists controlled 
the legislature, and numerous French manufacturers regarded the 
treaty as a misfortune for the country ; but the Emperor ignored the 
legislature, and, as a matter of fact, the commercial treaty resulted 
in the foreign trade of France increasing in ten years from three 
to eight million francs. 

But though this material prosperity naturally made a great im- 
pression, the opposition of the intellectuals and the numerous ideal- 
ists, as has already been indicated, was not overcome. Its spokes- 
man, the Journal des Debats, expressed their feelings when it de- 
clared, "Man does not live by bread alone; and all is not for the 
best in the world simply because the price of cattle and govern- 
ment revenues are rising." These people could not forgive the Im- 
perial Regime either its illegal origin or its suppression of all free 
intellectual life. The government, always afraid of opposition, un- 
dertook, in alliance with the church, a spy system of extraordinary 
rigor. In the years before i860 persons were arrested for expres- 
sions which they had used even in private conversation. News- 
papers could be summarily suppressed or suspended by government 
authority. No new newspaper could be established except by the 
express permission of the government. Teachers in the "Univer- 
sity" might be dismissed at any time. The dangerous professor- 
ships of history and philosophy were altogether abolished. All po- 
litical agitation was rendered impossible. Newspapers were allowed 



2IO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

to publish only the official reports of the sessions of the Chamber. 
Electoral campaign meetings, and even the publication of party 
platforms, were forbidden. 

The government was quite aware that there was an unyielding 
opposition in the country. So it was driven more and more to seek 
the support of those forces which it regarded as the only sure sup- 
port of its authority, namely the army, the clergy, and the commer- 
cial circles who were glad to be free of having to bother with politics 
and of the danger of socialistic uprisings. How correct the gov- 
ernment was, was seen at once as soon as it modified its oppressive 
system after i860: Paris, the intellectual center of France, chose 
exclusively opposition candidates in 1863. 

The situation which developed at that time had an importance 
which extended far beyond France itself. While the fact that a 
military dictatorship appeared to be the only means of holding down 
the socialist revolutionary movement exercised a great influence on 
the political thought of all Europe, the new dynasty's close con- 
nection with the army also led to a complete change in foreign policy. 
Emperor Napoleon III (as he called himself, since he regarded the 
Duke of Reichstadt, the great Napoleon's little son, who had never 
actually ruled, as ''Napoleon II,") believed it necessary to give 
the army an opportunity to distinguish itself; and he also wished 
to win, as far as possible, the support of public opinion in France 
by a display of "prestige." The national policy of his predecessors 
was replaced by a dynastic policy of his own. In place of the 
pacific policy of the July Monarchy which had suited so excellently 
the economic structure and geographical expansion of France, and, 
in fact, France's position among the European states, there now fol- 
lowed a period of military adventures and fruitless warlike activities. 
Napoleon III did not begin wars of conquest; even from victorious 
wars he scarcely expected any increase of French territory. Usually 
he championed the aspirations of other nations, whose interests 
either did not touch, or were even in direct conflict with, those of 
France. He allowed himself to be influenced either by general sen- 
timental considerations or by the hope of acquiring for France 
(empty) diplomatic distinction, which would reconcile the hostile 
elements in his country to the imperial regime. 

One of the most important results of this changed attitude on 
the part of the French government was a fundamental alteration in 
the relations of the European states to one another. The period of 
peace following the Congress of Vienna came to an end. In place 
of small wars of limited extent (like that in Belgium), or of colonial 



THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 



211 



wars, conflicts between the Great Powers began again. The 
most important of these struggles took place in Italy. But before 
an account is given of them a resume must first be given of the 
great war which marked the beginning of this new era, and also of 
the Civil War in America, which made clearer than anything else 
the change in the political views of Europe. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE CRIMEAN WAR. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN 

QUESTION 

Napoleon III quickly secured recognition from the other Great 
Powers. Although a Bonapartist government in France was in direct 
contradiction with the Treaties of 1815 and 18 18, still the other 
Great Powers made no serious opposition to the Second Empire. For 
reasons to be described in the next chapter, they felt they had a 
common interest with the conservative regime victorious in France; 
they hailed with joy the establishment of a monarchy instead of 
a republic on the Seine, especially a republic tinged with socialism. 
But the legitimist principles, which had been advocated by the Con- 
servative Alliance of the Eastern Powers since 181 5, were not 
to be shoved aside all at once. Napoleon III was indeed recog- 
nized as a de facto ruler, but he was not treated on terms of equality. 
When he wished to marry, all the princely families of Europe, 
even including Bernadotte's Swedish dynasty, refused the hands of 
their daughters, so in January, 1853, the French emperor married 
Eugenie de Montijo, who came from an old and respectable but not 
princely family in Spain. 

Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, was the ruler who was most cool to 
Napoleon III. He had always regarded himself as the peculiar de- 
fender of legitimacy. Shortly before this he had reaffirmed his atti- 
tude by destroying the revolutionary Hungarian republic (which was 
scarcely to be justified from a purely Russian standpoint). Nicholas 
now refused to address Napoleon as "Mon Frere," which is the usual 
form in which legitimate princes address one another. 

If Napoleon wanted to make himself count with the other 
Powers, the best way to do it naturally seemed to be by a stroke 
against Russia. Furthermore, the French emperor could at the same 
time show his good will toward his clerical adherents in France, if 
he was able to stand forth as the defender of Roman Catholicism 
against the Russian schismatics. A struggle with Russia, particu- 
larly a military one, was hardly in the interests of the French na- 

212 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 213 

tion. France did not care if her new ruler was snubbed in inter- 
national etiquette. But Napoleon was guided by dynastic interests, 
as has already been pointed out, and if he held to these, war with 
Russia was perhaps advisable. 

Such an undertaking seemed particularly favorable, from a military 
point of view as well as for reasons of prestige, if it could be carried 
out in conjunction with some other Great Power. For evident rea- 
sons England was the only possible ally. England was naturally 
hostile to Russia, and had become increasingly so, as Russian and 
English interests clashed more sharply in Asia (see ch. xvii). 
The English court had fewer scruples to overcome, and the British 
government had been the first to recognize the French Empire. 
Finally, England was also in a position, being the only great naval 
power of the age, to afford better support to the French land army 
than any other country. 

The Eastern Question, that is, the question which European Power 
should secure control over Constantinople, had become essentially 
less favorable to Russia since the end of the War of Greek Inde- 
pendence. From her defeats at that time Turkey had learned her 
lesson, and had been reorganizing her army according to European 
models and under the direction of European instructors. The 
"Straits Convention" of 1841 had declared the Bosphorus neutral 
and closed it to all ships of war, particularly to those of Russia. 
If Russia wanted to retain free exit into the Mediterranean in case 
of war, she was compelled to make preparations to break through 
by force ; with this in mind, she had been building a mighty fortress 
and naval port on the Crimean Peninsula at Sebastopol. There was 
danger that Russia might possibly get ahead of Turkey with her 
war preparations before the Sultan at Constantinople had organized 
sufficient defenses to free him from his dependence on St. Petersburg. 

Russia herself, during the last decades, had been using her vast 
natural resources for greater and greater military preparations. Al- 
though she did not look forward to conquests in Europe, and 
although her soldiers were chiefly used in suppressing revolutions and 
in preserving existing conditions, still Nicholas I devoted most of 
his attention to military matters. While his elder brother, Alex- 
ander, had toyed with liberal political ideas, his interests were exclu- 
sively devoted to the creation of a strong army and navy. He felt 
that the existence of his government, and indeed of conservative 
legitimist principles in Europe in general, were bound up with Rus- 
sia's strong military force. 

It is not to be denied that he accomplished his purpose with 



214 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

astonishing success. The corruption and inefficiency of Russian 
administration have become proverbial in Western Europe, but the 
facts brand this view as wholly false in many respects. Certainly, 
many of the stories are true, which have been told by Russians as 
much as by others, of the bribery and inefficiency of Russian offi- 
cials. But only a superficial moralist will lay great weight on these 
stories. If one wants to regard the matter critically and historically, 
one must first of all see whether these delinquencies, which natu- 
rally took place, actually hindered the working of the Russian state 
machinery, and rendered abortive the aims toward which Russian 
policy was directed. On this point the only answer that can be 
given is that they did not. Though a great deal of corruption took 
place, and though state funds were often squandered by officials, 
nevertheless the efficiency of the Russian army and of Russian 
foreign policy scarcely suffered at all thereby. One simply has to 
remember the account given above (in ch. xvii) of Russia's expan- 
sion in Central Asia, and one will admit that it would be difficult 
to find any other state which could have carried out these tasks 
better. 

The error of the current view largely rests on the fact that people 
are accustomed to think of policy and administration as being de- 
pendent on natural resources. But just as a business man who has 
only a little capital must proceed quite differently from a firm which 
has millions in reserve, so it is also in the life of nations. Russia 
was in the position of a millionaire with an enormous income, who 
does not need to worry if his agents line their own pockets to some 
extent. In spite of corruption, Russian revenues were always suf- 
ficient, and Russian finance was more solid than that of other states 
less favored by Nature, which pursued foreign policies not in har- 
mony with their weak economic basis. 

Furthermore, in the Russian civil service there were by no means 
lacking persons who may be compared in patriotic self-sacrifice, zeal 
and intelligence with the bureaucrats of other countries. To be»sure, 
it became evident, step by step, that the centralized military admin- 
istrative system which had been artificially transplanted to Russia 
from the West demanded for its successful action a much more ad- 
vanced state of civilization and a less primitive economic system 
than existed in Russia. The Russian Empire, made up almost 
wholly of peasants, in which only a few cities were little more than 
large villages, in which a great part of the peasants were serfs under 
the practically unlimited power of landlords, and in which there 
was lacking both a strong city middle-class as well as free peasant 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 215 

proprietors, — such a country did not sufficiently possess the ele- 
ments necessary to keep the complicated state machine at St. Peters- 
burg working satisfactorily in all its detailed administrative parts. 
Too many of the officials in its service were lacking in the necessary 
knowledge and desired honesty. But the system still gave honest 
men opportunities for service in a much larger degree than 
has generally been admitted, and what the Russian government ac- 
complished, both at home and abroad, shows clearly that these 
opportunities were largely made use of. To be sure, it was unfor- 
tunate that the "Panic of the French Revolution," augmented by 
the officers' revolt of 1825 (the so-called Decembrist Revolution) 
which aimed at the introduction of a constitution, lasted longer in 
Russia than any other states; and, as a result, capable officials, 
who were naturally inclined to western liberalism, were persecuted 
by the system of suspicion, and, as far as possible, pushed to one side. 
But, on the other hand, the civil service was less a monopoly of the 
nobility than in many of the other feudalistic states of Central 
Europe. Since there did not exist in Russia proper, as has already 
been pointed out, a system of large landed estates based on primo- 
geniture, younger sons of the nobility were placed under no economic 
necessity of being put into the civil or military service, even when 
they were not fitted for it ; it was otherwise, however, in the German 
Baltic provinces of Russia, where estates were entailed; from this 
region, therefore, there have come an unusually large number of 
Russian higher officials. Naturally, also, the nobility were promi- 
nent in the administration and in the army, because the necessary 
economic and social qualifications were harder to find in the other 
social classes in Russia. But the nobility were not really privileged 
as such ; and aristocracy based on service everywhere dominated over 
aristocracy based on birth. The nobility (that Is, the landlords, 
since only nobles could acquire land) were at the same time the in- 
dustrial class in Russia. To be sure, Russia did not have the neces- 
sary conditions for the introduction of modern industry. The rela- 
tively thinly settled soil, with its enormous mineral deposits and 
with the great stretches of land in the south so excellent for grain 
growing, was at that time only prepared to produce raw materials, 
and these formed the larger part of her exports. But the govern- 
ment, by prohibitive measures against the importation of those 
products which could be manufactured in Russia itself, had tried 
since 1822 to develop native Russian industries; and since the 
nobility had the right to establish factories on their own soil and 
even to inscribe themselves among the "merchants of the first guild," 



2i6 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

they were able to engage in industrial as well as commercial imder- 
takings. Thus, modest home industries had been developed. 

Although Nicholas I had taken so much care of the army, and 
although during his reign the military element dominated the civil 
administration, still he never thought of making war against his two 
neighbors on the west. Austria and Prussia were both too valuable 
as bulwarks of absolutism, he thought, for him to attack them; and 
also, at that time and for a long time afterwards, there were no 
grounds for war against them. It was part of his policy, too, to 
keep his subjects as far as possible from any contact with the foreign 
nations of Europe: to go abroad, in his day, one had to have the 
Tsar's personal permission; an attempt to emigrate might be 
punished by exile to Siberia; foreign books and newspapers were 
admitted only with difficulty, and all foreigners were watched by the 
police. Now a war with the states of the west would only have 
increased this contact with European civilization, which he so much 
feared. But after Nicholas I had suppressed the Hungarian revolu- 
tion in 1849, and thereby made Austria indebted to him, he believed 
the moment had come to put an end to the reorganization of the 
Turkish defensive measures which were growing steadily more threat- 
ening; the time had come to establish Russia's supremacy in the 
Balkans. 

The Tsar naturally expected that he would only have to deal 
with one opponent, England. He therefore first sought to arrange 
the matter in a friendly way. He proposed to England a partition 
of the empire of the "Sick Man," as he called the Sultan: in the 
Balkans a number of independent states would be created under 
Russian protection; Great Britain would have Egypt and 
Crete; and Constantinople would not be Russian territory exactly, 
but only be occupied by Russia "provisionally." But the English 
government was unwilling to give Russia access to the Mediterranean 
and declined the proposal. 

Parallel with these negotiations, conflicts had been taking place 
in regard to the Holy Places in Palestine. Here the claims of the 
Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox monks were opposed to one 
another. Since the former were under the protection of France, the 
French government also was involved. Russia sought to use this 
opportunity to compel Turkey to yield to her the right to protect 
all Greek Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish empire. But 
owing to the pressure of the British ambassador in Constantinople, 
Turkey rejected this demand. Russia thereupon broke off diplo- 
matic relations with Turkey in 1853. 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 217 

Both sides then tried the plan of making miUtary demonstrations. 
The Tsar occupied the Rumanian Principalities with an army, and 
England and France sent their fleets through the Dardanelles; since 
this was contrary to the convention of 1841, Russia protested. 
Great Britain replied that Russia had already broken the peace by 
her occupation of Rumania. On November 4, 1853, Turkey de- 
clared war on Russia. So far, it was not at all inevitable that these 
events should result in a European war; it was conceivable that tlie 
war might this time also have been merely a local one. But the 
Great Powers which were hostile to Russia, particularly Napoleon 
III, who at that time was trying to translate his dynastic policy of 
prestige into action, did not want to let the opportunity pass of 
putting an end once for all to the danger which threatened Constan- 
tinople through Russia's possession of a navy in the Black Sea. 
When the Russian fleet sailed out shortly after Turkey's declaration 
of war, and annihilated the Turkish fleet at Sinope on November 30, 
1853, the Powers believed the favorable occasion had come for in- 
tervening on behalf of Turkey. A combined Anglo-French force 
sailed into the Black Sea, and the Russian vessels were compelled 
to withdraw to Sebastopol, The Tsar thereupon broke off relations 
with the two Western Powers. The latter then demanded the evacua- 
tion of the Rumanian Principalities. When the Tsar rejected this 
demand also, they declared war on him (March 27, 1854). 

Since Russia did not want war, there were no serious military 
operations at first. In order to deprive his enemies of any pretext 
for an attack, the Tsar even withdrew his Russian troops from the 
Rumanian Principalities, and had them occupied by Austrian troops, 
so that no land attack against them was possible. But the Allies 
raised new demands, such as the neutralization of the Black Sea, 
and therefore continued the war. 

Naval operations, which alone were possible at first, took place in 
both the Baltic and the Black Sea. Though the Anglo-French at- 
tacks on the Aland Islands and on Kronstadt were of no great im- 
portance, their expedition against the naval port of Sebastopol on 
the Crimean Peninsula developed into an enormous undertaking. 
Their purpose here was the total destruction of this stronghold, in 
order to deprive Russia of her Black Sea base for attack against 
Constantinople. 

The operation proved much more difficult than any one had antici- 
pated. Thanks to their naval superiority, the Allies were able to 
land their troops smoothly on the Crimean Peninsula north of 
Sebastopol (30,000 French, 20,000 English, and 7,000 Turks). 



2i8 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

Shortly afterwards, by their victory on the Alma (September 20, 
1854), they were able to fight their way from the landing point down 
to the fortress of Sebastopol. But the battle had been such a costly 
one for the victors, and Sebastopol appeared to be so well fortified, 
that the Allies did not dare to try to take it by storm. Instead they 
began a regular siege. 

The Russians made splendid use of this delay. Defensive works 
of enormous strength were built. The entrance to the bay on the 
southern shore of which Sebastopol lies was blocked by sinking 
ships, so that the city could not be reached by the Allied naval 
guns. The siege dragged along in an extraordinarily slow manner. 
The besiegers were attacked by cholera which caused fearful losses 
in their ranks. The Russians were able to bring up a'relieving army 
which compelled the Allies to fight battles at Balaklava and Inker- 
man, which further reduced their forces. It was only their control 
at sea which saved the Allied troops from a catastrophe. 

From the point of view of world history it is important to note 
how the contingents of the various nations performed their military 
tasks. Here, for the first time, it became evident that the English 
administration was not equal to the demands of a campaign against 
a great European Power. In courage and bravery the English troops 
were in no way inferior to their French allies; but the English gov- 
ernment lacked the training and centralized administration necessary 
for affording proper support and sufficient provisions. Not only did 
English regiments often have to be saved by the French on the field 
of battle, but the frightful winter which the Allies unexpectedly had 
to spend in the Crimea deprived the British of half their troops, 
owing to the deficient transportation system. So great was the 
scandal that it overthrew the British ministry. More important than 
these temporary consequences, however, was the fact that the Con- 
tinent now saw for the first time since 18 15 how weak Great Britain 
was from a military point of view. 

The Allies therefore gladly accepted offers of reinforcements which 
were made to them from various sides. The Austrian government's 
plan of uniting with them against the Russians was not carried out, 
to be sure, because it was opposed by Prussia, Russia's natural ally. 
But Turkey placed a new army corps at their disposal, and the King 
of Sardinia, under Cavour's energetic leadership (see below, ch. 
xxv), gladly seized the opportunity to take part in the war and so 
place himself in a position of equality with the other two great 
states of the west. The government at Turin undertook to send 
15,000 Piedmontese troops to the Crimea, on January 26, 1855. 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 219 

With the aid of these and other reinforcements, the Allies finally 
succeeded in taking Sebastopol. To be sure, it cost a series of mur- 
derous attacks; but finally, on September 9, 1855, after several 
frightful reverses, the fortress was taken; that is, the Russians 
evacuated the city after destroying everything. 

But the Russian army itself was not destroyed; in fact, in another 
theater of war, in the Caucasus, the Russians even won an important 
success in taking the fortified position of Kars on November 27, 
1855. But the French concluded there was nothing more to be 
gained. Napoleon had secured what he wanted: his prestige was 
increased and Russian pride was humiliated. In vain did the Eng- 
lish government desire to continue hostilities. But as the French 
had little to gain from the expedition against the Crimea from the 
outset, so now Napoleon had little to expect personally through a 
continuation of the war. Therefore peace negotiations were opened. 
On Russia's side the decision for peace was made easier by the death 
of Nicholas I on March 2, 1855, He had been the irreconcilable 
enemy of the French usurper; his son and successor, Alexander II, 
was not hindered by any personal motives of prestige from adopting 
a conciliatory attitude. 

The Peace Congress, as was natural under the circumstances, met 
at Paris in February, 1856. This was the first great international 
assemblage since the Congress of Vienna. It was at the same time 
an official sign that the era which began in 181 5 had come to an 
end. In addition to the old Great Powers, including France and 
Turkey, the Kingdom of Sardinia also was admitted to a seat in the 
Congress, in accordance with the purpose which Cavour had had 
in sending Piedmontese troops to help in the Crimean War. The 
terms reached on March 30, 1856, corresponded with the demands 
which the Allies had made upon Russia before the attack on Sebas- 
topol. The victors put into the treaty of peace provisions desired 
by Great Britain which gave Turkey guarantees against Russian 
attack. The Powers undertook to respect the integrity of the 
Turkish Empire; the Black Sea was neutralized, so that no state 
might have naval ship-yards or war-ships on it; the navigation of 
the Danube was declared free and open to all nations, and placed 
under the supervision of an international commission; and the two 
Rumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were recog- 
nized as autonomous. 

This last provision was carried out in such a way, thanks chiefly 
to Napoleon's influence, that the Rumanians were able to unite 
into a single state in 1859, in spite of Turkey's opposition. Russia 



220 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

lost her monopoly of protecting Greek Orthodox Rumanians, and 
her path to Constantinople was now barred by a practically inde- 
pendent state. Rumania no longer stood under the influence of 
Russia, but was placed under the general Concert of Europe. This 
was a situation which had many analogies with the establishment of 
the Greek Kingdom in 1829 (p. 42). 

But it would be a mistake to regard the Crimean War merely as 
a phase in the development of the Eastern Question. Such a view 
would be all the more incorrect, inasmuch as the limitation placed 
on Russia at the Congress of Paris remained in force only so long 
as the victors in the Crimean war, especially France, possessed the 
power to stand behind the execution of the terms of the treaty. So 
far as the Near East was concerned, the Crimean war only resulted 
in postponing Russia's advance against Constantinople for two 
decades, and in creating a united Rumania. Much more important 
were the general results of the war. 

One of the first and most important of these general results was 
the putting an end to Great Britain as a military factor in European 
politics. It had been shown that her great economic development 
and her political evolution, which was so happy in general, had not 
been accompanied by any corresponding growth in her military 
strength; in fact, that many of the peculiarities of the British con- 
stitution, like the absence of bureaucracy on the French model, made 
Great Britain almost unable to compete in military matters with the 
Continental Powers. This did not exactly mean a real endangering 
of Great Britain's safety; although her position was not so favor- 
able as at the beginning of the century, since the extraordinarily great 
increase of her population made it possible to starve her out by a 
blockade, nevertheless the English navy and merchant marine were 
still so superior to those of the other European Powers, that any 
naval attack upon her was regarded as out of the question. Also, 
a state with such solid economic strength as England could never 
be ignored. But the fact had been proved that England was in no 
position to interfere effectively in wars on the mainland. The states- 
men of the continent now realized that they could carry on their 
wars without having to reckon on English intervention, particularly 
so long as their operations were limited to land warfare. 

The Crimean War also opened an era of great wars in Europe, 
after a period of nearly thirty years of peace following the Congress 
of Vienna. This was less due to the fact that "the ice was broken," 
as people said, than to the fact that Russia, which was the strongest 
protector of conservatism, had lost a part of her military prestige 



THE CRIMEAN WAR 221 

through her campaign in the Crimea. The Russian Empire could 
no longer be regarded as invincible; her warnings that the old order 
must be upheld lost force. 

Finally, on Russia herself the Crimean War exercised a powerful 
influence. In her foreign relations, wholly contrary to her natural 
interests, she was forced into a hostile attitude toward a state with 
which she had no fundamental grounds for conflict, namely toward 
France; and, as a result, she was drawn more closely than ever to 
Prussia. Henceforth, Russia had a real interest in the downfall of 
the French Empire, an event which alone could enable her to regain 
her former position in the Black Sea. 

No less important, at least for the moment, were the changes 
which took place in Russia's internal condition as a result of her 
defeat in the Crimea. Formerly, Russia's absolutist military 
bureaucracy had often been credited with Russia's success in foreign 
policy; but now this halo had disappeared. People dared openly 
to blame the all-powerful bureaucrats, or "tchinovniks," for the 
unhappy outcome of the war; their corruption and follies were held 
to be responsible. The cry for reforms, particularly for a control 
over the bureaucracy and a lessening of the censorship of the press, 
became louder and louder; moreover, the so-called intelligentsia, 
composed of nobles and students with academic training and chiefly 
represented in St. Petersburg, even demanded the introduction of 
liberal institutions like a constitution. 

The new Tsar, Alexander II, was not disinclined to yield to these 
wishes. He limited the censorship, and permitted people to journey 
abroad. But his most important reform was the abolition of serf- 
dom. 

The liberals had long demanded that the Russian people, too, 
should be raised to the rank of a real nation by being given per- 
sonal liberty. Hitherto, nine-tenths of the cultivable land in Russia 
had belonged to the vast domains which were in the possession of 
the great nobility or the state. On these domains lived 47,000,000 
serfs, who were bound to the soil and forced either to serve in the 
household of their lord or to cultivate his soil (though some were 
also allowed to become artisans or traders in the towns). The no- 
bility were naturally opposed to putting an end to these conditions 
which often actually differed from slavery only in name, and in 
which the person of the serf was completely at the lord's disposal. 
But the Tsar remained firm, and in the famous ukase of February 19, 
i86i, he declared serfdom totally abolished. On the crown lands the 
serfs were either made tenants on a long lease, or were raised to free 



222 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

peasant proprietors who were to pay for their land over a long period 
of time. The other domains were divided: one part remained in 
the possession of the lord, and the other was handed over to the 
peasants on condition that they pay a definite sum in compensation 
over a period of years. The state advanced four-fifths of the capital 
necessary for these payments. 

The Russian peasant thus became not only personally free, but 
also an owner of land. Great stretches of land, to be sure, were 
not given to individual owners, but were handed over to the village 
communities, the so-called mirs; but even these were later divided 
up on the basis of individual private property. The great landed 
estates of the earlier period did not, however, wholly disappear. 
They were not done away with until the Bolshevist Revolution, but 
alongside of them there now existed free peasant village communities. 

Tsar Alexander was not content with this reform only. Although 
he refused to introduce popular government even in the limited form 
which was customary in Prussia, he nevertheless granted the right 
of local self-government within definite limits to the great and small 
land owners. Thus, he broke with the system of autocratic 
bureaucracy. The mirs were placed under assemblies composed of 
the heads of households; above them were the district and provin- 
cial assemblies, known as zemstvos, composed of delegates of the 
nobility (or great landlords), of the clergy, and of the mirs; besides 
administrative functions these zemstvos also participated in the crea- 
tion of the lower courts of law. They formed a |)reliminary train- 
ing school for parliamentary life. 

At the same time, more freedom was introduced into the univer- 
sities. They were given richer endowments and the right to elect 
their own professors. The number of students increased enormously. 
Many teachers even held socialistic views. 

Thus, though much of the ancient regime still survived in Russia, 
nevertheless, as a result of the Crimean War, the country had defi- 
nitely entered upon an era of liberal reforms. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM AFTER THE 
FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 

In the last chapter an example was given of the way in which the 
February Revolution and its consequences influenced European 
politics. We have seen how it smoothed Napoleon's path to the 
imperial throne, and thereby opened the era of great wars which did 
not come to an end until 1870. One would only half understand 
these events, however, if one did not also consider the enormous in- 
tellectual consequences which resulted from the French events of 
1848. 

It almost seems to be an historical law that most men are willing 
to learn lessons only from most recent history. Only what they 
themselves, or possibly their fathers, have intensely experienced, 
seems to avail them as a guide for their own future. Moreover, 
it continually happens that two things are regarded as inseparably 
connected with one another, simply because they chanced to have 
happened at the same time. To this category belong two conclu- 
sions which were drawn from the events of 1848 and 1849 hy large 
circles of hitherto liberally-minded persons. In the first place, all 
''progressively-minded" bourgeois politicians, at least in countries 
which were somewhat industrialized, were given a terrible fright by 
observing that the Fourth Estate had dared to take part in gov- 
ernment and even to put into practice some of their doctrines, which 
had hitherto been laughed at as merely theoretical, like "the right 
to work." The intrusion of such socialistic elements into govern- 
ment office seemed to many to be inseparably connected with the 
abolition of bourgeois customs, of order, and even of civilization in 
general; so political measures which gave the Fourth Estate any 
rights were now regarded with the very greatest suspicion, even if 
they ought to have been approved from the standpoint of liberal 
theory. This panicky fear was still further increased by observing 
that the February Revolution had come into existence through a com- 
bination of Republicans and Socialists: whoever mentioned republic 
or even democracy was now regarded as advocating anarchy and 
communism. Constitutional liberalism might still be the aim of all 

223 



224 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

honest citizens as heretofore; but if it could not defend itself against 
the destructive attack of the "reds," then indeed absolutism, or even 
a military dictatorship after the style of Napoleon, ought be chosen 
as the lesser evil! 

It is noteworthy that this fear of the Socialist Movement, which 
amounted to a horror of all liberal reforms, had by no means its 
strongest effect on the class which was most directly threatened, 
namely the manufacturers. At least a great part of the intellectuals 
were just as strongly affected; they were afraid of a rule by the 
barbarian masses of the people, and they were also often trembling 
for the security of their little middle-class incomes. Like Schopen- 
hauer, they might be little satisfied with the attitude of the old con- 
servative system; but did not this system, even with all its bigotry, 
at least guarantee the preservation of good order? Even so honest 
and idealistic a statesman as the English free-trader, Cobden, be- 
lieved that the regime of Napoleon III, with all its defects, was still 
better than "the anarchy of Utopians, Anarchists, and Babblers," 
which Napoleon had put an end to. 

A few political thinkers, indeed, had sufficiently freed themselves 
from fear to draw from the example of France another, and appar- 
ently directly contradictory, lesson: a republic, according to them, 
was indeed dangerous; but could not some of the radical demands 
be turned to conservative uses? Had not the elections under the 
Second French Republic and Napoleon's plebiscites shown that a re- 
public, or even parliamentary government with monarchical forms, 
might be best opposed through the adoption of apparently revolu- 
tionary arrangements like universal suffrage? Was not the real 
"people," they asked, often less revolutionary than middle-class 
idealists? 

This is not the place to examine these theories, which, as is known, 
were chiefly represented by Disraeli and Bismarck. Here we can 
only observe that this drawing of analogous conclusions can only 
claim to hold good so far as the social conditions are the same as 
those in France, that is, where the majority of the population is not 
composed of factory operatives or agricultural day laborers, but of 
peasants living on their own property. Only in such a case is an 
appeal to the interests of private property likely to find a hearing 
among the masses. 

In this connection, however, it should be stated that in France 
itself this "realistic" conception of the intellectuals had less in- 
fluence on the ruling authorities than in other countries. On the 
other hand, as far as literature is concerned, the abandonment of 



THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM 225 

liberal notions was particularly notable in France. The new 
"realism" in literature, which differed from its predecessors 
in that it aimed to criticize and make fun of the exaggerations and 
ideals of romanticism, has found its classic expression in a French 
work of art — in Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857); but nowhere 
else, as already stated, did there persist such a strong opposition 
to this "realistic" way of thinking. 

In another respect, however, it was only in France that the in- 
fluence of the February Revolution reached its fullest development. 
This was the change in the attitude toward religion on the part of 
the bourgeoisie, who had hitherto been liberal. The capitalist 
middle-class now passed through the same kind of conversion of 
spirit as did the nobility after the French Revolution of 1789. They 
did not, indeed, revert to the old dogmas; but they thought it neces- 
sary to renounce Voltaireanism, outwardly at least, because their ex- 
pectation had not been fulfilled that the masses could be held in check 
by religion, even when the upper classes were not true to it. To 
be sure, no true religious conversion took place; but they gave up 
their opposition to having the schools placed under the Church. 

This new religious attitude differs chiefly from the somewhat 
analogous situation after 181 5 in two respects. 

One of these respects was the new alliance between the Papacy 
and most of the Catholic governments, the most important exception 
naturally being the Kingdom of Sardinia (see below, ch. xxv). 
After the Restoration in 181 5 the state had undertaken to advance 
the demands of religion; but it had had no intention of renouncing its 
own political rights in regard to the Church, or of giving the Catholic 
Church, as an organization, any kind of direct political influence. 
The conservative governments were favorably inclined toward re- 
ligion; but they remained "Galilean" (in France) and "Josephist" 
(in Austria). Now the Revolution of 1848 awakened in the gov- 
ernments and the bourgeoisie the conviction that this policy did not 
suffice. The struggle against religious unbelief, which threatened 
property rights, must be carried on more systematically, they thought ; 
they ought no longer to oppose the Pope's word of command nor 
the cooperation of bodies independent of the state. To the Pope 
and the bishops there was given almost complete freedom from state 
control. The "Ultramontane" parties, which had often grown up in 
opposition to the state ecclesiastical control, were now allowed un- 
checked activity. This change in France has already been men- 
tioned (p. 203), but it was much the same in the other great states. 
In the Prussian Constitution of 1850 the government renounced its 



226 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

right of supervision and control over the Catholic clergy, and even 
handed over religious instruction in the primary schools to them. The 
Austrian government went somewhat further in the Concordat of 1855, 
which completed the measures begun in 1850 for putting an end to 
"Josephism" (the subjection of the Catholic Church in the country 
to state control). The Placet was abolished, and instead the clergy 
was given the right to supervise the schools and the censorship of 
books. 

Pope Pius IX on his side showed his gratitude by pronouncing 
liberal revolutionary theories to be erroneous and forbidden by the 
Church. This attitude found its classic expression in the "Syllabus 
of Modern Errors" which the Pope issued with his Encyclical of 
December 8, 1864. This declared emphatically that society must be 
built up again on the basis of legitimate order, now that Catholic 
civilization had been weakened (note the sequence) by Lutheranism, 
Jansenism, Voltaireanism, and Socialism. The "Syllabus" therefore 
declared erroneous not only numerous liberal principles which related 
directly to church matters like the right to freedom of worship, but 
also many of the fundamental demands of liberalism in general. 

Of still greater practical importance was the establishment of an 
unlimited supreme power within the Catholic Church which took 
place a little later. It had always been a matter of dispute whether 
definitions of dogma could be made by the Pope alone, or whether 
they had to be confirmed by the sanction of the Church, represented 
in ecclesiastical assemblies or councils. This was also a dispute 
between the authority of the national churches and that of the Pope: 
since the bishops, who formed the overwhelming majority at 
councils, were inevitably more or less dependent upon the state gov- 
ernments, the exclusion of councils from control was equivalent to 
putting an end to what was left of the influence exercised by gov- 
ernments upon the central authority of the Catholic Church. 

In this dispute the Pope won a complete victory. On December 
8, 1854, he promulgated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception 
of the Virgin Mary, without being authorized thereto by a council. 
Having thus tested his authority, he issued in 1868 a call to a 
Vatican Council at which was to be officially confirmed the new 
dogma of "Papal InfalHbility," that is, the doctrine that the Pope 
alone, without the approval of the Church, possesses in the defini- 
tion of matters of faith the same infallibility which Christ gave to 
the Church. The council met on December 8, 1869. It was char- 
acteristic that, in contrast to former times, no temporal ruler was 
represented at it. From the beginning the Holy Father had at bis 



THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM 227 

disposal a majority of the votes, thanks to the presence of a great 
number of Italian bishops and of bishops in partibus infidelium; the 
opposition, composed chiefly of German, Austrian, and French 
bishops, had altogether scarcely a seventh of the votes. The deci- 
sive Constitutio de Ecdesia was voted on July 18, 1870, before the 
occupation of Rome by Italian troops compelled the Pope to adjourn 
the council indefinitely on October 20; this suspension of the as- 
sembly is still officially in force. 

Thus the Catholic Church, also, as a bulwark against the inter- 
national socialist movement, had been able to strengthen itself as 
an international organization superior to national governments; it 
offered itself as an ally, indeed, to the conservative states, but it 
was more independent of conservative governments than had hitherto 
been the case. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE WAR OF SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 

Nothing, perhaps, shows so clearly the change in public opinion 
mentioned in the last chapter as the attitude assumed by the gov- 
erning classes in Europe toward the war over slavery in North 
America. If ever humanity made a demand which was endorsed not 
only by all Liberals, but also by a great part of the Conservatives, 
it was the demand for the abolition of slavery, at least in countries 
occupied by whites. Governments which in other matters yielded to 
revolutionary desires very unwillingly, in this question were willing 
to make concessions. Not even the fact that the abolition of the 
slave trade and of slavery involved considerable sacrifices prevented 
England, for example, from completely emancipating the slaves on 
the sugar plantations in the British West Indies in 1834. Every- 
where it was regarded as a disgrace that slavery was still tolerated 
in the United States of America, — the only great country in the 
world occupied by whites, with the exception of large parts of 
Brazil, where slavery still existed. 

One would have supposed, accordingly, that when the war against 
slavery broke out in America, it would have been greeted with joy 
by public opinion in Europe, and especially in the two countries 
which had taken the lead in suppressing slavery, namely in Great 
Britain and France. It is astonishing that this was not the case, 
and yet one can understand the reason. All those groups which 
had been driven by the revolutions of 1848 into a panicky anxiety 
about a republican form of government, took the side of the slave- 
holders. They almost had the effect, by their attitude, of prolonging 
the continuance of slavery in the United States. 

From the time of the first settlements in America climatic con- 
ditions had brought it about that the southern colonies had an alto- 
gether different economic structure from those in the North. The 
South was the region where tobacco, rice, and cotton were cultivated 
on a large scale; it was the region where the planters used negro 
labor exclusively. With the exception of certain outlying districts, 
not only was slave labor prevalent, but the plantations were wide 
in extent. There was lacking any considerable group of towns- 

228 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 229 

people or peasants; in fact with a few exceptions, there were no 
large cities in the South. Small proprietors were extraordinarily 
few in number. The mass of the population as early as the 
eighteenth century in the most southern colonies, was largely made 
up of negro slaves, the slaves greatly outnumbering the whites. 
Above the slaves stood an aristocracy of plantation owners, who 
possessed wide estates, which they had cultivated by the blacks. 

Even at that time, cultivation of wide estates had many advan- 
tages, which were all the greater as the plantations were extended. 
At the close of the eighteenth century this extension of large planta- 
tions at the expense of smaller ones increased in an unexpected 
fashion. After the mechanical inventions in England had developed 
enormously the means of using cotton, an American, Eli Whitney, 
invented in 1 793 the so-called cotton gin, a machine which facilitated 
the separation of the seeds from the cotton wool. Slavery, which 
was beginning to decline, now acquired an altogether new impor- 
tance. Cotton production increased very rapidly: in 1791, before 
the invention of the cotton gin, it amounted to two million pounds; 
in 1 80 1, to forty million; and in 1826 to more than three hundred 
and thirty million pounds. New land was continually being brought 
under cultivation. Since the overseas slave traffic had been stopped 
through England's efforts, there arose in parts of the southern states, 
where the cultivation of cotton was not profitable on account of 
climatic conditions, as in Virginia, an interest in slavery, because it 
was possible to breed slaves there who could always be easily sold 
in the Cotton States. All efforts for the emancipation of the slaves 
were now hopeless, although before this there had been a strong 
movement for the abolition of slavery even in some of the slave 
states like Virginia. 

The more slavery was extended in the south, the more firmly it 
became established and the more evident became the contrast be- 
tween the slave states and the free states in the North. In the 
northern states, where the cultivation of cotton was impossible, 
slavery was formally abolished at the beginning of the century 
under the influence of the new humanitarian movement; the 
descendants of slaves were given a position of legal equality. The 
districts of the North and the South differed sharply in their eco- 
nomic interests. This need not necessarily have led to an economic 
conflict. In fact, the cotton industry in New England, just begin- 
ning in a modest way, derived a direct advantage from cotton grow- 
ing in the South. Still, economic differences did exist. The most 
important of these related to the tariff question: the infant Indus- 



230 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

tries in the North wanted protective tariffs ; but the South, interested 
in the free export of its raw products, and still more in the free 
importation of foreign manufactures, was naturally inclined toward 
free trade. But these differences never centered on the question 
whether slavery should be totally abolished; they merely had the 
result of making the South anxious that control in the Union should 
not fall into the hands of the protectionist North ; the North, on the 
other hand, strove to secure control over Congress. Owing to the 
Constitution of the United States this conflict was now sharpened 
by the question of the admission of new states. The free states 
were more thickly settled than those in the South and they also had 
a larger representation in the House of Representatives; for in the 
apportionment of representatives three whites were counted as equal 
to five blacks. The only way in which the South could prevent itself 
from being outvoted by the North was by its influence in the Senate 
where each state was represented by two senators without regard to 
the population of the state. 

Since some northern senators who were indifferent in regard to 
slavery usually associated themselves with the senators from the 
South who were unanimously in favor of slavery, the South usually 
had a majority in the Senate. Thanks to this majority it was able 
to bring it about for a long time that it suffered no disadvantage 
in the proportion between the slave and free states. In 1820, the 
Southerners even succeeded in passing the Missouri Compromise, 
which forbade slavery north of the line 36° 30', but admitted the 
territory of Missouri to the Union as a slave state although it lay 
north of this line. 

This victory was all the more important for the South, quite aside 
from the political considerations just mentioned, in view of the fact 
that cotton growing demanded ever wider and wider territory. Cul- 
tivation by slave labor in the South was exceedingly exhausting to 
the soil, and fresh land was therefore continually necessary. The 
desire for new soil was so great that it even led to the only war of 
conquest which the Union fought before it was completely settled. 
The northern part of Mexico, known as Texas, had been filling up 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century with immigrants from 
the United States, who were naturally chiefly from the South. In 
1836 these Americans made use of internal troubles in Mexico 
to separate from it and declare Texas an independent republic. This 
independence, however, was merely a first step toward annexation 
by the United States. This again sharpened the conflict in regard 
to slavery, which meanwhile had been increasing: the northern states 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 231 

feared that the slave states would be strengthened. Finally, in 1845, 
when the Democratic presidential candidate had been elected, after 
expressly stating that he favored the annexation of Texas, Texas 
was adopted into the Union as one of the states. But Mexico de- 
clared that she had never recognized the independence of Texas and 
that she regarded its annexation by the United States as an infringe- 
ment of her territory. She therefore broke off diplomatic relations 
with her larger neighbor to the north. Soon afterwards, in 1846, 
an incident led to a formal declaration of war on the part of the 
United States. 

In view of the anarchy in Mexico, the outcome of the war was 
a foregone conclusion. Although the Americans had to improvise 
an army and commissariat in great part, and although they could 
scarcely have been able to meet an army organized in the European 
fashion, still their forces were infinitely superior to those of Mexico. 
Furthermore, on this occasion also, they were able to use their navy, 
and at once took possession of the important California territory. 
On land, Mexico was attacked both from the north and from the 
Gulf of Mexico; the main American army, under General Winfield 
Scott, advanced from Vera Cruz to the Mexican capital and seized 
it on September 14, 1847. The Mexican republic had to yield. On 
February 2, 1848, it signed the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, by 
which it not only gave up Texas but also Northern California and 
New Mexico. 

In this way the United States acquired definitely not only Texas, 
but also a firm foothold on the Pacific Ocean, since the Bay of San 
Francisco was included in Northern California. This was all the 
more important inasmuch as a little while before this, in 1846, they 
had secured by a treaty with Great Britain the southern part of the 
Oregon territory, which had hitherto been disputed between Great 
Britain and the United States. The United States now stretched 
in a broad belt from east to west, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
By a lucky chance, it also happened that as soon as California fell 
from the hands of the indolent Mexicans into those of the Americans, 
rich deposits of gold were discovered there on January 24, 1848, at 
the Sacramento River. This discovery at once resulted in a sur- 
prisingly quick development of this region. 

While the South had apparently scored a success by the annexa- 
tion of Texas, the real situation was changing more and more to her 
disadvantage. It was of relatively small importance that California, 
contrary to expectations, was not adapted to slave cultivation. The 
discovery of gold had drawn a laboring population from all terri- 



232 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

tories into the region, and this population naturally wanted to be 
protected from the competition of slave labor; they at once drew up 
in 1849 a draft constitution forbidding slavery. On the other hand, 
it was of decisive importance that there was beginning to spread a 
new and purely humanitarian agitation which was independent of 
the economic and political conflict between the North and the South, 
and which was to put an end not only to the political power of the 
South, but to the institution of slavery altogether. 

About twenty years before this time there had arisen an apostle 
in favor of the emancipation of the slaves, who can best be com- 
pared with the old Puritan leaders. He was one of those per- 
sonalities who perhaps embodied more clearly than any other that 
change from religious to humanitarian motives which took place in the 
nineteenth century. It was no mere chance that his birth, in 1805, 
took place in the very center of American Puritanism, the State of 
Massachusetts. This man was William Lloyd Garrison. Garrison, a 
self-educated man, differed from other enthusiasts for freedom of that 
time, whose ideas he shared in general, by the fact that he combined 
with an enthusiastic desire to aid the Greeks a propaganda in favor 
of social and ethical reforms which at that time had relatively few 
advocates. From his youth, for instance, he had abstained from 
alcohol, and he founded the first prohibition newspaper in the United 
States. He was won over to the cause of emancipation of the slaves 
by a Quaker, one of the sect that had long opposed slavery. With 
this man he published an Abolitionist weekly in Baltimore. Quite 
characteristically he at once began to advocate a radical solution of 
the slavery question. His Quaker friend wanted to bring about 
emancipation step by step, and thought of settling negroes outside 
the United States. But Garrison demanded that the negroes should 
be given immediately all the rights of free citizens. Slavery, he 
said, was a sin in itself and with sin no compromise ought to be 
made. 

It is a sign of his courage that he began his activities in Balti- 
more, Maryland, one of the main markets for the traffic in slaves. 
In various ways he was made to suffer for his attacks on the slave- 
holders. Soon he had to transfer his agitation to Boston, and there 
he founded, in 1831, a newspaper known as the Liberator. Its 
motto was, "Our country is the world — our countrymen are man- 
kind," and its exclusive aim was the abolition of slavery. In the 
following year, he founded at Boston The New England Anti-Slavery 
Society, which in 1833 was enlarged into The American Anti-Slavery 
Society. 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 233 

At first his agitation gathered only a small minority of the popu- 
lation in the Puritan New England states. Opposed to him were 
nearly all the business people and manufacturers ; many good Ameri- 
can patriots, who feared that a dissolution of the Union might result 
from emphasizing the slavery question; and also many peaceful 
Abolitionists who did not approve of Garrison's reckless policy and 
radical proposals. But the uncompromising teacher was not fright- 
ened by this nor by the attacks of mobs which once even set fire to 
the Abolitionist meeting-place in Philadelphia in 1838 and also to 
an orphan asylum for negro children. In spite of all the opposition, 
his movement made great progress. Leading politicians at first were 
scarcely moved by it, but aside from them the number of his ad- 
herents steadily increased. This was shown by the mass of petitions 
which were presented to Congress asking at least for the abolition 
of slavery in the District of Columbia, which meant in Washington. 
In 1836 the House of Representatives, by the so-called "gag rule," 
voted not to discuss such petitions at all any more. How far indi- 
vidual Abolitionists were ready to go is best illustrated by the fact 
that some of them from Massachusetts and Ohio even demanded the 
dissolution of the Union. By 1840 the Anti-Slavery Society is sup- 
posed to have numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 members. 

On ground thus prepared there now arose the struggle over the 
question of how slavery was to be treated in the districts acquired 
from Mexico. Once more political leaders succeeded in avoiding an 
open conflict by adopting a compromise. By the "Compromise of 
1850" it was agreed that California should be admitted to the Union 
as a free state, but that in the other territories in question the popu- 
lation itself should be allowed to decide in regard to slavery. In 
the city of Washington the slave trade was abolished, though not 
slavery itself. On the other hand, a concession was made to the 
South which soon proved a very dangerous gift. This was the sharp- 
ening of the Fugitive Slave Law: federal officials were now bound 
to pursue slaves who fled into states where slavery was forbidden; 
in identifying the fugitives a summary procedure was adopted which 
gave no adequate protection against arbitrary arrest. People in the 
North who had hitherto been able to ignore slavery now had their 
attention called to the fact that they were living in a slave-holding 
community. The Abolitionists often opposed the execution of the 
law by force. How greatly this Fugitive Slave Law aroused public 
opinion in the northern states is evident from the fact that it gave 
the impulse to the writing of the most powerful book against slavery 
in America: Uncle Tom's Cabin, by Harriet Beecher Stowe, which 



234 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

appeared in 1852, owes its origin directly to the story of the saving 
of a fugitive slave. 

Tension was drawn tighter by the so-called Dred Scott case. 
Owing to the peculiarities of the Constitution of the United States 
it had happened that the Supreme Court had never decided the 
question whether the Missouri Compromise, excluding slavery from 
definite territories by an Act of Congress, was constitutional or not. 
A case now arose of a Missouri slave, named Dred Scott, who had 
been taken into free territory and afterwards sold to a citizen of a 
slave-holding state. The negro thereupon appealed to a federal court 
and maintained that he had become a free citizen by reason of his 
residence in a free state. But the Supreme Court finally rejected his 
appeal on the ground that a slave cannot be a citizen of the United 
States. The Court went further and expressed the opinion in 1857 
that Congress had not even the right to forbid slavery in the terri- 
tories at all, for slaves were to be regarded as property, the protection 
of which was imposed on Congress by the Constitution. Thus, at a 
stroke, all that had been won by the anti-slavery movement seemed 
jeopardized. No further progress could be made except by an 
amendment of the Constitution to which the southern states would 
never voluntarily agree. 

Gradually, therefore, the view gained ground more and more that 
it was unavoidably necessary to use force to compel the South to 
give up at least its efforts for extending slavery further. The exist- 
ing political parties, to be sure, used all their power to prevent such 
a solution. They wanted neither a breach in the Union nor a dis- 
solution of the existing political organizations, which were by no 
means divided along the lines of North and South. But acts of vio- 
lence committed by Southerners to influence voting in their favor 
in the new territories in the West — acts of violence which in some 
places amounted to civil war — roused feeling everywhere to such an 
extent, especially in the North, that the old party dictation lost its 
power. In place of the Whigs, who wanted to smooth over the 
slavery question by political compromises, there arose in the North 
a new political party, the Republicans, who took an uncompromising 
attitude at least on the question of slavery in the territories. At 
first the Republicans were in a minority in the Union, but this was 
due to the fact that they could not win at once all the states in the 
North. The majority of the northern states, however, soon became 
Republican, and thenceforth it was merely a question of time when 
the control of the Union would be transferred to the hands of the 
anti-slavery party, for the representatives of the free states had a 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 235 

majority both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, 
and as soon as the Republicans got control of both these bodies the 
slaveholding party would be outvoted. 

This was what soon threatened to happen. In the presidential 
election of i860, the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won 
all the free states with the exception of New Jersey, and received 
therefore a majority of the electoral votes. Thus the President, 
though not the majority in Congress, became Republican. The 
Southerners now believed that they ought not to delay longer. There 
was no place for them any longer within the Union. If they wanted 
to protect slavery from abolition the only way to do so seemed to 
be to found a new republic of their own. On December 20, i860, 
a convention called for this purpose in South Carolina was the first 
to pronounce in favor of secession from the Union. Her example 
was quickly followed by six other southern states. In February, 
1 86 1, the seceding states formed a new political body, the Confed- 
erate States of America. Its constitution in general was modeled 
after that of the Constitution of the United States, but slavery was 
expressly protected against interference by the central government 
and the introduction of protective tariffs was forbidden. 

Secession, as such, was still not a cause for war. The question 
of whether the states of the Union did not have the right to leave, 
just as freely as to join, the Union had never been decided. Aside 
from this disputed but unsettled constitutional question, it was con- 
trary to all American traditions to use force as a means of compul- 
sion against an obstinate community. President Lincoln expressly 
declared that the Union would not assail the South, but war broke 
out nevertheless, because the Confederates seized by force a federal 
fort claimed by the North. So it was the South which opened mili- 
tary operations, April 12, 1861. The North, also, now believed that 
they must delay no longer, and on April 15 the President issued his 
call for seventy-five thousand state militia for the suppression of 
rebellion. This act united the whole South; of the eight southern 
states which had hitherto not joined in secession, four (Virginia, in 
part) left the Union and joined the Confederacy. The capital of 
the Confederacy was soon fixed at Richmond, Va. The president 
was Jefferson Davis, former senator from Mississippi. 

To imderstand the course of the war and the importance of a pos- 
sible intervention from Europe it is necessary to make clear the 
character of the forces on each side. 

In latent power, the northern states were greatly superior to those 
of the South, and it was therefore a mathematical certainty that the 



236 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

North would win, unless they ended the war prematurely because of 
some unfortunate defeats, or unless they were deprived of their 
natural superiority by the interference of foreign powers. The North 
had a much greater reserve in man-power, for the number of in- 
habitants in the northern states was altogether much greater than 
in the South (twenty- two million in the North as against nine million 
in the South). Furthermore, the great mass of negroes in the South 
could not be exactly regarded as proper material out of which to 
make soldiers. Then, also, the North possessed a superiority in the 
matter of machinery which amounted almost to a monopoly. In the 
South every effort had been directed toward the production of raw 
materials ; commerce and industry had been left wholly undeveloped ; 
even the cotton was practically not manufactured at all. If grain 
and meat had to be imported into the South from the North before 
the war, one can imagine how it was in the case of manufactured 
goods. The most important consequence of this was the fact that 
the control of the sea from the outset belonged to the North. The 
North possessed both the ships and also the means for building a 
navy, and was, therefore, in a position from the beginning to blockade 
the southern ports and prevent the profitable exportation of cotton 
as well as the importation of European military supplies. At the 
start, to be sure, some of the forts and arsenals in the southern 
states, which had belonged to the Union, passed into the hands of 
the Confederacy; this provided arms at first, but later these could 
only be replaced with difficulty, because the South had no steel 
industries. 

Over against these disadvantages, however, the South had certain 
advantages which at least enabled it to delay the triumph of the 
North. Though the armies and steamers of the North were able to 
advance more rapidly along railways and rivers owing to their 
better technical equipment, the Confederates, on the other hand, 
controlled a solid, well-rounded territory and had the "inner line"; 
their armies did not have to march such long distances, nor to 
operate often in thinly-settled areas, as did the Northern armies. 
Though the North could depend on much larger reserves of men, 
the South had a much larger number of specially trained military 
officers. Not only had the military academy at West Point usually 
been more largely attended by Southerners, but the control over 
slaves had, perhaps, afforded an excellent training school for military 
command. The South was also especially favored by the chance that 
its armies were placed under the command of General Robert E. 
Lee, perhaps the ablest military leader in the nineteenth century, 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 237 

since the time of Napoleon. With chivalrous qualities and per- 
sonally no friend to slavery Lee, however, was scarcely a typical 
representative of the Southern planters. He did not come from the 
more pronounced plantation region, like the cotton states of South 
Carolina or Georgia, but from Virginia, where a true aristocratic 
civilization had always been able to boast many more representa- 
tives than the regular Southern states. 

Thanks to these advantages, the South was actually able to de- 
fend its lost cause for a long time; so long, in fact, that there arose 
for the North the question of a premature abandonment of the war, 
and for Europe the question of intervention. If people in the North 
had generally hoped to overcome the South quickly, they were soon 
disillusioned in the first years of the struggle. The North intended 
to attack the southern states from three directions. The main 
theater of war was to be northern Virginia ; here a crushing advance 
was to be made upon the enemy's capital at Richmond. The second 
offensive was to be carried out along the Mississippi from the north 
toward the south; if this succeeded the Confederates could not only 
be driven back from the north and the west, but their whole terri- 
tory lying west of the Mississippi would be cut off from their main 
body. The third line of attack by the North was to be by way of 
the sea and aimed mainly at blockading the Southern ports against 
Europe. The first year of the war (1861) resulted unsuccessfully 
for the northern armies, both in Virginia and on the Mississippi. 
The defeat which the Union troops met at Bull Run in Virginia on 
July 21, 1 86 1, was particularly disheartening. On the other hand, 
the navy gave a good account of itself from the outset; it captured 
two of the most important forts on the coasts of North and South 
Carolina. 

Everything now depended on the attitude which Europe would 
assume toward the war. It had become apparent that the North, in 
spite of all its energy, and its enormous superiority in supplies, could 
not win the war until it had spent a long time in organizing a mili- 
tary system; and meanwhile it was possible for foreign countries to 
intervene effectively. This was what the southern states undoubt- 
edly counted upon. Two motives for this were brought forward, 
one financial and the other political. The financial or economic 
motive lay in the fact that European factories, particularly in the two 
countries which might have become allies of the Confederacy, namely 
England and France, could not get along without Southern cotton. 
The political motive lay in the fact that all the capitalists of Europe, 
and also the opponents of democracy who were so numerous after 



238 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

1848, had a feeling of common interest with the Southerners; they 
wanted nothing better than the downfall of the Union and the crea- 
tion of a free-trade slaveholding state. 

These considerations were not so far from the point; but in the 
end it fell out otherwise. The Confederates had not realized that a 
deep odium attached to slavery after all, and that however much 
their European sympathizers might close their eyes to the horrors 
of the plantation system in America, an open support of the slave 
states could only be undertaken with the approval of a solid public 
opinion. This did not exist in England. Aside from the fact that 
humanitarian arguments had not lost all their force, the British 
workingmen felt that their interests were no less bound up with the 
much-abused northern states than were those of the manufacturers 
with the slaveholders; so the English workingmen were opposed to 
any declaration in favor of the South. In vain did the friends of 
the Confederacy try all methods of persuasion to convince the work- 
ingmen of Lancashire, the center of the English textile industry, that 
the workingmen would be no less injured than their employers if the 
factories should have to be closed for lack of American cotton. The 
suffering workingmen would not allow any decision in favor of 
slavery to be wrung from them. As a result, the English Liberal 
Government, and consequently the French also, were hindered from 
any regular intervention in favor of the South. 

But though no regular intervention took place, the attitude which 
the European states took toward the North was neither one of 
friendliness nor of strict neutrality. This showed itself in two re- 
spects which had an influence for a long time. The first was the 
systematic manipulation of public opinion in a way unfavorable to 
the cause of the North. An effort was made to stamp out the idea 
that the great American democracy had gone to war from idealistic 
motives. Economic differences were given as the cause of the con- 
ilict: the war was represented as originating from the jealousy of 
the plebeian masses in the North toward the aristocratic civilization 
of the South. This conception prevailed for a long time, although it 
was wholly contrary to the facts. Commercial and political differ- 
ences did exist between the North and the South, particularly in the 
matter of the protective tariff, as has been mentioned, but certainly 
no one in the North would have ever gone to war because of these 
differences, especially as they were usually decided in favor of the 
North. Moreover the whole movement for emancipation in America 
had not come mainly from people who could be regarded as economic 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 239 

. rivals of the plantation owners ; on the contrary, the politicians and 
manufacturers of the North had tried, up to the last moment, to 
prevent the outbreak of open war. Industry and capital in the North 
enjoyed a great advantage from the one-sided production of the 
South; they had a splendid market for their raw materials and manu- 
factures and they could buy their cotton at a lower price than would 
ever have been possible if slavery had not existed. If they had been 
really moved by economic motives, the northern states, ought, on the 
contrary, to have championed the maintenance of slavery. In reality 
it was indignation at the disregard of the rights of man and at the 
all too frequent acts of cruelty which was the determining factor with 
the North. Any one who reads the correspondence of intellectual 
American leaders in those years, especially those from the New Eng- 
land states, will always discover how deep was the feeling of shame 
at this disgrace, unworthy of a free country, which gnawed at the 
heart of humane individuals in the North. In general, the attitude 
of the South also is not to be wholly explained on economic 
grounds. Proud Southerners who were not attached to slavery by 
any strong economic interests were often embittered by the numerous 
exaggerations and the unjust generalizations of which the Abolitionist 
agitators were guilty, and also by the Abolitionist habit of always at- 
tributing to the worst motives various regulations which the South 
regarded as indisnensable disciplinary measures. 

To the defenders of privilege in Europe, America had always been 
a thorn in the flesh. Even at the time of the Congress of Vienna, 
at an evening gathering at the house of the Austrian reactionary 
writer, Gentz, horror had been expressed when an eye-witness told 
of conditions in the United States — "of a free state whose develop- 
ment affords the unbelievable, indeed frightful, example of a common 
citizen exercising as much power and influence as we here in Europe 
are accustomed to associate only with nobility and kings." And 
now one was expected to admit that these Republicans would shed 
their blood in an idealistic humanitarian cause! 

A living contradiction to these notions was furnished by the Presi- 
dent of the United States who held its fate in his hands during the 
war and who embodied the typical qualities of the North as did Lee 
those of the South. Abraham Lincoln, whose election to the presi- 
dency had decided the South to secede, was born in the wilds of 
Kentucky of "poor whites," as white persons who had no slaves 
were called in the South. He grew up in needy circumstances in Illi- 
nois, whither his father had moved. He was a regular self-made and 



240 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

self-educated man; he had tried all sorts of trades before he settled 
down as a lawyer, which he did primarily in order to devote himself 
to politics. He was a man of altogether extraordinary gifts, possessed 
an unerringly sound understanding of men, and was honesty itself. 
In the case of no other statesman, perhaps, is personality reflected 
so directly and so sympathetically in public speeches as in the case of 
Lincoln. These masterpieces of good, popular eloquence show not 
only a man who is self-reliant, sympathetic, and full of humor, but 
one who is an honest thinker throughout. No sophistical phrases, 
no attempts to win a cheap triumph by irrelevancies, mar these utter- 
ances, in which modern eloquence has perhaps reached its highest 
level. Lincoln's combination of popular sympathetic feeling with his 
clear recognition of essentials, without allowing himself to be con- 
fused by the details of a bookish education, constitute the greatness 
of the man; in a certain degree they formed the very basis on which 
the persistence of the North rested in spite of defeats. Great will- 
power and tenderness of feeling were blended harmoniously together 
in Lincoln. 

Along with this manipulation of public opinion, Europe attempted 
also to give direct assistance to the Southern states. It has been 
pointed out that the military inferiority of the South rested chiefly 
on the weakness of the Confederacy on the sea. It was just here 
that the English government now permitted aid to be given by its 
own subjects. It permitted privateers to be built and armed in 
England for the benefit of the Confederate States. These privateers 
did great damage to the shipping of the North and rendered partly 
ineffective the blockade of the Southern ports. From a legal point 
of view this action was all the more objectionable since Great Britain 
did not venture to recognize the Confederacy as an independent state, 
although the question was once discussed in the House of Commons; 
moreover she was supporting a party which, from the point of view 
of the North, must be regarded as one of rebellion. The case of 
France was somewhat different. Napoleon III, in fact, held back 
somewhat more than England. Nevertheless, he took advantage of 
the division in the Union to disregard the Monroe Doctrine, and 
landed French troops in Mexico where an empire under Archduke 
Maximilian was set up. The French Emperor expressly declared 
that he wanted to prevent an extension of the influence of the Union 
over America. 

But all these measures did not suffice to turn the outcome of the 
war in favor of the South. The superiority of the North was much 
too great to be seriously threatened by a few blockade runners. 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 241 

Thanks to capable leadership, the South was able to prolong the 
war, but it could not win it. So the fate of secession was sealed 
slowly but surely. 

As to the main outline of the course of the war: in the original 
theater of operations along the Potomac in the east, between the two 
capitals of Washington and Richmond, the Union troops could make 
no progress against Lee, although the Confederate army, in view of 
its numerical weakness, could likewise undertake no decisive advance 
to occupy territory in the North. At sea the struggle was quickly 
decided in favor of the North. Thus the real fighting was concen- 
trated in the Mississippi valley. Here the Northern states had all 
the advantage, owing to their better naval equipment, the Union 
having more than seventy-five armored vessels. Excellent new in- 
ventions, like the Monitor, which were afterwards imitated in the 
armor-turreted ships of Europe, quickly made the North superior 
to the Southern forces. Union troops attacked the Southern posi- 
tions on the Mississippi from two directions. From the north. Gen- 
eral Grant advanced, conquering Kentucky and Tennessee, and then 
moving down the river in 1862 as far as Fort Vicksburg. At the 
same time, the mouth of the Mississippi, with New Orleans, was 
taken from the water side. Admiral Farragut compelled the city to 
capitulate on April 25, and then pushed up the river to Port Hudson, 
two hundred miles south of Vicksburg. The Southern states to the 
west of the Mississippi were therefore cut off from the rest of the 
Confederacy, except for the relatively small strip between the two 
forts. 

On the other hand, in the East, in spite of many bloody battles, 
the situation remained essentially unchanged. It became clear that 
the war, however good the prospects for the North might be, was 
still likely to last a long time. In view of this, President Lincoln 
undertook to induce the Southern states to give up the war by weak- 
ening their morale. On September 22, 1862, he issued a proclama- 
tion stating that all the slaves in the South would be declared free 
in seceding states which did not return to their allegiance by Janu- 
ary, 1863. 

This ultimatum, however, had no direct success, though it was 
of the greatest importance later on; since the Union in accord- 
ance with it declared all slaves free on January i, 1863, and since 
the war ended with the defeat of the Confederacy, it was impossible 
to repudiate this act; for the moment, the proclamation also was of 
importance in the Union's relationship with foreign countries. It 
had now been officially stated that the war really meant securing 



242 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

emancipation for the slaves, although its outbreak, strictly speaking, 
had not had anything to do with the slavery question; the Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation made it clear that the Northern states had really 
taken arms to give freedom to the Southern blacks. 

The year 1863 passed in much the same way as the preceding 
year. Again the operations in the eastern theater of war remained 
indecisive. Lee, who had pressed forward in a bold advance far 
toward the North and threatened Philadelphia, was checked at 
Gettysburg and forced to a retreat which was carried out in splendid 
fashion. But the armies of the North were able to maintain them- 
selves on the defensive, and during the winter took about the same 
positions as the year before. On the Mississippi, on the other hand, 
the North was able to extend its successes. After two months' siege, 
Vicksburg, on the east bank of the Mississippi, finally fell into 
General Grant's hands. With this fort the Confederates lost also 
their best army in the west under General Pemberton; it had been 
shut into Vicksburg by Grant and fell into his power on July 5, 
1863. Immediately afterwards, on July 8, Port Hudson surrendered; 
this had checked the advance of Northern troops from New Orleans, 
but now Union troops controlled the whole Mississippi. The Con- 
federacy had lost Texas, Arkansas, and the greater part of Louisiana ; 
these territories were now outside the field of military operations; 
henceforth, there was nothing but a guerilla warfare in the region 
west of the Mississippi River. 

Union forces were now able to attack the main army of the South 
under Lee, not only from the north but also from the west and even 
from the south. The year 1864 was taken up with the execution 
of this grandly conceived plan. Grant, who had been appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern armies after his successes on 
the Mississippi, reserved for himself the direct attack upon Lee. 
His subordinate, Sherman, who commanded the army of the south- 
west, or Tennessee army, was given the task of invading the Con- 
federacy, marching from the Mississippi into the Confederate States 
and attacking the enemy from behind. Sherman in a bold march 
carried out his orders exactly as they had been given to him. While 
in the North Grant was held in check by the superior strategy of 
Lee and was able to make no progress in spite of bloody battles 
and of a two-to-one superiority in numbers, Sherman on the other 
hand, invaded Georgia on September 2, 1864, captured Atlanta, the 
largest arsenal of the Confederates, and then pressed forward in a 
southeasterly direction to the Atlantic Ocean, without concerning 
himself about the Confederate army of the west. After a short siege, 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 243 

Sherman captured and occupied Savannah on December 20. This 
meant that the greater part of the Southern states was lost to the 
Confederacy. Lee was narrowed down to a small area and could 
be attacked by Union forces from the north as well as from the 
south. At the same time, the last armored ships of the Confed- 
erates were destroyed, so that all hope of aid from overseas disap- 
peared. 

Nevertheless, the South was still unwilling to give in. It counted 
on the war-weariness of the North. For in the North, also, the 
extraordinarily bloody battles had demanded great sacrifices. It 
was not only in the South that the last man had been summoned 
for service, so that at the close ot the war every man between the 
ages of seventeen and fifty was liable to service; the decision had 
even been taken, though it was not carried out, of enrolling negroes 
as soldiers; the North had also had to resort to conscription in 
1863, and this measure had led to draft riots in several places. The 
war debts of the North no less than in the South had risen to enor- 
mous figures. In their convention in 1864, the Northern Democrats 
declared that after four years of fruitless war an end ought to be 
put to hostilities. 

But the people of the Union would not give ear to such "de- 
featist" sentiments. In November, 1864, after Lincoln had been 
nominated for the presidency, he was elected by the voters in twenty- 
two out of twenty-five states, although he had expressly stated that 
he was in favor of continuing the war to a victorious end. The war 
accordingly was continued and soon led, as was to be expected, to the 
defeat of the South. 

To be sure, Lee's strategic genius succeeded in postponing the 
downfall for some months. Attacked at the same time by Grant 
and by Sherman, he succeeded in escaping toward the west. But his 
fate was sealed. The North cut off all the railways from him so 
that, without being exactly defeated, he had to surrender on April 9, 
1865. Shortly afterwards, Johnston, commanding the Confederate 
army of the west, also surrendered. The conditions were very lib- 
eral, considering that secession was regarded as rebellion. No pri- 
vate property was confiscated, the officers and men of the Southern 
states were released on their word of honor ; the president and vice- 
president of the Confederacy, as well as some of the officials, were, 
to be sure, imprisoned, but they were later released without a single 
one of them being legally condemned. Even Lee, who had been 
greeted at his surrender in chivalrous fashion by Grant, was left 
wholly unmolested. 



244 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

The results of the war may be chiefly considered from three points 
of view. First as to the economic consequences. 

As a result of the proclamation of September, 1862, slavery was 
abolished in all the warring states of the South, without any com- 
pensation for the owners. The same thing happened in most of the 
other states, and finally Congress, by an amendment to the consti- 
tution on January 31, 1865, provided that slavery was abolished 
throughout the territory of the Union, The Southern planters had 
already suffered extraordinarily as a result of the operations of war. 
The fighting had been carried on almost exclusively in their terri- 
tory; wide areas had been systematically laid waste; their exports 
were cut off; and their war currency and war bonds were worthless. 
Now, in addition, the plantation owners lost their human labor mate- 
rial, and received no compensation. Many negroes made use of 
their new freedom merely to roam around in laziness. A change for 
the better seemed all the more impossible, as many landowners did not 
have enough cash to pay negroes regularly. 

But it soon became evident that the advantages coming from rich 
harvests were not wholly impossible simply because of difficulties 
due to lack of capital. Where people could not pay negroes in cash, 
they gave them a parcel of land in return for a part of the raw 
produce, and though the production of cotton declined in the first 
years after the war, nevertheless, by 1870, it had again reached the 
production of i860, and since then has exceeded it. It was also now 
possible for whites to maintain themselves as workingmen by the 
side of the blacks in the South. Production was less one-sided. 
Industries and mining grew up along with agriculture. The eco- 
nomic catastrophe which it was predicted would follow the emanci- 
pation of the slaves did not take place, although emancipation was 
accomplished under the most unfavorable circumstances imaginable. 

Much more complicated and more permanent in its consequences 
was the question as to what was to be the relation between the 
whites and the negroes who had been given legal equality. In the 
regular Southern states the negroes were in a large majority, and if 
the principle of equality before the law was strictly adhered to, this 
meant that the government would fall into the hands of a mass of 
negroes who had just emerged from slavery and were in no way 
trained for the exercise of political rights. The southern whites 
attempted to prevent this from happening by special laws. They 
decided, for instance, that negroes should not be allowed to buy or 
lease land, that every negro must be in service to a white, that 
colored vagabonds should be set to forced labor, and so forth. These 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 245 

provisions, in addition to the excited feeling which naturally pre- 
vailed in the North immediately after the war, caused bad blood and 
Congress determined to interfere. The situation was extraordinarily 
intensified by the unfortunate circumstance that President Lincoln, 
when the war was scarcely over, was assassinated on April 14, 1865. 
Lincoln would have possessed the authority to convince the North 
that certain concessions must be made to the South, but his suc- 
cessor, the Vice-President, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, who had 
been nominated as a concession to the Southerners loyal to the Union, 
did not command the same general confidence. 

Congress, therefore, in spite of a presidential veto, took up the 
cause of the freed negroes and insisted that the former Confederate 
states should not be admitted again with full privileges to member- 
ship in the Union until they had agreed to the amendments of the 
Constitution, which among other things forbade any limitation of 
the franchise on the grounds of race. At the same time, the territory 
of the Southern States was placed under the command of Union 
military officials who were to see to it that the new elections were 
carried out on the basis of the legal equality of all men, with the 
exception of some whites who had compromised their rights by 
fighting 

These "reconstruction laws" were put into effect and brought it 
about that all the Southern States finally accepted the amendments 
to the Constitution, so that by January 30, 1871, all the states were 
again represented in Congress. But this had not been accomplished 
without all sorts of abuses occurring. In the South it caused especial 
bitterness that disreputable politicians from the North, called 
"carpet-baggers," exploited the political inexperience of the negroes 
in order to get themselves elected to offices which permitted them to 
line their own pockets with public monies. This unnatural govern- 
ment could not be permanent. Officially, the South indeed could not 
revert to its earlier policy of publicly excluding the negro. Likewise 
Southerners could not think of reintroducing slavery in some dis- 
guised form, as had been their intention at first; but though the 
negro was free and remained free, he was again deprived of his legal 
political rights. At first the Southern whites sought to do this by 
means of secret societies of which the best known is the so-called 
Ku Klux Klan. These organizations attempted to terrorize tlie 
negroes in all sorts of ways and frighten them from exercising their 
political rights. When Congress stepped in and even permitted the 
federal troops to be used in suppressing the secret organizations, 
the whites resorted to somewhat more harmless methods with which 



246 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

they secured their ends a little more slowly but none the less surely. 
Although in the minority, the whites succeeded by 1877 in winning 
back their control over all the Southern States. They have retained 
this domination uninterruptedly ever since. 

This was all the easier for them because the more the war became 
a thing of the past, the more the North became somewhat indifferent 
toward the condition of the negroes in the South. In 1877 this 
indifference was publicly manifested further by the withdrawal of 
federal troops from the South. However, as has been said, any re- 
turn to the slavery of former times was out of the question. But 
the negro problem was not solved. Little as the negro in general 
might care for the exercise of political rights, there remained the 
contradiction between his official political rights and his actual treat- 
ment, especially his treatment in social relations, quite aside from 
the fact that the so-called "lynch law," tolerated by the govern- 
ment, was used almost exclusively against negroes, and that those 
who employed it were never brought to justice. Even economic im- 
provement has not altogether helped the negro: for while the 
domination of the whites is threatened by the lazy negro who has 
no property, what they really fear is the businesslike negro with 
property. White workingmen too do not like the competition of 
negroes working for less wages. When negroes recently have 
appeared in the North as competitors of the whites, violent scenes 
have taken place, as bad as those in the South. If one considers also 
that in the case of a war, which is very rare to be sure, the same duties 
are demanded of the negroes as of the whites, without their being 
given, however, quite the same rights, one must admit that the nine- 
teenth century has left few problems so difficult to solve as the 
question of the colored people in the United States. 

As a political consequence of these conditions, it may be further 
noted that the whites of the South belonged almost without excep- 
tion to the Democratic Party, because it was the Republican Party 
which carried out measures for the protection of the slaves. The 
Democrats have thereby secured not only a firm hold on the "Solid 
South," but their attitude of opposition to capitalism has been dis-- 
tinctly increased. 

The third result of the happy outcome of the War of Secession is 
seen in the changed attitude of the United States in foreign affairs. 
States which believed that they could get some advantage from the 
division of the Union had to content themselves with actually mak- 
ing concessions to the American republic, which was really not weak- 
ened by the war, but actually unexpectedly consolidated in its 



WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 247 

power. Scarcely was the Civil War ended, when the United States 
demanded of France the withdrawal of the French troops which had 
been supporting Emperor Maximilian's rule in Mexico since 1864. 
Napoleon III could do nothing but yield to this demand. In the 
early part of 1867, he recalled the army under Bazaine, and the Aus- 
trian Archduke whom he had set up was captured shortly afterwards 
by the opposition party in Mexico and shot on June 19, 1867. The 
Monroe Doctrine was again restored to vigor. 

Negotiations with Great Britain lasted somewhat longer. The 
United States demanded compensation for the losses which their trade 
had suffered through the privateers which had been fitted out in 
England, especially for the losses caused by the Alabama. England 
finally consented to submit the question to arbitration. Arbitrators 
sitting at Geneva awarded the United States as compensation the 
sum of fifteen and a half million dollars, which was thereupon paid 
by England — one of the first cases in which a conflict between great 
nations has been settled by arbitration, and in this respect of per- 
manent influence on the later relations between Great Britain and 
the United States. 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL NATIONAL STATE 

IN ITALY 

Anti-liberalism had suffered a decisive defeat in America. There 
the attempt to found a republic based on a feudal system of agri- 
culture had failed. The hated Union had not suffered shipwreck, 
but had come out of the War of Secession strengthened and eco- 
nomically more powerful than ever before. The complete defeat of 
the South had put an end to the danger that the United States would 
have to adopt armaments. America was lost to the cause of anti- 
democratic militarism. 

About the same time, liberalism was winning a decisive victory m 
Italy. Here, indeed, it was not so much the representatives of an 
aristocratic economic system who were beaten, as the defenders of 
the view that the privileges of the Church ought to be protected for 
the sake of preserving the existing order of things. 

The reader will perhaps remember (see ch. x) the unhappy con- 
dition in which Italy found herself in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The greater part of the peninsula was directly or indi- 
rectly under foreign control, which also meant the control of those 
opposed to intellectual liberty. In Central Italy there were the 
States of the Church, which, owing to their inner organization, could 
not be won over to liberal reforms, perhaps not even to well-ordered 
government. There was no hope of a change for the better. The 
Great Power which dominated over Italy was far too strong to be 
overthrown by the Italians themselves. 

Such was the situation in 1848. The revolutions which broke out 
in Austria at that time, as a result of the February Revolution in 
Paris, raised for a moment the hope that Hapsburg military su- 
premacy had come to an end. When Metternich's government col- 
lapsed in Vienna, the patriots in the Austrian parts of Italy revolted 
everywhere; the people attacked the Austrian troops in Milan, and 
compelled the Austrian governor, Radetzky, to withdraw from the 
city. In Venice a republic was proclaimed with Daniel Manin at 
the head as president. The King of Sardinia thought he ought to 
make use of the opportunity; so he invaded Milan and pressed 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE LN ITALY 249 

forward as far as the Mincio. He rejected French assistance; this 
was the time when he used the well-known phrase, "I'ltalia fara 
da se." Charles Albert, the king, even received support from the 
King of Naples and the Pope, and succeeded in defeating Radetzky 
and in driving him back as far as the Adige on May 29, 1848. 

But this success was only momentary'. Radetzy received rein- 
forcements, the Pope and the King of Naples withdrew, and the 
Austrian Field ^Marshal was able to inilict a crushing defeat on 
the Piedmontese at Custozza, July 24. Milan was again occupied 
by Austrian troops. 

But in the following year, there was again a revival of the liberal 
movement. The republican revolt in Hungary had triumphed, and 
this seemed to give the Italian patriots new hope, but the Italian 
princes would no longer cooperate. Ferdinand, King of the Two 
Sicilies, suppressed with great bloodshed the revolt in ^Messina, and 
was nicknamed ''Re Bomba," because of the way he bombarded the 
city. Pius IX fled before revolution, and in the place of the papal 
government, there was set up a democratic republic, at the head of 
which stood the ablest man among the Italian revolutionists, the 
Genoese, Mazzini. On February 9, 1849, Garibaldi, the brave leader 
of volunteer troops from Nice, was given command over the Roman 
army. In Tuscany also the grand duke was driven out and a re- 
public proclaimed. All this finally induced the King of Sardinia 
to try his luck once more, and again he invaded the Milanese ter- 
ritory', but was completely defeated by Radetzky at Novara. Charles 
Albert therefore abdicated, and his son and successor, Victor Em- 
manuel II, signed a treaty of peace with Austria, August 6, 1849. 
In this he renounced Lombardy, and undertook to pay a large war 
indemnity. There was one notable concession, however, which the 
Austrians could not wring from him: he refused to aimul the liberal 
constitution which his father had granted the kingdom on February 
8, 1848, although the Austrians intimated that they would give up 
the demand for the indemnity if he would annul it. So Piedmont 
retained her liberal institutions, the foundation on which Cavour 
shortly afterwards was to build up his policy. 

The old regime was now reestablished everywhere. The restora- 
tion of the Pope's authority in Rome by French aid has already been 
mentioned in another coimection (p. 202). Sicily, and especially 
Palermo, was again subjected completely to the authority of the 
Neapolitan kings. Particularly important was the fact that Austria, 
after overthrowing the Hungarian Republic with Russian help, was 
now able to restore her predominant pos'tion in Northern and Cen- 



250 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

tral Italy. Austrian troops brought back the former rulers into 
Modena and Tuscan}'^ again. In Venice the republic was overthrown 
after an heroic defense on August 29, 1849. The former conditions 
seemed restored more permanently than ever. 

In reality, these events had simply taught the Italian patriots 
and lovers of liberty that nothing could be done against Austria's 
power by the methods hitherto pursued. The man who above all 
others saw this clearly was the Piedmontese minister of commerce, 
Count Cavour, then forty years of age and perhaps the greatest 
statesman of the nineteenth century. He perceived that the expul- 
sion of the Austrians from Italy and the creation of an Italian na- 
tional state must be brought about in a different way. 

The methods which he adopted differed from those of his prede- 
cessors chiefly in three respects. So far as possible, he created an 
efficient army ; he broke off completely the alliance with the Church, 
in order to make sure of the cooperation of all liberal elements; and 
he no longer disdained to appeal to the support of a foreign Great 
Power, even if he should have to purchase it by making territorial 
sacrifices. 

In order to accomplish his purposes, he began, in 1850, a thorough- 
going transformation of the Sardinian state in the direction of lib- 
eralism. At the very time when other states were making political 
concessions to the Papacy (see p. 225), he had the Piedmontese gov- 
ernment issue a law by which the legal privileges of the clergy were 
abolished. He terminated the Concordat with the Holy See; and 
henceforth pious gifts in mortmain had to receive the sanction of 
the state. The archbishop of Turin, who protested against this law, 
was imprisoned for a month in the citadel of Turin. In the Chamber 
of Deputies the government put an end to the traditional alliance 
with the clerical right, and secured the election to the presidency of 
the Chamber of the leader of the left center, a decided liberal. This 
was the beginning of the so-called Connubio, the alliance of the 
Piedmontese government with the liberals, or, one might say, with 
the anti-clericals, for, in Italy, liberalism had been determined 
primarily by church politics; owing to the conquests of the French 
under Napoleon I, and also to the reforms made by the Italians 
themselves, equality before the law, at least outside the Papal States, 
existed in a far higher degree in Italy than in other regions under 
Austrian rule. "What the nobility is to Germany, the priest caste 
is to Italy," an Italian remarked at the time to a German historian. 
At any rate, the unification of Italy was only to be accomplished if 
the patriots were willing to put an end to the claims of the Papacy^ 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 251 

This policy of Cavour also made his military reforms easier. For 
it was not enough to reorganize the army according to the Prussian 
model. He had also to provide an increase in the revenues of the 
state, and this could only be brought about by interfering with the 
privileges of the clergy. Cavour not only sought to stimulate 
Genoese shipping by commercial treaties; he wanted also to impose 
taxes on church lands and above all things to abolish the monasteries, 
which had become useless. In spite of energetic papal protests, he 
succeeded in doing this. Out of about 600 monasteries in the 
kingdom, 334 were secularized. Cavour was able to force the 
feudalistic senate to approve this measure only by threatening to 
resign (1855). The well-being of the country was now systematically 
improved. Railways and canals were constructed. With the help of 
his new financial resources, the fortresses were modernized, arsenals 
were built, and the army was increased. 

Along with these measures, Cavour proceeded to bring about the 
third point in his new program, — the alliance with a» foreign Great 
Power. It happened that he could not have found a helper more to 
his liking than the man ruling in France at the time. The French 
people, to be sure, had not the slightest interest in supporting an 
Italian national movement against Austria; there were no grounds 
for hostility between France and Austria; nor was it an advantage 
for France to build up a rival Great Power on the Mediterranean. 
This was the thought which had guided Louis Philippe and Guizot, 
and they had done nothing to aid the Italian cause. But Napoleon 
III put dynastic above national considerations. Intervention in the 
quarrel between Sardinia and Austria would give an opportunity 
further to increase the military prestige of the Second Empire. 
The Bonapartist family had a traditional fondness for Italy. 
Napoleon I had shown an inclination to Italy which can not be 
wholly explained on political grounds, and the same was true of his 
nephew. From the first years of his government, he pursued a 
policy of raising Italy to the rank of a Great Power. Later on, his 
efforts may have been somewhat stimulated by the attempt which 
an Italian conspirator, Orsini, made to kill him with a bomb in 1858. 
Orsini wanted to take vengeance on Napoleon because he regarded 
him as responsible for the failure of the Italian revolution of 1848; 
he conjured the emperor to come to Italy's aid. 

Napoleon yielded to the wishes of the Italian patriots, although 
from the very beginning this placed him in a very embarrassing 
position. Italian unity, as desired by the Italians, meant the aboli- 
tion of the Papal States; and how could a prince who rested so 



252 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

much for support on the Holy See as did Napoleon give his approval 
to this? From the outset, he could only accept a part of the Italian 
nationalist program: he could support Cavour's aggression only to 
the extent that the Temporal Power of the Papacy was not jeopard- 
ized. In other words, he was helping to enlarge a state with which 
he must eventually come into a life and death struggle. He was 
creating a force which might crush himself. 

A fantastic ruler like Napoleon, who had at his disposal the 
best armies of Europe, was exactly the right kind of a man to be 
Cavour's accomplice. The Piedmontese statesman had at once recog- 
nized that he must first do something to place Napoleon under obli- 
gations to himself. This is the explanation of Sardinia's alliance 
with France and England during the Crim.ean war, which has already 
been mentioned in another connection (see page 218). By this 
Cavour also established cordial relations with England, where public 
opinion was more or less on the side of Italian liberals, particularly 
on account of English disapproval of the misrule in the Papal States. 

A regular offensive alliance between Sardinia and France against 
Austria was concluded in 1858. Napoleon III, who was then under 
tlie vivid impression made by Orsini's attempt on his life, invited 
Cavour to a confidential interview at Plombieres, where all the de- 
tails for an attack against Austria were agreed upon. Here, for the 
first time. Napoleon attempted to reach a compromise between the 
claims of Savoy and those of the Pope. It was agreed that Italy 
should be "free from the Alps to the Adriatic"; the kingdom of 
Victor Emmanuel II should be enlarged by depriving Austria of the 
Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom and also by seizing a part of the Papal 
States. A further extension of the Sardinian boundary toward the 
south, with a complete abolition of the Papal States, was not antici- 
pated. Prince Napoleon, a son of King Jerome of Westphalia and 
a cousin of the Emperor's, was to marry a daughter of the King of 
Sardinia, which he did in 1859. 

Accordingly, in 1859, when the war actually broke out, Cavour 
was not afraid, following his program, to ally with revolutionary 
elements. Just as he had already maintained relations with 
republican revolutionists like Garibaldi and with Hungarian 
rebels, so now he had the newspapers of Turin openly urge Austrian 
soldiers in Lombardy and Venetia to desert. When Austria, ex- 
asperated by his continual provocations, opened hostilities. Napoleon 
declared on ]\Iay 3, 1859, that he would hasten to the aid of the 
Italians. How decisive his support was is shown by the whole 
course of the war. The French auxiliary army was not only numer- 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 253 

ically much stronger than the Piedmontese force (about twice as 
strong), but it made possible the great battles (particularly that of 
Magenta to the west of Milan on June 4), which freed the whole 
of Lombardy as far as the ]\Iincio. However, it should be mentioned 
that, at the same time, Garibaldi on the north drove back the Aus- 
trians toward Como. 

The Austrians, who had withdrawn into the so-called "Quadrilat- 
eral" formed by the fortresses of Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and 
Legnago, and had received reinforcements there, took up a strongly 
fortified position on the hills near Solferino south of Peschiera, 
After a bitter struggle, the Franco-Sardinian army, which was nu- 
merically somewhat weaker, succeeded on June 24, 1859, i^ driving 
the Austrians back and in crossing the Mincio. King Victor Em- 
manuel was already contemplating an attack upon Venetia. 

But at this moment, the Emperor of the French withdrew from 
the undertaking. He had an interview with Francis Joseph at Villa- 
franca, where preliminaries of peace were drawn up. Whatever may 
have been the motives which made him take this step — ^perhaps he 
thought the costs of a campaign against an Austrian army which 
defended itself so obstinately were out of proportion to the ad- 
vantages which would accrue to France; perhaps he was afraid 
that Piedmontese ambitions would go too far; possibly he was in- 
spired with fear by Prussia's mobilization — at any rate, whatever 
may have been his motives, he returned to Paris with his troops, 
and this simply put an end to the campaign. The peace of ZUrich, 
which was signed shortly afterwards on November 10, 1859, handed 
over to Sardinia Lombardy, but not Venetia. 

At the same time, the alliance which Cavour had made with 
Italian liberalism now bore fruit. Venetia, to be sure, under Aus- 
trian protection, could not be attacked. But in the weaker Italian 
principalities there took place everywhere national revolts which 
led to their alliance with Sardinia. In Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, 
the princes were driven out, and the papal officials in the Legations 
(Bologna) fared no better. In harmony with the liberal principles 
of the Sardinian government, Cavour did not directly annex these 
liberated territories, but everywhere asked the people to vote as to 
annexation to Sardinia. The plebiscites resulted in 'overwhelming 
majorities in favor of annexation; in Emilia, for instance, there were 
426,000 ayes, to 756 noes. This procedure was also adopted when 
Napoleon, who had not opposed this extension of Piedmont, de- 
manded compensation for France. The treaty of Turin, of March 23, 
i860, providing for the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, was 



254 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

first laid before the populations in question for their approval, and 
not carried out until the people had voted in favor of it, likewise 
by an extraordinarily large majority. Accordingly, when Victor Em- 
manuel opened the "National Parliament" at Turin on April 2, i860, 
no distinction was made between the deputies from the old and 
the newly-acquired Sardinian provinces. 

The next point to be attacked was Southern Italy, as Rome did 
not at first come into consideration. Officially, indeed, Cavour 
could not participate in any such undertaking. But he at least se- 
cured it an unhampered execution. In the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies there still prevailed an unlimited absolutism, and the new 
king, Francis II, who had succeeded his father, Ferdinand II, "King 
Bomba," in 1859, held fast to his absolutism, in spite of Napoleon's 
warning. Now that Sardinia had become the center not only of 
an Italian national state, but also of liberalism represented by a 
parliamentary anti-clerical organization, this was a dangerous pro- 
ceeding on the part of Francis II. Representatives of autocracy 
could no longer count on Austrian help, and patriots now had 
before their eyes a definite aim, — union with Sardinia along the 
same lines accomplished in North Central Italy. Revolutionary com- 
mittees were formed everywhere, and in April, i860, an insurrec- 
tion broke out in Sicily. 

This insurrection was quickly supported from the outside. 
Cavour, as has been mentioned, did not dare to give the insurrec- 
tion official aid, but he allowed an international expedition for the 
liberation of Southern Italy to be organized directly under his 
eyes. The old hero of liberty, Garibaldi, formed a volunteer force 
in Genoa (on Sardinian soil), consisting mainly of Italians, but also 
including revolutionists from other countries, Hungarians and espe- 
cially Frenchmen, like Maxime du Camp and Alexander Dumas, 
Pere. The whole expedition was like an international crusade 
against absolutism. A red shirt was the symbol which was adopted 
by "The Thousand" as they set out. 

Without any interference from the Sardinian fleet, "The Thou- 
sand" embarked from Genoa and landed in safety in Sicily. They 
were received with enthusiasm by the population. They easily dis- 
persed the royal garrison troops in Calatafimi and Milazzo, and soon 
had the whole of Sicily in their hands with the exception of Mes- 
sina. Upon representations from France, Cavour requested Gari- 
baldi to stop at this point; but Garibaldi took no notice of the re- 
quest, and crossed over to the mainland. He soon won the whole 
Kingdom of Naples. "The Thousand" entered the capital on Sep- 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 255 

tember 7, i860, without shedding blood, and the King shut himself 
up with the remainder of his troops in Gaeta. 

After the undertaking had resulted so successfully, Cavour be- 
lieved that he ought not to hold back any longer. With a half- 
authorization from Napoleon he sent the Piedmontese army from 
the north to aid Garibaldi's troops. The Sardinian forces invaded 
the States of the Church, defeated the papal army, and occupied 
Ancona. Here another popular vote was taken, and here, also, 
there was an overwhelming majority in favor of annexation to 
Piedmont, the Marches voting 134,000 to 1200, and Umbria 97,000 
to 380. Connections with Naples were now established by land 
and King Victor Emmanuel II was able to ride into Naples in 
triumph by Garibaldi's side (November 7, i860). The operations 
against Gaeta were carried out by the Sardinian troops in such a 
way that Garibaldi and his volunteers were more and more pushed 
ifito the background. Garibaldi himself was given no political posi- 
tion, so that his feelings were hurt, and he retired to his rocky island 
of Caprera. However, neither he nor the republicans made any 
serious opposition to Victor Emmanuel's kingdom. 

The capture of Gaeta and Messina was now merely a question of 
time. Shortly afterwards, these two last supports of Bourbon rule 
fell, and the royal family fled on a French ship into exile. Naples 
and Sicily also voted practically unanimously for annexation to 
Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel could now take the final step of pro- 
claiming himself King of Italy. In the whole of the peninsula, Vene- 
tia and the curtailed States of the Church were the only territories 
which still remained beyond his authority. The establishment of 
the Kingdom was completed in the month of May, 1861, by an act 
of parliament. The Italian problem was now solved except for 
the States of the Church and Venetia. At the time of his death, on 
June 6^ 1 86 1, shortly after the proclamation of the Italian Kingdom, 
Cavour's aim in life had been largely attained. 

Of the two territorial problems still to be solved, the Roman 
one was the most complicated. It was evident that an Italian 
national state without Rome would be a torso. On the other hand, 
international religious reasons made it undesirable completely to 
abolish the States of the Church. Furthermore, the Papacy was 
unyielding in matters of domestic politics. Moderate Italian patri- 
ots would have perhaps been satisfied if the Papacy had been will- 
ing to join in a liberal alliance with the Italian Kingdom; but for 
this it was necessary that the Pope should make his state as liberal 
as the Italian Kingdom, and this was precisely what the Pope re- 



256 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

fused to do. Although Napoleon advised the Holy Father to yield 
to the demand for modern reforms, the Curia refused to enter into 
any kind of a bargain. Pius IX declared expressly, "We can make 
no concessions" {"Non possumm"). 

The French, however, did not withdraw their protecting hand 
from the States of the Church, and at first the Italian government 
did not dare to interfere. The task of freeing Rome again remained 
to be done by the revolutionary party. Again Garibaldi collected 
his army of volunteers. But the government did not give it 
support. On the contrary. King Victor Emmanuel sent troops 
against the liberal hero, who was advancing against Rome from 
Calabria; the Sardinian troops met Garibaldi at Aspromonte, and 
dispersed his little force (1862). The Papacy then went further 
and emphasized its dogmatic opposition to liberalism in the so-called 
"Syllabus" (see p. 226). After this a compromise was no longer 
possible. For the moment the Italian government seemed to give 
up its Roman ambition. It removed the capital to Florence, which 
was intended to indicate that at present it did not intend to make 
Rome the capital of Italy. 

The Italian government could now devote all the greater energy 
to the acquisition of Venetia. The attack which Prussia was about 
to make upon Austria (see ch. vii) offered the most favorable op- 
portunity for this. With Napoleon's assistance, Italy signed on 
April 8, 1866, an offensive alliance with Prussia against Austria, 
good for three months. In accordance with this, as soon as Prussia 
opened hostilities, Italian troops entered Venetia, while Garibaldi 
again sought to penetrate into the Tyrol with his volunteers. For- 
tune, however, did not favor the Italians, who in this war lacked 
French support. The army under La Marmora was checked and 
completely defeated on June 24, 1866, at Custozza by the Aus- 
trians under Archduke Albert. But the Austrians were unable to 
take advantage of their victory. Shortly after Custozza they were 
terribly defeated by the Prussians at Koniggratz, and the Austrian 
troops had to be withdrawn from Venetia to defend Vienna against 
the advancing Prussians. Italian troops occupied the territory 
abandoned by Austria. They now hoped for more, and even wanted 
to win back Trieste and the possessions in Istria which had formerly 
belonged to Venice. But their fleet was crushed at Lissa by the 
Austrian navy under Admiral Tegetthoff on July 20, 1866. In the 
Peace of Prague of October 3, 1866, Italy was only given Venetia; 
for form's sake Austria ceded the province to Napoleon who 
then handed it over to Italy. This annexation was also confirmed 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 257 

by a plebiscite in which only 69 persons voted to remain under Aus- 
tria, while 647,000 favored annexation to Italy. 

So only the Roman question still remained unsettled. How 
long would France be in a position to protect the curtailed States 
of the Church from Italy's attack? The Pope himself possessed no 
means for his own defense, and the Italian government had re- 
mained throughout true to Cavour's program. It retained its con- 
nection with the liberal revolutionary groups and refused to make 
to the Church concessions in political matters which would have 
injured the Italian national movement. In view of a conflict with 
Prussia, Napoleon believed that he ought to rely for support more 
than ever upon the clerical party in France, which was attacking 
Italy in the bitterest fashion. Veuillot, its best-known representa- 
tive writer, even demanded that Italy ought to be made again "a 
geographical expression," as in the days of Metternich. 

Napoleon, however, needed all his troops in France, and was 
compelled to recall the French garrison from Rome. The Italian gov- 
ernment also had made some objections to this French garrison. 
Scarcely had Rome been deprived of French protection, when Gari- 
baldi took advantage of the fact. Unchecked by the Italian govern- 
ment, he collected a volunteer army of sixty thousand men, and in 
1867 marched with it from Florence against Rome. But Napoleon 
had no intention of letting matters take their course. He despatched 
from Toulon two divisions which arrived at Rome just in time to 
save the States of the Church from destruction. The Garibaldians 
had just defeated the Papal army, when they were driven back in 
turn by the murderous fire of the French artillery. Garibaldi had 
to retreat to Florence. "Les chassepots out fait merveille," wrote 
one of the French generals to Napoleon (November 3, 1867), a 
phrase which the Italians remembered a long time against the 
French. 

This made it clear that Italy could never secure Rome so long 
as the French were in a position to oppose the abolition of the 
Pope's Temporal Power, Even the modifications in the French gov- 
ernment in the direction of liberalism, which were then being con- 
sidered, promised no change in the attitude of France toward the 
Roman question ; for the representatives of the tradition of the July 
Monarchy, as was expressed at the time by their spokesman, Thiers, 
were just as energetically opposed as the clerical party to Italy's an- 
nexation of Rome, because they were opposed to the growth of a 
dangerous rival Great Power south of the Alps. 

But Nemesis soon overtook this French policy; since France — 



258 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

and even French liberals — had tried to prevent what was inevitable, 
and what, from an Italian point of view, was necessary, France 
found no support in Italy when the Franco-Prussian war broke out. 
All the projects for an Austro-Italian alliance with France came to 
nothing, because the French Emperor had not been willing to give 
Rome to the Italians — a step which Austria herself would not have 
opposed. The crushing defeat to the French at Sedan resulted in 
French statesmen failing to secure what had been their chief aim 
in Italy. The day after the battle, the French garrison was re- 
called from Rome and this sealed the fate of the city. The Italian 
government at once despatched an army under General Cadorna, 
who occupied the new capital on September 21, 1870, while the 
Pope withdrew into the Vatican. This annexation also was ratified 
by the people by an overwhelming majority of 130,000 to 1500. 

United Italy thus acquired her natural capital. The work of 
unification could be regarded as complete, except for several dis- 
tricts with an Italian population, like the Trentino, Trieste, and the 
coast towns of Istria and the Adriatic, which remained under Aus- 
trian rule because of Italy's lack of success in the war of 1866. 
Liberal Italian patriots believed that they had all the greater claim 
to this "Italia Irredenta," inasmuch as they appealed, not to the 
right of conquest, but to the freely expressed wish of the popula- 
tion. Here was a diplomatic difficulty which became evident as 
soon as Italy wished to join Austria in opposition to France on 
account of the North African question (see below, ch. xxix) ; it re- 
vived again very actively when a new cause of difficulty arose be- 
tween Italy and Austria-Hungary owing to their rival ambitions in 
the Balkans. 

During the following years, however, this difficulty was less im- 
portant than two other questions. One of these was the religious- 
political one. Pope Pius IX could not be forced to give up his at- 
titude of persistent opposition on account of loss of his temporal 
power. In vain did the Italian government offer him, in the so- 
called "Law of Guarantees" in 1871, considerable financial and 
political advantages, if he would actually recognize the Italian King- 
dom. In vain did the "Law of Guarantees" allow the Pope to re- 
main as a sovereign prince in the Vatican, and give him an unlimited 
right in appointing Italian bishops and a civil list of three and 
a quarter million francs. The Pope regarded the "invaders" as ex- 
communicate, and declared that, being a "prisoner," he could not 
leave the Vatican. He refused to recognize the Italian kingdom 
and to accept the civil list offered to him. Pious Catholics were 



FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 259 

not allowed to recognize Italian rule in Rome as legal. Theoretically 
at least, there was still a danger that the Papal States might be 
restored; this was a project which Catholic politicians who opposed 
the Italian government often played with after 1870. A part of 
the voters refused to take part in Italian elections, because this had 
been forbidden by the Pope in his encyclical, "Non Expedit" (to 
have taken part in Italian elections would have been tantamount 
to an indirect recognition of the revolutionary kingdom). Other- 
wise, religious-political relations were practically arranged in the 
way the Italian government wished. The policy of secularizing 
monastic and ecclesiastical property, which had been introduced 
by Cavour, was now carried out in the Papal States, so that in the 
years 1868 to 1873 the whole operation realized more than five hun- 
dred million francs for the government. At the same time, the ap- 
pointment of bishops by the Pope was tacitly recognized by the 
government. 

The government's greatest difficulty lay in the matter of finance. 
To have kept up an army and navy of the size wished by Cavour 
was far beyond the natural resources of the Sardinian government; 
and the same was true of the new Italian Kingdom, if it wanted to 
play the part of a Great Power along with the other members of the 
European Concert. The natural resources of the country could only 
be insufficiently exploited. The necessary means of communication 
were lacking, and the soil was not properly divided, particularly in 
the south. Another obstacle may have lain in the lack of education, 
especially in the territories which had formerly belonged to the 
Pope and to Naples. In many regions, particularly in the former 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, order had first to be restored by force 
of arms, and plundering had to be stopped, before a well-regulated 
administration could be set up. All this could be accomplished in 
the course of time, and was, in fact, acccomplished in good part. 
But this did not increase the state revenues sufficiently to cover the 
military expenditures. Furthermore, as a consequence of the German 
victories in 1870, which resulted in the introduction of universal 
military service in Italy, the cost of armaments was still further 
increased. Manufacturing for export on a large scale could not be 
created in a day. The modern factory system had only been intro- 
duced to a slight extent in Italy, and the lack of coal also proved 
a serious obstacle, preventing the Italians from devoting an energetic 
attention to this source of wealth. Finally, it was difficult to bring 
about many reforms, and particularly perhaps the most important, 
such as the breaking-up of the great landed estates, because up to 



26o STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

1882 the right to vote was dependent upon the payment of a land- 
tax and this excluded the great mass of the peasant tenants from the 
franchise. And the ministry had to pay heed to the majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies. 

Thus the new kingdom had to pass through a difficult period of 
transition, whose social and political consequences are evident even 
to the present day. How Italy sought to play the part of a 
Great Power and a colonizing country, in spite of her difficulties, 
will be explained in a later chapter. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 

About the same time that Italy was changed from a "geographical 
expression" to a unified military state and was beginning to play a 
part in international politics, a similar change was taking place in 
the north. There also national ambition resulted in the creation of 
a new Great Power, which was destined to play a much greater part 
in the history of the world than Italy. But just because the analogy 
between Italy and Prussia is so striking, it is desirable to call atten- 
tion to the great differences which existed between them, quite aside 
from those which happened to result from differences in personality 
of the leaders. We may leave out of consideration here the final 
result and the steps by which unity was achieved, and merely com- 
pare briefly the conditions at the outset. 

At first sight conditions in Germany seemed to be more favor- 
able in every respect than in Italy. In good part directly, and to a 
greater extent indirectly, Italy was under the rule of a foreign Great 
Power, and was without protection against interference by foreign 
governments. Germany, to be sure, included three small territories 
(Holstein, Hanover and Luxemburg) which were connected by per- 
sonal union with foreign states; but the administration was nowhere 
in the hands of foreigners, and it was wholly out of the question for 
foreign Great Powers to interfere in German relations by force of 
arms. This was prevented by the fact that Germany included two 
of the most powerful great states of the period, which would have 
opposed any intervention, whereas Italy was composed of a num- 
ber of helpless little states which scarcely possessed the rudiments 
of an army. Italy, moreover, was merely a geographical expres- 
sion; the bond of nationality was of a purely intellectual nature. 
German states, on the other hand, were held together in the "Ger- 
man Confederation," which, loose as it was, still afforded a certain 
unity as against foreign powers. The members of the Confedera- 
tion promised mutual protection to one another, and were forbidden 
to make any alliance directed against its safety. The people in the 
states of the Confederation were assured certain, though limited, 

261 



262 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

rights throughout its whole territory, and there was a common politi- 
cal tradition, which was wholly lacking in Italy. The German Con- 
federation of 1815 was indeed in no wise the legal successor of the 
old Holy Roman Empire, but there was a general feeling of con- 
tinuity, which was evident in such superficial circumstances as the 
fact that Austria, which in recent centuries had almost always pro- 
vided the emperors in the old empire, now had the presidency in 
the Confederation. 

But this relatively powerful position which the Confederation en- 
joyed through the inclusion of the two Great Powers was precisely 
the thing which proved an obstacle to its further development. It 
was natural that Austria and Prussia, only a part of whose territories 
were included within the Confederation, should pursue an inde- 
pendent policy and be more intensely interested in their own aims 
than in the national aspirations of German patriots. They were, to 
be sure, strong enough to nip in the bud any foreign attack on Ger- 
many, but they were not inclined to subordinate their own particu- 
lar interests to the general good of Germany as a whole; in fact, 
they were not inclined to advance the development of the Con- 
federation, unless this development was of particular benefit to their 
own country. From the point of view of those German patriots 
who wanted to raise Germany herself to the position of a Great 
Power, in spite of the dual rivalry between Austria and Prussia, it 
was not a problem simply of uniting the smaller states together as 
in Italy, but rather of subjecting them to one or other of the two 
Great Powers in Germany. Furthermore, the rivalry between the 
two Great Powers must be ended either by the expulsion of one of 
them from the Confederation, or by its reduction to the position 
of a middle-sized state. To be sure, these alternatives were not 
clearly seen by any one at the time; in fact, almost all of those 
who wanted to bring about a closer union of the German states 
hoped that a compromise might be found which would solve the 
existing Austro-Prussian rivalry; but in reality conditions were such 
that no compromise solution was possible. 

In this connection it is noteworthy that German national aspira- 
tions were particularly lively in the small states. Subjects of the 
two Great Powers naturally prided themselves primarily on being 
either Prussians or Austrians, and felt little need of supporting the 
ardent aspirations toward the creation of a new Great Power in 
Germany. But subjects of the little states were not content with 
the limited activity afforded to them at home, nor with member- 
ship in a Confederation which counted for little internationally in the 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 263 

eyes of foreigners; they could not help feeling the impotency 
of the German Confederation and were natural representatives of 
the "imperial idea." In general these people at first formed only 
small groups. At that time and long afterwards, there was only 
one form of national feeling which held all classes in Germany to- 
gether, and this was hatred toward France. Even where the desire 
for a new state and for the abolition of local boundaries in favor 
of a national unified state was weak or not developed at all, there 
existed an extraordinarily strong hostility to France. And it was 
very important later on that this feeling was not least strong among 
people who politically might have been called friends of French 
thought, namely among the liberals. 

An intelligent view of German history up to 1870 can only be 
acquired by observing, not the German Confederation as a whole 
with all its weaknesses in organization, but the two Great Powers 
who determined its direction and later development. The his- 
torian must turn his chief attention to the Power whose history was 
to decide the fate of Germany, namely to Prussia. Austria can best 
be treated by itself except so far as it has to be considered as a foil 
to Prussia. The other German states scarcely need be considered 
at all. 

In speaking of Prussia one must make another distinction. The 
kingdom consisted at that time, as is well known, of two separated 
parts: Prussia proper in the east (which for the sake of convenience 
is usually called the "East Elbian territory"), and the newly-acquired 
Rhineland in the west. Of these two it was the East Elbian terri- 
tory which dominated both. This was the nucleus or original terri- 
tory from which Prussia proper had developed. Whoever wants to 
understand Prussian history, and recent German history in general, 
must begin with this region. 

This East Elbian territory had a wholly peculiar structure. Con- 
siderable cities with trade and industry in the modern sense were 
rare. Most of the towns consisted of settlements of a petty local 
character, usually with a strong proportion of Jews. There was 
lacking, therefore, a strong middle-class. This condition was more 
marked in the country districts. Here there prevailed exclusively 
the system of large landed estates, though not everywhere in such 
a pronounced form as in Ireland, for instance; but still the popula- 
tion was sharply divided into two classes: baronial landlords 
(Rittergutsbesitzer) and agricultural day-laborers, without there be- 
ing any free peasantry between them. The landlords or "Junkers" 
were the only economically strong element in the country, because 



264 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

there were no large manufacturers. They exercised an almost un- 
limited authority in the open country; and as there were few large 
cities they met with almost no rival opposition. 

The Prussian system of large landed-estates, as is always the 
case, existed only by reason of the fact that the State took care of cer- 
tain members in each family of the nobility. The relative infertility 
of great stretches of the East Elbian territory made the nobles less 
able than elsewhere to provide adequate support for younger sons 
who did not take over the estate. So the State had to come to their 
support and look out for sons who were excluded from the patri- 
monial inheritance through primogeniture or the system of entails. 
For the nobility, therefore, it was a question of their very existence 
that their families should possess, if not a monopoly, at least a 
privileged position in appointments to higher positions in the army 
and civil service. 

The noble families believed that they had all the better claim, 
inasmuch as, owing to the conditions under which they lived, they 
believed that they alone were fit to fill these positions. Accustomed 
to see about themselves "common people," living in a primitive 
way as uneducated agricultural day-laborers, they easily came to 
the idea that the state was not only bound to assure their economic 
existence, but that it could not get along without them in general, 
particularly as regards military service. In this connection, it is not 
impossible that this idea was still further strengthened by another 
peculiarity of East Elbian agrarian conditions which has often been 
cite, with praise. Observers who have investigated economic politi- 
cal conditions from the point of view of morality have often em- 
phasized the fact that the East Elbian landlord was much superior 
to the English landlord in Ireland or the owners of great estates 
in Spain, in that he lived and worked on his estate himself, and 
did not merely spend the income from it in the city. This is doubt- 
less true; "absenteeism" was unusual in Prussia, although it may be 
a question whether it was not economic necessity, resulting from the 
relatively small productiveness of the estates, which made the 
Junker remain in the country. But, from a political point of view, 
this circumstance was not without danger. Landlords in other 
countries who spent a part of their life in the larger cities came in 
contact with new currents of thought, and came into immediate 
touch with men of capacity among the upper bourgeoisie and "in- 
telligentsia." But in Prussia the Junkers were too often acquainted 
only with members of their own class and with the agricultural day- 
laborers who were dependent upon them. Even their acquaintance 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 265 

with foreign countries may have been limited by this life of 
isolation. 

However, this was not the chief peculiarity of the Prussian State. 
In the eighteenth century Prussia was by no means the only state 
in which large landed property was favored through the exemption 
from taxation, through a monopolization of all the government 
offices, and through the exclusion of burghers from the possession 
of extensive agricultural lands. What gave Prussia in the nine- 
teenth century her peculiar structure was, in the first place, the dis- 
proportion between her natural resources and her ambition to play 
a role as a Great Power; and, in the second place, the extraordin- 
arily interesting changes which took place in her institutions after 
the catastrophe at Jena in 1806. 

Let us take the first point. Practically all the conditions were 
lacking which might enable Prussia to take a place as a military 
Great Power alongside of the other European Powers. The land 
was not naturally rich either in population or resources; nor did it 
possess highly developed industries or a large merchant-marine, like 
other small states, which might have made up for its territorial weak- 
ness. If, in spite of this, Prussia was determined as far as possible 
to stand up beside other states more favored by Nature, it was neces- 
sary for her to strain her powers to the very utmost. The concen- 
tration of all her efforts for the support of an army, severe thrift 
to cover the cost of military expenditures out of proportion to the 
natural resources of the country, the union of all authority at a 
central point in order to make sure that none of the meager revenues 
were lost, — all these conditions were indispensable if Prussia was to 
play the role of a Great Power as she wished to do. It presupposed 
also the creation of a bureaucracy dependent on the monarch, which 
should take the place of the old feudal patriarchal administration 
and bring about a uniform development of the revenues of the State 
for the general good, that is for the army. Already in the eight- 
eenth century, therefore, there had been formed by the side of the 
privileged landlord class a new body of administrators directed by 
the king or at least by a central authority; these administrators 
could oppose the privileges of the nobility whenever the role of the 
State as a Great Power demanded it. 

But even with all these measures. Nature was scarcely to be over- 
come. Some observers may become very enthusiastic over the fact 
that here the marvel of creating a state in spite of all unfavorable 
conditions was accomplished simply by human energy. But the 
shrewder judge, applying political and economic tests, will not over- 



266 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

look the dangers of an artificial creation of this kind. However 
much the Prussian government accomplished, and however power- 
ful the proud structure of the new State appeared externally, it 
rested on a dangerously small foundation. The State had been 
wholly fashioned with a view to war, and yet was economically 
much too weak to carry on war during a long period on its own 
resources. It will be recalled that Frederick the Great was able to 
bring the Seven Years' War successfully to a close only because of 
financial support from England and his alliance with British sea- 
power in general; and even then the odds were often very seriously 
against him. Still more notable, perhaps, is the very unusual finan- 
cial burden which the Napoleonic Wars imposed on Prussia. In com- 
parison with other great states like Austria, Prussia had taken part 
only a relatively short time in the wars of this period. In the final 
decisive conflict she had had only a subordinate economic and mili- 
tary part, if one compares what she did, with what Great Britain 
or Russia accomplished. She had also come out of the Napoleonic 
Wars with an extraordinarily large increase of territory, having been 
enlarged not only by a piece of former Poland, but also by a part 
of Saxony and the Rhineland. Nevertheless, the kingdom was crip- 
pled financially to such an extent that for several decades she had 
to abandon her warlike ambitions. She could not even undertake 
her natural aim of establishing a direct connection between the East 
Elbian nucleus and the Rhineland by conquering the Kingdom of 
Hanover and the Electorate of Hesse. 

The second factor which created modern Prussia was the catas- 
trophe at Jena. One must bear in mind the contrast between 
Prussia's earlier powerful position and her later collapse, perhaps 
without parallel in all history, to understand how this event exer- 
cised an almost revolutionary influence. The fact that the Prussian 
army was thrown back head over heels by Napoleon was not the 
decisive thing. The Emperor of the French had inflicted crushing 
defeats on other opponents often enough without causing such an 
inner collapse. But besides the loss of military prestige, it had been 
shown that the artificially created Prussian structure was no longer 
able to offer any resistance when times had changed. At a single 
blow, the creation of many decades collapsed in a panic as soon 
as the halo of military invincibility disappeared. If Prussian patri- 
ots wished to prevent the repetition of such a disaster there was 
nothing left for them to do except to adopt some of the "French 
ideas." To be sure, the old bases of government did not need to be 
abandoned altogether; for unless Prussia made use of all her re- 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 267 

sources, she could never compete with the other great states; but 
the whole population, and not merely the nobility and bureaucracy, 
must be drawn into the active service of the State; the towns and 
the middle-class must be something more than mere tax-payers. 

Accordingly, after 1806, reform legislation, combining the old 
and the new, was carried out in a way to evoke admiration. With 
the aid of several non-Prussian statesmen, like Stein and Harden- 
berg, whose interests were not bound up with those of the Prussian 
landlords, there was adopted so much of the French Revolution 
idea of equality as was possible without exactly destroying the 
privileged position of the landlords. The king allowed the nobility 
to keep their favored position in the army and administration, but 
he put an end to their monopoly, so far as it still existed; but at 
the same time he compelled them to help pay the increased costs 
of the State, 

The most important of these reforms was certainly that which 
dealt with the army. The Prussian army of the eighteenth century 
had not differed essentially from those of other countries. Officers 
were appointed from families of the native nobility, while the sol- 
diers consisted in good part of non-Prussian mercenaries, who were 
often recruited by improper means. This army had been defeated 
by French troops in which there were neither privileges due to birth 
nor recruits who were not French. Chiefly under the influence of a 
Hanoverian, Scharnhorst, this French system was now introduced 
in Prussia, at least in principle. The monopolization of military 
office by the nobility was done away with, to the extent that 
henceforth positions of command were given to burghers, and even 
(during the war against Napoleon) to Jews. It was decided that 
henceforth promotion should take place according to ability and 
bravery. Recruiting outside Prussia was to cease. Instead, the 
whole male population, including all nobles and townspeople who 
had hitherto been exempt from military service, were now to be 
given military training. Beside the standing army, there was created 
a "reserve," consisting of all young men; this was an extension of 
the Napoleonic system of conscription, but differed chiefly from it 
in that, owing to the limited area of the Prussian state, all young 
men were to be given military training. Humiliating military pun- 
ishments in the army were abolished, because now members of the 
upper classes were also to serve as common soldiers. 

The system of universal military service, which was legally de- 
creed on September 3, 18 14, after it had already been introduced in 
practice, might easily have had the dangerous consequence that the 



268 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

Prussian army might become, as in France, an instrument of democ- 
racy and have destroyed the controlling influence enjoyed by the 
landlord nobility. But this possibility, at least in times of peace, 
was prevented by favoring the appointment of nobles as officers in 
such a way that they possessed a majority of the positions, especially 
in the higher places of command. The common people, particularly 
the descendants of argricultural laborers, remained practically pre- 
vented from rising to be officers. In this way the Prussian govern- 
ment, in spite of the relatively small number of its population (about 
ten and a half million in 1815), succeeded in using the whole of 
the male population, thus being able to create as strong an army 
as more populous states. But, at the same time, it avoided the 
danger which might have arisen from the introduction of legal 
equality in the army. 

Many analogies with this military innovation are seen in the 
"Town Ordinance" of 1808. The previous exclusion of the middle- 
class in the towns from the army and local administration had re- 
duced the townspeople to complete passivity as regards the state, 
a circumstance which contributed not a little to the collapse at 
Jena. According to French principles, it would have been natural 
to remedy this situation by giving the middle-class some share in 
the government, or at least in administration, by creating some form 
of representative government or at least advisory councils. But if 
the government had gone as far as this it would have limited the 
existing authority of the baronial landlords. The government, there- 
fore, rejected such an innovation and limited its reform at first to 
the towns, leaving the country districts, containing the great class 
of agricultural laborers, wholly out of consideration. The burghers 
in the towns were given a share in local government, but not in the 
central government of the state. In the towns there was introduced 
a uniform civil law, somewhat like the French equality before the 
law. Citizens chose from their midst representatives who formed 
a city council which in turn elected a magistrate as executive head. 
All this, to be sure, was done under the supervision of the govern- 
ment, which, for instance, had to confirm the election of the magis- 
trate. But in spite of this the law certainly gave to the town coun- 
cils greater authority than was the case under Napoleon's system 
of prefects, particularly at first; in 1831 and 1853 the government 
assumed a somewhat wider supervision. It was also thoroughly 
characteristic that nothing like this was done for the country dis- 
tricts; there the authority of the nobles was limited neither by 
village nor district organizations ; for such an innovation would have 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 269 

disturbed the very foundation of the Prussian system of govern- 
ment. 

On the other hand, it must also be added that, in spite of this, 
the condition of the agricultural population was notably improved 
by the reform legislation. To be sure, the reformers did not exactly 
dare to abolish completely the system of entails, and primogeniture 
continued; but at least they made it possible to put an end to an 
entail. On the other hand, the feudal limitations on personal free- 
dom were abolished in a thorough-going fashion. Serfdom was done 
away with. Feudal dues disappeared, as in France; the separation 
of classes into separate castes ceased; henceforth, in Prussia, as in 
France or England, a burgher might acquire land in the country, and 
a noble might take up a profession. To be sure, the nobility still 
retained great privileges, which were all the more important, inas- 
much as the landlords were so much more powerful economically than 
the agricultural laborers. The Junkers still retained their baronial 
courts and their control over the rural police just as before. Never- 
theless, a considerable approach was made to the "revolutionary" 
principle of legal equality, which appeared to have transformed Prus- 
sia into a modern political structure, at least in comparison with the 
other states of Eastern Europe. 

Other measures aimed chiefly at increasing the revenues of the 
state. The government even thought of putting an end to the ex- 
emption of noble estates from taxation; it at least brought it about 
that taxes were more equitably distributed. All that was left of 
large ecclesiastical estates was confiscated. This secularization 
brought in a great deal to the crown, particularly in Silesia. In 
order to improve trade and the well-being of the middle-class, free- 
dom in choosing occupations was introduced, after the manner in 
France. Hardenberg even issued an edict which was intended to 
be a first step in removing the economic subjection under which the 
agricultural population suffered (1811); but this, like the similar 
Russian decree for the emancipation of the serfs, remained ineffective. 

What gave particular significance to this adoption of "French 
ideas" was the fact that the government could make use of an ex- 
traordinarily efficient civil service, owing to the traditions and so- 
cial system of the country. Owing to political and economic condi- 
tions, men who did not belong to the land-owning nobility and yet 
who craved more than a mere shopkeeper's existence, entered the 
Prussian government service gladly. A political career, as well as 
influence through the press, was out of the question in Prussia; in 
a state where neither parliament nor freedom of the press existed, 



270 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

a field of activity was offered in government civil service. Further- 
more, there was scarcely as yet any great industry or commerce to 
act as a rival in attracting persons away from a career as govern- 
ment officials. The wider activities in which the Prussian State was 
engaging, in comparison with other German territories, and the 
many new opportunities which resulted from the fact that the terri- 
tory of the State had been more than doubled, — all this attracted 
many gifted men from non-Prussian regions. Thus, the King of 
Prussia acquired a staff of executive officials dependent upon him- 
self whose interests were not bound up with that of any other exist- 
ing class. 

This class of civil servants, as was natural in this age, and as 
was also the case in the other German states, had been reared com- 
pletely in the ideas of Enlightened Despotism, From this they had 
drawn their energy and their reckless conviction of the necessity of 
creating a new state in accordance with the progressive tendencies 
of the eighteenth century. But from it they had also drawn the 
conviction that all initiative ought to come "from above"; and that 
the common people, like minors unable to act in their own interest, 
ought never to have an independent part in government and admin- 
istration. To this people belonged, in their opinion, not only the 
so-called "uneducated masses," but also every one who had not 
passed through the bureaucratic school and also the members of 
the professional, industrial, and commercial classes. 

Here was the point where the ideas of the nobility and the bureau- 
cracy coincided. The interests of the two classes, in general, were 
often opposed to one another. More than once did the tendency of 
the bureaucracy to extend state authority and increase state revenues 
bring them into conflict with the nobles, who were defending their 
privileges. But both classes were agreed that no third power should 
be allowed to rise by their side. 

All this will only be completely clear if one considers also the 
influence of religious conditions. The nucleus territory of East and 
West Prussia, from which the Prussian kingdom had developed, was 
Protestant, and this had two important consequences. One of these 
was of a political nature. There never existed in Prussia any such 
independent church organization as had always acted as a check 
upon the omnipotence of the State in absolutistic Roman Catholic 
countries. The Protestant Church, like all other corporations in 
Prussia, stood unconditionally subject to the authority of the State 
and of the classes controlling the State, like the nobility in the rural 
districts. The educative value of institutions half independent of 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 271 

the State — educative for rulers and ruled alike — did not exist; and 
it is well known that not only was the Catholic Church always re- 
garded in Prussia as a foreign body, but also that the ruling authori- 
ties in Prussia have never shown so clearly their incapacity for deal- 
ing with independent organizations as in their dealing with the 
Roman Catholic Church, 

For the moment, however, the other consequence was more im- 
portant. The very fact that the direction of the Church was identi- 
cal with that of the State resulted in a relatively greater intellectual 
freedom. To be sure, Protestantism clung as closely as Catholicism 
to unchanging creeds. But the Protestant State Church lacked the 
power to enforce its creeds, because the statesmen who possessed 
the authority were too strongly influenced by the ideas of Enlighten- 
ment not to allow them free rein. In theory, Prussia was naturally 
no less imbued with reaction against the ''Revolutionary Enlighten- 
ment" than the other conservative states, but the liberally-minded 
officials who had charge of education in Prussia, as in the other 
Protestant parts of Germany, extended much more broadly the 
bounds of what was permitted, than did statesmen who were under 
Catholic influence. Education, indeed, was strictly supervised, and 
everything which smacked of revolution was systematically forbid- 
den. But there was no such anxious exclusion of all new ideas as 
was the case, for instance, in Catholic Austria. Although news- 
papers and books were sharply supervised, the government at least 
allowed the university authorities a relatively free contact with 
new intellectual currents. 

In order to make this clear a few words must be said about the 
peculiar position of the German, and particularly the Protestant, 
universities in the nineteenth century. 

The role which the German universities had originally played did 
not differ from that of universities in other countries, and they had 
not enjoyed any greater freedom. But in the eighteenth century, 
through the foundation of the University of Gottingen in 1737, a 
complete change was brought about. The Electorate of Hanover 
was at that time, as is well known, connected with England by a 
personal union, and it was therefore possible to transplant to Ger- 
man soil English liberal ideas. The most important of these was 
academic freedom; books did not have to be approved by officials 
before being printed. Furthermore, all religious and political pres- 
sure was removed. As a result, the University of Gottingen soon 
enjoyed an extraordinary prosperity, and in the second half of the 
eighteenth century became in Germany the center of science and 



272 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

learning. But the influence of the new university soon extended 
far beyond the limits of Hanover. Competition compelled other 
German governments to give their professors greater freedom. So 
gradually the German universities were transformed into those in- 
stitutions familiar in the nineteenth century as places for scientific 
study. Though they were dependent upon the state, and more or 
less strictly controlled, and though admission to the faculty was 
strictly supervised by the state, nevertheless teachers were no longer 
bound to a prescribed textbook, nor forced to subscribe to a definite 
creed. 

This relative freedom was all the more notable in that it formed 
in general, in Germany, the only exception to government inter- 
ference with intellectual life. Academic freedom was allowed, be- 
cause natural resources could not be fully developed without 
scientific knowledge, and also because the consequences of university 
education did not penetrate down to the lower classes. It had in 
fact come about that there was an almost complete separation be- 
tween persons of academic training and the "common people," to 
which almost the whole middle-class belonged. As there was no in- 
dependent political writing and no large reading public interested 
in political and economic questions as in England or France, it came 
about that academic people primarily wrote merely for one another. 
This enhanced, on one hand, the narrowness of their work, but, on 
the other hand, gave them great freedom in expression. This was 
one of the main reasons of the poor "isolated life" of a German, of 
which Goethe once complained to Eckermann. 

Being the only places where political discussion was relatively 
free, the universities assumed an extraordinary position in the politi- 
cal life of the time. In Austria the authorities were thoroughly con- 
sistent in excluding from the universities everything that was new, 
in degrading, for instance, so dangerous a subject as history to the 
rank of a despised subordinate study, which indeed would be better 
not taught at all. But the other governments did not dare, as has 
been said, to go so far as this. It had, however, the result that "re- 
actionary" measures of the time were chiefly directed against the 
upper schools. 

But before these measiu-es are discussed, a few words must be 
said about conditions in Austria. They illustrate the point that 
Prussia can only be understood in contrast to Austria. 

Although the principles of Enlightened Despotism had not re- 
mained unknown in government circles in Austria, and although a 
series of reforms had taken place in accordance with it in the 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 273 

eighteenth century, nevertheless the Austrian state was in many re- 
spects the precise opposite of Prussia. This was due mainly to her 
greater internal strength. A state of Austria's size, with nearly 
double as many inhabitants as Prussia and with a correspondingly 
larger area including some of the most fertile parts of Europe, — 
such a state could adopt the role of a Great Power ''naturally," that 
is, without extraordinary efforts and without a concentration of all 
its powers upon the army and finance. Austria could suffer in mili- 
tary and financial matters with an ease only equaled by France. 
Neither the numerous defeats which her armies had suffered during 
the Napoleonic Wars, nor the bankruptcy of 1814, could destroy 
the country's moral credit or lead to such a catastrophe as that 
which followed Jena in Prussia. 

Austria, therefore, did not need to reform her system to such an 
extent as Prussia. The "old regime" organization continued, with 
all its clumsiness and petty detail. There was no regular cabinet 
and no regular centralized administration. The privileges of the 
nobility continued untouched. The nobles were exempted from 
military service and from the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts. 
They possessed a monopoly of authority on their estates and in the 
high places of the government. The peasantry were not only sub- 
ject to the jurisdictional authority of the landlords, but also had to 
pay feudal dues. In the various political assemblies of estates 
(Landstdnde), which still existed, only the nobility were repre- 
sented, along with a few of the towns at most; and the right of 
assessing the taxes, which in Bohemia, for instance, belonged to 
these assemblies, was used in such a way that the peasants had to 
pay much higher taxes on their land than did the lords. Nothing 
was done to stimulate the industrial activity of the middle-class. 
Commerce lay almost exclusively in the hands of the Jews. Pro- 
fessional life was not developed, because educational institutions 
were lacking. Industry was able to maintain a miserable existence 
merely owing to the brutal prohibitive tariffs against foreign manu- 
factures, which, however, were ineffective, owing to the active smug- 
gling which went on. To be sure, one must not overlook the fact 
that there was here no need for free trade. The fertile country 
did not need to depend upon revenues from export trade, and per- 
haps the very fact that there was no manufacturing on a large 
scale, and consequently no great excess population, brought it about 
that Austria still preserved her old reputation as a land in which 
living was cheap, abundant and good. It was due to these rela- 
tively easy conditions of life that only a negative attention was 



274 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

given to intellectual matters. Political discussions were harmful 
pnly because they would mislead people into being discontented 
with their pleasant enjoyment of life, and set them instead to think- 
ing about their political rights. Every change in the old system 
rightly seemed dangerous, because it would have disturbed the 
happy economic adjustment, and would therefore eventually have 
brought about more wide-reaching changes. Therefore the govern- 
ment forbade all political discussion in general. The censorship 
was exceedingly strict; even a book like "The Restoration of Con- 
stitutional Law," by Ludwig von Haller, a romantic, conservative 
patrician of Berne, could not be sold in Austria. To print a politi- 
cal pamphlet in Austria was unthinkable. All societies, even harm- 
less pleasure meetings of literary persons, were forbidden, because 
they might have given occasion for political discussion. One could 
only journey abroad by permission, so that personal contact with 
foreign ideas was forbidden as far as possible. A very highly de- 
veloped secret police even watched over opinions which were ex- 
pressed in private life. The universities were managed in the old 
fashion just like schools. 

This exclusion of everything new was still further strengthened 
by the Roman Catholic character of the State. In itself the Roman 
Catholic Church was scarcely less dependent upon the State than 
the Protestant Church in Prussia, but it has already been pointed 
out above that the Catholic clergy were less inclined to make com- 
promises with modern civilization than were the Protestants. The 
schools were now completely under the clergy, and even the students 
had to attend mass. Non-Catholics were merely tolerated and had 
no access to public office. 

But the burdensomeness of Austria's system of repression was 
lessened, not only on account of the natural wealth of the country, 
but also on account of the naturally peaceful character of her for- 
eign policy. Essentially Austria was not organized on a pacifist 
basis. The maintenance of an efficient army could not be neglected 
(although it did not equal modern trained armies like those of 
France and Prussia), because the system of primogeniture made it 
necessary to provide for the younger sons of the nobility by giving 
them places in the army. But here also the government's policy 
was merely conservative. The state was already rounded out terri- 
torially, and therefore not driven, like Prussia, by ambitions to 
unite separated territories by conquest. In view of the opposition 
which she faced, particularly in Italy, Austria could regard it as an 
advantage if only she were able to protect from attack what she 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 275 

already possessed. Any ambitions for territorial extension existed 
at most only in connection with Turkish territory in the Balkans; 
but even here Austria did not intend to interfere by force of arms. 
Thus she could keep her army within relatively limited bounds, 
avoid excessive military expenditures, and, in contrast to the* purely 
continental power of Prussia, develop a fleet which was by no means 
inconsiderable. All this sufficed to preserve the external position 
of the monarchy for almost half a century. On the other hand, 
Austria refrained from all offensive wars and did not even inter- 
fere in the Russo-Turkish struggles, though Prince Metternich, in 
view of his conservative principles, would have liked to interfere 
against the Greeks in their fight for independence. 

After this discussion, one can see in what respects Prussia dif- 
fered mainly from her later rival. I say from her later rival, for in 
the generation after the Congress of Vienna, Prussia was not in a 
position to take up a struggle with Austria for control in Germany. 
To be sure, Prussia had laid the foundation of her military system; 
but the consequences of the Napoleonic period in this state to which 
Nature had been so niggardly were felt for several decades, so that 
for the time being Prussia was forced to follow a policy of peace. 
Nothing is more characteristic of this than the fact that universal 
military service, which could produce in Prussia an army equal in 
size to the armies of the other great states, was not fully carried 
out for financial reasons. Although the population grew steadily, 
the number of men who were summoned for military service re- 
mained the same; in i860, only 40,000 out of 65,000 liable to mili- 
tary service actually served under the colors. 

And yet the thing which is characteristic about what has been 
called "Prussian militarism" is the fact that institutions and views, 
which in other countries have been advocated merely by a single class 
or profession, have been in Prussia transferred to the whole people. 
In itself there is little which is original in Prussian military con- 
ceptions. A number of old military views are perhaps particularly 
accentuated in it, and they are carried out more rigidly to their 
logical consequences than in other armies. But one has only to 
look at the quite similar rules of the Jesuit Order to see that the 
Spanish officer of the sixteenth century had the same ideas as to the 
necessity of discipline and "corpse-like obedience" as the Prussian 
military officers of the nineteenth century. What was new and of 
importance in Prussia was rather the fact that these principles now 
became a part of the thought of a whole people. As every one was 
a soldier, so it went without saying that every one had the feelings 



276 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

of a soldier, and must obey like a soldier. Therefore an altogether 
extraordinary attention was given to the education of the people. 
For they furnished the men who would be in actual service for 
what in those days was regarded as only a short period of time, 
and yet who must be instilled forever with a definite military way 
of thinking. It was in this spirit that the press and higher educa- 
tion had to be influenced. It was in this spirit above all else that 
the civil service was administered, in order that in his daily life 
the subject should always learn to think in a military way. 

This is not the place to consider what may be the evil conse- 
quences of such a militarization of all public life, or, to speak more 
accurately, to what extent the direction of all State activity toward 
military aims and the subordination of all State work to military 
purposes makes the representatives of the State unfit to fulfil non- 
military tasks. Here it is merely possible to mention the fact. It 
may also be pointed out how harmoniously this system fitted in 
with all the other institutions in Prussia. Universal military service 
itself was indeed a consequence of the smallness of the state, and 
of its determination, nevertheless, to rival the Great Powers; but 
when once this disproportionately large military machine had been 
created, it offered an excellent support to the nobility, and har- 
monized wonderfully with other institutions which deprived citizens 
of all initiative, including initiative in politics. 

From the point of view of world history, the period of German 
history between 1815 and 1848 offers little of importance. Impor- 
tant events in foreign politics were rare. The conflicts of the two 
great states (particularly Austria) with the middle-sized, and little, 
states, — conflicts which related to the censorship of the press, the 
supervision of the universities and student societies, and the intro- 
duction of liberal constitutions, — these conflicts were without great 
significance; and even if gains in a liberal direction had been made 
in the smaller states, they would have been of little importance so 
long as the two great German states remained conservative. Much 
more important for the future were the changes which, at this 
period, were gradually taking place in economic conditions. 

The long period of peace, together with the improvements in the 
means of communication which were beginning in Germany, re- 
sulted in a large increase in the population, which at first was offset 
by only a small emigration. This new situation gradually brought 
about the development of manufacturing on a large scale. Begin- 
ning with the 1830's, the mining and textile industries began to 
increase slowly in Germany. Just as in England, there took place 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 277 

a shift in the population from the wooded regions to the coal dis- 
tricts; but, in comparison with England, the changes which took 
place in these matters were indeed very modest; but still, as a 
period of preparation, these years are very significant. 

These changes also influenced politics. Whereas, in the earlier 
period, the demand for the union of the German states into a new 
empire had come chiefly from liberal youthful idealists, with ro- 
mantic patriotic feelings and with a hatred toward France, now 
practical arguments began to be used more and more, urging the 
necessity of putting an end to the "small states system," which in- 
terfered with commerce. Henceforth, it was primarily an economic 
demand which insisted on a uniform commercial policy and the 
abolition of all internal obstacles to trade and all vexatious local 
regulations. 

Now it was decisive that of the two great states, without whose 
cooperation such reforms could not be carried out, Prussia alone 
showed herself favorable toward these new considerations. 

This was evident to every one through her founding of the Tariff 
Union (Zollverein). 

The fact that Prussia favored these ideas for a uniform tariff 
policy for all Germany rested in part, at any rate, on geographical 
grounds. Unlike Austria, Prussia did not form a solid territory, 
with what might be called a natural boundary. She consisted of 
two separated areas, inclosed numerous non-Prussian territories 
("enclaves"), and had a very inconvenient and extended boundary, 
more than seven thousand kilometers long. Thus, Prussia had a 
motive for simplification and also for uniting with the other states, 
which was lacking in Austria. 

But besides this motive, there were others. Prussia was just as 
much inclined toward innovations for the benefit of the State, as 
Austria was conservative in the true sense of the word. It was easy 
and in harmony with her ambitions for increasing the economic 
power of the kingdom for Prussia to introduce a uniform, low tariff 
in place of the sixty-seven tariff systems which existed in Prussia 
in 181 5. Her commercial policy also differed from that of Austria 
in very important respects. As has been said, Austria adhered to 
a prohibitive tariff system, and did not want economic relations to 
be disturbed in any way by contact with the outside world. Prussia, 
on the other hand, had no such scruples, and also possessed as yet 
no factories which the government thought ought to be protected. 
The tariff, therefore, which Prussia proposed was very simple, and, 
for that period, quite low: a tariff of ten percent ad valorem for im- 



278 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

ported goods in general, twenty percent for colonial products. The 
tariff had the advantage that the collection of duties required only 
a relatively small number of officials. Furthermore, it was easy to 
make tariff agreements with other countries, inasmuch as the Prus- 
sian tariff system did not aim at the protection of special Prussian 
industries. 

Soon after the adoption of the tariff in 1818, Prussian officials 
began to try to secure the adhesion of other states in the German 
Confederation. It was not difficult to win over the little central 
German principalities, which formed complete or nearly complete 
"enclaves," as the states totally surrounded by Prussian territory 
were called. In these states, also, the cost of collecting duties had 
been very high in proportion to the amount collected so long as they 
insisted on having their own tariff system; but as Prussia offered to 
share the income from tariff duties on a per capita basis, these 
states gained very considerably by adopting the Prussian tariff sys- 
tem. The first prince to join the Tariff Union was the Duke of 
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen in 1819, and a number of other small 
princes, who were in a similar position, followed his example. In 
1828 it was possible to secure the first adhesion of a state in South 
Germany, the Grand Duchy of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt.) This 
was not accomplished without difficulties, and Prussia had to make 
various concessions to secure the adhesion of Hesse, such as allowing 
Hesse to have her own customs officials. But Prussia was glad to 
make this "poor bargain," as it was called, because she hoped to win 
other states by it, and this hope was fulfilled. Meanwhile the 
central German states, especially those which feared annexation by 
Prussia, like Hanover, Brunswick, and Saxony, and also the South 
German states (with the exception of Baden) had also made Zoll- 
vereins of their own. But the tariff union which Prussia had so 
cleverly made with the Grand Duchy of Hesse put an end for the 
most part to these local or "particularistic" unions. Thus, Electoral 
Hesse (Hesse-Cassel) joined the Prussian Zollverein in 1831, giving 
Prussia a direct connection with South Germany and causing the 
central German Zollverein to collapse. In 1833 the Bavarian-WUrt- 
temberg Zollverein also broke down and these states joined the 
Prussian union, which after 1834 was known as the "German Com- 
mercial and Tariff Union." By 1841 there remained outside of the 
Union only a few small states like the Hanseatic towns and the 
states which were most afraid of Prussia like Hanover, Brunswick, 
Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg. But in the years 1841-52 most of 
these were also won over as Prussia agreed to adopt several lower 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 279 

tariff schedules. Hesitating governments were won over more 
easily by the fact that the tariff agreements were not perpetual, but 
were signed merely for a short period of years; it always, there- 
fore, seemed possible to withdraw in case Prussia should use their 
adhesion to the Tariff Union for political purposes. But the finan- 
cial returns proved to be so favorable that the agreements were 
always renewed, — in 1853 for a period of twelve years. 

Austria, on the other hand, was wholly opposed to the idea. As 
a result, about the middle of the nineteenth century, unity in eco- 
nomic matters at least had been accomplished under Prussian 
leadership in a large part of Germany, without Austria having any 
part in it. 

But before any account is given of the corresponding political and 
military union, the events of 1848, which in many respects trans- 
formed Prussia, must first be mentioned. 

One preliminary observation must be made. The history of the 
following years, especially the developments in Prussia, would be 
incomprehensible if one were to conclude from what has been said 
that the advocates of national unity were moved merely by economic 
motives. On the contrary, it is significant that the very persons 
who from class interests most emphasized the need of unifying Ger- 
many's economic policy were also the persons who were insisting on 
political liberty. The opposition of manufacturers and merchants 
to landowners and the tendencies which they represented in Prussia 
was strong; people wanted legal equality just as much as a mod- 
ernization of economic life. But since the idea was current that 
Prussia was no less willing to adopt the one than the other, these 
persons generally took the side of Prussia, hoping indeed to secure 
both aims together. 

In Prussia itself the conflict within the wealthy classes was very 
marked. Hostile to the old Prussian system, with its privileges for 
the landowners and the bureaucracy, were the western provinces, 
which were reproached by the eastern provinces and by the 
government with being "democratic"; these were the provinces in 
which French civil law was in force and in which the government 
had to create an artificial nobility for definite electoral purposes. 
The large towns also were everywhere hostile to the privileged posi- 
tion of the nobility. Hostile, furthermore, were the industrial regions 
in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. These groups all doubtless 
supported the effort to establish the Zollverein, but they were no 
less zealous in advocating liberal political reforms. The history of 
the following years is chiefly filled with the conflict which the Prus- 



28o STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

sian government carried on against these groups but which resulted 
in their ultimate victory. 

The demand for liberal reforms, especially for the introduction of 
a constitution and parliamentary government, reached back in Prus- 
sia to a period before 1848. 

Although the King of Prussia had promised in 1815 to create a 
representative legislature, and although the German Act of Con- 
federation made obligatory "a constitution based on a system of 
estates," Prussia had nothing of the kind until 1823, and even 
then only "Provincial Estates" which were merely advisory and 
representative of the old feudal division of the population into 
classes. In these Provincial Estates, whose meetings were secret, 
the Prussian nobility naturally had the majority, owing to the nature 
of the Prussian State: the nobility had 278 representatives, the 
burghers 182, and the peasants 124. Only tax-payers could vote, 
only possessors of property could be elected, so that members of 
the liberal professions, like physicians or lawyers, could only be 
elected in case they also happened to be landowners. But this ar- 
rangement proved unsatisfactory when the State had to turn to the 
public to borrow money to satisfy its new financial needs. To be 
sure, by 1828, the frugal government had managed to change the 
deficit into a surplus; but the limited state revenues did not suffice 
to finance great undertakings, like the building of railways, — which 
on purely military grounds could not be neglected. Furthermore, 
it had been expressly promised in 1820 that no new loans would be 
made without the consent of the Estates, and in 1842 the "United 
Committees" of the Provincial Estates had refused to assume the 
responsibility for such a loan. Therefore a royal order of Febru- 
ary 3, 1847, finally summoned, as a provisional measure, the "United 
Diet," or united meeting of the Provincial Estates, which was to 
have the right of granting new taxes. But the United Diet was no 
more yielding than the United Committees. It demanded at least 
that the assembly should meet periodically, and it refused to grant 
the money for railway construction. 

In the midst of this conflict arrived the news of the February 
Revolution in Paris. This encouraged a part of the opposition in 
Prussia to emphasize their demands more strongly. In the large 
cities especially, in which agitation was active, but in which the 
bourgeoisie proper took no part, the groups of revolutionists were 
composed almost exclusively of young persons and of a few laboring 
men. The country districts and the army were wholly unaffected; 
in fact, the army officers, who had the greatest interest in conserv- 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 281 

ing the existing order of things, were down-right opposed to the move- 
ment, and the agricultural laborers in the East Elbian provinces were 
much too dependent upon their lords and too passive politically to 
make common cause with the liberals in the towns. Fundamentally, 
it was less a struggle of liberals against monarchy than an opposi- 
tion of towns and manufacturers against large landlords and their 
privileges. Since the latter were the stronger, the insurrection was 
destined to fail from the very start. The king, as weak intellectu- 
ally as physically, was indeed ready to make some concessions, and 
on r^Iarch 8, 1848, consented to periodic meetings of the Diet, almost 
before a petition for this had been drawn up. In a proclamation on 
March 18 he also promised a constitutional system for all Germany. 
But at this point the military authorities interfered, and attacked the 
burghers in Berlin, who replied by throwing up barricades in the 
city. The king was unwilling to take sides unconditionally with the 
army and ordered the troops to withdraw from the city. His brother, 
the later Emperor William I, who was especially opposed by the 
people as being the pronounced representative of the claims of the 
officers, had to leave Prussia and flee to England. 

For the moment revolution triumphed. The king had to promise 
a constitution which included universal suffrage among other things. 
But the "National Assembly" which soon met in Prussia was wholly 
powerless from the outset. Opposed to it were all the solidly estab- 
lished powers in the state: the army, the bureaucracy, and the king. 
Its decisions had only a momentary validity. Though it was dom- 
inated, not by radicals, but by moderate liberals, jurists, and pro- 
fessors, and though it voted to abolish what was left of the authority 
of the landlords and to place local administration everywhere under 
elected boards in place of the Junkers, and though it demanded a re- 
sponsible ministry, — still all this did not result in any permanent 
change. After sitting for seven months the National Assembly was 
dispersed by the military authorities. The king then issued a new 
constitution of his own on December 5, 1848. The revolution had 
thus triumphed to the extent that the Old Regime was changed at 
least in certain forms, and a constitution was introduced. But as in 
the case of the reform legislation after the battle of Jena, it was here 
less a question of the complete adoption of liberal reforms than of 
a mere adaptation of them, in which care was taken that the privi- 
leges of the classes which had hitherto ruled should not be essen- 
tially restricted. 

New, indeed, was the creation of a parliamentary assembly and 
the constitutional principle that the House of Representative^ 



282 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

{Abgeordnetenhaus) must give its approval for new taxes. But the 
authority of the assembly did not go beyond this and all administra- 
tion remained exclusively dependent upon the king as heretofore. 
Furthermore, the king took care, so far as possible, to prevent any 
effective parliamentary opposition to the privileged position of the 
large landowners. He did not dare to abolish universal suffrage, but 
he modified it in such a way that the rich, who in the eastern prov- 
inces were the nobles, secured a preponderant influence: in 1849 
he issued a new electoral law which divided the voters into three 
classes according to the taxes they paid, in such a way that each 
of the three classes paid one-third of the taxes. Each class chose 
the same number of electors, so that the rich were far more strongly 
represented than the poor. Moreover, voting was done in public, 
the voter announcing his vote orally, before it was written 
down. Voters who were financially dependent were therefore liable 
to pressure from the government or from the nobles. Finally, in 
1854, a House of Lords (Herrenhaus) was organized by the side of 
the House of Representatives, and representation in it was given 
almost exclusively to the nobility and the members of the royal 
family; part of the members were hereditary, but the greater part 
were appointed for life by the king, mainly from the ranks of the 
nobility. 

This constitution, which remained in force until 19 18, is his- 
torically of the greatest importance. It not only made possible in 
the 1850's and later the carrying out of a number of "reactionary" 
measures, but it also had the result that later, when Prussia united 
the other states into the German Empire, the largest and most influ- 
ential state possessed a parliament which was thoroughly plutocratic 
in its organization, and so prevented any possibility of the empire's 
changing in the direction of liberalism. 

At this point it is possible to speak only of the immediate conse- 
quences of Prussia's triumph over revolution. To be sure, all the 
measures which had been passed during the revolutionary days, were 
not wholly undone by the administration; but for the most part the 
privileges of the nobility were restored. The system of entails was 
immediately revived in 1852, the landlords were again given control 
over police, and the attempts to reorganize the provincial admin- 
istration were interrupted. 

Much more important were two developments which took place 
without the active interference of the State. One of these, which 
related to the attitude of the ruling classes in Prussia toward the idea 
of German unity, will be discussed in the next chapter in connection 



GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 283 

with the history of the national movement. The other may be 
touched upon here. This was the unusually large and sudden emigra- 
tion which began to take place as a result of the disillusionment over 
the failure to secure liberal reforms in the matter of political 
equality, and which tended to preserve the East Elbian provinces 
from the danger of revolution for a long time to come. It is not 
possible, so far as I know, to prove directly by statistics that the 
masses who left Germany at that time to seek political freedom and 
a home of their own in the United States came mainly from the 
eastern provinces of Prussia; however, it is not a question of the 
absolute number of emigrants to America, but rather whether a 
relatively larger percentage did not leave the somewhat thinly settled 
eastern provinces of Prussia as compared with the other parts of 
Germany. It is a fact that the density of population in the eastern 
provinces of Prussia increased so slowly between 1840 and 1900, 
although there was no artificial limitation of the birth-rate during 
the earlier decades, that the density there in 1900 was less than that 
in South Germany in 1840. In Mecklenburg, where the social and 
political conditions are similar to Prussia, the figures are still more 
unfavorable. Even if the actual number of emigrants from the 
thickly-settled territories of South and Northwest Germany had 
been the same as from the agricultural regions of the Northeast, 
it is clear that the agricultural provinces of Eastern Prussia would 
have suffered very much more severely on a percentage basis. It is 
probably safe to assert that the same thing happened there in the 
country districts as happened in English industry in the 1830's and 
40's: it was precisely the energetic and intelligent members of the 
population who had no property who emigrated, because it was dif- 
ficult for them to rise at home. The result was that the danger of 
revolutionary movements was essentially diminished. Naturally, all 
these "emigrants" did not go to America; many simply moved into 
the towns, but the social and political consequences were the same. 
There was no longer any danger of a rising of the agricultural pro- 
letariat against the landlords. To appreciate correctly the emigra- 
tion figures, it must also be observed that even the decidedly agrarian 
provinces of Prussia were not wholly in the hands of large land- 
lords. Cautiously as the State had undertaken measures to estab- 
lish independent peasant proprietors, the measures had not been 
wholly without effect, and so only a part of the agricultural popu- 
lation was forced to emigrate to America or to the towns in order 
to secure a wholly independent position for themselves. 
It must also be borne in mind that when the emigration from Ger- 



284 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

many to the United States suddenly assumed enormous proportions 
in the 1850's, this was certainly in most cases not due to disillu- 
sionment over the failure of political ideals, but rather to material 
necessity and a feeling of hopelessness. In general, this was natu- 
rally observable not only in the regions of large landed estates, but 
also in other thickly settled districts, and perhaps even in the regions 
which were becoming slightly industrialized. But it was in the East 
Elbian provinces particularly, where there were no factories, that 
the political influence of emigration was mainly felt. 

At the same time a revolutionary change was taking place in the 
Old Regime in Austria. The details of this must be left until 
later; here only so much can be said as is necessary to make clear 
the conflict with Prussia to be treated in the next chapter. 

The March Revolution of 1848 which broke out in Vienna almost 
at the same time as in Berlin also ended in failure. In Vienna too 
the government and the army remained masters of the situation. 
But no more than in Prussia was there simply a complete restoration 
of the previous system. A number of reforms were permanent. 
The feudal dues which had been abolished, the inequality in taxa- 
tion, and the administration of the provinces by the nobility, were 
not established again. The old patriarchal government gave way 
to a stricter supervision by a central authority. The cabinet began 
really to function and not simply to let things take their course and 
avoid innovations. Austria approached, one may say, to the Prus- 
sian system. Furthermore, the State needed economic changes: this 
was the age of great railway construction. A new policy was also 
adopted in regard to religious matters. Attention has already been 
called above (see p. 226) to the Concordat of 1855, which meant an 
official break with "Josephism," — with the state church of the INIet- 
ternich period; Catholicism again became the state religion. 
Similar measures, to be sure, had taken place in Prussia where, for 
instance, the public schools were placed under the clergy and where 
the court party and the Junkers sought to use religion as a support 
in the struggle against liberalism. But, it must be repeated, such 
efforts meant quite a different thing on Protestant soil from what 
they did in Catholic countries. With numerous Protestant friends 
which Prussia had among the nationalists in Germany, Austria's 
alliance with the Roman Catholic Church was a much stronger in- 
fluence than the Prussian monarch's union with Protestant orthodoxy. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA; 
PRUSSIA'S CONQUEST OF GERMANY 

The decades after 1815 in Germany were characterized by the fact 
that Prussia and Austria woris^ed hand in hand. Not only was Prussia 
prevented from taking an independent military course, owing to 
various reasons which have been mentioned, but she also held back 
because her government adhered to conservative legitimist doctrines 
of which she regarded Austria, next to Russia, as the principal pro- 
tector. Frederick William III, who died in 1840, once observed in 
the Political Testament which he made in 1827 for his successor, 
"Russia, Prussia, and Austria should never separate from one an- 
other. Their cooperation is to be regarded as the keystone of the 
great European alliance." After 1840 this attitude changed some- 
what. To be sure, the new king remained true to legitimist prin- 
ciples and rejected the possibility of any conflict with Austria. But 
a younger generation of Prussian politicians and military officers had 
no such scruples. They did not care if legitimacy was interfered 
with so long as Prussia might in this way strengthen her position as 
a Great Power. In a certain sense, therefore, they approached the 
point of view of the liberals who wanted German unity. Like the 
latter, they shared the view that Prussia with only sixteen million 
inhabitants in 1848 could maintain her position as a Great Power 
only in case she joined the other German states to herself, and 
then she would be able to assume a still greater position in the 
world. This naturally was the same thing as saying that Prussia 
must take up the struggle with Austria; for it was out of the ques- 
tion that the Austrian state would voluntarily consent to a reorgani- 
zation of the German Confederation which should relegate her to 
second place. 

It was not until 1848 that the conflict between the two Powers 
came sharply to the surface; then at least it became clear in the 
"Greater Germany" (grossdeutch) plan for German unity with the 
inclusion of Austria, and the "Smaller Germany" (kleindeutsch) plan 
for unification under Prussia without Austria. 

285 



286 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

Such a struggle was one of the conditions of the new Prussian 
policy. The other condition, and perhaps the more important one, 
lay in the change which had taken place in international relations. 

In any attack on Austria before 1848, for which Prussia by herself 
was scarcely strong enough, Prussia could have counted only upon 
Russia's support; for various reasons, therefore, such an attack would 
have seemed a dangerous matter. But now Napoleon Ill's policy 
had created for Austria a powerful new opponent, — in fact, two 
opponents, if one considers the Kingdom of Sardinia which was 
being reconstructed with Napoleon's assistance. This created an 
international situation which after the middle of the century gave 
a prospect of success to a Prussian war against Austria. 

This last point has already been touched upon several times and 
therefore needs no further consideration here. But the change in 
Germany itself must be briefly considered. 

As to general conditions — the large increase in population, the 
beginnings of industrialism, and the development of transportation 
— enough has already been said. It has also been pointed out how 
all these changes seemed to render necessary the economic and po- 
litical unity of Germany, But the events of the year 1848 showed 
also that such a union could only take place with the approval of 
the Great Powers, and that the question of the best form of bring- 
ing it about reduced itself to the alternative as to which of the two 
German Great Powers should take over the leadership of it. 

When the February Revolution had triumphed in Paris and lib- 
erals in Germany were daring to advance their demands more ener- 
getically, something of a panic seized the German governments. 
Although at bottom their authority, at least in the larger states, 
was scarcely endangered, the princes felt paralyzed by the unusual 
situation and made unheard-of concessions. The Frankfort Diet, 
which represented the sovereigns of the German Confederation, 
adopted the colors of the forbidden Burschenschajten, the German 
student societies, which stood for nationalism and liberalism. 
It also sanctioned the demands of the liberals that a German par- 
liament should be summoned to sit in place of the Frankfort Diet. 
Accordingly, a National Assembly was elected on the basis of uni- 
versal suffrage throughout all Germany, including even the parts 
of Prussia which did not belong to the German Confederation. It 
m.et at Frankfort and among its members were all the leaders of 
the liberal opposition, many of whom were professors or writers; as 
there had been no opportunity for real parliamentary life in Ger- 
many, universities and pamphlets, though severely censored, had 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 287 

afforded the only forums free for political discussion. About a third 
of the Assembly could be regarded as republican. 

After this National Assembly had established a provisional gov- 
ernment with an "imperial administrator" in the person of the Aus- 
trian Archduke John, it began to discuss "fundamental rights." 
This action has often been criticized, but perhaps unjustly. It was 
naturally an illusion, due probably to the political inexperience of 
most of the members, that the Frankfort Parliament imagined that 
it could pass anything more than paper decrees in opposition to a 
firmly-estabhshed military state like Prussia, especially as the Par- 
liament had not the slightest military force at its disposal. But if 
they counted on exercising anything more than mere moral influ- 
ence it was not so foolish to begin by setting forth the minimum 
rights which should be enjoyed by every German in the federation. 
If these decrees, which were intended to abolish all legal inequalities 
and class privileges and establish the independence of the courts and 
freedom of occupations and of the press, — if these decrees had really 
been carried out, then the local particularistic opposition which was 
especially strong in Germany against a unification of Germany by 
Prussia would have been destroyed; the privileges of definite classes 
which encouraged the nobles and officers in Prussia to maintain an 
opposition against the national movement would no longer have 
had any point. But the National Assembly in St. Paul's Church at 
Frankfort had, as has been said, no military force at its disposal 
to translate its decrees into acts. The Great Powers ignored its 
decisions, and in September, 1848, the Assembly even had to be 
protected by Prussian and Austrian troops against a little republican 
insurrection. 

More important for the later period was the fact that the question 
of Austria's attitude to the unification of Germany was made clear 
for the first time. Was it possible to include a country like Austria, 
composed of many nationalities, in a single political organization 
which should have a purely national character and whose members 
should have equal rights? There was the greatest doubt as to this, 
Austria, in fact, rejected a compromise proposal that she should join 
the new federation merely with her purely German territory. So, 
after a small majority (267 to 263) had decided on the establish- 
ment of a hereditary empire, the King of Prussia was chosen Em- 
peror on March 28, 1849, by 290 votes. But as this would mean 
that Austria would have to come under the tutelage of her rival, 
the Austrian government, on April 5, recalled her deputies from 
the Frankfort Parliament. 



288 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

On the other hand, Frederick William IV, the legitimist King of 
Prussia, did not dare to accept the imperial crown which was offered 
to him by a revolutionary / ssembly. He declared that he could 
make no decision without tne voluntary approval of the other 
crowned heads in Germany, and therefore rejected the proffered 
crown on April 28. 

The two Great Powers, after suppressing meanwhile a number of 
republican revolts in Saxony, Baden and elsewhere, then sought to 
bring about a closer form of confederation by way of negotiations 
among the governments. But all proposals came to nothing owing 
either to Prussia's or to Austria's opposition. So finally in 1850 
the old Diet of the Confederation had to be recalled to Frankfort, 
and Prussia had to give up her attempt to make a separate union 
with the smaller states. 

Austria was not altogether displeased with this situation: she de- 
sired no enlargement of Germany, and she again controlled the presi- 
dency in the Confederation. It was otherwise with Prussia. Her 
backing-down before Austrian wishes was regarded as a humiliation. 
People saw that Prussia's union of Germany could only take place 
as a result of a triumphant struggle over Austria; so Prussia began 
to make preparation for such a war. 

At first, however, there was a brief pause in the conflict. So long 
as Frederick William IV, with his romantic legitimist notions, di- 
rected the government of Prussia, an immediate open struggle with 
Austria was not to be thought of. Not only was it necessary to 
make military preparations for the civil war in Germany, but the 
foreign policy which had hitherto been pursued had to be abandoned. 
Prussia's relations to other states must no longer be determined by 
the principles of conservative solidarity. Alliances must be made 
with revolutionary governments and even with revolutionary parties. 
In short, to use a new word which was becoming current, the gov- 
ernment must act according to the principles of RealpoUtik, — a 
policy of opportunism which aims by shrewd calculation of actual 
forces to secure practical success in politics. This word, which has 
often been misunderstood, can only be seen in its real meaning if it 
is contrasted with the maxims of legitimist solidarity which were 
represented at that time by the court party in Prussia. 

So it was not until 1858 that Prussia could begin to realize her 
purposes; in that year the king became completely insane and was 
removed from the government, and later died in 1861, His place 
was taken by his younger brother, William, a man who hitherto had 
been exclusively interested in military matters; he had nothing of 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 289 

his brother's pohtical idealism and thought of himself only as a 
Prussian. He also had the advantage that he had not been educated 
as an heir to the throne and tlierefore understood thoroughly at least 
one profession, namely tlie army. Though one could not expect 
from him any comprehension of far-seeing plans, still there was no 
fear that he would adopt any of the doctrinaire notions with which 
his elder brother had blocked the aims of the war party and of the 
"red reactionary," Bismarck. In general, in all matters where the 
maintenance of his personal authority was concerned the new king 
was as unyielding as his brother. 

After the group which had opposed war with Austria as a matter 
of principle had thus been deprived of its support, the Prussian 
government proceeded as rapidly as possible with military prepara- 
tions. It could only hope to beat Austria if its army was enlarged 
and the number of its professional officers increased. Ever since 
1820 the number of young men called annually to the colors had 
remained the same and the number of regiments had not been in- 
creased. This was no longer to be the case according to a proposal 
which was laid before the Prussian legislature in i860. The number 
of annual recruits was to be increased by about one-half — from 
40,000 to 63,000 — and the peace strength of the army was also to 
be considerably increased. No more exemptions from military 
service were to be allowed. On the other hand, men were to be 
allowed to leave the Landwehr at the age of thirty-two instead of 
forty, so that in case of war the first brunt of the fighting would fall 
chiefly upon the younger men. To carry out this reform, its chief 
advocate, Albert von Roon, was appointed minister of war on De- 
cember 5, 1859. 

The Prussian legislature was asked to assent to the army reform, 
because it involved an increase of taxation of nine and a half million 
talers. A part of the expense, however, was to be met by increasing 
the land tax ; but this proposal displeased the landlords in the Upper 
House as much as the great increase in the standing army — from 
about 230,000 to 450,000 — displeased the liberals, who formed a 
strong group in the House of Representatives. This opposition party 
felt that the increase in the army could be accomplished at a mate- 
rially lower expenditure if the term of service was again reduced to 
two years instead of three, though the king regarded three years' 
service as unconditionally necessary to instil an enduring soldierly 
spirit into the men. The increase in the number of officers simply 
meant that it v/as easier to make provision for the Junkers. 

The opposition was so great that the government adopted a subter- 



290 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

fuge. It asked for a grant of nine million talers merely for one year 
(1860-61), as a "temporary" military arrangement. In this form 
the government's proposal was adopted almost imanimously. But 
the government ignored from the outset the clause which declared 
that the increase in the army was only temporary. It proceeded to 
organize permanent regiments. It is noteworthy that in so doing 
the government met with the approval of the large landowners and 
was thus assured of support at least in the House of Lords. This 
was shown clearly by the fact that the Upper House even accepted 
in 1 86 1 the increase in the land tax to which it had hitherto been 
steadily opposed. 

But all this naturally did not put an end to the party conflict in 
the legislature; it merely postponed it. This was all the more 
serious for the government, as the parliamentary situation became 
by no means more favorable after i860; a "German Progressive 
Party in Prussia" was formed in 1861 which aimed at a thorough- 
going modernization of the Prussian state, including the abolition of 
the privileges of the land-owners, the separation of church and state, 
and the reform of the House of Lords. In 1862 this party had a 
majority in the lower house and was supported not only by the 
great cities and the industrial districts in the west, but also by those 
in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. The lower house demanded 
that the government lay before it a detailed budget, in order to pre- 
vent the government from finding the money for the increase of the 
army by roundabout methods, such as the paring down of other 
items. Thereupon the legislature was dissolved. But the new elec- 
tions of May, 1862, strengthened, instead of weakening, the Progres- 
sive Party, and an open constitutional conflict was unavoidable. 

To carry on this conflict, the government needed at its head a 
man who would not hesitate to take upon himself the odium of defy- 
ing the constitution and of championing the king's prerogative in 
the chamber regardless of all else. Such a man was found in Bis- 
marck, "a young conservative," who had hitherto been employed 
chiefly in diplomatic positions, but who became the head of the 
ministry in the fall of 1862. This was an official declaration of 
war, so to speak, against the legislatiure; the "constitutional con- 
flict" had begun. 

The new minister-president was a typical representative of the 
realpolitik which had been developing among the younger genera- 
tion of Prussian conservatives. To be sure, like every considerable 
personality, he was not merely an exponent of the prevailing views 
of his class; but in all essentials he did not differ from the political 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 291 

views of his fellow Junkers which have been described in another 
connection. Like them, he believed that the people were incapable 
of looking out for their political interests themselves; like them, he 
had only a slight practical acquaintance with the political life of 
Western Europe; he had never stayed in England and he had been 
to France only on brief diplomatic missions; like them, also, in a 
struggle with intellectual forces, he knew no appeal but to force; he 
never knew rightly how to estimate the effect of compulsory state 
measures against the Catholic Church or the Socialists. With mod- 
ern economic problems he was never really acquainted, and later he 
was never able to see the importance of modern colonial policy. On 
the whole, he was not a creative statesman, if one means by this a 
far-seeing political thinker who pushes aside all old forces in order 
to make place for a new structure capable of further development. 
He was more clever, more logical, more opportunist than the other 
Junkers of his class; but in his way of thinking he did not essen- 
tially differ from them. 

It was, therefore, not surprising that Bismarck's appointment as 
minister-president was greeted with a storm of disapproval by all 
Liberals in Germany, and not the least by those who were friendly 
to Prussia, and hoped for the development of a new liberalism in this 
northern Power. This was all the more natural as no one could 
foresee at that time Bismarck's real importance; even those who 
regarded it as an illusion that it might be possible for "Prussia to 
merge in Germany," — the illusion that the dominating classes in 
Prussia would make any renunciation for the sake of national ideals 
— and who were therefore inclined to see the only means for the 
unification of Germany in a participation of Prussian Conservatives 
in a war against Austria — even such persons could never have sus- 
pected what skill and diplomacy was possessed by the new Prussian 
minister-president. To be sure, Bismarck had already been active 
for a considerable time in the diplomatic service; but of what he 
had accomplished as ambassador naturally nothing was known to 
the public. And it was in the field of diplomacy that Bismarck's 
real strength or even genius lay. Provided with a clear knowledge 
of foreign relations which was almost infallible where it dealt with 
states which were politically akin to Prussia, like Russia and Aus- 
tria, free from any exaggeration of his own power and the blind- 
ness of thinking himself invincible, free also from all scruples and 
especially from any fear of allying himself with revolutionary move- 
ments abroad, Bismarck proved himself to be a born artist in the 
management of foreign affairs. He had at his disposal all the means 



292 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

provided by the old as well as the new diplomacy, where he was 
much less afraid of pursuing untrodden paths than in matters of 
domestic politics. 

Bismarck, one may say, was so strongly imbued with the diplo- 
matic way of looking at things, that he regarded the conflicts of 
parties and social classes as struggles for power which could only 
be solved by the use of force. Compromise and cooperation he 
regarded as impossible: one single authority must be supreme. He 
therefore rejected any attempt by way of compromise to persuade 
the Prussian House of Representatives to give a provisional assent 
to the military law, and instead resorted to the "gap theory." The 
Prussian constitution, he said, had a gap in it, because it made no 
provision for the case in which the crown and the legislature failed 
to come to an agreement in regard to the budget, and yet the ma- 
chinery of government could not be left at a standstill; this gap 
must be filled out of the monarch's unlimited power; the king, there- 
fore, had the right to expend monies even without the approval of" 
the legislature. The conflict was thus narrowed down to the alter- 
native whether the king or the legislature was to be the determining 
factor in Prussia. 

The "constitutional conflict" followed. The House of Repre- 
sentatives refused, as before, to approve the government budget; 
whereupon Bismarck had the financial estimates voted by the House 
of Lords, and ignored the protests of the House of Representatives. 

When the government no longer feared to set aside the constitu- 
tion, it had won in the conflict, at least for the moment, because all 
agencies of power, such as the army and the administrative system, 
were in the hands of the government and enabled it to collect taxes 
without consent of parliament. All these powers were now used to 
the fullest extent. At elections the government set up official can- 
didates; liberal-minded officials were forced to conform; liberty of 
the press was virtually done away with; liberal town mayors who 
had been elected were replaced by government commissioners; and 
the presentation of 'petitions was punished by fines. 

At the same time that Bismarck was thus rendering the Progres- 
sives and popular majority ineffective in their opposition to the 
increase of the army, he was also making systematic diplomatic 
preparations for war against Austria. Such a war could only succeed 
for Prussia if it were certain that none of the European Great Powers 
would intervene. A war which would last a long time could scarcely 
turn out to the advantage of Prussia, in view of the numerical infe- 
riority of the Prussian reserves and the financial weakness of the 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 293 

country. The only possibility of ending it quickly lay in Prussia's 
having to deal Vi^ith only a single Great Power, namely Austria. The 
international situation was already as favorable as possible; and it 
was taken advantage of by the Prussian minister-president with the 
greatest skill. England, since the Crimean War, scarcely counted any 
longer as a military Power; Bismarck was convinced, and moreover 
had tested his conviction in a harmless case, that Great Britain was 
unable to intervene with military force — that is, in the only way 
which would be effective, Russia, likewise, had been driven back 
by the Western Powers in the foolish dynastic war waged by Na- 
poleon III and England in the Crimea; moreover, Bismarck had 
earned the gratitude of the Tsar by emphasizing the common inter- 
ests of Prussia and Russia in the war against Polish independence, 
and had delivered over to the Russian authorities Polish rebels who 
fled to Prussia in 1863 (see p. 79). Under these circumstances it 
was the Emperor of the French who was the most dangerous pos- 
sible opponent. The European balance of power which had existed 
hitherto would be seriously disturbed to the disadvantage of other 
Powers who remained in their old position, if one of the Great 
Powers, like Prussia, should enlarge its territory; and it was to be 
expected that Napoleon III would not consent to such an enlarge- 
ment of Prussia unless he were promised compensations in favor 
of France, somewhat similar to the arrangement with Italy in 
i860 (see p. 253). The Prussian government, therefore, had to ap- 
pear to be not opposed in theory, at any rate, to some such arrange- 
ment for compensation, and had to give Napoleon III the impres- 
sion that he could accomplish his aim without having to resort to 
arms. Bismarck carried on this tantalizing game with France in a 
masterly way; and he was supported in it by the unquestioned 
superiority at that time of the Prussian army administration, so far 
as concerned rapidity of mobilization. This made it extraordinarily 
difficult, from a military technical point of view, for Napoleon to 
intervene in a war between Prussia and Austria. Last among all 
these preparatory measures was the alliance with Italy, for whose 
support in war Bismarck held out the prospect of the acquisition 
of Venetia. 

The first steps toward the territorial enlargement of Prussia and 
the triumph over Austria took place in 1863 in the first year after 
the outbreak of the constitutional conflict in Prussia: Prussia made 
an effort to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, which had hitherto been 
connected with Denmark, or at least the important harbor of Kiel; 
and also to test whether Great Britain would really dare to inter- 



294 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

fere on the continent in behalf of the small Powers threatened by 
Prussia. 

The formal occasion which caused the Danish War of 1864 arose 
from a complicated question in regard to rules of inheritance and 
constitutional law which need not be described here. It is sufficient 
to state that the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, like Hanover 
formerly, had been under the rule of a foreign prince, the king of 
Denmark, and that Holstein, but not Schleswig, had hitherto be- 
longed to the German Confederation. When Christian IX came to 
the throne of Denmark in 1863, a German prince, the Duke of 
Augustenburg, proclaimed himself as duke of Schleswig-Holstein 
under the name "Frederick VIII." The Frankfort Diet thereupon 
let Holstein be occupied by Saxon troops. Prussia and Austria 
also demanded that Schleswig be occupied and actually proceeded to 
occupation in spite of a decree to the contrary by the Diet and in 
spite of warnings from England. They knew that this would mean 
war with Denmark, but they let war take place in 1864. The war 
could only have turned out favorably for the much weaker forces of 
Denmark in case the Great Powers — especially England, which had 
promised her protection in a more or less binding way — should inter- 
fere in her favor against the two powerful German states. This pos- 
sibility was not wholly out of the question, inasmuch as Prussia, lack- 
ing a navy, could not think of attacking Copenhagen or the Danish 
Islands, but had to limit her military operations to the Danish penin- 
sula. Thus Denmark possessed a nucleus of impregnable territory, 
and could, if given assistance by the friendly Great Powers, prolong 
the war. But she received no such support; Great Britain, in view 
of her weak military organization, offered nothing but advice, which 
naturally made no impression upon Bismarck. So, after the Prussian- 
Austrian troops had quickly occupied the Danish peninsula, Den- 
mark was soon compelled to make peace. The only fighting of great 
importance was the attack on the Diippel trenches in Schleswig, 
opposite the island of Alsen, on April 18, 1864. On October 30, 
1864, Denmark ceded to Austria and Prussia her rights to the 
duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. 

The future fate of the duchies was not in any way fixed formally 
by this cession. Prussia, however, offered the prince of Augusten- 
burg a choice merely between a half or a complete annexation of the 
territory to Prussia, being willing to recognize him as ruler over 
Schleswig-Holstein only in case he made Kiel into a Prussian naval 
station, signed with Prussia a military and naval agreement, and 
joined the Zollverein. The prince, in fact, almost accepted these 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 295 

demands unconditionally, but Bismarck used certain arguments to 
get rid of him and the decision in regard to the two duchies then lay 
wholly in the hands of the two possessory powers which were in actual 
occupation — Prussia and Austria. 

As to these two Powers, Prussia naturally wished to annex the 
duchies, but Austria opposed this. Austria, which could not annex 
these territories directly to herself, wanted them erected into an in- 
dependent state as a member of the German Confederation. After 
a provisional division of the territories, by which Austria received 
Holstein in the south and Prussia Schleswig in the north, a struggle 
took place between the two populations in the duchies themselves, 
inasmuch as each Power stirred up an agitation in its own interests. 

War was in danger of breaking out. But Moltke, the chief of 
the Prussian general staff, was of the correct opinion that Prussia, 
by herself, was too weak to wage war with Austria and that an 
alliance with Italy must first be sought. This accordingly was 
arranged: on April 8, 1866, Bismarck signed with Italy an offensive 
alliance against Austria to last three months; by this Italy hoped 
to acquire V^enetia, and Prussia German lands of equal value. At 
the same time, both states began to arm, which led in turn to 
military preparations in Austria. The direct provocation to war 
finally came from Prussia who occupied Holstein and thereby 
broke her former provisional agreement with Austria. Austria there- 
upon demanded the mobilization of the army of the Confederation, 
and her demand was adopted by a small majority in the Diet. 
Prussia thus found herself at war with Austria and with the German 
Confederation on June 14, 1866. 

However, not all the German states obeyed the vote of the Diet. 
Especially in North Germany almost all the little states held back, 
that is, they practically took Prussia's side and Prussia only had to 
deal with a coalition between Austria and the middle-sized German 
states. 

The course of the war now showed for the first time what an 
advantage the Prussian army possessed owing to its more speedy 
mobilization and its more systematic preparation. It was able at 
the outset to carry the war into the enemy's territory and to attack 
Austria before she was really armed. In the war with the middle- 
sized German states it was also of advantage to Prussia that she 
carried on the war without regard for any one, while the states on 
the other side entered unwillingly into a German "civil war." Such 
a moral hesitation was also felt by a part of the population in 
Prussia, but owing to the pressure of the military system it was 



296 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

unable to make itself effective. With the exception of Saxony, the 
middle-sized German states also refused to join their troops to those 
of Austria. The result of all this was that not even the defeat of the 
Italian army at Custozza could prevent the complete victory of the 
Prussian forces. 

The decisive battle took place against the army of Austrians and 
Saxons. The Austrians were under the command of General 
Benedek and took a strong position in northern Bohemia. There 
they were attacked by the Prussians who had approached by three 
different lines of march, were numerically stronger, and, thanks to 
the needle gun, were better armed. After hard fighting, known as 
the battle of Sadowa or Koniggratz, on July 3, 1866, the Austrians 
were routed. Their defeat amounted to a catastrophe. The only 
Austrian army able to fight was destroyed and the road to Vienna 
lay open to the Prussians. Not only a military collapse but the fall 
of the monarchy itself was threatened, since Bismarck had estab- 
lished relations at the beginning of the war with the Hungarian 
insurgents who had revolted against Austria in 1849, ^od since he 
now invited the Czechs also to revolt from Vienna after he had 
occupied their territory. 

From the German Confederation Austria could expect no help, 
because in Germany Prussia's advance had been equally successful. 
The battle with the Hanoverians at Langensalza on June 27 had 
turned out indeed to the advantage of the Hanoverians; but in view 
of the numerical superiority of the Prussian forces, the Guelf army 
had to capitulate soon afterwards, on June 29. After the battle of 
Sadowa Prussian troops marched into Bavaria as far as Wiirz- 
burg and Nuremberg, Nassau was occupied, and also the Free City 
of Frankfort, which had to pay a large war contribution of 
25,000,000 gulden. The army of the Confederation was also de- 
feated, and the Diet of the Confederation, which had moved to 
Augsburg, was disbanded. 

As a result Austria was ready to sign an early peace, and asked 
the French emperor for his mediation. It was offered at once; but 
Napoleon III, who was not in a position to support his intervention 
and desires by force of arms, merely secured a success in a few 
superficial formalities. On the whole, Bismarck succeeded in carry- 
ing through completely all of his wishes, although not exactly those 
desired by the war party and the king, Bismarck wished to make 
it easy for Austria to sign peace quickly, so that the Great Powers, 
France and Russia, would have no time to intervene. Preliminaries 
of peace, therefore, were signed at Nikolsburg on July 26, before the 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 297 

Prussian government was officially informed of the Russian proposal 
to call a congress or of the French request for compensation. 

In these preliminaries of peace with Austria, Prussia secured all 
the demands for which she had been struggling against Austria since 
1848. Austria withdrew from the German Confederation, which 
was now dissolved, and gave her consent to the founding of a north- 
ern and a southern federation; this meant that she handed Germany 
over to Prussia's leadership. Austria also ceded to Prussia all her 
claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and gave her assent to Prussia's an- 
nexations in North Germany consisting of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, 
Nassau, Frankfort, and some slight districts of Hesse-Darmstadt and 
Bavaria; but she succeeded in preserving from seizure the territory 
of her only wholly loyal ally, namely Saxony. Austria herself lost 
only Venetia, which was ceded to Italy. Furthermore, considerable 
war contributions were levied upon the German states. 

The final peace between Austria and Prussia, which was signed 
soon afterwards at Prague, on August 23, 1866, virtually confirmed 
these conditions without change. The demands for compensation 
which Napoleon III had made in the meanwhile were not directly 
refused by Bismarck but merely treated in a dilatory fashion and 
then finally ignored; Napoleon III had wanted some compensation 
in territories on the left bank of the Rhine or in Belgium. Bismarck 
yielded to the French Emperor on only two points in the treaty, 
both of which were polite but valueless gestures: one of these was 
the article which assured an "international independent existence" 
to the South German Confederation which was to be established; 
the other promised that the northern districts of Schleswig should 
be united with Denmark if they should express their wish to this 
effect in a plebiscite. 

The first provision was valueless because no South German Con- 
federation was actually established; it could not take place because 
Prussia had already in August, 1866, signed a secret "offensive and 
defensive alliance" with the South German states; this was pub- 
lished in 1867, and m case of war placed the full war strength 
of the South German states at the disposal of Prussia and even 
under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. This offensive 
and defensive alliance between the South German princes and 
Prussia meant that the South German states were put under Prus- 
sian military leadership. The other valueless provision, which was 
contained in Article V of the Peace of Prague and which promised 
a popular vote in Schleswig, was never carried out; it was probably 
regarded from the outset merely as decorative, judging by the fact 



298 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

that the "northern districts" spoken of in the text were nowhere 
in the treaty precisely defined geographically. Moreover, such a 
plebiscite would have been in direct contrast to the procedure fol- 
lowed by Prussia in annexing her other new territories: all her 
annexations were made merely on the basis of the right of the 
victor, and often in pronounced opposition to the wishes of the popu- 
lation. In many of the newly- won territories this procedure of 
Prussia's gave rise at once to a party of systematic opposition. 

This was at first a matter of domestic German concern, but in 
1 87 1 it led to an international conflict which has been of extraor- 
dinary importance up to the present. It is therefore necessary, at 
this point, to add a few observations of a general nature in regard 
to this controversy which has often been only half thought through. 

The problem in fact is not so simple as the supporters of the 
Prussian theory have often thought. It is beyond doubt that the 
procedure which Prussia followed in annexing Hanover, Schleswig- 
Holstein, and the other territories was in itself nothing new; it was 
in accordance with principles which have been practiced by states 
since the most ancient times, and in fact was applied without con- 
cern by all the states in 18 15. But historic parallels only carry 
complete conviction when the comparison goes deeper than a con- 
sideration of mere rough superficial points. The transfer of one 
country to another by annexation meant something quite different 
in the nineteenth century from what it had meant in former times, and 
was in much sharper contradiction with general political conceptions 
then than formerly. 

Let us take the last point first. It is clear that in an age when 
subjects are permitted to have a say in regard to the introduction 
of the new taxes, new laws, and so forth, the idea of handing them 
over to a foreign state without consulting them appears much more 
objectionable than in earlier ages when the modern conception of 
political rights was unknown. Furthermore, one might suppose that 
the theory of plebiscites, thanks to its frequent application in Italy 
and France, might have become a part of European constitutional 
law. Whoever sinned against it was introducing again a procedure 
which had come to be regarded as out of date. 

But more important, perhaps, is another point. In former cen- 
turies the transfer of one state to another had usually interfered very 
little with the life of the individual. In many cases this change 
has simply meant that the local authorities who had hitherto held 
power were dismissed and their rights transferred to new officials. 
Economic conditions and legal relationships remained unchanged. 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 299 

What difference did it make to a peasant if a town incorporated the 
territory of his feudal lord? The services and payments which he 
had to make were in no way altered. It should be remembered 
that usually there was not even freedom of trade between the dif- 
ferent territories which were gradually brought together under a 
common ruler; in most cases the old tariff laws remained in force 
so that there was no change in the daily life of the individual. The 
conditions which existed in Alsace before the French Revolution are 
known to every one, but it is less well known that these conditions 
were by no means at all exceptional. 

But what a contrast this affords to the consequences which re- 
sulted from annexations in the nineteenth century! Even here, in 
various fields such as that of religion and law, it was possible for 
the annexed provinces to keep a part of the old arrangements. But, 
on the other hand, incorporation in a new territory meant for the 
individual personal burdens and duties, which made it seem natural 
that he ought to be asked to give his approval to this change as 
well as to other important innovations. Among these one need be 
reminded only of universal military service, which was at once put 
into practice by Prussia in all her new territories. This had the 
result that a population, which had perhaps been annexed against 
its will, not only had to endure the new situation, but even had to 
defend it with its own blood. Wliatever one may believe in theory 
as to plebiscites, it can scarcely be denied that there was something 
altogether new in this application of the right of the victor and that, 
though it can perhaps be defended on its own merits, it cannot be 
justified by an appeal to the practices of earlier ages. 

The undesirability of this return to the earlier method of making 
annexations was increased by the fact that the state which was doing 
it was not offering to its new subjects even a liberal parliamentary 
form of government. The opposition of the Progressives in Prussia 
had not only proved itself ineffective, but it had dealt a blow to 
liberal principles for a long time to come in the judgment of the 
public. The splendid military victories and the large conquests 
which Prussia had won were made possible only by the fact that the 
government had disregarded the constitution and ignored the right 
of the legislature to approve the budget. It was not the House of 
Representatives, but the members of the Junker party, who had been 
proved to be right by the outcome of later events. This did not 
mean, necessarily, that the old ideals of Liberalism needed to be 
completely buried ; it must still be the task of the Liberals, as before, 
to strive for internal political reforms and reduce the administrative 



300 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

authority of the large landowners in favor of the civilian bureaucracy, 
but the Liberals must not carry their opposition to the point of 
opposing the government's military demands or its leadership in 
foreign affairs; such an opposition would be as useless as un- 
patriotic. 

There was the further consideration that, after the events of 1866, 
friends of the unification of Germany were unable to accomplish 
their purpose except by adhering unconditionally to Prussia and 
Prussian policy. AH plans for making a real federal state in Ger- 
many, or for having 'Trussia merge itself in Germany," had proved 
abortive; all attempts at securing a reform of the German Confed- 
eration in any peaceful manner had failed. The only solution pos- 
sible was by force of arms and with the aid of the authorities who 
dominated Prussia. Therefore even the capitalistic circles, who 
were interested in national unification in economic matters but who 
had hitherto opposed the preponderant influence of the large land- 
owners, began to swing away from the Liberal Opposition and form 
a new party known as the National Liberals — a group of voters who 
on internal questions still held fast to their liberal principles but 
who in foreign affairs unconditionally supported the government. 
This party now acquired a majority in tlie House of Representatives 
in Prussia. The Progressive Party, on the other hand, was now 
largely deserted by the voters who naturally could only make their 
influence felt so far as was possible under the plutocratic ''three- 
class system of voting." 

An outward expression of this party change was seen on Sep- 
tember 3, 1866, after the war with Austria and the German Con- 
federation, when the Prussian House of Representatives formally 
voted, by the large majority of 230 to 75, an indemnity for the dis- 
regard of the constitution. This was the first time that the National 
Liberals separated from the Progressives. 

The vote was perhaps inevitable; but it had wide-reaching con- 
sequences, both for Prussian politics and for German politics in 
general, which its advocates perhaps did not expect. The fact that 
the Liberals had abandoned their opposition to the military policy 
of the government in a state which was completely founded on a 
military basis and which had almost no need of a parliament except 
to approve military expenditures meant that the Liberals had put 
out of their hands the only weapon with which they could exercise 
a pressure on the government. The king had expressly declared 
that his procedure during the constitutional conflict had been an 
unavoidable necessity and that in similar circumstances he would 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 301 

again always act as he had done. If the Liberals approved this 
conception of the constitution they condemned themselves henceforth 
to impotency. This is naturally not the place to discuss the question 
whether the absolutist system represented by the king, or whether 
a parliamentary system, was more advantageous from the Prussian 
standpoint. It is only necessary to make clear the point that from 
this moment Liberalism was henceforth dead as a decisive factor in 
Prussia and in Germany. The government might make use of it for 
its own purposes when it wanted to make a breach in the privileges 
of the nobility and the clergy in the interests of the government; 
but Liberalism was never able again to develop an effective initia- 
tive of its own. Likewise, a parliamentary career was no longer a 
thing to be thought of. The bureaucracy, whose prerogatives and 
privileges were protected by the government, formed a solid front; 
even if a Liberal were admitted to the ministry he did not have the 
power to carry out his wishes. Naturally, this then had the further 
consequence that gifted young men, who in other countries went into 
politics, in Prussia and later in Germany sought out other careers, 
preferring to devote their lives to the growing commercial, indus- 
trial, or banking opportunities rather than to the profession of 
politics. This change did not come at once; even after 1866 the 
illusion still prevailed for a while that in spite of all this the ideals 
of the Liberals might find expression in internal politics — that there 
would be a " jreisinnige Verwaltung," a "liberal and open-minded 
administration," as it was stated in the National Liberal party plat- 
form; and the competition from the professions, just mentioned, 
was not so strong at first. But the more this illusion vanished and 
the greater the opportunities became in trade and manufacturing, the 
more this development became accentuated. 

After Prussia had destroyed all the middle-sized states in North 
Germany which had opposed her in the War of 1866, nothing stood 
in the way any longer of a union of the other states in a federation 
dominated by Prussia. The new constitution for this was drawn up 
in such a way that the Prussian system of government was trans- 
ferred to all North Germany. The North German Federation of 
1867 was essentially nothing more than an enlarged Prussia. Prussia 
received the presidency in the Federation and appointed at will the 
Federal Chancellor. The creation of a Federal Cabinet with a par- 
liamentary system of government was expressly rejected. Prussia, 
as Federal President, was given the military and diplomatic powers, 
including the right to declare war; the king of Prussia was federal 
commander-in-chief and appointed the ambassadors. The army was 



302 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

placed completely under Prussia's authority. All laws had to receive 
the approval of the king of Prussia. The Reichstag, as the federal 
parliament was called, had merely the right, as in Prussia, to vote 
the budget and new laws. Above it was the Federal Council 
{Bundesrat) , in which the state governments were represented, but 
in which Prussia possessed seventeen votes of a total of forty-three, 
so that no change in the constitution was possible without her con- 
sent, as a two-thirds majority was necessary. The only respect in 
which the Federation differed from the Prussian system was that in 
elections to the Reichstag universal suffrage was introduced. By 
this Bismarck hoped to play off the masses of the people against the 
opposition of the particularist conservative circles in the annexed 
provinces, especially in Hanover, where the nobility supported the 
"Guelfs," On the other hand, there arose at the outset a number 
of "protesting" representatives in the Reichstag who protested on 
principle against their districts being joined to Prussia. These 
"Irreconcilables" were made up of Hanoverians, Danes, and Poles 
(who after the dissolution of the German Confederation now for the 
first time really belonged to Germany). 

Beside military and diplomatic matters, the central government in 
the main was given control only over such matters as had to do with 
commerce and communications, i.e., with public utilities, whose di- 
versity and decentralization had been most severely criticized by 
those interested in industry and trade; thus, tariff, postal, and 
coinage matters were dealt with by the federal government. In gen- 
eral, on the other hand, existing political institutions, like the state 
legislatures, were left in existence; however, the rights of the indi- 
vidual states as opposed to those of the federal government were not 
really defined, so that it was not impossible that the authority and 
activity of the Federation might be extended later. The army 
was organized on the Prussian model in every respect, and the 
training of the troops was put in the hands of Prussian officers. 
The flag adopted was based on the Prussian black-and-white flag 
by adding to it a strip of red. 

If ever the much-abused phrase "transition stage" is applicable, 
it was applicable in this case: no one had any doubt that the North 
German Federation was merely a provisional arrangement. Within 
Germany its relation to the South German States was regulated only 
in a very primitive form by the military treaties of 1866; outside 
Germany the question of the compensation which France was to 
receive on account of Prussia's enlargement was still undetermined. 
The most natural solution appeared to be to settle both questions at 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 303 

the same time by a war with France, which would both put an end 
to the possibility of any cessions of territory to the French and also 
lead to the complete adhesion of South Germany to the North German 
Federation dominated by Prussia. 

This appeared to be all the more necessary, because feeling in the 
South had by no means been inclined to submit to Prussia. In the 
"tariff parliament," which was made up of deputies from the South 
sitting with members of the Reichstag and which had to adapt the 
Zollverein to the new political conditions, a feeling of hostility to 
Prussia had prevailed among the representatives of the South. In 
Wiirtemberg and Bavaria the antagonism to the Prussian military 
system had been very marked, and there had even been a movement 
for cutting down the army expenditures and for the introduction 
of the Swiss militia system. In the North, also, there was no little 
discontent with the new military burdens which had resulted in an 
increase of the taxes hitherto unknown. Even the landlords began 
to realize the disadvantages of great armaments. All these com- 
plaints might be overcome by a victorious and profitable war. 

On the other side, the French government was also interested in 
war. Although Napoleon III was not at all a conqueror by nature 
and the prospect of a few small extensions of French territory would 
not under any circumstances be worth the cost of a war — although 
France, therefore, had much less to expect from a successful military 
struggle than had Prussia — nevertheless, to a system of government 
which was so dependent upon prestige as was France at that time, 
a war seemed necessary if she was to retain her preponderant posi- 
tion among the European Powers, or even if she was to preserve 
the European balance of power. This French feeling gained strength 
from Austria's policy at that time. The Hapsburg Empire naturally 
did not regard its expulsion from Germany as final; though it had 
been compelled to yield in 1866 to a coalition of Prussia and Italy, 
there was the possibility that an alliance with France, and possibly 
with Italy also, might undo what had been done. But all these plans 
could only succeed in case France kept her military equipment at 
least on a par with that of Prussia; and Austria would not consent 
to a regular alliance with France because Italy, owing to the French 
support of papal rule in Rome, refused to ally with France. 

Whatever one may think of this policy of the French, it was most 
unpardonable from their own point of view that Napoleon Ill's gov- 
ernment did not develop its military equipment in proportion to its 
political ambitions. All French calculations were senseless unless 
the French army could make a stand against that of Prussia. Now 



304 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

in this matter the French military circles were under a complete illu- 
sion. To be sure, the arguments showing a superiority of the French 
army were not all incorrect. French generals possessed a practical 
experience which could not be matched by their opponents; French 
infantry which had been trained in actual war, was undoubtedly 
superior to that of Germany in quality; and part of the French 
artillery was more modern than that of Prussia. France could also 
bring forward a navy to which her enemy had practically nothing to 
oppose. On the other hand, the French military leaders had nothing 
to equal the methodical, "scientific," preparation for war in Prussia. 
The French system of mobilization, advance to the frontier, and 
independent action of individual generals by "improvisation" was 
not so scandalously bad as was often asserted afterwards; it was 
simply the military system of the old school, and with it the French 
had fought a series of brilliant victories, not only in their colonies, 
where victory was to be expected, but also in the wars with the 
Austrians in Italy. But against Prussian methods it was thoroughly 
antiquated. The thing which was almost inconceivably careless was 
that the French army administration, which had witnessed the events 
of 1866, was blind to the innovations in the Prussian system of con- 
ducting war. A Prussian field-marshal. Prince Frederick Charles, 
who had taken a leading part in the war of 1866, had remarked in 
regard to this campaign, "We have no battle generals. ... It is 
our military organization, and not the genius or talent of any leader, 
which has given us victory in 1864 and 1866." Even if one does 
not regard this remark as literally true, it is, nevertheless, beyond 
question that it was the "organization" which was chiefly responsible 
for the victories in those years, because it was possible for Prussia, 
by means of her quicker mobilization, to begin the attack before the 
enemy was really prepared for war. It should have been the duty 
of the French military experts to draw their conclusions from these 
facts and to modernize the French military organization in the same 
fashion, or else to have avoided altogether a war for which France 
was inadequately prepared. 

As is well known, the opposite happened. To what extent per- 
sonal reasons, like the sickness of Napoleon III who took chief 
command, were to blame for this is uncertain. But it is a fact that 
only a few civilians, like Thiers, recognized, to some extent, how 
little the French army was in a position to undertake war with 
Prussia. 

Again one must admire the diplomatic skill with which Bismarck 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 305 

directed Prussian policy before the war. Prussia had a greater in- 
terest in the war than France, and the desire for it was certainly as 
strong in Berlin as in Paris. But Bismarck nevertheless understood 
how to make public opinion think that France was really responsible 
for the war. From a practical point of view this was of the greatest 
importance. This would not only have a quieting effect on the other 
Great Powers, who would have been inclined to regard Prussia as 
the disturber of the peace of Europe in view of the recent wars; 
but it would be also of decisive importance in securing the adhesion 
of South Germany. To be sure, the South German states, under 
any circumstances, were obligated by treaty to take part in the war. 
But the carrying out of this obligation would be made considerably 
easier if the war could be represented as an act of self-defense on 
Germany's part. It was at this point that France made one of 
her greatest blunders. Frenchmen were aware only that the popu- 
lation in South Germany had a feeling of strong antagonism toward 
Prussia ; they were blind to the fact that the feeling of hatred toward 
France, which had been long nourished, was much stronger than the 
antipathy toward Prussia, and that this feeling was bound to become 
stronger the more Germany was regarded as the party which was 
attacked. 

The course of events was briefly as follows. After the negotiations 
to compensate France for Prussia's enlargement had had no success, 
there arose, in 1870, the incident of the Hohenzollern Candidacy. 
A revolution had broken out in Spain in 1868, and the Spanish gov- 
ernment thought of electing Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern as king. 
Bismarck favored this plan for the advancement of one of the King 
of Prussia's relatives. But in France objection was taken to this 
"disturbance of the European balance of power," and France made 
a threatening declaration. The candidacy of Prince Leopold was 
thereupon withdrawn by the Prince's father. The incident seemed 
closed, but the French government, in order to gain the prestige of 
a diplomatic victory, went further and requested from King Wil- 
liam I a definite promise that he would never in the future permit 
the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain. 
The king refused to make this promise and declined to receive 
again the French ambassador, Benedetti. 

This matter would scarcely have had any further importance if 
Bismarck had not immediately published it through the newspapers 
to the whole world. This announcement of the affront which was 
supposed to have been given to the French ambassador on July 13, 



3o6 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

1870, at Ems, where the King of Prussia was staying for his health, 
was calculated as a blow to the French policy of winning prestige, 
without exactly provoking France to war. 

The blow had the effect which Bismarck apparently had expected. 
The French cabinet informed the legislature of the events at Ems 
and of Prussia's official notification to the cabinets of Europe of 
King William's refusal to Benedetti. The French Legislative As- 
sembly and Senate were overwhelmingly in agreement with the 
French ministry that no further attempt at conciliation ought to be 
made, and voted the credits for the army and navy; in the small 
minority who spoke against a declaration of war were Thiers and 
Gambetta. As great, if not greater, was the enthusiasm for war in 
Germany. Even in South Germany all opposition collapsed and 
mobilization began everywhere. Finally, on July 19, 1870, the 
French issued a declaration of war — but only against Prussia. 

For the outcome of the war much the same factors were decisive 
as in 1866. The German troops advanced according to a well- 
prepared plan and were able to attack with their full strength before 
the French could send more than a few regiments to tlie frontier. 
From the outset, therefore, the French had to fight on the defensive 
and await the enemy in their own territory. How much they suf- 
fered from their antiquated methods, especially from their defective 
intelligence department and the wholly inadequate connection be- 
tween the different army corps, has already been suggested. It must 
also not be forgotten that domestic politics complicated the situation. 
Now was seen the tragic result of the fact that the Napoleonic 
regime, although it had just been modified in the direction of lib- 
eralism, still rested essentially on prestige. The government did not 
dare to recall its troops in time from the frontier after it recognized 
the superiority of Prussia's preparation. It was afraid that such 
an admission of its own weakness would lead to the overthrow of 
the dynasty; it thus lost the only opportunity which it might have 
had to adapt its antiquated organization to some extent at least to 
the enemy's advance in a way which might possibly have lengthened 
the war and made foreign intervention possible. 

So the war was decided in an unbelievably short time. After the 
first skirmishes on August 2, the Germans attacked two French 
armies on August 4-6 and drove them back, the Alsatian army, being 
driven back to Chalons after battles at Weissenburg, Worth, and 
Froschweiler, and the second army on the Rhine under Napoleon 
being forced to retreat to Metz after the Germans had stormed the 
heights of Spichern. As a result of this, within scarcely four days. 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 307 

foreign countries regarded France's cause as lost; Italy, which had 
hitherto been hesitating, signed a treaty with England in which both 
states pledged themselves to neutrality; Great Britain had already 
declared her own neutrality on July 19. Russia, from the begin- 
ning, had adopted a benevolent attitude toward Germany and threat- 
ened to intervene against Austria in case Austria should support 
France. In Paris the Ollivier ministry, which had declared war, was 
overthrown. 

Less successful for the Germans were the later battles. The 
bloodiest ones of the war, Borny on August 14, Mars-la-Tour on 
August 17, and Gravelotte and St. Privat on August 18, may even 
be regarded as defensive successes for the French. But from a 
strategic point of view, victory remained with the Prussians. The 
best French army under Bazaine was cut off from its line of retreat 
to the west and had to retire into Metz, where it was shut in by the 
Germans and rendered immobile. Napoleon III himself, however, 
managed to escape in time to Verdun. 

Out of the remnants of MacMahon's army, which had been driven 
out of Alsace, together with auxiliary troops of inferior quality, the 
French now formed a new army which was to relieve Bazaine from 
the north. It was only very unwillingly that MacMahon under- 
took the task, because he well knew how little was to be expected 
from his improvised army; but the minister of war had warned him 
that Napoleon's retreat to Paris would result in the outbreak of 
revolution. So MacMahon began to advance. But his worst fears 
were more than fulfilled. The Germans succeeded in shutting him 
in at Sedan; in spite of furious attacks the French were unable to 
free themselves. So on September 2, 1870, the French army, in- 
cluding Napoleon III, had to surrender. 

This practically decided the war. France no longer had any 
trained army and only an inadequate equipment in artillery, and 
therefore had to buy arms abroad — in England. France, however, 
did not give her cause up for lost, and maintained a heroic resist- 
ance. Her armies accomplished deeds which, in view of the un- 
favorable conditions, can only be regarded as marvelous. But re- 
garded from a military point of view, the continuation of the war 
was hopeless from the outset. 

In spite of the haste with which new armies had been created 
and all men between the ages of twenty and forty-one recruited, 
it was impossible for the French to make use of the rela- 
tively favorable position in which they found themselves directly 
after Sedan. The situation was more favorable for the French then 



3o8 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

than later, inasmuch as a great part of the German troops were still 
detained in front of the unconquered French fortresses. While two 
German armies marched toward Paris after Sedan, the third German 
army was occupied with the siege of Metz, and considerable German 
contingents were also held in front of the other French fortresses 
like Strasbourg. Strasbourg did not surrender till September 27; 
and Bazaine, in Metz, did not capitulate until October 27, when 
compelled by hunger. The new French armies, however, were not 
able to begin operations until October, and even then, in the judg- 
ment of competent French officers, their training had been inade- 
quate. Their attacks, which lasted from October, 1870, to January, 
187 1, were therefore without success; an eastern army under 
Bourbaki, which was to have advanced from the Free County of 
Burgundy and cut off the communications of the Germans, was 
forced, on February i, 1871, to retreat behind the Swiss frontier. 
Paris, which had been bombarded since December 27, had to sur- 
render on January 24, on account of lack of food, after all attempts 
to relieve it had failed. 

The hopelessness of the French situation made any active inter- 
vention by foreign Powers impossible. After Napoleon had been 
taken prisoner, a Republic was proclaimed in Paris and the other 
cities, and a Government of National Defense was formed on Sep- 
tember 4, 1870; its most important member was Gambetta, a leader 
of the Liberal Opposition under Napoleon III. It had been hoped 
that the proclamation of a Republic would result in a speedier peace; 
Prussian official proclamations had emphasized the fact that Ger- 
many was not making war upon the French people but only upon 
the Emperor, Napoleon, But the French insisted, as a condition of 
peace, that they should not cede any territory. Bismarck, however, 
demanded an extraordinarily large indemnity and the cession of 
Alsace; these conditions, as well as the difficulty of provisioning 
Paris which was being besieged, caused all the negotiations to fail; 
not even an armistice was signed. The French, furthermore, re- 
ceived no support from abroad, in spite of the fact that in many 
countries sympathy which had at first been against France had 
swung over to her side. Only volunteers, like Garibaldi who wished 
to express his gratitude for French assistance in the Italian War of 
Liberation, hastened to the aid of France; but all foreign govern- 
ments kept out of the war which they regarded as hopeless. Russia 
took advantage of the war to annul, on her own authority and as her 
compensation for Prussia's increase in power, the limitations which 
had been imposed upon her after the Crimean War: on October 31, 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 309 

1870, she claimed again complete political liberty in the Black Sea 
(see p. 219). So France was left to face victorious Germany un- 
aided, and after her military efforts had proved unsuccessful she had 
to accept virtually all the conditions which were imposed upon her 
by the Prussian government; the only point in which she did not 
have to yield was the giving up of Belfort. 

Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles on February 26, 

1 87 1, and were identical, in the main, with the final treaty of peace 
signed at Frankfort on May 10. The most important provisions 
were the cession of all of Alsace and a part of Lorraine, the pay- 
ment of five billion francs as a war indemnity, and the obligation 
on the part of both France and Germany to give each other the 
most-favored-nation treatment in tariff matters. 

Before the importance of this treaty is analyzed more closely 
mention must be made of the change which took place in the 
character of one of the signatories. The war which all Germans 
had waged together successfully side by side made it possible to 
reach quickly the result at which weary negotiations had been aim- 
ing shortly before: the South German states declared their adhesion 
to Prussia's North German Federation. The extension of the Fed- 
eration took place in the form of treaties with the individual states: 
Wiirttemberg and Bavaria had to be allowed to retain considerable 
rights, such as special military privileges, indirect taxes, and postal 
and telegraph systems of their own. Shortly before the last and 
relatively strongest South German state — Bavaria — expressed its 
approval by legislative vote to these innovations, on January 21, 
1 87 1, an official proclamation had been made of the new name which 
was to be given to the Federation: on January 18, in the Hall of 
Mirrors at Versailles, the "German Empire" had been solemnly pro- 
claimed in place of the North German Federation, and the king of 
Prussia had been raised to "German Emperor." This meant that 
the national unity of Germany could be regarded as accomplished, 
and that she might claim the position of a Great Power which 
people had come to think of as being connected with the former 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Otherwise, no essen- 
tial changes were made in the Constitution of the North German 
Federation; in spite of various concessions of a formal nature, all 
the real prerogatives remained in the hands of the Prussian king 
who was now German emperor. Equally important was the fact 
that the constitutions of the individual states were left unchanged, 
so that Prussia with its dominating influence retained as before its 
House of Representatives chosen by "the three-class system," its 



3IO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

House of Lords, and its ministry which was independent of the 
legislature; the result of this was to exclude any possibility of a 
transformation of the imperial constitution in the direction of liber- 
alism. 

The treaty of peace itself was in its content not very different 
from the treaties of 1866, but it had far wider consequences, because 
it struck at international relations and involved a change not merely 
in Germany, but in the whole continent of Europe. The question 
of the self-determination of peoples was renewed in a new and a 
very much sharper form than in 1866; while in 1866 Prussia had 
annexed only territories which had already belonged to the German 
Confederation and in which a part of the population, at least, favored 
the new regime, in the case of Alsace-Lorraine an integral part of 
a foreign country was annexed against the general wish of its in- 
habitants and against the solemn protests of its official representa- 
tives, both in the French National Assembly at Bordeaux and in 
the Reichstag of Berlin. To be sure, Thiers, France's representa- 
tive at the peace negotiations, had been able to secure a provision 
by which individual Alsatians might "opt" or choose in favor of 
France. But this provision of the peace treaty was interpreted 
in such a way by the German administration in 1872 that every 
Alsatian who "opted" for France had to leave the country; he was 
thus made to choose simply between accepting German citizenship 
and exile. Furthermore, in the case of the annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine, the annexed peoples were not joined to a country which 
gave the citizens political rights similar to what they had already 
possessed, as was done, for instance, for the Hanoverians who 
became Prussian citizens; on the contrary, they became part of a 
state which gave its members a much smaller share in the govern- 
ment and administration than had been the case in France at any 
time since the Revolution. The Alsatians, also, did not even acquire 
the right of local autonomy which was enjoyed by the citizens of 
the other states of the Empire, like Baden, but were made into an 
"Imperial Territory" (Rekhsland) and were mainly ruled from 
Berlin by means of a governor-general. Finally, a considerable part 
of the Imperial Territory did not even form part of Germany from 
a nationalist point of view, inasmuch as the population spoke French 
— but in practice this was the least important point. So it came 
about, as calm statesmen outside Prussia had already foreseen in 
1 87 1, that an "Alsatian question" developed, which was not merely 
a local dispute, but was an international conflict which was impor- 
tant as a matter of principle; the Alsatian desire for liberty, or at 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 3" 

least for autonomy, coincided with the French desire for a restora- 
tion of the old frontiers, and both together proclaimed to all the 
world the contrast between the conception of the State which was 
held in Germany and that which was held by the Western Powers. 

In still another respect the Treaty of Frankfort had an impor- 
tance which extended far beyond the special case which the treaty 
dealt with. This was the provision in regard to the so-called war 
indemnity; I say "so-called," because the five billion francs which 
France had to pay to victorious Germany covered much more than 
the mere costs of the war. By making this war indemnity an 
unheard-of amount according to the conception of those days, Bis- 
marck had intended so to weaken France that she would lose her 
position as a Great Power; he wanted to make her "impotent to 
make alliances." On the other hand, he intended that the war should 
appear as a profitable affair for the German Empire, the German 
states, and the German military leaders and statesmen who had 
conducted the war. Only a part of the money was used to cover 
the costs of the war. A considerable remainder was devoted to 
building up the imperial navy, to the construction of a new 
Reichstag building, to the postoffice administration, and so forth; 
and also to large gifts, totaling fifteen million francs, to Bismarck, 
Moltke, Roon, and the others. Thus, the poorer state had acquired 
by war the means for developing its power and its transportation 
system through the help given it by the enemy — a circumstance 
which psychologically was of enormous importance in the estimation 
in which war was held. 

This side of the indemnity payment must be emphasized all the 
more, because Bismarck was not at all successful in the political 
calculation which we have just mentioned. It soon became clear 
how superficial it is to judge the wealth of a country according to 
unessential things like density of population, the balance of trade, 
military success, and so forth. The natural wealth of the country, 
the wise limitation in the increase of population, a general frugality 
and industriousness, which result from the prevalence of small peasant 
proprietors and from a relatively small proportion of industrial pro- 
letarians in the whole population, a disinclination for speculation, 
and a preference for safe investments, which is also a result of stable 
population conditions — all these things made it possible for the 
French to pay the five billions within an unbelievably short period, 
namely, by September 5, 1873. The Germans, therefore, had to 
evacuate the French territories, which they had occupied as a guar- 
antee, much earlier than Bismarck really wished. 



312 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

In addition to these changes, which are directly connected with 
the treaty of peace itself, the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War 
also modified Europe fundamentally in other respects, only the most 
important of which can be touched upon here. 

In the first place, the Prussian system was so far adopted over 
the whole continent that universal military service was introduced 
everywhere. The burdens of militarism increased enormously: 
armies grew to a size, which even aside from the increase of popu- 
lation, would have been regarded as unthinkable at an earlier time; 
the so-called peace strength was now often as large as what had been 
the war strength formerly. The system of borrowing money for un- 
productive purposes now became general for the first time. What 
had formerly been regarded as exceptional in ordinary times and as 
normal only in time of war now became the rule and a matter of 
course: this was the borrowing of money for sterile military expendi- 
tures which would have to be paid back by posterity, a practice 
which was made inevitable by the enormously increased costs of 
"an armed peace"; this also involved similar practices in other 
branches of the budget. Furthermore, the number of citizens who 
were withdrawn from economically productive work increased dis- 
proportionately, for it was not possible any longer to fill up the 
army ranks by improvisation. The bonds between the individual 
and the State were drawn much closer; the State was compelled to 
give a much more careful attention than formerly to the develop- 
ment of the individual than had hitherto been the case anywhere 
outside of Prussia. Language and school questions which had been 
regarded as important only by small circles were now dealt with by 
governments as matters of prime importance in which the State must 
take a hand. The question of the language to be used for command 
in the army, for example, had hitherto been merely an internal mili- 
tary question in cases where there was a mixed population; now it 
became a national problem. The heavy personal obligation which 
universal military service laid upon every individual was in itself 
a regular training in national exclusiveness ; whoever dedicated his 
life in this way to his country believed that he had a right to lay 
claim to special advantages from foreigners. A severe blow was 
given to the idea of "world citizenship" (Weltburgertum) , that is, 
the enjoyment of a larger citizenship and freedom beyond the limits 
of one's own state. 

This increase of armies and this extension of military obligations 
over the whole population, however, made people regard war much 
more seriously than heretofore. For the individual, as for the state, 



STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 313 

the stakes of war became indescribably greater — for the individual 
because wars were no longer fought by professional soldiers, and for 
the state because the normal state revenues no longer sufficed to 
cover even the military expenditures in time of peace, to say nothing 
of their inadequacy for a long war. The Franco-Prussian War was 
followed, therefore, by relatively longer periods of peace among the 
Great European Powers. The only wars which took place were 
colonial wars, or wars like the Russo-Turkish War and the Spanish- 
American War, which could be conducted by Great Powers with a 
part of their military resources and were not really vital struggles 
for the very existence of the country. It was natural that the 
country which had been able to avoid the introduction of universal 
military service, owing to its insular position, was easily able to 
concentrate all its resources upon colonial wars of this kind; and it 
is also easy to understand why the British Empire, being behind the 
other Great Powers in military matters, as a result of this trans- 
formation in Europe in which it did not take part, was especially 
interested in the maintenance of peace on the Continent and always 
sought by peaceful means as far as possible to come to an under- 
standing with Powers with whom its colonial aims came into conflict. 
But just because a war between two or more European Great 
Powers on the Continent could turn out favorably for the victor, only 
in case the war was a short one, it was of the highest consequence 
that the two wars to which Prussia owed her leading position in 
Europe had come to an end so quickly and smoothly. People were 
too often inclined to draw the conclusion from this that the same 
thing would always happen in the future; people calculated, not 
only upon certain victory, but also upon the possibility, which was 
very unlikely, that a new war could be made to more than cover 
its costs as was the case in 1870. It would lead us too far afield 
to indicate in detail the false conclusions on which these calculations 
rested. But two points may be mentioned. The first is that the 
numerical advantage which Prussia had formerly derived from her 
system of universal military service was now equalized to the extent 
that other states placed their whole population under arms in 
the same way. Furthermore, the art of rapid mobilization was 
easily copied in other states to such a point that there could never 
be in the first days of a war such unequal combats as took place 
in 1866 and 1870. In the second place, the two wars just mentioned 
were altogether exceptional in the fact that in both cases the party 
which had naval superiority had not been able to make any use of 
this superiority: Austria had not been able to counteract her defeat 



314 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE 

at Sadowa by her naval victory at Lissa; and the French navy had 
not been able to make its superiority effective against Prussia, be- 
cause the war had been practically decided in the first month; the 
navy remained virtually intact. According to an old but by no 
means praiseworthy habit, people were inclined to draw conclusions 
from recent experiences alone, and to overlook former wars, like the 
Napoleonic wars and the War of Secession in America, both of which 
were decided in good part by the superiority which one side had 
upon the sea. 

Of the further consequences of the Franco-Prussian War, only 
one more can be mentioned — the effect on the new position of 
affairs in Eastern Europe. 

Without attempting to decide whether it is true that Austria de- 
sired the War of 1870, the historian may at least maintain with cer- 
tainty that it was this German victory over France which first defi- 
nitely destroyed all Austria's plans for winning back again in any 
way her position within Germany. The two German Powers which 
had been rivals now became allies. The result of this was that 
Austria, which never contemplated an overseas colonial policy, now 
directed her expansionist plans exclusively toward the East, — toward 
the Balkans. Her conflict with Russia, which had already existed 
for a long time in a mild form, now became acute, and dominated 
the whole policy of Eastern Europe and in many respects also that 
of Central Europe. From being a Conservative Power, Austria had 
become an aggressive one; and, though the Franco-Prussian War 
may have resulted in outwardly peaceful conditions for a few decades 
in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe it had caused a condition of 
latent war which ultimately resulted in a complete new grouping 
of the European Powers. 



BOOK V 
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 

From a theoretical point of view there was nothing new in the eco- 
nomic conditions which were created in the last quarter of the nine- 
teenth century by the economic organization of industry on a world 
basis; by this is meant not merely the exchange of goods between 
nations, but above all things the dependence of the most important 
European nations upon food and raw materials imported from over- 
seas. These economic conditions merely brought to a logical close, 
one may say, the development which had begun in England at the 
close of the eighteenth century in connection with the Industrial 
Revolution. But already the very extension of this movement had 
given it an altogether changed significance. It also became involved 
with other tendencies which still further changed its character. In 
the following pages these changes will be briefly outlined. 

The extraordinary increase in population, which in its modern pro- 
portions occurred at first only in the industrial centers of Great Brit- 
ain, now not only took place in similar proportions in other equally 
industrialized countries; but in these the ratio of population to agri- 
cultural land and to food-supply was relatively more serious, because 
the existing population was greater to begin with. Population in- 
creased to an extent unparalleled in the history of the world (with 
the exception of countries whose population was increased by im- 
migration). In Great Britain, in 1800, there were 16,200,000 per- 
sons; in 1900, 41,600,000. The figures for the other countries in 
1800 and in 1900 run as follows: Germany, 21 and 56.3 million; 
Italy, 1 8.1 and 32.4; Austria-Hungary, 23.1 and 45.4; European 
Russia, 38.8 and 11 1.3 million. The total population of Europe in 
1800 has been estimated at 180 million; in 19 10 it numbered 450 
million; that is, in no years it had multiplied just two and a half 
times. 

These figures, however, can be rightly appreciated only when con- 
sidered in connection with the enormous settlements of population 
in regions outside Europe. The increase in Europe was not only 
accompanied, it was in fact only made possible, by a great emigra- 
tion into pretty nearly every corner of the world fit for habitation 

317 



3i8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

by whites. It was this emigration which helped to swell the popula- 
tion of the United States from 5.3 million in 1800 to 77.1 million 
in 1900. The increase of population in Europe was in fact condi- 
tioned upon this emigration, because it was only by the productivity 
of the whites in these thinly settled regions outside Europe that 
there could be supplied the food which Europe more and more 
needed. Now toward the end of the nineteenth century came the 
first symptom indicating that this temporary situation might pos- 
sibly come to an end before long. In the United States not only 
was the vacant land largely occupied, but the former surplus of 
products, particularly of wheat, was needed to feed the population 
at home. There were, to be sure, still great areas, particularly in 
South America, in which the saturation point had not been reached. 
And in other parts of the world, particularly in Australia and New 
Zealand, the stationary character of the population assured for the 
future a surplus product which stood at the disposal of Europe; 
and technical inventions, like the refrigeration of meat, enabled food 
to be transported even over so great a distance as that between Aus- 
tralia and Europe. But in both these cases of South America and 
Australia, the situation would remain as it was only so long as there 
was no immigration from Europe. Therefore, although the Euro- 
pean industrial countries, in return for the products of their fac- 
tories, might be fed forever from regions outside Europe (and parts 
of Russia), nevertheless they would no longer have an outlet for 
excess population such as had existed for all Europe up to about 
1890. In densely populated countries, therefore, the necessaries 
of life became dearer, because they were scarcer in proportion to 
the population; and at the same time the competition for foreign 
markets, and also for colonies affording the necessary raw materials 
for manufacturing, became more intense — became, to speak more 
accurately, a veritable struggle for existence. It was no longer a 
question of exporting manufactured goods simply for profit; indus- 
trial states were compelled to export their products as a means of 
securing food for their overgrown population. 

Attention must be called to a circumstance which still further 
aggravated this overpopulation. In addition to new factors, like 
steam transportation, which enabled inland and partially barren 
countries to increase their population beyond the natural limits, 
there was now added modern hygiene. To be sure, no sharp dividing 
line between the past and the present can be drawn in this matter. 
Every one knows that important measures to protect life, like vac- 
cination, antedate the nineteenth century. But in connection with 



NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 319 

the development of the natural sciences, which now for the first 
time completely emancipated themselves from theology and which 
were increasingly fostered by industrial employers because of their 
practical value, and along with the humanitarianism which attributed 
a new value to human life, there took place about the middle of the 
nineteenth century many discoveries which furnished medicine, 
surgery, and sanitation with new tools and resources. Like the 
new sources of food-supply, all these factors tended to lower the 
death-rate. For instance, there was Lister's antiseptic treatment, 
Pasteur's researches in bacteriology, and the Semmelweiss treatment 
for the prevention of puerperal fever. Everywhere it was recog- 
nized to be the duty of the state to make use of these discoveries 
in fulfilling its functions, one of the most important of which was 
now regarded as the preservation of human life. Urban building 
was nearly revolutionized; the most minute hygienic regulations 
were laid down, affecting the planning and construction of private 
houses and especially of hospitals. To realize the decrease in the 
death-rate due to all these factors, one has only to look at the sta- 
tistics of infant mortality a century or more ago. Formerly it was 
not uncommon for two-thirds of the children to die young. Even at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century the infant mortality in 
Russia somewhat exceeded 27 per cent. But even this figure is 
unusually favorable compared with earlier periods. And the coun- 
tries which have made the most progress in this respect, like Scandi- 
navia, Switzerland, England, and France, have succeeded in saving 
about 90 per cent of the children under one year of age. 

Never perhaps in history did people live so improvidently, so 
carelessly as to the inevitable results of their behavior, as the indus- 
trial peoples of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The undreamed-of progress in all technical matters so completely 
overthrew former conceptions of what was possible that even the very, 
conditions of human physical existence seemed to have altered. To 
be sure, not all peoples were of this opinion, nor did all need to be. 
Nations which had a sense of responsibility toward posterity, or 
which, being made up of peasant proprietors not dependent on the 
state, counted their resources carefully, like the French, the North 
Americans (particularly in the Eastern States), the Australians, and 
the New Zealanders — all these nations had already taken thought 
in the nineteenth century to secure comparative stability in their 
population. Others, like the English or the Russians, still had so 
much unoccupied land at their disposal, either in Europe or in the 
colonies, that the necessity of limiting the "natural" increase of 



320 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

population, now possible with all the modern inventions, was not 
so evident. In the case of still other nations, a decrease in the birth- 
rate was beginning to be noticed. But this decrease was insufficient 
to counteract the decrease in the death-rate. 

As a result of these various conditions, the luxuries of life became 
cheaper, and modern comforts due to invention and technical 
progress came within the reach of every one; but the ordinary- 
necessaries of life became dearer and more difficult to secure. Char- 
acteristic of this situation is the fact that the problem of housing 
and land became almost the greatest social problem. Though food 
production could not possibly keep pace with the increase of popu- 
lation, nevertheless, thanks to modern transportation, which was al- 
ways improving, and to thinly settled areas overseas, this difficulty 
could still be solved; international agreement within certain limits 
was possible. But nothing like this was possible in the housing 
problem; here the effects of overpopulation and modern hygiene 
made themselves felt more keenly than in the food question. While 
the state tended greatly to increase the cost of building by its 
sanitary regulations, real estate became a monopoly in the hands of 
a few private persons who, in view of great demand, were able to 
raise prices to exorbitant rates. 

These were the circumstances which lay at the basis of that 
"unrest" which has been so often and not unjustly complained of. 
They made more difficult the struggle for existence by the profes- 
sional classes, often attributed by dilettante writers to a change in 
intellectual conditions. In contrast with the past, this was now 
felt by the middle classes, and even by a part of the well-to-do. 
The situation was particularly hard for young people of ability 
but little property. The relative increase in the number of elderly 
people, due to hygienic discoveries for prolonging life, often blocked 
the path of the young. Noteworthy in this connection is the great 
lengthening — in contrast even with conditions at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century — of the period of professional education, 
without, however, any certainty of finding after it all a place which 
would even pay the expenses of the years of training. The rise of 
the well-equipped poor was thus made extraordinarily difficult. Any 
one who was able to wait a long time for a place, and did not have 
to begin to earn his living at an early age, had pretty nearly a mon- 
opoly of the occupations which were regarded as socially desirable. 
Naturally the rich have always had a better chance, and before the 
French Revolution (see p. ii f.) they were favored by many political 
privileges. But whereas at that time the number of applicants for^ 



NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 321 

office did not exceed the number of positions vacant in at all the 
same proportion as later, the outlook for a gifted and energetic man 
was then somewhat greater than more recently. This circumstance, 
more than perhaps any other, has recently created in wide circles 
a gloomy feeling of hopelessness, which may have had no small im- 
portance as a psychological foundation for the development of a 
war spirit. 

One circumstance has not yet been mentioned which has sharp- 
ened the economic conflict between nations. This is the new strug- 
gle for markets. 

It has been pointed out above in another connection (see p. 96 f.) 
that in England the problem arising from the Industrial Revolution 
was never given a carefully considered solution. The dangers 
which arose from the exploitation of the workers, from the depend- 
ence on foreign food-supply, and from the social condition of the 
laboring classes, were lessened, but never removed. What had been 
accomplished was due mainly to favoring circumstances; emigration 
was possible on a wide scale, and steam transportation made possible 
the importation of an unlimited food-supply. Moreover, after the 
first critical years were passed, the income from exported manu- 
factures was so large and steady that workingmen could be safely 
allowed tolerable living conditions and sometimes even an increase 
in wages. At least as late as 1870 the English large-scale textile 
and steel industries were practically without a rival; the artistically 
superior products of France were supplementary rather than com- 
petitive. Up to this time England and France had taken the lead 
in industrial technique. They had made, or turned to practical 
account, virtually all the discoveries of the first half of the nine- 
teenth century. So England had come to be regarded proverbially 
on the Continent as a satiated, somewhat indolent, rich nation. 
' Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this situation began 
to change more and more for the worse. It would be misleading 
to speak of the "decadence" of English manufacturing, or to assume 
a falling off in English exports. The change consisted rather in 
the fact that several great industries began to compete with 
those of England in the markets of the world. This competition, as 
^compared with that of the earlier period, was felt more in 
the new articles of export rather than in the old English staple 
products. The new industrial countries, in so far as they did not 
enjoy the same favorable situation which England had formerly 
had, were forced from the outset to deal with a competitor. At 
first France retained her leading position in all articles in which 



322 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

artistic taste and delicacy of manufacture played an important 
part. Then America, having ceased to be a colonial country im- 
porting manufactures and exporting raw materials, and having 
become a country of great industries competing in world markets, 
hit upon the important practice of ''standardization" (the making 
of goods according to a few but complete types); "standardized" 
goods could be manufactured very cheaply because all the goods of 
one type were uniform. Though this practice is best suited to 
young countries with identical needs and a uniform social structure, 
like the United States and analogous colonial territories such as Can- 
ada or Australia, it can be successfully adopted for many articles 
in differently situated countries. More worth considering at this 
point is the rise of German manufacturing on a large scale, for it 
was involved much more closely than the English or American with 
political and military factors, was much more fostered by the State, 
and therefore has exercised a deeper influence on the history of 
Germany. 

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, there did not 
exist a single large factory in Germany. As compared with Eng- 
land, raw materials in Germany were very inadequately developed; 
in 1850, Germany mined only seven hundred-weight of coal per 
capita, England, forty- three; the figures for pig-iron were 30 pounds 
for Germany, as compared with 160 for England. In 1859, Germany 
produced 5,000 tons of steel, while what England merely exported 
was double that amount. From 1859 onwards the increase of popu- 
lation, as well as the patriotic movement (involving gun-making in 
the metal industries), led to a more intensive activity. How this 
had increased among the German states the need for economic 
unity has been pointed out above (p. 277). This need had been sat- 
isfied by the political changes in 1866 and 1871. Thus one obstacle 
to industrial development was cleared away. 

But this was not all. The new German Empire could not draw 
upon rich natural resources any more than its predecessor, the Prus- 
sian Kingdom, without disturbing its dominant position in foreign 
politics. Now, as previously, though to a lesser degree, Germany's 
economic resources did not harmonize with her powerful position 
in international politics. To be sure, Germany as a whole was not 
so niggardly provided by Nature as the old Prussian Kingdom; but 
the economic foundation was, and remained, too small for the exces- 
sive political superstructure, particularly as the population steadily 
grew larger and larger. This difficulty was further sharpened by the 
extraordinary devotion to military matters which Germany inherited 



NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 323 

from Prussia. Too large a part of the population was withdrawn 
from productive work for military and administrative duties in a 
country which was not adapted by Nature to bear the cost of enor- 
mous armaments. The two evils went together: the burden of exces- 
sive armaments and the application of large resources to uneconomic 
ends. Futhermore, owing to the prevalence in Prussia of large 
landed estates no serious progress could be made with agricultural 
reforms, such as the establishment of small farmers on the soil. 

Now what was the attitude of the German government toward 
these difficulties? A completely satisfactory solution was not pos- 
sible; for human energy and cleverness could not wholly offset 
Nature's niggardliness. But a strong will and skill can at least 
ameliorate the consequences of unfavorable conditions. This task 
was undertaken with great adroitness by the governing classes 
of Germany, They used the military and political situation of their 
country in such a way as to compensate to some extent their dis- 
advantageous position. In the first place, as has often been asserted, 
the fact that the whole population, including the civil service, was 
accustomed to military discipline, made easier the organization of 
large industries under single management, since employers and 
laborers were already intellectually prepared for submission to one 
central authority. More important than this assertion (the truth 
of which it is difficult to prove) was the growth of a "learned pro- 
letariat" to an extent unequaled in any other country; this was 
created through the exclusion of the middle classes and the intel- 
lectuals from political office and through military regulations which 
put a premium on higher education (like the privilege of serving 
only one year in the army for those who were able to pass an 
educational test). This provided the cheap and easy supply of 
scientifically and technically trained labor needed in industry. The 
German economist, Sombart, was certainly correct when he wrote 
in 1903: "The political backwardness in which the German nation 
still finds itself is not one of the least influences which have deter- 
mined the peculiar character of our people. We are still to-day 
governed in a half absolutistic fashion. We, or at any rate, the 
members of our middle class, still do not enjoy what exists in con- 
stitutional countries, namely, the possibility of a political career. 
But, so far as I can see, this has all the more favorable result for 
our economic life. With us there is no large diversion of talent into 
the field of politics, as in other countries. Neither the rich, nor what 
is more important, the talented, men of the middle class are with- 
drawn from economic life to devote themselves to politics. They 



324 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

remain to place their abilities at the service of industry as directors, 
engineers, chemists and so forth." 

This explains the characteristic which distinguishes German large- 
scale production from that of all its competitors: its systematic sup- 
port from science, with the emphasis on ''systematic"; for this is the 
word which best describes the essence of German experimental in- 
vestigation in the service of industry and the State. For the most 
part, the great discoveries of "happy genius," like submarines, ma- 
chine-guns, aeroplanes, telephones, phonographs, wireless telegraphy 
and so forth, have been made outside Germany (especially in France). 
But these discoveries have usually been more systematically devel- 
oped in Germany than elsewhere. Germany was one of the Great 
Powers where proper laboratories and financial support were pro- 
vided by industrial plants and by the State. 

This stimulation of manufacturing was a much more vital ques- 
tion for the German Empire than for other states. What could pay 
for the ever increasing cost of armaments, what could pay even 
for the food of the ever increasing population (hailed with joy as 
potential soldiers), if not the exported manufactures? A reduc- 
tion in expenditure for the army was regarded as tantamount to an 
abandonment by the Empire of the preponderance won in Europe 
in 1870, and by the ruling classes of their preponderance in Germany. 

As a matter of fact, German manufacturers succeeded by these 
means in establishing themselves beside their competitors in the 
markets of the world, and even in acquiring a monopoly in certain 
products — especially in the chemical trades. From an earlier period 
of inferiority German trade also had developed a kind of affable 
adaptability which enabled manufacturers to meet more quickly 
the wishes of their customers, than did their rivals. Equally im- 
portant too, was the fact that the German government used the 
army, whose costs had in good part been paid by exported manu- 
factures, as a lever for securing valuable marketing opportunities 
for these same German manufactures in the shape of favorable 
commercial treaties and so forth. Thus was created an extraor- 
dinarily effective system of mutual support. Its only defect lay in 
the extreme uncertainty of the bases on which it rested, namely on 
a continued expansion of German ejqjorts, and on the irresistibility 
of German threats of war. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 

The economic factors sketched in the preceding chapter gave 
a new value to the possession of colonial territory. Although about 
the middle of the nineteenth century the view had prevailed, and 
not least in countries like England which possessed most colonies, 
that overseas possessions were nothing but a costly burden for the 
mother country, now opinion went so far to the opposite extreme 
as to assert that the control over regions outside Europe, suitable 
for settlement and providing raw materials, was indispensable for 
a great industrial country. It was regarded as a great advantage 
for an over-populated country to be able to settle its citizens in a 
territory where they would not have to break their political con- 
nection with the land of their birth. It also seemed desirable to 
possess overseas territories which were occupied by fellow country- 
men to whom the products of home industries could be more readily 
sold. 

Another motive was the desire to secure raw materials for manu- 
factures. Now that the industries of the Great Powers had entered 
upon the competitive stage with each other, a wholly new importance 
attached to the possibility of obtaining from one's own colonies, 
perhaps at lower cost on account of state aid, the necessary ma- 
terials which were to be worked up by manufacturing. An industry 
which could draw its raw materials from politically dependent 
colonies was believed to have an advantage over its rivals. 

Though this new situation might be explained by the new policy 
which' England, for instance, adopted toward colonial possessions, 
the attitude of all Europe toward colonial matters was further altered 
by the fact that by 1870 two new Great Powers had arisen which 
likewise wanted their share in the extension of European rule in 
other continents. 

Germany and Italy regarded themselves, not without reason, as 
being at a disadvantage. At the period when the other nations 
were gaining great colonial empires, they either did not exist or 
were occupied with their own unification. Not only had sea-faring 

32s 



326 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

nations like the Dutch and the English made extensive conquests, 
but great colonial regions had been acquired by the French in Al- 
geria and by the Russians in Central and Eastern Asia. Now Ger- 
many and Italy, finding that they had been left far behind at the 
start in the race for colonial territory, had to look about to see 
whether they could build up colonial em.pires in regions which had 
not been occupied by their more fortunate rivals. 

Important in its consequences was the circumstance that, though 
the earth had not yet been completely divided up as far as con- 
cerned regions which produced raw materials, there was, on the 
other hand, relatively little territory left which was adapted to 
settlement by the white man. Nearly all this kind of territory 
had been occupied by other nations, particularly by the English 
and the French, and, in a different fashion, by the republics of 
North and South America. Almost the only exceptions were the 
strips of territory in North Africa, like Tunis and Morocco, and 
some parts of Turkey in Asia. If the belated states wanted to 
catch up with their rivals who were ahead in the colonial race, they 
believed they could only do so by force ; that is, by war or by threats 
of war. Since the British colonies were fairly well populated, the 
two Powers who were seeking land for settlement purposes turned 
their attention primarily in the direction of the French colonies. 

It can scarcely be denied that, of these two states, it was Italy 
which from the outset saw more clearly the goal in view and chose 
its means more cleverly. To be sure, it may have partly been due 
to her relatively weak military force that Italy steadily took care 
to avoid coming into open conflict with any other Great Power. As 
compared with Germany, Italy could point to a much larger emigra- 
tion of valuable labor; she perhaps had even greater reason for 
retaining the political bond between her emigrant sons and the 
mother country, and she certainly adapted her foreign policy more 
consistently to this end and never failed to see the importance of 
colonial policy. The same cannot be said of Germany. Her colonial 
acquisitions, to be sure, measured merely by their area, were more 
important than those of Italy. Thanks to the military pressure 
which she could exert, she could secure from other countries con- 
cessions which Italy could not think of. But the effects on her for- 
eign policy of this kind of pressure were not always well considered ; 
Germany's foreign policy in Europe was not modified as it should 
have been in view of her new colonial aims. 

The responsibility for this lies largely with the statesman who at 
that time ruled German policy autocratically; or, to speak more 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 327 

correctly, it lies rather with the system which he represented — the 
system which reserved to a single man and a single class a monopoly 
in the management of foreign relations. While a younger generation, 
particularly men in large business circles, favored the acquisition of 
commercial colonies, Bismarck stuck to his old principle of opposing 
"colonies on the French model"; such commercial plans, which were 
so completely beyond his economic horizon and so contrary to his 
purely Continental traditions as an Old Prussian squire, he regarded 
only with hesitation and fundamental disinclination. As is most 
clearly seen in the memoirs which he wrote at the end of his life, 
he never had a real interest in the problems of naval and colonial 
policy, nor indeed in the tasks of the future which were facing Ger- 
many as a result of her growing population and industrialization. 
Understanding at bottom only the kindred governments of Russia 
and Austria, but not the more liberal parliamentary countries of the 
West, he never realized what France and England owed to their 
colonial system. To be sure, it was under him that Germany made 
her first colonial acquisitions; but neither in domestic nor foreign 
politics were the traditions of the Prussian system of government 
suited to the new task. 

For the sake of a better bird's-eye view of recent colonial history 
the following narrative has been divided into three chapters — the 
partition of Africa, the struggle for Asia and the islands of the 
Pacific Ocean, and the rise of the British Empire in its modern 
form, together with the development of the foreign policy of the 
United States. In itself no one of these chapters deserves precedence 
over the others; the reason for treating Africa first is simply that 
it was in Africa that one can see most clearly the rivalry of the 
European Powers. 

The interior of Africa was virtually untouched by European rule 
up to about the middle of the nineteenth century (1865). The 
coastal regions, to be sure, were largely in the hands of the old 
trading nations — Portuguese, Dutch, English and French. But in 
only two places did European rule extend deep into the interior: 
in the north in French Algeria, and in the south in English Cape 
Colony with its Boer prolongation. These two colonial conquests 
were not due to a special "African" policy, but served, at least 
originally, the same commercial purposes as the occupation of the 
coast districts. Cape Colony was important for England's commerce 
with India; the conquest of Algiers was intended to put an end to 
the nuisance of piracy in the Mediterranean. No one at that time 



328 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

thought of any systematic exploration of the interior, or hinter- 
land; and the rather few places in which white men could be set- 
tled in large numbers had not yet attracted attention. 

Even in the period immediately following, the old ideas prevailed 
at first. The occupation of Egypt is in many respects the counter- 
part of the acquisition of Cape Colony; less regard was paid to the 
advantage which might come from the territory itself than to the 
importance which the whole region had for the trade with India. 

Egypt, after the time of the Napoleonic expedition, became a semi- 
independent state. An Albanian officer, named Mehemet Ali, raised 
himself to the position of an independent pasha, and organized an 
army and navy of his own. With the aid of his new forces he 
conquered the Egyptian Sudan, including Khartum, and proved so 
much more powerful than the Sultan at Constantinople, that the 
latter was only saved from destruction by the Powers of Europe. 

Mehemet Ali was one of the first oriental princes who consciously 
and systematically strove to introduce European (especially French) 
civilization and technical knowledge into his country. Large irriga- 
tion works were built by French engineers in order better to dis- 
tribute the fruitful waters of the Nile. What was perhaps more 
important, Mehemet Ali introduced new crops, particularly cotton, 
and thereby gave his country an exceedingly valuable article of 
export. But this all took place after the fashion of an oriental en- 
lightened despotism. There was lacking the middle class which 
guarantees continuity in economic life. The fellaheen remained 
poorer and more oppressed than ever. As there was no limit to 
the pasha's power of squandering money, the expenditures of the 
court regularly exceeded the revenues, no matter how much the 
latter might be increased. 

The situation was somewhat better, to be sure, under Said, Me- 
hemet All's son and third successor, who ruled from 1854 to 1863. 
Said recognized the right of private ownership among his Egyptian 
subjects though hitherto the Pasha had owned all the land. He 
dismissed a part of the soldiery in order to reduce expenditures. He 
sought much more definitely than his father to promote the pros- 
perity of his country by economic measures. But even in his case 
everything depended on him personally; and so he had to turn to 
foreigners to aid him in carrying out his reforms. 

From the outset the foreigners belonged chiefly to the two na- 
tions which had the greatest interest in the development of North 
Africa and the route to India, namely, France and England. An 
English company built the first railroad from Alexandria to Cairo. 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 329 

A French engineer, De Lesseps, founded, mainly with French cap- 
ital, the company which planned to build the Suez Canal. 

Although the Sultan at Constantinople, influenced by the English 
against the French, had not given his approval, De Lesseps began 
the long and difficult excavations in 1859, Said supported him 
eagerly, put 25,000 fellaheen a month at his service, and gave him 
the necessary lands for nothing. In his honor the newly constructed 
city at the mouth of the Canal was named Port Said. When he 
died, the new Pasha, Ismail, under English influence, put great dif- 
ficulties in the way of the French, and even canceled the concessions 
promised by his predecessor. The English government early declared 
that for the defense of India it would be compelled to seize Egypt 
in case the canal was built. But in spite of this, De Lesseps suc- 
ceeded by untiring energy in continuing his undertaking, and in 
1869 the canal was finished. It proved of great advantage mainly 
to the French, Italian and Austrian ports in the Mediterranean, 
which now took over a large part of the European trade with Asia 
and Australia. 

Said's thrifty administration was only an episode in Egyptian his- 
tory. His successor, Ismail, (1863- 18 79) again acted as if the 
riches of Egypt were inexhaustible. However, he used the resources 
which the economic prosperity of the land put at his disposal to 
give his country greater independence and to Europeanize it further 
along the lines which Mehemet Ali had laid down. He bought from 
the Sultan of Turkey the right to bear the title of Khedive, or sov- 
ereign; to make commercial treaties of his own; to increase his 
army at his pleasure; and to introduce primogeniture for the ruler's 
family. His government took possession of rich lands in Upper 
Egypt and ordered the introduction of sugar-cane and the erection 
of sugar refineries. In Cairo arose a European Quarter. Many oc- 
cidental officials (mostly Frenchmen) were appointed. The Capitu- 
lation System, which gave special rights and privileges to Europeans, 
was restricted. Mixed courts, that is, courts composed of Egyp- 
tian natives and Europeans living in Egj^t, were instituted for 
trying Europeans. 

But all these innovations were beyond the financial resources of 
his country. In ten years the Egyptian debt increased eightfold — 
from 250 million to two billion francs. Ismail's credit was ex- 
hausted and he could borrow only at ruinous rates of interest. At 
that time (1875) the Khedive decided he must sell the 200,000 
shares in the Suez Canal Company which he happened to own. 
Disraeli quickly seized the opportunity to buy the shares for Eng- 



330 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

land and so secure a direct influence in the administrative board of 
the canal company. This money also was quickly spent by Ismail, 
and the next year lie began to default in the payment of his obli- 
gations. 

Egj^t was now placed under European guardianship. The Euro- 
pean governments took up the cause of the creditors and established 
an international commission which should see to it that out of the 
revenues of the Egyptian government the first payments should be 
the interest on the debt. The commission consisted at first, in 1876, 
of a Frenchman, an Italian, and an Austrian, that is, of representa- 
tives of the nations which had the largest share in the trade of the 
Mediterranean; later, representatives of Great Britain (1877) and 
of Germany and Russia (1885) were added. Furthermore, however, 
the whole financial administration of Egypt was placed, in 1876, 
under special control, in fact, under two Controllers-General, one 
Frenchman and one Englishman. France, after her prestige had 
been weakened by the Franco-Prussian War, found it necessary to 
keep on good terms with England; though she had formerly enjoyed 
a preponderant position in the Nile region, she now agreed to this 
"Anglo-French Condominium." 

The Controllers-General now virtually took the whole government 
into their own hands. They quickly discovered that the alleged 
Europeanization of the administration had not put an end to the 
Khedive's former autocratic methods in finance, and that the peas- 
ant population (the fellaheen) were still plundered in the old fashion. 
They demanded, therefore, a fundamental reform — that the Khedive 
be content with a "civil list," or fixed revenue for the expenses of 
his court and administration. Ismail consented and in 1878 even 
appointed two of the commissioners as his ministers. But a reform 
of Egyptian administration was bound to meet with dangerous op- 
position. Certain as it was that the fellaheen, who had been ex- 
ploited for centuries, would profit by an impartial and economical 
government, it was equally certain that a limitation upon the Khe- 
dive's financial power would injure the pockets of Egyptian notables. 
The military and civil officials who were dismissed as superfluous 
roused the people to revolts against the government of the European 
commissioners. Ismail used this unrest to pose as a defender of 
Islam. He dismissed his European ministers in 1879 and formed 
a purely Egyptian cabinet. 

The Dual Control Powers then succeeded in having the Sultan 
remove Ismail. His son and successor, Tewfik, thereupon reestab- 
lished the Dual-Control boards. But this did not silence the agita- 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 331 

tion of the Mohammedan notables against European interference. 
The Egyptian party compelled the Khedive to appoint a new cabinet 
in which their leader became minister of war. The army was en- 
larged and purified of its pro-European elements, and the authority 
of the Controllers-General was no longer heeded (1882). 

A proposition for a joint Anglo-French intervention, mainly urged 
by one of the most active and important Frenchmen of the time, 
Gambetta, failed through the opposition of the cautious French 
Chamber of Deputies which objected to all colonial wars. All that 
took place at first was merely a naval demonstration at Alexandria 
and an international conference at Constantinople. In Egypt itself, 
however, actual attacks were made by natives on Christians and a 
number of Europeans were massacred in Alexandria. In spite of 
this the French government refused to join with the British in in- 
tervening, and even recalled their ships. The British admiral there- 
upon bombarded Alexandria and occupied it with marines (1882). 

The latent conflict now broke into open war. The Egyptian 
minister of war threatened to destroy the Suez Canal. At this the 
English advanced to the canal (after the French Chamber had again 
refused to join with them) and seized it. They also occupied Cairo. 
The Egyptian army was destroyed; its leader, the minister of war, 
Arabi Bey, was captured and banished to Ceylon. 

Out of the British occupation now arose the Egj^tian "provisional 
arrangement" — which was to last for decades. The English did not 
proceed to annex the territory. They did not even interfere with 
Egyptian institutions. They merely replaced the only force which 
could have offered opposition to Europeans, namely the Egyptian 
army, by a military organization dependent on themselves. The 
Egyptian army was reorganized under the leadership of a British 
general, or ''Sirdar," and a standing English force of five to six 
thousand men, paid out of the Egyptian budget, was stationed 
in the country. The joint Anglo-French control was now at an 
end (1883). 

This was the beginning of the Anglo-French tension which was to 
last twenty years. Henceforth French diplomacy strove to compel 
the rival British to leave the land which they had occupied provision- 
ally. The efforts, however, were in vain. All that France could bring 
about was a European conference which neutralized the Suez Canal, 
so that, in case of war, it could not be closed. This tension was not 
officially ended until the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. But before 
this is described, it is necessary to look at the situation in North-West 
Africa; because the Entente of 1904 depended as much upon what 



332 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

had been taking place in the western, as in the eastern, part of 
North Africa. 

As France's desire for influence in Egypt was mainly a conse- 
quence of her occupation of Algeria, so her new policy of extending 
French occupation over the regions to the west, south and east of 
Algeria was also a natural continuation of a series of events which 
began in 1830. To the French in Algeria it was important that the 
nearest powerful Mohammedan country, Egypt, should be in the 
hands of a friendly or dependent state; it was still more important, 
in fact absolutely indispensable for the safety of the colony, that the 
immediate border territories should be thoroughly subjected. In 
Egypt a compromise arrangement with one of the other Great 
Powers was conceivable; but in Tunis and Morocco any kind of 
condominium would vitally interfere with French colonial policy in 
Africa. 

The first question which arose was the annexation of the region 
lying to the east of Algeria. The Bey of Tunis, who was nominally 
subordinate to the Sultan of Turkey like the Bey of Algiers formerly, 
was a less dangerous neighbor for Europeans than the former piratical 
princes of Algeria. Not only was there no piracy at Tunis, but 
Europeans were admitted with relative freedom. As compared with 
Algiers formerly, Tunisia had a somewhat larger percentage of fixed, 
non- nomadic inhabitants, peasants and merchants; in addition there 
had come a considerable number of European settlers, chiefly from 
Italy and Malta, but also a number of French capitalists. The for- 
eigners lived under the Capitulations System and were under the 
jurisdiction of their own consuls. 

There were not lacking, however, grounds for intervention. The 
Bey of Tunis, like the Khedive of Egypt, could not live within his 
income. He was compelled to borrow considerable sums from Eu- 
ropean capitalists, and only the pressure of a control by the Great 
Powers could persuade him to pay the interest regularly. Further- 
more, he either could not, or would not, prevent robber bands in 
his country from making raids upon French Algeria; for this there 
seemed to be no remedy except occupation by a European Power. 

As to the raids, France was the only power directly interested; 
but the French were also largely concerned in a solution of the finan- 
cial question. So it was natural that the French should cast their 
eyes toward Tunis. But a French conquest of the country was 
directly opposed to the views of other Great Powers. Great Britain 
had not been pleased when the French got a foothold in North 
Africa (see above, p. 118), and now supported the Sultan's rights 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 333 

of sovereignty. Still more dangerous was Italy's opposition. If 
Italy wanted to pursue a colonial policy at all, Tunis was naturally 
her first objective. The land of the Beys had already attracted a 
considerable number of Italian settlers. It stood right at the door 
of the newly-created Italian Kingdom. And it offered much more 
favorable economic opportunities than Tripoli, which lay further 
to the east. Italy therefore insisted from the first that she at least 
be treated on an equal footing with her two rivals. As in the sim- 
ilar case of Eg5^t later (see p. 330), when an international commis- 
sion for controlling the collection of the Tunisian revenues was es- 
tablished, one Italian was given a place on the Council along with 
a Frenchman and Englishman (1865-1870). But soon afterwards, 
Italy's position grew less favorable. In 1878 Great Britain gave 
up her untenable position in favor of France, and henceforth Italy 
stood alone in opposition to her more powerful French rival. The 
first result of this was that the Bey favored the less dangerous 
Italian state at the expense of France; in railway concessions, for 
example, he granted more to the Italians than to the French. But 
this very circumstance drove the French to take the last step of 
converting Tunis into a French protectorate. 

A new attack on the Algerian frontier by a mountain tribe of 
Khroumirs furnished the pretext for intervention. The Bey refused 
to help the French punish the robbers. Thereupon a French division 
marched into Tunis and occupied the Khroumir territory. The Bey 
appealed to Europe for help; but no Power (not even Italy) would, 
or could, interfere. So, after his capital had been occupied by the 
French, he had to sign the Treaty of Bardo, recognizing a French 
protectorate. 

As in the case of Algeria earlier, there occurred a revolt of the 
Mohammedan tribes to the south of the new protectorate. But the 
French easily suppressed it, and from this time (1881) remained in 
undisturbed possession. The eastern frontier of Algeria was thus 
definitely secured. 

The development which then took place in Tunis has many anal- 
ogies with that in Algeria, with the single exception that the rule of 
the native prince — the Bey — continued as a matter of formality 
(somewhat as in Egypt and partly as in India). But the real govern- 
ment lies in the hands of a French resident, and the real military 
power is exercised by French troops stationed in the country. Eco- 
nomic prosperity also has developed along the same lines as in Al- 
geria; numerous roads and railways have been built by the French. 
The budget, which under the Bey regularly closed with a deficit, now 



334 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

shows just as regularly a surplus. But as far as the European popu- 
lation is concerned the French are at the same disadvantage as in 
Algiers. Tunis is much less suited than Algeria to the one kind of 
French immigration which is most important, namely that of French 
peasants. No subdivision of the soil has taken place. Furthermore, 
the Italian settlers in Tunis are about three times as numerous as 
the French, who are preponderant only in wealth; the Italians are 
active as laborers and not as small proprietors. 

Between France and Italy the annexation of Tunis caused an 
estrangement which lasted nearly a generation. Italy now turned her 
back completely on France. She joined with Germany and Austria, 
which had been allied since 1879, in forming the "Triple Alliance" 
(May 20, 1882). The Italian government was not able to secure 
from Austria an express promise of support for Italian Mediter- 
ranean projects. But in Rome there evidently existed the hope that 
henceforth Italy could pursue her colonial aims in opposition to 
France with more success. Significant in this connection also is the 
fact that a special declaration was attached to the Triple Alliance 
Treaty stating that under no circumstances could the treaty be re- 
garded as directed against Englnd. 

At the same time Italy began to increase her armaments, which 
had not been possible after 1870 on account of her unsatisfactory 
financial condition (see above, p. 259), and initiated on the Red Sea 
a colonial policy of her own. The account of these events, however, 
must be postponed; at this point it is more convenient to explain 
the progress of the undertakings which have transformed the orig- 
inally tiny colony of Algiers into the center of a mighty colonial 
empire. 

There were two tasks confronting the French government in Al- 
geria. One, in general the more important, was the counterpart to 
the subjection of Tunis; it was the occupation of Morocco, which, 
as an independent neighboring state, was more dangerous to the 
safety of the French colonists in Algeria than Tunis had been. But 
as this could not be undertaken at once because of England's oppo- 
sition, the French after 1880 devoted their energies to the other 
task. 

This was the further extension of the southern frontier of Al- 
geria, already advanced into the Sahara Desert, so that it should 
come into touch with the French settlement at the mouth of the 
Senegal River on the West Coast of Africa. This work was under- 
taken from both extremities. From the colony of Senegal, which 
in 181 5, like nearly all the other European possessions in Africa, 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 335 

had consisted merely of a narrow strip of coast, the French pressed 
up the Senegal River into the interior until they finally reached the 
Niger (1883). Everywhere military posts were established. Leaving 
the Niger, they pushed on eastwards to Lake Chad (1898). They 
had already captured Timbuctoo, the capital of the region (1894). 
By 1898 the French had reached a point south of the Sahara lying 
somewhat further east than Tunis. All of these conquests, however, 
would have remained incomplete if a sure connection had not been 
established with French Guinea. This also was brought about by 
systematic advances and political agreements. After the Ivory Coast 
hinterland had come in good part into French hands, the whole 
Ivory Coast itself fell to France by a friendly arrangement with 
England (1892), though hitherto the French had had nothing but 
insignificant settlements there. A second connection with the Guinea 
Coast was created by the fact that the negro military kingdom of 
Dahomey, whose ruler had often maltreated French traders, was 
destroyed and annexed by the French. The French Sudan Empire 
now comprised a solid area of over two million square kilometers, 
with free access to the sea in the south and west as well as in the 
north. 

Finally, thanks to the bravery of their explorers and the energy 
of their generals, the French succeeded even in uniting their newly- 
founded Congo colony with their possessions in the Sudan. Under 
Major Marchand they pressed on, passing what was then the Ger- 
man Kamerun territory, north-eastwards as far as Uganda (1896- 
98) ; after a convention of 1899 England recognized their right to 
expand over the Wady region; this was definitely brought under 
subjection in 1901 and established a direct connection between the 
Chad region and the whole Sudan. 

This last advance, however, threatened again to sharpen the still 
imrelieved tension over Egypt. The military expedition under 
Marchand had in fact pushed eastwards to the White Nile and taken 
possession of a little place called Fashoda. But the French and Eng- 
lish governments both remained true to their policy of avoiding war, 
and the affair was settled when the French ministry recalled Mar- 
chand's detachment. France even went further, and, in a convention 
which may be regarded as foreshadowing the later Entente, ex- 
pressly renounced all her claims to the Upper Nile; that is, she 
recognized indirectly British supremacy in Egypt. 

In order to understand this, the story of the extension of British 
power over the Egyptian Sudan may here be briefly told. Mehemet 
All (see p. 328) had already planned the conquest of the Upper 



336 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Nile region, and under Ismail the conquest had been accomplished. 
The whole Egyptian Sudan, up to the great lakes, was brought 
under Egyptian administration. This innovation resulted in many 
difficulties: Sudanese negroes were sometimes set over European 
officials, and native slave-dealers were disquieted lest the Europeans 
wanted to check their business. The discontent became much more 
serious when in Egypt itself a Mohammedan party began to oppose 
the supremacy of the Europeans (see above, p. 330). At the moment 
when Arabi Bey was stirring up revolt against the English and the 
French, there arose among the Sudanese a native who proclaimed 
himself the "Mahdi" — Prophet or Messiah — ^who would win for 
Islam supreme power throughout the world. The Mahdi formed a 
religious brotherhood, whose members the English called "dervishes," 
organized an army, and overthrew the Egyptian administration in 
the Sudan. An Egj^Dtian army which was sent against him was 
destroyed. General Gordon who came up from Cairo to suppress 
the movement was besieged with his Egyptian garrison in Khartum. 
After holding out for a year during 1884-85 the town was taken 
and Gordon was murdered. In spite of this tragic occurrence, 
which roused great indignation in England, Great Britain at that 
time was so occupied with other cares that she did not at once at- 
tempt to recover her position. Moreover, the British occupation of 
the Nile region was still regarded by many in England as provisional ; 
as such, it did not imply any duty to occupy the hinterland in the 
Sudan. 

Not until 1897, after Egypt had become more and more a real 
British possession, did the English authorities seriously prepare a 
campaign against the Mohammedan fanatics in the Upper Nile 
region. With the aid of carefully-laid railways a much quicker ad- 
vance could be made this time than in the case of the unfortunate 
expedition led by Gordon. As soon as a considerable force of trained 
troops with European firearms opposed the dervishes, their resistance 
naturally collapsed. On September 2, 1898, the Sirdar of Eg5T3t, 
General Kitchener, captured Omdurman on the White Nile, the 
stronghold of the Mahdi. Shortly afterwards the town of Khartum 
fell into the hands of the Anglo-Egyptian troops. The "Calif" who 
had succeeded the Mahdi fled into the desert, where after long wan- 
derings with his chiefs he was finally slain by the English a year 
later. 

It happened that in Khartum General Kitchener received news 
of Marchand's occupation of Fashoda. He therefore went over on a 
little steamer and hoisted his Egyptian flag opposite the French 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 337 

tricolor. The way in which this incident was settled has already 
been told. It may be added that the English, in order to obliterate 
the memory of this painful incident, have wiped out the name 
"Fashoda" from their maps, so that the village where the historic 
meeting took place is now called "Kodok." 

France did not have to wait long for compensation. For a long 
time and for more insistent reasons than in the case of Tunis, France 
had sought to secure control over Morocco. The south-eastern part 
of this country was the starting-point for all the Mohammedan re- 
volts which had caused unrest in Algeria. The French had already 
taken advantage of the extension of their power in the Sudan to 
establish some military posts in Southern Oran, in order to check 
this danger, but her further efforts to subdue Morocco had always 
failed on account of England's opposition, England had also often 
sent arms to the Sherif, or Sultan, and had helped train Moroccan 
troops. In English eyes, however, Morocco had lost much of its 
value since the opening of the Suez Canal; and although the foreign 
trade of Morocco was almost exclusively in English and French 
hands, the English government preferred to make secure its com- 
munications with India by getting firm hold of Eg3^t rather than 
to prolong its conflict with France in Egypt and Morocco. Ac- 
cordingly, in 1904, there took place the famous Convention or 
"Entente" which definitely put an end to the differences between 
England and France over their colonial policies in North Africa. 
France agreed to cease demanding England's withdrawal from Egypt; 
in return, England accorded France full freedom of action in Mo- 
rocco. It was a fine example of the way peacefully-inclined Great 
Powers can settle their disputes; the diplomatic battle was fought 
out without the accompaniment of military threats, increased arma- 
ments, and warlike demonstrations. 

The events just narrated may be regarded in a certain sense as a 
continuation of the old Hellenistic-Roman Mediterranean policy. 
On the other hand, the policy of the European states toward Africa 
which began about 1870 — the regular partition of Africa — was 
something altogether new. It differed essentially from the old 
policy in that it was not confined to the North African coast, which 
after all is a part of Europe geographically, nor to the strips of 
coast occupied by European traders; on the contrary it aimed at 
the systematic control and exploitation by Europeans of the whole 
interior of the Dark Continent. A natural result of this new move- 
ment was the increase in the number of states participating in 



338 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

African politics. Hitherto the occupation of African territory had 
been confined either to states which were interested in Africa on 
account of their own Mediterranean position — like France, and, to 
a slight extent, Spain — or which sought points of support for their 
trade with India and Eastern Asia — like Portugal, England and Hol- 
land. But now the competition for territory in the Dark Continent 
was taken up by states which were driven merely by the desire to 
share in the plunder — like Germany and, indirectly, Belgium. 

Italy's case was peculiar. Her interests rested primarily on her 
position as a Mediterranean Power. Her late entrance into the race 
for Africa was due solely to the fact that she had become unified 
as a Great Power later than France; it was not due to any new 
conception of the value of Africa. Italy's African policy accordingly 
followed its own bent; it is not to be regarded as a part of the gen- 
eral European action. Austria-Hungary also, in spite of her large 
Mediterranean interests, took no part at all in the partition of 
Africa, doubtless on account of her internal political situation; Aus- 
trian expansion gravitated exclusively toward the Balkans. 

The first impulse toward a European settlement of the African 
question was a humanitarian one. The journeys into the interior 
of Africa by explorers of different nations had disclosed the existence 
of an extensive slave-trade. The exportation of negro slaves to 
America, to be sure, had completely ceased since England put her 
foot down; but the export to Asia was still flourishing. On the 
east coast of Africa there were great slave depots in which traders, 
mostly Arabs, bought their wares for further sale in Asia. One 
of the main reasons the negro chiefs were in continual war with 
one another was that their tribesmen were captured and sold. The 
slave-trade had assumed such proportions that some European ob- 
servers even feared that Africa would be depopulated. Without 
considering whether such a thing was possible, this much can be 
stated with certainty: the slave traffic as it was then carried on in 
Africa entailed a disproportionately large loss of human life. Negroes 
captured in war who were too weak or too old to be sold as slaves 
were simply murdered; and many died of exhaustion as they were 
being driven down to the coast to be sold. 

Many philanthropic societies were founded in Europe to put an 
end to this inhuman traffic. They wanted the European Powers to 
intervene. But it soon became evident that nothing but a permanent 
occupation by Europeans could accomplish anything. Of how little 
avail were mere proclamations had just been shown in the case of 
the Egyptian conquest of the Upper Nile during the years 1869- 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 339 

1875: these were supposed to put an end to the slave-trade in the 
Egyptian Sudan; in reality the traffic still continued under the 
Kliedive's administration. 

At first a semi-official European arrangement was attempted. 
Leopold II, King of the Belgians, along with De Lesseps, the con- 
structor of the Suez Canal, and Cardinal Lavigerie, the Primate of 
Africa, founded in 1876 the "International African Association." 
Its aim was the exploration of Central Africa as well as the sup- 
pression of the slave-trade there. It began its task with great 
energy. It provided Henry M. Stanley, who had just explored the 
Congo River, with means for establishing a series of military posts 
in the Congo region. Various places in the neighborhood of Lake 
Tanganyika were fortified as places of refuge from the slave dealers. 
This barred the great slave route from the Zambesi in the South to 
Khartum on the Upper Nile. 

But national rivalries soon arose within the Association. The 
nations which already owned colonies in the neighborhood (like 
Great Britain, France, and Portugal) feared they would lose a 
valuable hinterland. And at any rate they were not inclined to 
concede a free access to the sea to the new Belgian colonial state, 
as one might call it. Moreover Germany, which hitherto possessed 
no colonies in Africa, laid claim to a part of the Dark Continent. 
Bismarck knew how to bring it about that a European conference 
should meet in Berlin in 1885, in which the Great Powers of Eu- 
rope systematically laid down the principles and prepared the way 
for the partition of Africa. 

The Conference dissolved the International Association, but this 
did not mean that Leopold's work was undone. The diplomatists 
recognized that a Congo state, lying in the middle of the continent, 
would furnish as good a buffer as the rival European countries 
could wish. They therefore allowed Leopold's new creation to 
exist under the name of "The Congo Free State." But its admin- 
istration did not remain international. It was the personal property 
of the King of the Belgians, but it had no connection with the Bel- 
gian state (until later when Leopold II bequeathed it to Belgium). 
The Congo Free State was also given an uninterrupted access to the 
ocean, inasmuch as the navigation of the Congo and the Niger 
was declared free to all nations — on the analogy of the Rhine and 
Danube agreements. The new conquests in the French Congo 
(see p. 335) were given international recognition, and equal trading 
privileges in the whole Congo region were thus assured to all nations. 

The Berlin Conference also laid down for the future some funda- 



340 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

mental principles of a general nature: all the Powers agreed to sup- 
press the slave-trade; henceforth, every annexation of African soil 
must be officially notified to the Powers; and no annexations were 
to be recognized unless accompanied by effective occupation. 

Now began the era of great annexations. The prevailing motive 
was no longer necessity or security, but the feeling that without 
colonies a Great Power was incomplete, especially in the case of 
the two Powers which had hitherto had no share in the colonization 
of Africa. In 1884-5 Germany took possession of Togoland and 
the Kameruns on the Gulf of Guinea, of the economically worth- 
less South West Africa — where later some diamonds were discovered 
— and of the more promising German East African Territory to the 
east of the Belgian Congo. Bismarck's dismissal gave a new free- 
dom to German colonial policy. As several of Germany's recent 
acquisitions conflicted with British claims, Germany and England 
signed an agreement in 1890 dividing between themselves the lands 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar. England took the island of Zanzibar 
and the Northern continental part which connected the Upper Nile 
region directly with the Indian Ocean, and Germany received the 
Southern part. As compensation for other claims, Germany also 
received from England the island of Heligoland, thanks to which the 
English had hitherto been able to control the entrance to the Elbe 
at Hamburg. For England the treaty was unfavorable to the extent 
that it destroyed for the present her purpose of establishing an un- 
broken colonial Empire in Africa reaching from the Cape to Cairo. 
To be sure, it was now possible to protect the Egyptian Sudan from 
any threat of danger from Germany, just as it was protected against 
a French advance; but between the English possessions in the Su- 
dan and in South Africa, there was now shoved a barrier in the 
shape of the German and Belgian colonies. In this respect England's 
position in Africa was much less favorable than that of France. 

France further extended her African possessions by conquering the 
island of Madagascar. This also was a blow to British claims. The 
English had often supported the native population in their resistance 
to French efforts at annexation. In 1868, the English even suc- 
ceeded in converting to Anglicanism Ranawalo II, Queen of the 
Hovas, so that British influence had seemed assured. 

However, the quarrels between the Hovas and the French colonists 
on Reunion Island (or lie Bourbon) did not cease any more than 
the conflicts with the French traders on Madagascar itself. After 
bombarding the coast several times, the French received in 1885 
the right to maintain a French resident with a military guard in the 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 341 

capital, Tananarive, as well as to occupy a number of coast dis- 
tricts. This veiled protectorate was the first step toward annexa- 
tion. The Queen of the Hovas at the time, Ranawalo III, used 
her liberty to maintain direct diplomatic relations not only with 
Great Britain as before, but also with the United States, The 
French therefore sent an ultimatum in 1894. French public opinion 
had recently become much more favorable to colonial undertakings 
and the Chamber of Deputies without difficulty granted money for 
decisive action when the ultimatum was rejected. Under these cir- 
cumstances, French success was certain. Although the 15,000 French 
troops who were landed on the west coast of Madagascar suffered 
terribly from fever, Tananarive was captured with almost no serious 
opposition in 1895, and the Queen recognized the French protectorate. 
But as she or her officials, in spite of this, tried to stir up rebellion 
against the French, Madagascar was changed from a protectorate 
into an out-and-out French colony. Here also slavery was abolished 
as one of the results of European rule. 

The check which the English had suffered through the creation 
of German East Africa was all the more bitter in that shortly before 
the conclusion of the Zanzibar Agreement they had begun a new 
advance from South Africa which seemed to bring them considerably 
nearer their goal of uniting Cape Town and Cairo. The Portuguese 
had retained as remnants from the age of their bold voyages of 
discovery two relatively large stretches of land on the east and west 
coasts of Africa — Angola on the west, and Mozambique on the east. 
Portugal now considered the possibility of uniting these two regions 
into an unbroken whole by converting the Zambesi territory into a 
Portuguese colony. Such a scheme would have completely cut off 
Cape Colony from Northern Africa. The British therefore com- 
pelled Portugal to abandon her plan. The weak little country had 
to give its consent to the Convention of August 20, 1890, which 
established the British in the Zambesi territory. Under the leader- 
ship of Cecil Rhodes the new British territory was quickly brought 
under English subjection and the warlike tribes of Matabeleland 
were conquered by his companion, Dr. Jameson. The railway which 
ran inland from Cape Town was at once extended almost to the 
Zambesi; but its completion was prevented on the one hand by the 
existence of German East Africa, and on the other by the opposi- 
tion of the French, who refused their consent to the transfer of a 
strip of land in the Belgian Congo west of Lake Tanganyika. 

The disputes between the Great Powers were not completely set- 



342 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tied by these various agreements. Between Germany and Great Brit- 
ain, to be sure, there were no longer any serious grounds of conflict, 
but between Germany and France there developed an opposition 
which in many respects was much more dangerous. Germany seemed 
to oppose on principle France's efforts to round out her African 
colonial empire and render it secure; in particular Germany opposed 
the "Tunification" of Morocco after England in 1904 had withdrawn 
her opposition. But before an account is given of these matters, 
something must be said of Italian policy in Africa, 

Italy's policy of conquest in Africa is peculiar in the respect that 
it affords the only case in history in which a native African state 
succeeded in successfully evading European control. The Empire 
of Abyssinia (with only the apparent exception of the negro Re- 
public of Liberia) was the only really independent state in Africa 
at the close of this new colonial period. It owed its independence 
not only to the jealousy of European states toward one another, 
but also to its own real power. 

The Christian Empire of Abyssinia for centuries had been torn 
by internal feuds. The "Ras" — local rulers — were in almost con- 
tinual strife with the "Negus" or supreme ruler, to whom they often 
paid only nominal obedience. The country also was virtually un- 
known to Europeans and these civil wars had attracted little atten- 
tion in Europe. Only once had the English felt compelled to inter- 
vene, when Negus Theodore II arrested and imprisoned an English 
consul in 1862. Great Britain despatched an expedition and suc- 
ceeded in winning the support of the Ras. The Negus was defeated 
and in 1868 committed suicide in his fortress of Magdala, whereupon 
the English withdrew their troops. They were content to have 
restored British prestige. Moreover, they believed that the country 
could only be conquered by a large number of troops and that the 
cost would be more than it would be worth. 

From the 'eighties onward it was not England but Italy which 
had most to do with Abyssinia. In 1885 an Italian colony had been 
established at Massowah on the Red Sea near the Abyssinian fron- 
tier. This settlement was often troubled by the Negus John, and 
some Italian troops were completely routed. Italy therefore entered 
into close relations with Menelek, who was Ras of Shoa and a rival 
claimant for the position of Negus. Through his support Italy 
tried to secure a firm foothold in Abyssinia and an agreement was 
signed in which Menelek, in return for recognition by Italy, was 
supposed to recognize an Italian protectorate. By this Treaty of 
Ucciali of May 22, 1889, Italy agreed to recognize Menelek as 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 343 

"King of Kings" or "Negus of Ethiopia"; Menelek on his side made 
the concession that he would negotiate with European Powers only 
through the mediation of Italy. He also gave commercial privileges, 
and agreed to have coins stamped in Italy and to order munitions. 
An Ethiopian coin was struck which bore the image of the King 
of Italy and the inscription, "Italy protects Ethiopia." On October 
II, 1889, Italy officially notified the other Powers that she had as- 
sumed a protectorate over Abyssinia. 

These arrangements were extended by a further Italian occupation 
of African territory. Hitherto, the Italians had only taken a piece 
of land on the Red Sea ; now followed the occupation of territory in 
East Africa on the Indian Ocean. In 1891 the Italians signed a 
convention with England which separated their claims from the 
British possessions in Somaliland. The whole hinterland as far as 
the region of the Upper Nile was recognized as an Italian sphere of 
influence. Italy seemed to have laid the foundation for a great 
African colonial empire, and for a share in the struggle for the 
possession of the Egyptian Sudan. 

But the Italian statesman, Crispi, the chief promoter of these 
colonial undertakings, had reckoned without his Ethiopian ally. 
Menelek succeeded in getting his own sovereignty recognized by the 
successor of Negus John. This restored the unity of Ethiopia, and 
Menelek no longer needed to lean on the Italians. He had himself 
solemnly crowned and sent a direct notification of the fact to all 
the Powers. When Italy complained that this infringed the Treaty 
of Ucciali, Menelek on May 11, 1893, declared the treaty at an 
end altogether. So war began. 

The Italian attack was led by General Baratieri from Massowah 
as a base. The Italians first had to deal with the Ras of Tigre, 
Menelek's former rival. He was beaten in a series of brilliant en- 
gagements and had to flee to Menelek in 1895. After his most 
dangerous rival had thus been overthrown, Menelek took courage. 
He summoned his people to a national war against the invaders, 
and soon had under his banners some 150,000 men, so it was said, 
against about 20,000 Italians. The result came quickly. One 
Italian column was annihilated; another had to capitulate; and an 
even worse fate overtook the main force under General Baratieri 
himself. In spite of the enemy's overwhelming superiority in num- 
bers, the Italian General was unwilling to leave Abyssinian territory 
and prepared to fight at Adowa. The result was a catastrophe. One 
Italian general was taken captive, two others were killed, the retreat 
took on a panicky character, and about 4,000 Italians, together 



344 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

with all the artillery, fell into the hands of the Negus on March 
I, 1896. 

The blow was so crushing that Baratieri was court-martialed, but 
acquitted. Crispi had to resign. More important was the fact 
that the Italians were unable to attempt any military recovery. 
Although their army was reformed at Massowah they had to con- 
sent to negotiate, and on October 26, 1896, signed the Peace of 
Addis-Ababa, in which they officially abandoned the Treaty of 
Ucciali. Italy had to recognize the absolute independence of 
"Ethiopia," as Abyssinia was now called. Though the Italians re- 
tained the colony of Massowah, they had to give up their dream 
of an East African Colonial Empire which was to balance that of 
France in the West. They therefore made their next colonial at- 
tempt at a different point. But as this took place in connection with 
the Morocco trouble the latter must first be explained. 

Attention has been called to the fact that it was absolutely neces- 
sary for France to exercise a control over the administration of 
Morocco. So long as Mohammedan tribes from the Moroccan ter- 
ritory could disturb Algeria, the security of the French colony was 
always in danger. But hitherto French attempts to get control over 
Morocco had always failed on account of England's opposition. 
Now in 1904 the Entente with England seemed to open the way: 
the only country which had opposed French supremacy in Morocco 
recognized French rights there in return for the French recog- 
nition of British claims in Egypt. But events at once showed that 
France was rid of one rival only to raise up another in its place 
which was more dangerous both from a military and a political 
point of view. The German Empire raised belated objections to 
the French aspirations and succeeded in strengthening the Sultan 
of Morocco in his refusal of French demands. The Anglo-French 
Convention was held by Germany to be not binding internationally 
because it had not been officially notified to the other Powers (see 
p. 340) ; and at least it ought to be recognized that all European 
Powers should be accorded equal rights in Morocco. These views 
were given striking publicity by the German Kaiser's visit to the 
Moroccan port of Tangier on March 31, 1905. William II 
declared on this occasion that the object of his visit was to make 
it publicly known that he was determined to safeguard efficaciously 
German interests in Morocco; and that he looked upon the Sultan 
as an absolutely independent sovereign. 

This amounted to an official proclamation by Germany that she 
would absolutely oppose the establishment of a French protectorate 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 345 

over Morocco. The opposition between the two countries showed 
itself with an intensity hitherto unequaled in the history of the 
partitioning of Africa. On the one side was France, which believed 
that she must guard her great colonial possession from troublesome 
interference from an independent Morocco or even from German 
settlements in the country which, as was feared, would be only too 
easily used at every opportunity to support rebellions against the 
French. On the other side was the German Empire, which could 
only maintain her military system and support her excessively swollen 
population, now numbering sixty millions as against forty millions in 
1870, with the aid of her steadily increasing exports; Germany, 
therefore, believed that she must lay claim to every sort of territory 
which was still available, in order to provide for her industries. The 
opposition was still further intensified by the fact that France's 
new enemy was no longer a state like Great Britain, which avoided 
in principle any conflict with Great Powers on the Continent out 
of regard for her own military weakness; on the contrary, France's 
new enemy was the leading military state of the age, which never 
hesitated to appeal to the sword by threatening the possibility of war. 

The effect of this new turn in Moroccan affairs was enormous in 
France. It was felt that the military inferiority from which France 
had suffered in respect to her eastern neighbor since 1870 was now 
to be exploited not only in European matters, but also in the colonial 
affairs of North Africa from which Bismarck had always stood aloof. 

So this interference on Germany's part produced an impression 
which long outlasted the immediate episode. For the moment it 
was not difficult to settle the question at issue, because France 
gave way in all essential points to Germany's demands : Delcasse, the 
French minister of foreign affairs, who had refused to abandon 
France's privileges in Morocco as a matter of principle, had to re- 
sign on June 6, 1905, because his colleagues in the Cabinet and the 
Chamber of Deputies would not support him. France and Germany 
then signed, on September 28, 1905, an agreement which provided 
for the internationalization and independence of various branches of 
the Moroccan administration. This agreement was then laid before 
an international conference which met shortly afterward, from Jan- 
uary to April, 1906, in the Spanish town of Algeciras opposite 
Gibraltar. Here, also, the German view prevailed completely. 
Moreover, the very fact that the Moroccan question was placed be- 
fore an international assembly attended by the European Powers, 
the United States, and Morocco, was in itself a success for German 
diplomacy. France, who believed she had a right to claim a priv- 



346 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

ileged position in Morocco because of her Entente settlement with 
England in 1904, and because of earlier agreements with Morocco, 
had to agree to a Franco-Spanish police force and a Moroccan bank 
which were to be placed under international control, in spite of 
France's overwhelming financial interests in the region; the chief 
inspector of the police force was to be a Swiss. In all financial 
matters, such as the granting of contracts for public works, no one 
nation was to be given an advantage over others. 

But this settlement soon proved unsatisfactory. The native popu- 
lation committed various acts of violence against French subjects in 
Morocco. Against these acts the international police force, which 
was never really organized, was powerless. The French, therefore, 
occupied the town of Ujda on the Algerian frontier, and in 1907 the 
port of Casablanca was occupied by Spanish troops. At the same 
time the French advised the establishment of Franco-Spanish pro- 
tective military detachments in place of the police force, but this 
proposal was rejected owing to the opposition of the German gov- 
ernment. 

The Moroccan conflict therefore remained still unsettled. The 
opposition soon flamed up anew. Aside from the fact that France 
and Germany could not agree upon the interpretation of the eco- 
nomic clauses of the Algeciras agreement, the internal anarchy in 
Morocco made French military intervention more necessary than 
ever. The Sultan of Morocco, Muley Hafid, was threatened by 
native rebellious tribes who were also making attacks upon the 
French. France therefore sent a military expedition to the Moroc- 
can capital of Fez, and restored order there; as soon as this had 
been accomplished, in May and June, 191 1, the troops immediately 
began their retreat. At the same time Spain occupied the port of 
Larasch on the west coast, because of an earlier agreement. 

Germany regarded this advance of the French as a breach of 
the Algeciras Act, and replied to it by a military demonstration. 
The gunboat Panther was sent to Agadir on the south-west coast 
of Morocco on July i, 191 1. This was intended as an official procla- 
mation of German claims either to a part of Morocco, or to some 
other piece of French colonial territory. After long negotiations, 
during which England at first took a stand against Germany's ex- 
cessive demands, an agreement was signed on November 4, 191 1, 
by which Germany declared she was ready to recognize French polit- 
ical control over Morocco in return for the cession of considerable 
French territories in the Congo region. By this agreement, France 
acquired the right to occupy by military force all points in Morocco 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 347 

which she deemed necessary for public safety, and also the right 
to represent the Sultan in his foreign relations. This satisfied the 
chief complaints of the French. On the other hand, it was agreed 
that the French Protectorate over Morocco should not be used for 
the economic advantage of France exclusively; in commercial mat- 
ters, and in the granting of contracts for public works, no distinc- 
tion was to be made between nations. The Congo territory which 
France ceded to Germany amounted to 275,000 square kilometers. 

Even this Moroccan arrangement, however, did not wholly clear 
up the situation. France, on her side, possessed within her Protec- 
torate only limited rights; even the foreign consular courts, for ex- 
ample, remained in existence. On the other hand, it was to be 
expected that Germany would insist by threats of war, if necessary, 
that every extension of French authority should be paid^ for by 
further cessions of French colonial territory. The time had now 
come which has already been alluded to: Africa was so completely 
divided between the European Powers that henceforth, if one country 
attempted to extend its colonial possessions, it could only do so 
at the expense of one of the other European Powers. In practice, 
this situation found expression in the fact that the most powerful 
military state threatened to rob its less powerful neighbor of a part 
of its colonies: in Central Africa, especially, it was seeking to estab- 
lish a connection between the German colonies in the East and West 
and round them out toward the North. So there developed here 
inflammable matter of the most dangerous kind — dangerous pri- 
marily because it was due to economic causes and because Germany 
at that time regarded her own continued economic expansion as ab- 
solutely necessary if she was to retain longer the position of hege- 
mony which she had hitherto enjoyed (see p. 324). How completely 
Germany had planned for the acquisition of French colonial terri- 
tory is seen in the fact that in the decisive days at the end of July, 
1 9 14, the German government expressly refused to give Great Brit- 
ain any kind of a guarantee in favor of the integrity of the French 
colonies in case of war; in other words, she announced at the outset 
her purpose of annexing, in whole or in part, French colonial ter- 
ritory after she had won the war. 

A curious chain of circumstances now brought it about that one 
of the Powers on which Germany had thought she could count was 
no longer on her side, but on that of her enemy; and this was also 
a result of colonial aspirations in Africa. After Italy's attack against 
Abyssinia had failed so disastrously, the only region left to which 
Italian colonial policy could turn was Turkish territory, a remnant 



348 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

which still remained free from European control between French 
Tunis and the virtually English possession of Egypt. The Italians 
now aspired to the conquest of Tripoli. This was especially the 
case in the fall of 191 1, when the Franco-German negotiations over 
Morocco made it clear that under no circumstances would Italy 
be able to acquire anything in North West Africa. As early as 1901 
and 1903, France and Italy had mutually guaranteed to each other 
their interests in Morocco and Tripoli; was this, therefore, not the 
right moment for Italy to foreclose her mortgage? 

But how would such an undertaking harmonize with Italy's mem- 
bership in the Triple Alliance, to say nothing of the possible re- 
proaches which might be made to her on the score of the unattrac- 
tiveness and barrenness of a region which, not without reason, had 
hitherto been neglected by the Powers? Would Italy not have to 
go over to the other coalition of Powers, if she wanted to take pos- 
session of a Turkish province? Were not her two allies the most 
determined protectors of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which 
they would not allow to be weakened on account of their opposition 
to Russia? 

Italy realized all this and had prepared herself for the situation 
some time before by refusing to defend the interests of her official 
allies during the Algeciras conference. It was quite logical that 
Italy, who had originally joined the Triple Alliance mainly out of 
regard for her African policy, should now join the other coalition, 
after it had become clear that her African policy could be better 
pursued in alliance with France and Russia than with Germany and 
Austria. But in spite of this Italy at first preserved an intermediate 
position. She deserted the principles of the Triple Alliance, but 
since her partners declared that they agreed to this under certain 
reservations, she did not break with them. 

It was under these curious circumstances that the Tripolitan War 
took place. The main military operations were almost wholly lim- 
ited to the region which Italy wanted to acquire. Any attacks on 
Turkish territory in the Balkans, which would have struck Turkey 
in her most vulnerable spot, — like the attack upon Prevesa in Epirus 
which had been counted upon so much — ^had to be renounced or 
broken off, because Austria-Hungary was unwilling under any cir- 
cumstances to allow any change in the Balkan situation. 

The official reason given as the cause of the war was that the 
Turkish government in Tripoli, in spite of Italian complaints, had 
continually put difficulties in the way of Italian settlers. An Italian 
ultimatum therefore demanded permission to occupy the Tripolitan 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 349 

territory. When this was refused, Italy declared war on September 
29, 1911. 

The Turks had not expected this step, and, thanks to the surprise 
nature of the attack, the first phase of the Italian operations was 
highly successful. Within fourteen days all five of the chief ports 
in Tripolitania were occupied by Italian troops. Already the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies began to discuss the cabinet proposal that the 
newly-conquered land, which was now given the ancient designation 
of "Libya," should be declared annexed to Italy. But the resistance 
of the enemy was by no means broken. The hostility of the native 
Mohammedan population to Christian rule found a stronger support 
in Tripoli than in Algiers. The Turks succeeded in getting modern 
guns to Tripoli, with which to arm the Arabs; they also despatched 
a corps of officers under Enver Bey to organize a defensive war 
against the invaders. The only thing that was lacking to them 
was an adequate heavy artillery. In general, however, Turkish tac- 
tics soon proved very dangerous, and it was not long before the 
Italian government considerably increased its troops and burdened 
its budget with very heavy military expenditures. The Turks did 
succeed, at times, in restricting the Italians to the possession of 
the five ports; and although the Italians succeeded in reconquering 
some of the oases near the coast, all their further advances against 
the desert tribes met with insuperable difficulties. After half a year 
of fighting the war seemed likely to drag on endlessly. This at first 
gave the advantage to the Turks, who had not been able to do much 
except send munitions to the fighting forces. 

Under these circumstances, it occurred to the Italians to bring 
the war to an end in another region. If they could not attack the 
Arab tribes in the Tripolitan deserts, why should not Turkey be 
compelled to yield by attacks on her vulnerable points, especially 
as the Italians were absolutely superior at sea? The Italians there- 
fore attempted a number of such attacks: the bombardment of 
several ports in the Red Sea, November, 191 1, to January, 191 2; 
a naval demonstration against Beirut on February 24, 1912; and 
attacks on the Dardanelles, in April and July, 191 2. But here it 
became very clear how greatly Italy was hampered by her member- 
ship in the Triple Alliance. She had been denied any attack on 
the Balkans, as has just been stated, because of the opposition of 
her allies. Any effective attack upon Syria was not possible, 
because here the interests of Italy came into conflict with those 
of France and England, who had no reason to show any regard for 
a member of the opposing coalition. So, of all Italy's efforts, the 



350 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

only one of permanent consequence was her occupation of Rhodes 
and the dozen neighboring islands known as the "Dodecanese"; 
these gave Italy an important mortgage in hand when it came to 
peace negotiations. 

The occupation of Rhodes was also the decisive step. The Tur- 
kish government now perceived that a continuation of the war would 
only result in further losses of territory, and declared that she was 
ready for official peace negotiations in Lausanne; and as Turkey 
was now threatened by the Balkan League and its first victories, she 
consented to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October i8, 191 2. 
This satisfied Italy's claims for the most part. Not only was Italy's 
conquest of Tripolitania virtually recognized by Turkey, but the 
Italians were allowed to keep the islands in the ^Egean until the 
last Turkish officer had left Tripoli. The Sultan of Turkey retained 
only his religious sovereignty over the ceded territories, a concession 
which could only have serious consequences for Italy in case Turkey 
was able to support her demands with military measures; so Italy 
naturally came to be opposed to the maintenance of the Turkish 
power in its existing extent. 

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Italy did not judge 
it wise to break with either of the two coalitions of allied Powers. 
Scarcely was the Peace of Lusanne signed, when she gave her con- 
sent on December 5, 19 12, to a further renewal of the Triple Al- 
liance. Her allies had to recognize expressly her sovereignty over 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy was thus free to join, according 
to circumstances, whichever coalition promised her greater as- 
sistance in her policy of expansion in the Mediterranean. On the 
other hand, it was clear that the Triple Alliance could only be per- 
manent in case Austria-Hungary held strictly to the agreement, 
repeated in the new text of the Triple Alliance treaty, by which 
Italy and Austria-Hungary were to act in common and upon a foot- 
ing of equality in the Balkans. As Italy had been forced to submit 
to painful limitations in her war with Turkey out of regard for 
Austria's Balkan policy, she would hold fast to the Alliance only 
so long as her Austrian partner refrained from independent action 
in the Balkans. This was one of the main reasons why the Alliance 
was denounced prematurely by Italy. 

The African colonial policy of the European Great Powers — the 
partition of Africa among themselves — had at first resulted in a 
more or less easy division, but had then come to exercise a dominat- 
ing influence upon the relation of the Powers to one another in 
Europe, where opposing interests were becoming sharper and sharper. 



THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 351 

It became increasingly difficult to satisfy new Powers with all that 
they wanted, when the African territory had already been wholly 
divided up, without seriously injuring old legal owners. Not in 
vain had Africa been Europeanized ; it now became the battle-field 
and the military objective of European armies. 



CHAPTER XXX 

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. II: ASIA AND 
AUSTRALASIA 

In Asia the new character of European colonial policy was no less 
evident than in Africa. In Asia also there was an increase in the 
number of the Powers who were trying to acquire colonial posses- 
sions. To those nations which had been seeking to maintain or 
extend traditional interests were now added others which were pur- 
suing a colonial policy simply for its own sake. And in Western 
and Central Asia the result was much the same as in Africa: at the 
end of the period there survived no really independent states, that 
is, native states, which did not exist either by the grace or the jeal- 
ousy of the Great Powers of Europe. Very different, on the con- 
trary, was the case in Eastern Asia. Here took place on a great 
scale what had happened in Africa only in the Abyssinian region: one 
native state succeeded by its own power in triumphantly opposing 
European pressure, and another, though defenseless at first, was at 
least strong enough to proceed to Europeanize its resources and 
political organization. 

Of the territorial acquisitions made by European Powers which 
did not take part in the partition of Asia in the first half of the nine- 
teenth century, the most important were those of France. 

French colonial policy in Eastern Asia in its beginnings reaches 
back to the time of the Second Empire, when it was little more than 
a matter of prestige. The "Emperor" of Annam put to death some 
Christian missionaries in 1858 and refused to make amends. There- 
upon Napoleon III despatched an expedition and the Asiatic prince 
had to cede his southern provinces, including Saigon; these consti- 
tuted French Cochin-China in 1862. This proceeding made such 
an impression in the region that the neighboring King of Cambodia, 
who felt threatened by the more powerful ruler of Siam, put him- 
self under French protection; and in 1867 those of his provinces 
which lay next to Cochin-China were cut off and annexed to the 
French colony. 

Cochin-China in itself was not of great value. And if the French 
had hoped to acquire a part of the South China trade, the hope 

3S2 



ir ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 353 

vanished when the bold explorations of two French officers made 
it certain that the Mekong River, which empties into the sea through 
Cochin-China, was not navigable. They found that for the China 
trade the only suitable river was the Red River, or Song-Ka, which 
empties into the sea through Tongking, far to the north of Cochin- 
China. 

Here in Tongking began the really new colonial policy of France, 
dictated by modern commercial motives. French merchants estab- 
lished some settlements in Tongking and sought to exploit the new 
trade route. But they foimd a cool reception among the officials 
of Annam. An unfortunate incident occurred: French officers seized 
fortified places near the mouth of the Song-Ka, and in doing so 
were killed in 1873. The French government at the moment was 
not inclined toward an aggressive colonial policy. It refrained from 
reprisals and contented itself with the Treaty of Saigon of 1874, 
by which the Emperor of Annam promised to open Tongking to 
French trade and even recognized an indefinite kind of French 
protectorate. 

But in practice this treaty proved worthless. The ruler of Annam 
could disregard his promises the more easily from the fact that 
nominally he stood under Chinese suzerainty and was encouraged 
more or less officially by China to oppose the foreigners, so that 
the situation of the French merchants in Tongking was exceedingly 
precarious. Trade on the Song-Ka was out of the question. In ad- 
dition to all this, a French detachment, which had seized the fortress 
of Hanoi on the Song-Ka in order to secure respect for the treaty, 
was ambushed by bands known as "Black Flags," and annihilated 
in 1883. 

Thereupon the French Government decided to intervene in Tong- 
king in earnest. A regular expedition was fitted out. From this 
moment there was no longer any question of serious resistance either 
by Annam or by China. The new Emperor of Annam signed the 
Treaty of Hue by which he recognized a French protectorate. China 
gave way soon afterwards, after her troops, along with the "Black 
Flags," had been chased out of the Tongking territory; and on May 
II, 1884, Li-Hung-Chang signed in his country's name the Treaty 
of Tien-Tsin, by which the Chinese promised to recall the rest of 
their troops from the fortified places in Tongking and to recognize 
the French protectorate over both Tongking and Annam. 

China's signature, however, as it seems, was only a sham. French 
troops occupying the northern part of Tongking met with difficulties, 
as Chinese troops blocked the way. Therefore the French decided 



354 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

to strike a blow against China itself and secure guarantees that the 
treaty would be observed. They began a campaign which was 
splendidly conducted and lasted seven months during 1884-85. The 
French army destroyed the Chinese arsenal of Fuchau, 32 kilometers 
from the coast in Fukien Province, blockaded the island of Formosa 
off the coast, and occupied the Pescadores Islands which lie between 
Formosa and the mainland. Then the French decreed a rice-block- 
ade against the Gulf of Pechili, i.e., against Peking; North China, 
which was accustomed to import its rice supply from the southern 
provinces by sea, was to be starved into submission. Two Chinese 
cruisers which tried to break through the blockade were torpedoed. 
At the same time an effort was made to clear the Chinese troops 
completely out of Tongking. 

Although in this last operation the Chinese won some considerable 
successes — which led to the overthrow of the Ferry ministry which 
had begun the war — the general military situation was such that 
China had no alternative but to yield. A second time a treaty was 
signed at Tien-Tsin on June 9, 1885, which not only confirmed the 
treaty of the preceding year, but which also conceded to the French 
freedom of trade in the southern provinces of China. 

France thus acquired final control over Tongking and Annam. 
But how little the French at that time realized the importance of 
colonial possessions is shown by the fact that the credits asked by 
the government for the occupation of Tongking in accordance with 
the treaty were voted by the Chamber of Deputies only by the nar- 
row majority of 274 to 270 (December, 1885). 

But within a decade public opinion in France changed and un- 
reservedly supported the extension and safeguarding of the colonies 
in Eastern Asia. At first the various territories were consolidated 
for technical administrative reasons; Annam, Cambodia, Tongking 
and Cochin-China were united under "The General Government of 
Indo-China." Then the connections between the different parts, 
especially between Tongking in the north and Cambodia in the 
south, were improved by bringing the whole course of the Mekong 
under French control. The King of Siam, who held important posi- 
tions on the river at two points, was compelled by the Treaty of 
October 3, 1893, to cede the whole left bank to the French, and to 
promise not to erect any fortifications within 25 kilometers of the 
right or west bank. In 1896 the English, who by the occupation of 
Burma had become neighbors of the French, recognized the rights 
of the French on the Mekong where the river touched British terri- 
tory. Finally, in 1907, some southern provinces occupied by Siam 



II : ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 355 

were annexed, so that French Indo-China formed a solid and well- 
rounded economic whole. The independence of Siam — which lay 
between English and French territory in somewhat the same way 
as Afghanistan lay between British and Russian — was mutually 
guaranteed by both Powers. 

During the same period European nations were acquiring pos- 
sessions in Oceanica, though they are of less importance in world 
history. The islands of the Pacific in themselves were much easier 
to conquer than the Asiatic territories; but because of their sub- 
ordinate economic importance, at first at any rate, they had hardly 
attracted the attention of the European Powers. In 1843 the French 
proclaimed a protectorate over Tahiti, and in 1853 they annexed 
New Caledonia, to be a penal settlement like that of the original 
English settlement in Australia. Later annexations in the Pacific 
took place largely to satisfy the whites in Australia, who feared not 
without reason that their peaceful existence would be threatened 
if other Great Powers besides England made extensive conquests. 
Therefore the Australians continually urged London to extend more 
widely the area of British rule. 

The new era of British annexations began in 1875 with England's 
occupation of the Fiji Islands. The Australian province of Queens- 
land also desired the annexation of New Guinea; but the British 
Government at first declined. Only after Germany had annexed a 
part of the island did the English step in; New Guinea was then 
divided in 1886 between Germany, Holland and Great Britain. In 
the following years, a systematic partitioning of the islands of the 
Pacific took place, and the process has been going on in detail up 
to the most recent times. Many groups of islands were split up 
after the fashion of New Guinea — the Samoan Islands, for instance, 
between Germany and the United States, and the New Hebrides 
under a joint Anglo-French "control." Here in the Pacific the 
same thing took place as in Africa, only on a smaller scale; the Eu- 
ropeanization of the world was extended to Oceanica. 

Of far greater importance was the first collision which took place 
between one of the Great Powers of Europe and one of the European- 
ized nations of Eastern Asia. 

China's military weakness, which had been revealed in the Tong- 
king war, was soon afterwards again made evident in her war with 
Japan (see p. 161 f.). Japan's victory was so crushing that the Great 
Powers of Europe did not allow her to make full use of it: they 
not only compelled her to forego some of her conquests, but com- 



356 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

pensated themselves at China's expense. Thus Russia secured from 
China the right to lease Port Arthur and to extend the Trans-Siberian 
Railway across Manchuria. France received similar concessions, 
and also an important port in South China. Great Britain received 
Wei-hai-wei opposite Port Arthur. Germany occupied Kiaochau in 
the Shantung Peninsula. Italy alone had her demands refused. 
Everywhere the foreigners began to construct railways for which 
China had to grant concessions. 

Then a national Chinese reaction against the "Foreign Devils" 
began. This time the movement took place mainly, not in the South 
as formerly, but in the northern provinces which had felt most 
severely the political and commercial invasion of the European na- 
tions. The members of the secret societies who wanted to fight the 
Europeans were known as "Boxers," and they received underhand 
support from the Chinese Government, especially after 1898, when 
the Dowager Empress, Tsu-Hsi, seized the power from the young 
Emperor Kwang-Su, who wanted to introduce reforms after the 
Japanese fashion. 

The Boxer movement broke out in the early summer of 1900. 
Connections between Tien-Tsin and Peking were cut in June, many 
Christians were murdered in Peking, and the European Legations 
were besieged and partly destroyed. The German ambassador was 
one of those killed. But the senseless revolt quickly collapsed. An 
international army was sent up from Tien-Tsin and relieved the Le- 
gations without great difficulty, so that China had to renew the con- 
cessions made to the European Powers and also pay a heavy in- 
demnity. 

The Europeans then took up the penetration of China with re- 
doubled zeal. But it soon appeared that they had to reckon with 
a new opponent who was more dangerous than China. 

Of all the European nations Russia had the greatest interest in 
getting a firm footing in Eastern Asia. As the population in Russia 
rapidly increased, Siberia gained an undreamt-of importance as 
colonial land. Russian peasants had migrated there in large num- 
bers, and though they settled mostly in Western Siberia, it became 
increasingly important to make sure of the East. Siberia must be 
brought into close contact with the mother country and with the 
trade of the world; care must be taken so that Russia's overwhelm- 
ing military force could be available for use in the Far East against 
China and Japan. These ideas found most definite expression in 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was begun 
in 1 89 1 and completed ten years later. This mighty strategic 



II: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 357 

undertaking, which connected Moscow with Port Arthur as well 
as with Vladivostok, not only made it possible to forward large 
masses of troops in brief time to the Chinese frontier, but also stimu- 
lated to a large degree the immigration into Siberia. The products 
of the Siberian mines and farms and the tea of China could now 
be transported cheaply to the markets of Europe. 

It was easy to carry on this policy which concentrated, so to 
speak, all Russia's imperialistic tendencies on Eastern Asia, so long 
as it touched China only, but the Russians went ahead with just as 
little regard for the existing and future aspirations of the Japanese. 
They tried to occupy the harbor of INIasampo in Southern Korea, 
and threatened to bring the Korean Peninsula under their influence. 
They intended not only to deprive Japan of Korea (see p. 162), but 
also to cut off, as far as possible, all connection between Japan 
and China. With this in view they fortified strongly their naval 
base at Port Arthur. 

But Japan had no intention willingly to allow this to take place. 
Now that she had Europeanized her military organization, she felt 
equal in power to the great nations of Europe and she knew also 
that henceforth her policy of expansion would not have the whole 
European concert opposed to her. England, the old rival of Russian 
policy in Asia, had signed an alliance with Japan in 1902 and this 
had disrupted the harmony among the European Powers. The Tokio 
government therefore demanded of Russia that she recognize the 
independence both of Korea and Manchuria, that is, of the two ter- 
ritories which the Russians were intending to treat as their sphere 
of influence. Just like the European states, Japan also could insist 
that her own excess population needed Korea, both as a place for 
colonial settlement and as a market for Japanese manufactured 
goods. 

When the Russians merely gave evasive answers, Japan suddenly 
opened war a few months later. On February 9, 1904, without 
warning, she torpedoed at Port Arthur several of the best Russian 
ships in the Pacific. 

The war which began in this way lasted eighteen months and 
resulted in one defeat after another for the Russians. As in the 
case of the war with China earlier (see p. 161), Japan at once showed 
herself unquestionably superior at sea. Again it was evident that 
an absolutistic state was unable to accomplish naval results which 
were worth much of anything (see p. 37). On April 11, 1904, the 
Russian flagship Petropavlovsk was torpedoed, and thereafter the 
Japanese were in absolute control of the sea. 



358 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

On land the Japanese quickly drove the Russians out of Korea 
and forced them back into Manchuria beyond the Yalu River which 
separates Manchuria and Korea. This was followed in September, 
1904, by the Russian defeat at Liao-Yang. Port Arthur was then 
shut in and, being without reinforcements, had to surrender on 
January 2, 1905, after a siege of seven months. This set free more 
Japanese troops for service in Manchuria, where the Japanese armies 
were now able to concentrate and defeat the Russians in a fourteen 
days' battle at the Mukden, which was followed by the siege of the 
city of Mukden in March, 1905. The Japanese victories were in- 
complete only to the extent that the Russian army was able to 
withdraw in orderly fashion and take up new positions further north 
from which the Japanese were unable to dislodge them. 

In spite of this, the situation was most unfavorable to the Rus- 
sians. They had lost altogether, or in large part, both the territories 
for which they had risked war with Japan, and they had no hope of 
reconquering them. They therefore decided to make one desperate 
effort — to use the Baltic fleet which had been despatched around the 
world to help the armies in Manchuria; but the effort was in vain. 
The fleet was totally destroyed by the Japanese on May 30, 1905, 
near Tsu-shima Island in the Straits of Korea. 

Under these circumstances the Russians gladly accepted President 
Roosevelt's offer of mediation. Negotiations were opened at Ports- 
mouth in the United States and led to the signing of a treaty of 
peace on September 5, 1905. By this treaty Russia had to give up 
all her intentions against Japan. She resigned to her opponent the 
protectorate over Korea and ceded Port Arthur and the southern 
half of the Island of Sakhalin. Furthermore, she agreed to evacuate 
Manchuria, which was to be given back to China and to be open to 
the trade of all nations. 

Aside from these territorial agreements the Peace of Portsmouth 
marks a turning point in the history of the world. It was the first 
time that a non-European Power had proved herself superior in 
war to a European Great Power. It had been shown that the pupil 
might be more powerful than his teacher. It had been proved that 
European states, which had enjoyed a superiority due to the fact 
that they had gotten a start in technical inventions, might be easily 
overtaken by peoples of another race, and that the rule over the 
world which Europeans had established in the nineteenth century 
rested on a much more precarious basis than had hitherto been sup- 
posed. In many regions the triumph of the Japanese acted as a 
stimulus toward imitation of Europeans. It also strengthened 



II: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 359 

greatly the opposition to the tendency of Europeans to exploit non- 
European peoples. In comparison with these results all other con- 
sequences were quite subordinate, even such as the effects at home 
which the defeat of the Russian armies had upon the constitutional 
development of the Tsar's empire (see ch. xxxiii). 

It was in China that the lessons to be drawn from the Russo- 
Japanese war were most quickly turned to effect. The reactionary 
nationalistic "Boxer" tendencies disappeared completely. The gov- 
ernment itself now undertook to Europeanize China. It abolished 
tlie old system of examinations for civil officials which rested on a 
literary humanistic basis. Torture and penalties involving mutila- 
tion of the body were done away with. Even private practices, like 
the foot-binding of women of the upper class, were forbidden. 
Obstacles were no longer placed in the way of building railroads 
and establishing schools. Japanese teachers were engaged and 
numerous Chinese were sent to Europe to complete their education. 
As in the case of Japan, there followed at the same time a Euro- 
peanization of the system of government, that is, a reform in a 
liberal direction. In 1906 the government sent a commission to 
Europe to study the various forms of political institutions, and 
when this returned and made its report, the Dowager Empress, as 
regent, announced the issue of a constitution for China. 

But however progressive the Manchu dynasty professed to be in 
appearance, it soon appeared that it was not able, or perhaps did 
not desire, to carry out a real Europeanization of the country. A 
situation in which a foreign warrior tribe ruled the country was only 
tolerable so long as the Manchus were able to protect the empire 
against outsiders. Now the Manchus had shown themselves unable 
to prevent the intrusion of Europeans. Furthermore, it was in 
direct contradiction with European political notions that the 
supreme government should be conducted without any participation 
by Chinese natives, especially as it was in the hands of a foreign 
tribe which was of a lower civilization. It was not to be expected, 
therefore, that under these circumstances the Manchus would hon- 
estly assist in modernizing China when this would threaten at the 
same time their own authority. In vain did the government urge 
intermarriage between Manchus and Chinese — by which the ruling 
race, as such, would have ceased to exist. In vain did it issue lib- 
eral announcements. In 1908 the Dowager Empress and her son, 
who was a minor, suddenly died within twenty-four hours of one 
another and in 19 12 the Manchu dynasty was definitely overthrown. 
China became a republic with Yuan-shi-kai as Provisional President. 



36o ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

This transformation of China into a republic was merely the last 
step in a movement which had begun after the death of the Dowager 
Empress. In 1909, as a preparation for a future parliamentary form 
of government, provincial assemblies had been established. In 1910 
a national assembly consisting chiefly of officials was called together, 
which, in turn, demanded the immediate calling of a national Chinese 
parliament. This demand was conceded in 1912, and in 1913 there 
came together the first parliament, which confirmed the Provisional 
President in his office. But this did not bring about any regular 
functioning of the new political institutions, for the president's first 
act was to exclude his opponents from parliament and to dissolve 
the assembly. Since that time, China has been unable to emerge 
from the revolutionary stage and yet the process of Europeanization 
has not been undone. These results are closely connected with the 
size and organization of the Chinese empire, which differs so much 
from Japan. Japan is a relatively small territory with a unified 
population; there it was merely a question of replacing the rule of 
a caste by that of the old national imperial system ; but the gigantic 
area of the Chinese empire includes sharp contrasts. It had been 
held together hitherto merely by the rule ot a foreign dynasty. As 
soon as this was overthrown the question arose as to which part of 
the empire could assume the leadership. At once rival struggles 
broke out between the provinces, especially between those of the 
North and the South, The wealth of China lies more in the southern 
provinces, which lead in trade and industry, than in the region 
around Peking, which had become the capital mainly for military 
reasons. The South was therefore not at all inclined to subordi- 
nate itself to the control of the North which could only justify its 
claim by the fact that it possessed the capital. Out of this question 
arose rebellion and one civil war after another, and this is essentially 
the situation at the moment at which these lines are being written. 
The future of the Middle Kingdom is not clear. At the present 
moment, one can merely say that China's economic strength and 
productivity have been scarcely weakened by all this political con- 
fusion. The people of China have developed their economic life to 
a high point which, in its way, can scarcely be matched, and they 
have done this by their own initiative and without having to follow 
the directions of a central government. Therefore disturbances in 
the functioning of the central governmental machine have less serious 
consequences than would be the case in other countries. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. Ill: THE ANGLO- 
SAXON EMPIRES 

The most novel and modern colonial policy is that which has been 
pursued during the last half century by the two Anglo-Saxon em- 
pires, Great Britain and the United States. A wholly new type of 
federal state has been created by the British. A commonwealth 
which has wholly given up the old traditional forceful methods, it 
scarcely deserves the name of a political state, and yet in the end 
it has proven to be firmer than many another organization which 
is held together by force of arms. It is the purpose of this chapter 
briefly to describe this new phenomenon. The order followed will 
be to give an account first of the growth of the British Empire, then 
of the new world policy of the United States, and finally of the 
relations which have been established between these two empires. 

It must be expressly noted, especially as concerns the British 
Empire, that naturally only the so-called self-governing colonies or 
"Dominions" will be considered, that is, only the outlying colonies 
which are overwhelmingly settled by white men. For reasons which 
are evident, these are the only regions which can be regarded as 
sharing in the new "imperial" policy. In this chapter, therefore, I 
shall wholly leave out of account the colonies which are inhabited 
mainly by non-Europeans; the essential facts in regard to these 
have already been given in other connections (see ch. xviii for 
India, and chs. xxix-xxx for observations in regard to the British 
acquisitions in Central Africa and the Pacific). 

Let us take first British colonial policy, that is, England's relation 
to the settlements which have been made by white men outside 
Europe. 

The history of these relations is dominated by one single event: 
the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies gave a warning which could not 
be ignored by any English government. The demand of England 
which led to the revolt was that the colonies should bear their part 
of the military expenditures raised for the common interest. The 
Americans, however, had opposed this with the claim that as free 

361 



362 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

men they ought not to be called upon to pay taxes which had been 
voted, not by themselves, but by the Parliament at London. With 
the aid of the French this claim was triumphantly maintained and 
led to the loss of what was at that time the most important colony 
of white settlers. 

This had the result that other colonies in an analogous position 
were granted greater constitutional rights: in 1791, shortly after 
the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies, Canada was given a constitution. 
England renounced completely the earlier and, in itself, natural 
principle that obligations and rights ought to correspond to one 
another. Gradually she granted the colonies all the rights of self- 
government, even the right of having commercial policies of their 
own which might possibly be directed against the mother country; 
but in spite of this she also assumed, as before, all the military 
burdens, especially the burden of defense upon the sea. 

This was an altogether peculiar relationship. The citizen of the 
Dominions enjoyed all the advantages which come from belonging 
to a Great Power; the British fleet and British power protected him 
and his interests, but in return he himself did not have to assume 
the slightest obligation. He did not even have to contribute to the 
limited military taxes demanded of the inhabitants of the mother 
country. He was privileged in every respect: not only was he free 
from a financial burden, but he was spared all the difficult problems 
which arise in a liberally governed state from the union of the mili- 
tary and civil administrations. 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that about the 
middle of the nineteenth century, when the more advanced colonies 
began to pursue a tariff policy of their own — Canada introduced a 
protective tariff in 1859 — there developed in England, especially in 
strongly Liberal circles, a strong movement in favor of complete 
separation of the colonies. Since the colonies no longer adapted 
themselves to the wishes of the mother country, and no longer had 
regard for her interests — ^why should the connection which had 
become merely formal be continued any longer? Why should Eng- 
land assume duties and secure no services in return? Would not 
the connection due to the community of speech, of customs, and of 
political thought make itself just as strongly felt if the last remnants 
of the earlier dependence were done away with, leaving the colonies 
and the mother country to stand side by side as independent states 
with equal rights? 

This view, however, never prevailed, and events have proved that 
it was not well grounded. It is precisely this virtually complete 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 363 

freedom, in fact this privileged position which England has given 
her colonies, which has kept alive and untroubled the feeling of 
attachment which emigrant children have toward the mother coun- 
try. It is this which has taught them really to prize their membership 
in the British Empire. And, since the mother country never used 
compulsion, the Dominions, at least in large part, have ever been 
ready in time of need to give voluntary assistance on a wide scale. 
The correct treatment of colonies, the correct procedure in those 
questions of imperial policy which affect the particular interests 
of special regions in different and often contradictory ways, was and 
remains a difficult matter for the English government. It has often 
demanded almost superhuman political tact and an extraordinary 
adaptability in making political compromises, but the positive ad- 
vantage which has resulted to England, be it noted on the other 
side, is the fact that any idea of an armed uprising (like that, for 
instance, of the Thirteen Colonies) has never since been considered 
in the British colonies. The mother country has been spared the 
need of any kind of military preparations and burdens to prevent 
uprisings, at least in the regions occupied by Anglo-Saxons. 

The development of the Dominions themselves has been dependent 
in the nineteenth century mainly on population conditions in Europe, 
and in a lesser degree on economic events, such as the discovery of 
gold in Australia, which have attracted to the colonies other persons 
than those who have been driven there through the pressure of excess 
population. This was of importahce for the future; it increased 
essentially the preponderance of an English element among the im- 
migrants. It has been pointed out above that the European country 
which prior to 1850 was chiefly compelled to send a part of its 
population overseas was Great Britain, which by that time had 
become an industrial country. The settlers who went out to South 
Africa and Australia were of English descent; as a result not only 
were new colonies, like New Zealand, prevailingly English from the 
outset, so that immigrants from other nations were assimilated by 
the dominant race, but also even colonies which originally were not 
made up mainly of an English population, like the Dutch in the 
Cape Colony, or the French in Canada, acquired a strongly English 
stamp. 

In the first half of the nineteenth century the European emigra- 
tion to the English colonies was still so slight in comparison with 
the stream of emigrants which flowed into the United States that 
the Australian continent could still be used as a penal settlement. 
Though an English immigration into South Africa began as early 



364 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

as 1819, free colonists did not settle in Australia until 1828, nor in 
New Zealand until the years 1839-41. The sending of convicts to 
New South Wales was not limited until 1840, and did not cease 
completely until 1851; in Van Diemen's Land it did not cease until 
1853. As late as 1849 the territory of West Australia, which was 
less favorably adapted to colonists, still asked for the sending out 
of convicts. 

Shortly after this, however, occurred an event which attracted 
great numbers of free white settlers to Australia. In 185 1 the first 
gold was discovered and there began on a large scale that movement 
to the fifth continent which, as far as a good part of its area is 
concerned, is much less favorable for agriculture than Canada or 
even New Zealand. The number of inhabitants in the colony of 
Victoria rose from 77,000 in 1851 to 731,000 twenty years later. 
It was not until 1870 that the number of immigrants sharply de- 
clined. The country was then so thickly settled that it could not 
easily absorb a large stream of people without property; as there 
were no regular "poor" in Australia, such new immigrants would 
have been a danger for the people already settled there. They would 
have remained proletarians and would have tended to depress the 
relatively high wages of the workingmen who had settled there 
earlier. Furthermore, occupations like cattle and sheep raising, 
which formed the main support of the Australians, need only a 
relatively small population. If the population had become much 
denser the Australians would have been less able to support them- 
selves by their profitable exports, which had been made possible by 
the invention of refrigeration for transporting meat and other food 
products to Europe. 

The workingmen especially therefore were strongly opposed to 
immigration, and since 1873 nothing has been done to stimulate it. 
For the growing population itself, care was particularly taken in 
Australia that the large landed estates, so far as they had survived 
from the time of the first settlements, should be divided up more 
or less voluntarily. In the i86o's and '70's, legislation in many of 
the colonies had attempted to stimulate agriculture and the develop- 
ment of small peasant proprietors; then in the 1890's all the colonial 
governments in Australia attacked directly large estates and made 
possible the compulsory dividing-up of large lands. This was most 
energetically done in New Zealand, where somewhat the same cli- 
matic conditions exist as in England and where the country is there- 
fore particularly well suited for the extension of agriculture. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century four times as much land was 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 365 

cultivated as in 1870; sugar, wheat, and fruits could be exported in 
considerable quantities. This prosperous development was power- 
fully supported by the building of railways, largely undertaken by 
the governments, which brought the interior into direct connection 
with the ports of the country. 

Though the country was large, the natural increase of popu- 
lation was so limited that even modern France scarcely shows a 
smaller increase in population. The Australians, and still more, 
perhaps, the New Zealanders began to take care to preserve that 
satisfactory condition of economic equilibrium which secures to 
every one who wants to work an adequate livelihood, and which 
also prevents both excessive wealth and wretched poverty. The 
problem, indeed, was not simple in its solution. It is only in theory 
that states exist in isolation, and only a Utopian can construct a 
community which is rationally organized according to its own de- 
sires. In practice, the higher the standard of living rises, the 
greater is the danger that foreigners will come in who will work 
for less and underbid the natives. In Australia and New Zealand 
these dangerous foreigners were the neighboring East Asiatics and 
particularly the intelligent and industrious Chinese. At first, so long 
as there was a lack of labor supply, Chinese and Hindu coolies were 
imported by the Australians themselves, but when whole masses of 
Chinese began to enter the country after the first discoveries of 
gold, the Australians began to adopt their first defensive measures: 
ship owners who imported Chinese had to pay a special tax from 
1855 to 1861. This law, and others like it, were, however, not 
prohibitive, and remained in force only so long as the gold fever 
lasted. It was not until later, in the i88o's, that stricter measures 
were adopted. The Chinese were then excluded from work in the 
mines and from naturalization, and in 1888 had to pay a heavy 
poll-tax. Later, from 1897 to 1899, the example of the southern 
states in the American Union was adopted in various Australian 
states and in New Zealand: immigrants had to show an "evidence 
of education" which in practice resulted in a complete exclusion of 
"undesirables." What had formerly been merely the expression of 
class interests, now became a national ideal. It was no longer merely 
the workingmen who desired the exclusion of cheap labor; all the 
rest of the population insisted on keeping the land pure of elements 
which, on account of their foreign unassimilable character, might 
easily be an obstacle to the democratic development of the country. 
How strongly this feeling permeates all classes is best seen in the 
fact that since 1905 the Australians have preferred the lesser evil 



366 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

of attracting white settlers again. Though competition from whites 
may be ever so unwelcome, it is still far less dangerous than that 
of the Chinese! 

Military considerations have also had an influence. Was it not 
conceivable that some day China or some other Asiatic power would 
no longer tolerate the exclusion of its children and would try to 
compel the Australians by force to give up laws which were hostile 
to Asiatics? Against an actual attack, the colonies were, for the 
present, protected by British power, but even England was not al- 
ways free in her attitude, and so Australia finally had to give a 
welcome to new settlers who, as far as race interests were concerned, 
would have a feeling of solidarity with the old colonists. 

Under these circumstances, the connection with the mother coun- 
try gained new importance, both positively and negatively; posi- 
tively, in so far as protection by England assumed new importance ; 
and negatively in so far as the colonies wished to be in a position 
to defend their own interests themselves, whenever their attitude 
should happen to be in contradiction with the imperial policy di- 
rected from London, England made no opposition to this. On the 
contrary, the more the colonies developed their military resources, 
which, however, were quite limited, the more the mother country 
loosened her connection with them and did away with practically 
everything which served as a reminder of her control over the mem- 
bers of the Empire. 

Thus, at present, there are no longer any "imperial troops" in the 
Dominions. Even the execution of laws for the protection of na- 
tives, which in a way have formed a natural prerogative of the 
mother country, has been put into the hands of the colonial gov- 
ernments. The possibility of appealing from colonial courts to a 
supreme court in London has been partly put an end to, and partly 
so limited that the right must be regarded as virtually obsolete. 
Even in diplomatic relations the colonies have acquired a position 
of equality and the right to make treaties. Since 1877 it has been 
an established principle that the colonies may or may not, as suits 
them, adopt commercial treaties which have been made by the Im- 
perial Government; in 1900 this principle was extended to all inter- 
national agreements. No control is even exercised by London to 
ensure freedom of movement from one colony to another; the 
Dominions are free in the management of their immigration ques- 
tions, and Australia and Canada have the right to exclude a British 
subject from entering their country merely on the grounds that he 
appears to be "undesirable." 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 367 

In spite of this, or because of it, the British Empire has held 
solidly together. The feeling of unity and the realization of the 
advantages of political connection with Great Britain have been 
strong enough to make up for the lack of a federal organization. 
It was also a great advantage that not only were the language and 
customs everywhere the same, but also the political institutions. If 
one considers how greatly the unification of the German lands was 
hindered by the variety of political ideals from Prussian East Elbian 
territory to the South German states; or if one recalls what a great 
obstacle to the continuance of the union resulted from the existence 
of slavery in the southern states of America, then one can easily 
judge what an advantage the British Dominions have enjoyed 
through the fact that their political institutions have everywhere 
rested upon tlie same modern democratic basis. No colony has ever 
been compelled for the sake of unity to give up the liberal institu- 
tions and forms which it loves. On the contrary, the connection 
between the Dominions has resulted in reforms which have been 
introduced in one colony being adopted soon in another. Even the 
mother country herself, which, for reasons easy to understand, has 
retained more traces than the Dominions of her pre-revolutionary 
political organization, shows an increasing tendency, as time goes 
on, to copy political innovations from her colonies. An example of 
this is the spread of woman's suffrage. Women were first given 
equal political rights with men in New Zealand in 1893; during the 
following decade woman's suffrage spread through all the Australian 
states and about fifteen years later, in 19 18, it became law in Great 
Britain likewise. 

Gradually also the mother country ceased to oppose in any way 
the union into a federal commonwealth of colonies which were geo- 
graphically close together. From the standpoint of Machiavellian 
doctrine it would have been quite natural to keep the individual 
colonies as isolated politically as possible, in order to make it easier 
to control them; and in Canada, at least, England originally pur- 
sued this plan, although the separation into two provinces which 
was made in 1791 aimed primarily at protecting the weaker Anglo- 
Saxon population from being outvoted by the French. But whatever 
may have been the attitude of the London government at first, here, 
also, it later adopted a policy of trustfulness and liberty instead of 
suspicious calculations. Canada was later united again in 1840; in 
1867 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were added; and the whole 
federation was given the name of "Dominion of Canada." Similarly 
no obstacles were placed in the way of the Australian states when, 



368 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

after long negotiations, they were united into a federal common- 
wealth in 1900. 

This policy of federal organization and liberty was even applied 
in South Africa, where national differences and a war which had 
scarcely ended might have made the experiment seem especially 
dangerous. 

In order rightly to understand this one must go back a little in 
the narrative. 

When the English acquired Cape Colony as the result of the Revo- 
lutionary wars, she gained possession of a colony which was of great 
importance in view of her connection with India, and one which was 
at the same time largely settled by white men. But the population 
was not of English nationality. It was almost exclusively composed 
of planters of Dutch and French descent — Boers — who had forced 
the native population into a condition of semi-slavery, and who had 
taken the privileged position of a ruling race. The English occupa- 
tion now disturbed these patriarchical conditions. The Boers deter- 
mined therefore to escape from this new situation by emigrating, 
and, since the territory north of Cape Colony was still vacant and 
unclaimed by any European state, an emigration took place lasting 
more than twenty years, without interference, at any rate, by any 
European Powers. The first of these "Treks" or migrations took 
place in 1836, and led to the establishment of the Orange State. 
Other Boers later attempted to establish a colony in Natal; but 
since their settlement approached the sea and might have been 
dangerous to the ocean route to India they were soon pursued by 
the British; as the Boers wanted to remain independent they pushed 
further inland toward the northwest beyond the Vaal river and 
founded the "Transvaal" State (1845-1852). 

The founding of these states took place just at the time when 
the Liberal movement in England which placed little value on 
colonial possessions had reached its height; and furthermore, since 
the Boers had settled exclusively in the interior of the country 
where the British were not yet at all interested, the English 
government had no objection to recognizing the two new states, the 
Transvaal Republic in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854. 

But this attitude of toleration came to an end when the new 
colonial policy began to develop, when Africa began to be sys- 
tematically partitioned, and when the interior of the Continent began 
to be marked off into European spheres of influence. Even before 
this the Boers had been interfered with in various ways. Diamonds 
had been discovered in 1871 at Kimberley in the Orange Free State; 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRE 369 

these diamond fields had to be ceded by the Republic to the English 
in return for some compensation. Then, in 1877, the Boers made 
a new advance toward the Indian Ocean, but were driven back 
by the war-like Kaffir tribes. The British government took advan- 
tage of this opportunity to proclaim the annexation of the Transvaal 
at Pretoria, the capital of the territory. At the same time, also, the 
British took up the war with the Zulus, whom the Boers had not 
been able to overcome, and after considerable efforts brought it to 
an end. It was in the course of this undertaking that Napoleon 
Ill's only son, who had enlisted with the English as a volunteer, 
was killed by Zulu spears on June i, 1879. 

Immediately after the annexation of the Transvaal a number of 
the Boers had begun a new Trek northwards into the region of 
Portuguese East Africa. But even those who remained behind were 
unwilling to submit to British rule. Under their three leaders, 
Pretorius, Joubert, and Kriiger, a revolt broke out, which, thanks 
to a number of successful battles on the border of Natal, including 
especially one at Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881, turned out 
wholly in favor of the Boers. England had to give in and by the 
treaty of August 3, 1881, recognized anew the independence of the 
two Boer republics, though with a reservation as to British suze- 
rainty. A new treaty of February 27, 1884, in return for certain 
concessions of territory, limited Great Britain's authority still fur- 
ther, so that the British merely had control over the foreign rela- 
tions of the republics. 

Perhaps this situation would have lasted a long time if the Boer 
republics had not discovered an unexpected source of wealth. Not 
long after the treaty of 1884 extraordinarily rich gold fields were 
discovered in the so-called "Rand" south of Pretoria in the 
Transvaal, whereupon hordes of people from every possible country 
in Europe flocked to the spot. The new city of Johannesburg, 
south of Pretoria, shot up out of the ground. There developed a 
large colony of foreigners, or "Uitlanders" as they were called by 
the Boers, whose interests were not at all in harmony with those 
of the Boers. Being treated as foreigners more or less without rights, 
and yet compelled to pay heavy taxes over the expenditure of which 
they had no control, the Uitlanders finally united in the "Transvaal 
National Union" in order to secure equality of political rights, and 
especially representation in the "Raad" or legislature. At the end 
of 1895 ^ regular revolt was planned in Johannesburg. Dr. Jameson, 
the friend of Cecil Rhodes, who was president of the English Char- 
tered Company, to which the Kimberley diamond fields belonged, 



370 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

led a raid which was to aid the revolt in Johannesburg. But he 
was taken prisoner near Krugersdorp, and the rising in Johannes- 
burg itself was easily suppressed. 

But this by no means put an end to the trouble; on the contrary, 
it made it more acute. At first the British government more or less 
officially supported the rebels, because it imposed a merely nominal 
fine on Dr. Jameson who had been pardoned and handed over b}^ 
Kriiger, the President of the Transvaal. It also seemed as if the 
conflict between the Boers and the British might be taken advan- 
tage of by other Powers as an excuse for interference; the German 
Emperor, William II, did indeed send an official congratulatory tele- 
gram to President Kriiger after his victory over Jameson. All this 
took place at the moment when the British government was feeling 
disturbed at Russia's increase of power in Asia and was consequently 
more inclined than ever to find a kind of compensation in Africa 
by new acquisitions which would establish a closer connection be- 
tween her possessions there. 

England's interference consisted in supporting officially the inter- 
ests of the Uitlanders. Negotiations took place, but reached no 
satisfactory conclusion. The English High Commissioner demanded, 
but without success, that Uitlanders should be given political rights 
after five years' residence. Then the British began to move troops 
to Cape Colony. The Boers thereupon despatched an ultimatum to 
England, and when this remained unanswered, opened war on Oc- 
tober II, 1899, by invading Natal and Cape Colony. 

The Boers had opened hostilities before the British were at all 
prepared, so that they won all the victories at the outset. After 
invading Natal and Cape Colony, they laid siege to Ladysmith, 
Mafeking and Kimberley, and inflicted numerous defeats on the 
British. But the difference in power and resources was too great 
for them really to win a complete victory; moreover, the Boer ele- 
ment in Cape Colony remained thoroughly loyal. 

However, it took much longer to suppress the Boers than had been 
expected. Even after the arrival of the first reinforcements under 
an experienced general, Redvers Buller, in November, 1899, when 
the British forces were able to take the offensive, they again suffered 
at first a series of very serious defeats. But this only had the effect 
of rousing the British government and also the British colonies to 
still greater efforts. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were sent 
out to take command, and large bodies of troops were transported 
to South Africa. It was also of decisive importance that the rivalry 
between the European Powers, and also British naval superiority. 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 371 

made it impossible for any of the European countries to think of 
intervening. 

The new military offensive conducted by Lord Roberts quickly 
resulted in one success after another: the besieged towns were re- 
lieved; Cronje's Boer army near Paardeberg in the Orange Free 
State was forced to surrender on February 28, 1900; and Bloem- 
fontein, the capital, was occupied, as were also Johannesburg and 
Pretoria in the Transvaal. The war could now be officially regarded 
as ended. This was the idea which the British expressed by annex- 
ing the Orange Free State in May, 1900, and the Transvaal Republic 
in the following September. 

But the Boers were still not willing to admit that they were 
beaten. Aided by the vast extent and mountainous character of 
their territory, they were able to prolong the war for two years 
more. Their fighting force consisted only of a few thousand men; 
but thanks to the skill of their generals, Botha, De Wet, and 
Delarey, they always succeeded again and again in escaping from 
the pursuit of the British. But this guerilla war was hopeless so 
long as no European Power intervened, and there was less prospect 
of this than ever. Furthermore, the English more and more adapted 
their military measures to meet the peculiar conditions of warfare 
in South Africa. They hemmed the Boers in by lines of block- 
houses and brought their women and children together in concen- 
tration camps. These measures and the desolation caused by the 
war finally compelled the "bitter-enders" to give up their struggle 
for freedom. They accepted the British conditions, and by the 
Treaty of Pretoria of May 31, 1902, both Boer republics gave up 
their claim to independence. The Boers promised henceforth to 
be loyal British subjects. 

On their side the British promised to grant the Boers extensive 
political rights and to help them in the work of reconstruction on 
their farms. This promise was completely lived up to, and it is 
mainly thanks to this liberal policy toward an enemy who had 
just been suppressed in a bloody war that the annexation of the Boer 
states differs so sharply from other annexations which have resulted 
from compulsion by force of arms. As early as 1906 the Transvaal 
was given self-government; and the Orange Colony was accorded the 
same privilege in 1907. Soon afterwards all the South African 
colonies were united into a single federation — the Union of South 
Africa of 19 10, a state in which both races, British and Boers, were 
guaranteed complete equality. Even in the matter of the capital, 
both groups were given equal treatment: Cape Town remains the 



372 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

legislative capital, where the Union Parliament has its sessions, while 
Pretoria, with the administrative offices, is the capital of the execu- 
tive government. So it was brought about that the former citizens 
of the Boer republics enjoy the same political privileges in the new 
community as the rest of the whites, and they take an equally active 
part in the strictly parliamentary system of government as their 
former enemies. Only the colored natives are in an inferior political 
position. There are a great number of these and they constitute a 
serious problem. It is their presence, primarily, which distinguishes 
South Africa from Canada or Australia. But this problem cannot 
be considered here, as it belongs less to history than to current 
politics. 

This solution, however, has naturally not wholly put an end to 
the opposition between the two "races" of Boer and British, any 
more than did the granting of political equality between the French 
and the Anglo-Saxons in Canada. Nevertheless, one may say that 
any idea of a violent restoration of their former autonomy has com- 
pletely disappeared in the Boer states. Boers like Botha, who 
fought most bitterly against the British in the years 1900-1902, 
have more than once proved themselves thoroughly loyal citizens. 

It only remains to take a brief look at Canada. So long as the 
great mass of European immigrants could still be absorbed by the 
United States, and as Australia and South Africa attracted chiefly 
gold seekers, Canada possessed relatively little importance from the 
point of view of the new colonial policy. It was not until the last 
third of the nineteenth century that the situation changed. Then, 
after the Missouri Valley had been settled, Canada realized that she 
might become the heir of the United States and attract agricultural 
colonists. Hitherto, it was almost exclusively Eastern Canada which 
had been settled, and even there the population was relatively 
sparse. Now the government systematically set to work to open up 
the great territories in the West. It used the same methods that the 
United States had employed, except that the government took a much 
more active part. Thus Canada not only adopted the land acts of 
the United States in 1872 (see p. 105 ff.), but gave state support to 
railway construction, after private enterprise had proved insufficient. 
This was all the more important as nothing but the construction 
of a great railway line from east to west could overcome the dif- 
ficulty resulting from the existence of an extensive, barren area north 
of Lake Superior. But the construction of a railway made it pos- 
sible to connect the old provinces in Eastern Canada with the new 
settlement territory in the West, which was extraordinarily favor- 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 373 

able for raising wheat. These measures had a marked success. A 
considerable number of farmers began to settle in the western states ; 
quite characteristically not a few of them came from the United 
States where vacant land was already becoming restricted. Here 
also the Anglo-Saxon element prevailed, so that the assimilation of 
the newcomers took place quite easily. In the East, on the other 
hand, manufacturing on a large modern scale gradually developed. 
Here the soil was no longer sufficient for supporting the growing 
population and it was therefore easier for the factories to secure 
labor, and the factories also found a good market in the growing 
region in the West. This resulted in a decided protective tariff sys- 
tem, so that Canada lays more stress on commercial independence 
than do any of the other British colonies. 

Everywhere we see that the more the Dominions developed, 
the more they adopted an independent policy and defended their own 
interests against those of the mother country. It has been already 
pointed out that the English government put no obstacles in their 
way. From a formal point of view, the connection between the 
colonies and England was merely a very loose one and it seemed 
all the more possible that ultimately a complete separation might 
take place, as the population in the colonies at least did not feel 
the need for reviving imperial unity. Nevertheless, the colonial 
governments were not blind to the existence of common interests 
whose protection the Dominions were not able to look out for merely 
by action on their own part. The idea of creating a regular perma- 
nent imperial government could not be discussed at once. But it 
was possible, at least, to bring about voluntary meetings to talk over 
general lines of policy. The most natural form of these appeared 
to be a conference of all the colonial prime ministers. Such a con- 
ference took place, for the first time, in London, in 1887. It was 
at first scarcely more than an experiment and was for the purpose 
merely of exchanging ideas. It was not immediately raised to the 
position of a permanent institution. Seven years went by before the 
next meeting took place in 1894; as a concession to Canada this 
conference met in the Canadian capital at Ottawa. Soon these two 
meetings led to a further step: the question of preferential tariffs 
was discussed, and as a result the English Parliament removed the 
legal limitations which had hitherto restricted the colonies in tariff 
matters (see p. 366). At the third conference in 1902, which again 
met in London, it was decided that this new institution should meet 
regularly every four years. At the meeting in 1906 it adopted 
officially the title "Imperial Conference." 



374 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

These meetings at first had no executive power, but their discus- 
sions nevertheless were of the greatest practical importance. It was 
a matter of primary importance that the problem of imperial defense 
was continually discussed. This attracted general attention to this 
subject, and the Dominions became aware that the existing system 
of voluntary military support which had been given by all the large 
colonies in the South African War would not be adequate any more 
in the long run. In 1902 the various Dominions declared that in 
the future they would contribute annually a certain amount toward 
the cost of the imperial navy. Some of them, like Canada and Aus- 
tralia, even proceeded to the building of fleets of their own. 

This development found its final expression in the World War. 
Nothing was better suited to emphasize the community of interests 
between the mother country and the Dominions than this war. The 
military operations were extended over the whole world, including 
the Seven Seas. Parts of the British Empire were open to attack 
from the German colonies in South Africa or in the Pacific. More- 
over, a victory of Germany's military power threatened to limit, if 
not completely to destroy, the political freedom of the British 
colonies. All these things showed most clearly how completely the 
fate of the Dominions was bound up with that of the mother coun- 
try. Although all the colonies did not introduce universal military 
service after the fashion of Great Britain, nevertheless they all gave 
great military support on their own initiative. Their representatives 
were soon united in a regular "Imperial War Council," and in the 
treaty of peace with Germany the Dominions (and also India) 
figure, so to speak, as Powers on an equal footing with the mother 
country. But even here, as a matter of form, everything is not so 
simple: the Dominions are mentioned neither as members of a fed- 
eral state nor as wholly independent states. But still their diplo- 
matic independence has now been recognized in an international 
document, and at the same time their feeling of inseparable connec- 
tion with the mother country has been so greatly increased by their 
common efforts and experiences that they will never oppose on prin- 
ciple the creation of an imperial government. The Dominions are 
also directly interested in imperial policy through the acquisition 
of new colonial territories, and even if no external changes in the 
relations between Great Britain and her Dominions should take 
place, one can foresee that in the future the colonies will conduct 
their negotiations more and more on the basis of friendly mutual 
concessions even in economic matters. 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 375 

The colonial policy of the United States is in many ways analo- 
gous to that of Great Britain. Here also the government aimed at 
avoiding the danger of creating dependent territories or regular sub- 
ject lands. The inhabitants of the new territories were accorded 
the same political rights as the citizens of the old states. In theory 
this principle was never abandoned, but its execution has met with 
considerable difficulties where it was a question of dealing with for- 
eign races and especially with colored populations. These diffi- 
culties, however, were recognized at the outset. This was the reason 
the United States refrained so long from making any colonial acqui- 
sitions. It was also the reason that President Cleveland, in 1893, 
declined to annex the Hawaiian Islands. 

But this traditional policy could no longer be maintained when 
the economic structure of the United States had been changed as 
a result of the westward movement to the Pacific Ocean. America 
was no longer a land producing merely raw materials and food. She 
had developed an export trade on a large scale and she was striving, 
like her European competitors, for new markets, and also for points 
of support for her commerce. At first it was natural for her to look 
out at least for good order in neighboring territories where weak 
and inefficient governments hindered the Americans from exploiting 
the territory economically. 

The West Indies, where Spain retained a remnant of her once 
large colonial empire, was the region which most closely touched 
American interests. In Cuba, the most important of these posses- 
sions, American citizens had invested considerable capital, but were 
deprived of their profits by the almost continual revolts waged by 
Cuban patriots against Spanish authority. Nevertheless, the United 
States at first refrained from all intervention. No change of attitude 
was even brought about by the horrible measures of repression which 
were adopted by the Spaniards and which roused a powerful public 
opinion in the United States. But in 1897, when the anti-interven- 
tion administration of the Democrats gave way to a Republican 
administration under McKinley, America began to interfere in the 
Cuban revolt which had then been going on for two years. The 
Washington government demanded that Spain abandon the horrible 
methods which it had adopted to suppress the rebellion. The 
Spaniards yielded so far as to give the Cubans large autonomy, but 
this did not put an end to the revolt. Then it happened, apparently 
by accident, that the battleship Maine, which had been sent to 
Havana to protect American interests, was sunk by an explosion. In 
America the Spanish government was regarded as responsible for 



376 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

this, and President McKinley demanded that Spain should at once 
abandon hostilities against the Cubans who were fighting for free- 
dom. Shortly after that, on April 19, 1898, Congress decided to 
recognize the independence of the island and to demand the with- 
drawal of the Spanish troops. 

This decision was naturally equivalent to a declaration of war 
against Spain. As one might expect from the superiority of the 
American navy, the war resulted in a series of victories for the 
United States. First, a Spanish fleet was destroyed in the Pacific 
at Manila on May i, 1898. Then, on July 3, the main Spanish 
fleet was defeated at Santiago in a battle in which only one American 
lost his life. This decided the war, for though the American land 
army was insignificant it was now impossible for the Spaniards to 
send reinforcements to their colonies. So the Americans were able 
without great difficulty to take Santiago in Cuba, to occupy the 
Island of Porto Rico, and, on August 13, 1898, to seize Manila in 
the Philippines with the assistance of the natives who were in 
rebellion. On the preceding day an armistice was signed, as Spain 
had been seeking peace ever since July. Peace was eventually signed 
at Paris on December 10, 1898. Spain had to give up her claim to 
Cuba and to cede to the United States Porto Rico, the Philippines, 
and the Island of Guam, which lies in the Pacific to the east of the 
Philippines. Spain made special opposition to ceding the Philip- 
pines which had not been conquered at all, but the Americans settled 
this matter by agreeing to make a consolation payment of twenty 
million dollars to Spain for the Philippine Islands. 

The new problem which faced the United States was how to 
regulate the relation which the territories ceded by Spain should 
have to the Union. Now for the first time the Americans had 
acquired territories which did not lie on the continent and which 
were inhabited by a population of a wholly different sort politically. 
Should the system of political equality be applied to these colonies? 

The answer given varied according to circumstances. As far as 
Cuba was concerned a solemn promise had been made, and so from 
the outset there could be no question of annexing this island. As 
Congress had promised, Cuba was made an independent republic 
and American troops left the island in 1902, as soon as the new state 
had been established. However, the Cubans had to give certain 
guarantees for the protection of American economic interests. The 
United States retained, among other things, some naval stations, a 
control over Cuban finance, and a right to intervene under certain 
circumstances. The Cubans also were not to allow interference by 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 377 

any other Power. In 1906 when new disorders took place in the 
island, American troops were landed and a citizen of the United 
States was set up as governor-general. This occupation lasted until 
1909. Thus, a semi-protectorate was established by the United 
States in Cuba without Cuba being incorporated, however, into the 
Union. 

In Porto Rico, on the other hand, matters were regulated quite 
according to British precedent — not the precedent of the Dominions, 
but that of the crown colonies. The island was not treated as an 
integral part of the American Union but as a dependent territory. 
In 1900 a constitution was issued which gave the President of the 
United States the right to appoint the executive officials and the 
members of the upper house of the legislature. 

Both these territorial acquisitions — to which might be added San 
Domingo, over which the United States assumed a protectorate by 
a treaty in 1905 — belonged within the natural sphere of American 
expansion and did not meet with any regular opposition from the 
peoples concerned. The acquisition of the Philippines, on the other 
hand, meant a complete break in the traditional policy of the United 
States. In this case annexation took place against the wish of the 
population, and as to the manner in which it took place, it cor- 
responded exactly with the new East Asiatic policy which the great 
states of Europe were adopting. Like the Europeans, the Americans 
possessed considerable commercial interests in the Far East, and 
were all the more anxious to secure a point of support there as it 
was at this very time that the European Powers were beginning 
to partition China (see p. 356), though the Americans refused, on 
principle, to make territorial acquisitions at China's expense. There- 
fore, the Americans held fast to the Philippines, in spite of strong 
opposition in America itself when it became clear that the native 
population would first have to be suppressed by force ; to have given 
up the islands would have practically meant handing them over to 
Germany or Japan. America continued in this policy when Agui- 
naldo, formerly the ally of the Americans, prolonged a rebellion 
which had been stirred up in 1899 and which made it necessary, 
finally, to send out an army of seventy thousand men. On the 
other hand, the Americans never gave up their idea of educating 
the Filipinos in course of time for self-government. In fact they 
put this idea into practice with British rapidity: as early as 1907 
a legislature was called together, made up of inhabitants who only 
a little while before had been hostile. On August 29, 1916, the 
United States gave the islands complete autonomy. 



378 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

In the case of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, in 1898, 
the United States went even further. This territory was incorpo- 
rated into the Union at once in 1900, so that the Constitution of 
the United States extends to the islands, and in matters of com- 
merce they are in a position of equality with the states in the Union. 
Small extensions of the American colonial possessions resulted from 
the acquisition of Tutuila and other Samoan Islands in 1900, and 
the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies which was purchased 
from Denmark in 19 16. 

Much more important than these acquisitions, however, was the 
completion of the Panama Canal. This event can best be discussed 
in connection with the history of Anglo-American relations. 

Scarcely any other circumstance is so instructive in the history 
of the foreign policy of Anglo-Saxons as the relation between Great 
Britain and the United States. Here, opposite one another, stood 
two Great Powers between whom there was little political sympathy, 
and America had never wholly forgotten the hostile attitude of the 
governing classes in England during the War of Secession. Between 
the two countries also lay many serious sources of irritation — the 
rivalry of their navies, the competition with which American in- 
dustry threatened that of England, and the danger that Canada 
might some day be absorbed by her larger neighbor. But in spite 
of all this, it appears that not only have none of these causes of 
irritation led to war between these unmilitaristic states, but they 
have not even applied military pressure like threats of war. Dif- 
ferences may arise and sharp words may be exchanged, but it has 
never been necessary to rattle the sword to make one of the parties 
finally give way. The idea of a settlement by war disappeared so 
completely, that the boundary of Canada, though the question of 
fortifying it during the War of Secession was discussed in England, 
has been finally left without any fortifications at all, just like the 
boundary of an inland village. 

However, it must be said that the credit for this peaceful develop- 
ment belongs mainly to England which ultimately always gave way. 
This was particularly noticeable in connection with the negotiations 
in regard to the Panama Canal. 

In 1850, at a time when the United States had scarcely gained 
a foothold on the Pacific Ocean and had few colonies in the West, 
she signed the so-called Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain. 
By this both Powers undertook not to exercise any exclusive control 
over a canal which should be built at Panama. They also guar- 



Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 379 

anteed the neutrality of the canal and forbade the establishment of 
fortified positions in its neighborhood. 

England, therefore, had a formal right to oppose a canal which 
should be exclusively under American control. Nevertheless, the 
more the United States began to be a World Power, the more the 
feeling spread in America that the canal ought to be a purely 
American undertaking. The question became acute when the French 
Panama Company, which had been founded by De Lesseps, the great 
engineer who built the Suez Canal, collapsed. The opportunity 
seemed now to have come for America to take the matter wholly 
in her own hands, and, in 1901, the United States did actually 
succeed in persuading England to a new agreement, the "Hay- 
Pauncefote Treaty," which gave the Americans absolute control over 
the canal. 

The United States accordingly made full use of the treaty without 
interference from England, and even without the trouble with Co- 
lombia involving British intervention. The Republic of Colombia, 
which owned the canal territory, refused to cede the necessary strip 
of land six miles wide, and take ten million dollars in payment for 
it, because the Republic hoped to squeeze a higher sum out of the 
United States. The Americans helped themselves by arranging a 
wholly bloodless "revolution," somewhat in light-opera fashion, in 
the Colombian province of Panama. As a result of this, Panama 
declared herself to be an independent republic, and as such ceded 
the canal strip to the United States in 1903. The work of digging 
the canal was then undertaken by the American government with 
great skill in organization. Thanks to the discovery, a little while 
before, that malarial fever was caused by the Anopheles mosquito, 
measures could be taken to prevent the great loss of life which this 
had hitherto caused. The canal was completed in 1914, and offi- 
cially opened in 19 15. 

Another incident was the Venezuelan affair. When the English 
government came into conflict with Venezuela in regard to the 
boundary of their colony in Guiana in 1895, the United States in- 
sisted on diplomatic intervention, basing her claim on the Monroe 
Doctrine. In this case, also, England gave way, in spite of the sud- 
denness of the American demand, and submitted the point at issue 
to arbitration. Even at that time the idea of a general treaty of 
arbitration between the two countries was discussed, but President 
Cleveland's plan came to nothing in 1897, on account of the oppo- 
sition in the American Senate, in which the necessary two-thirds 
majority could not be secured for the treaty. Nevertheless, the rela- 



38o ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tions between England and the United States became steadily more 
friendly. During the Spanish-American War, England observed a 
benevolent neutrality, and in 1903 she gave her approval to a settle- 
ment of the question of the boundary between Alaska and Canada 
which was very favorable for the United States. 

It has been out of events of this kind that the Anglo-Saxon world 
has developed in a way which is in such marked contrast to the 
system of armed peace prevailing on the Continent of Europe. The 
more armaments and military threats increase and become serious 
there, so much more marked is the peaceful or rather unmilitary 
character of British and American foreign relations. More charac- 
teristic than the arbitration treaties or even the regular substitution 
of diplomatic or judicial decisions instead of war, has been the 
absence in these two countries of all armaments which could 
be used for offensive purposes; and also the absence of all military 
preparedness which could result in a sudden attack, or easily lead 
to a "preventive" war. Both Powers have armies which might be 
regarded, one might say, as non-existent, both in comparison with 
the armies of the other European Powers and in view of their own 
latent resources. Both have only the kind of navies which can be 
used solely for defense and not in cooperation with great armies. 
Neither Power has universal military service, nor a militarized sys- 
tem of education, nor pressure by militarists upon the civil authori- 
ties. In both, this peaceful attitude toward other Powers coincides 
with democratic political institutions. The idea has therefore grown 
up that the government of the people itself acts as a guarantee 
against a policy of aggression. On the basis of their practical expe- 
rience both countries are convinced that every conflict can be settled 
through the goodwill of the parties concerned, without having to 
appeal to arms. Occasional warlike operations against smaller states 
or semi-barbarous peoples have naturally not been avoidable, but 
such wars have been conducted without disturbing the normal life 
of the population and without demanding the whole powers of the 
state. They naturally, therefore, are not at all to be compared with 
the kind of wars between Great Powers which are feared in Europe. 

However, people of insight in both states perceived that the Anglo- 
Saxon world could retain its "unmilitaristic organization" only so 
long as it did not run the danger of being attacked by one of the 
great European Powers which was armed to the teeth. But these 
people were not numerous, and their warnings were not heeded. It 
was not until this danger became a very practical one that both 
states roused themselves to save their political ideals for the future. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ATTITUDE 
OF GOVERNMENTS TOWARD IT 

In the first half of the nineteenth century measures for the protec- 
tion of industrial workers, aside from those which were wholly un- 
political and due merely to philanthropic motives, were a part of 
the liberal movement of the time. They formed the left wing of 
liberalism. In demanding universal suffrage, bourgeois idealists and 
representatives of the working classes found themselves on common 
ground (see p. 194) ; but about the middle of the century a change 
began to take place. In the new policy pursued by workingmen the 
idea began to be given up that it would ever be possible to restore 
a harmony of interests between capital and labor merely by laws 
for the protection of workingmen. The view was wholly rejected 
that the misery of the working-classes could be prevented by hu- 
manitarian measures. It was becoming more evident than ever that 
the tendency of modern manufacturing on a large scale was to make 
it impossible for workingmen to rise to the class of property-owners 
or to gain a livelihood in a business of their own. Owing to this, 
the conviction gained ground that here were two classes whose in- 
terests could never be harmonized with one another. It was there- 
fore the task of the workingmen to unite in organizations of their 
own and to form a party based on class lines which should oppose 
ell the other "bourgeois" parties. They believed that in certain 
questions they might, however, cooperate with other parties. Since 
it was the aim of the "proletarian" or "communistic" movement to 
get control over the state, it was quite in accordance with the in- 
terests of the workingmen, they believed, to act in common with the 
"left" (or radical) liberals, who were also aiming to secure uni- 
versal suffrage; for since the proletarians formed the majority in a 
country, this would bring about the overthrow of the rule of the 
capitalists. In theory, however, the proletarians believed that they 
ought to fight all other organizations than their own, as being "the 
great reactionary mass." 

This program was first formulated in 1847 ^^ the Communist 

381 



382 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Manifesto by a German, Karl Marx. One of the points in which it 
differed most from the previous socialistic movements was that it 
abandoned nationalistic limitations on the workingmen. As religious 
zealots used to put the claims of their religious party above the in- 
terests of their country, so these new socialists regarded the world 
no longer as divided into national states but into economic classes, 
and the victory of their class was more important than the future 
of their country. "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" This is 
the phrase which rings through the Communist Manifesto and sounds 
clearly the international character of the new socialist movement. 

Accordingly, an international organization was founded. In 1864 
the International Workingmen's Association was established at Lon- 
don. Though various splits in it occurred later, there always re- 
mained a bond between the various Socialist-democratic or Col- 
lectivist parties in different countries. But as a matter of fact, this 
International Association never acquired great practical importance. 
What Socialists have actually accomplished has been due almost 
exclusively to the efforts of the party in separate countries. 

At any rate, it is only the successes of the socialist movement 
within the existing states which are of any historical importance. 
Here, indeed, Socialism has had a tremendous influence. It is 
scarcely saying too much to insist that the question of Socialism 
and its demands has dominated the internal policy of the states in 
Western and Central Europe during the last fifty years. At any 
rate, it has influenced it more strongly than any other single thing. 

But here it is impossible even to summarize the history of So- 
cialism in all the great states of Europe. It is only possible to indi- 
cate a few typical developments and at the same time consider the 
course of events in the largest countries. 

For one kind of development the course of events in France is 
most noteworthy. 

It will be recalled that one of the main factors which led to the 
establishment of the Second Empire was the fear of Socialism. A 
republican form of government and liberalism — especially liberalism 
with an anti-clerical tinge — had become objects of suspicion to the 
bourgeoisie as presaging a communistic subversion of society. To 
them, absolutism supported by the church seemed to be the only 
means of salvation against a social revolution (see p. 203). Now 
when the military collapse of Bonapartism at Sedan again opened 
the way for the establishment of a Republic on September 4, 1870, 
the question arose as to how the classes interested in the existing 
system of property rights would reconcile themselves to the bug- 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 383 

bear of a Republic. Would a Republic be able to survive when large 
groups of people were convinced that it meant the beginning of 
im^rchy and the rule of the proletarian masses? 

Men of insight, like the great statesman, Adolphe Thiers, who 
was now chosen "Chief of the Executive Power," recognized at once 
that a Republic was the only form of government for the new France, 
but that this Republic must give solid guarantees against any change 
in property rights if it was to survive. The two phrases which 
Thiers coined at that time characterized the situation perfectly: 
"The Republic is the form of government which divides us least"; 
and, "The Republic can only survive if it is conservative." 

But it was very difficult to make these views prevail. In the 
National Assembly at Bordeaux, which had been elected for the pur- 
pose of making peace with Germany, the so-called reactionaries, or 
Monarchists of various kinds, had a majority over the Republicans 
of 400 to 350. The Assembly refused to go on record in any way 
as favoring on principle a republican form of government. 

An event which took place a little while afterwards had a peculiar 
influence in reviving more strongly than ever in France and else- 
where the old panicky fear of radical republican and socialist tend- 
encies. 

The long siege of Paris had left the population of the capital 
extraordinarily excited against the government. Revolutionary 
idealists found fault with those in authority for not declaring a revo- 
lutionary war as in former times and leading them against the 
enemy. The irritation was still further increased by the reactionary 
attitude of the National Assembly which, on March 20, 1871, had 
moved from Bordeaux to Versailles, near Paris. People feared a 
restoration of the monarchy. 

Now it happened that the artillery of Paris had had to be moved 
to the industrial quarter of Montmartre on the occasion of the 
entrance of the German troops. There and in other suburbs of a 
similar kind, like Belleville and La Villette, a central committee had 
been formed from revolutionary groups in the National Guard (see 
p. 196), which was like a revolutionary government. The legal gov- 
ernment at Versailles therefore wanted to get the cannon out of this 
dangerous neighborhood. But in doing this, trouble developed. 
The revolutionists declared that the cannon were their property and 
on March 18 they shot down the two officers who were to have 
brought the guns away. Thereupon an insurrection broke out almost 
everywhere in Paris and the government officials fled to Versailles. 

The revolutionary government which was now established in Paris 



384 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

was not exactly a socialist organization in the new sense of the word, 
but a curious mixture of extreme Republican and idealistic Socialist 
institutions. On the one hand, the governing body of ninety per- 
sons, known as the "Commime" adopted the red flag as the sign 
and symbol of their socialist demands. But on the other hand, they 
favored a federated republican constitution and desired that every 
commune should have autonomy. 

From a military point of view the fate of the insurrection was 
hopeless from the outset. The only prospect of success would have 
been for the other communes to have followed the example of Paris. 
But it was only in a very few industrial towns like Saint-Etienne, 
Limoges, and Marseilles that ''communes" were formed, and these 
were very short lived. However, the Parisians succeeded in main- 
taining themselves for an extraordinarily long period. At the begin- 
ning they even undertook an offensive against Versailles. But as 
soon as a regular army could be formed from the prisoners of war 
who were released from Germany, MacMahon was given command, 
the "Communards" were driven back on the defensive, and Paris 
was besieged a second time. The siege lasted two months. On 
May 31, 1 87 1, after a week of street fighting, the legal government 
again gained control of the capital. 

Although this socialist civil war made an enormous impression 
everywhere, the permanent influence which the Commune exerted 
was connected with another circumstance. The conflict between the 
government troops and the revolutionists was not conducted ac- 
cording to the regular rules of war, because the Commune had not 
been recognized as a belligerent. This resulted in frightful reprisals 
being inflicted on the rebels. Captured Communard leaders were 
shot down without trial. The Communards, on their side, when 
they saw their cause was lost, took vengeance by setting fire to public 
buildings like the Ministry of Finance, the Hotel de Ville, and 
the Tuileries. Hostages whom they had in their hands, including 
magistrates and higher clergy, were simply murdered. 

These acts of rage and destruction, in which at least 6,500 persons 
are officially said to have lost their lives, left such an impression as 
has rarely resulted from any single event. All opponents of re- 
publican ideals, including a large number of cultured people who 
had trembled at the fate of the artistic monuments of Paris, be- 
lieved shudderingly that they had personally experienced the proof 
that a triumph of extreme republican tendencies would only result 
in the destruction of civilization and subversion of society. The 
Parisian Communards had expressly appealed to the example of the 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 385 

French Revolution, and among other things they had again intro- 
duced the republican calendar. Could there be any better argu- 
ment for the conclusion that the poison of revolution would ulti- 
mately lead to the general dissolution of society? 

It was almost a wonder that the anti-republican movement did 
not triumph in France. Nevertheless, the wonder actually took 
place. To be sure, those who had taken part in the Commune were 
very severely punished. No less than 7,500 guilty persons were 
deported to New Caledonia, In 1873 the National Assembly also 
brought about Thiers's resignation, and a ministry was chosen in 
which the three monarchist parties were represented and which 
adopted as its motto the restoration of "ordre moral" which had 
been shattered by the radicals. But the restoration of the monarchy 
failed, aside from personal reasons, owing to the religious question. 
The Legitimists and Orleanists did indeed unite in 1873 by means 
of the so-called ''fusion"; they both agreed to support the repre- 
sentative of the older Bourbon line, the Count of Chambord 
("Henry V"), with the understanding that he should be succeeded 
by the Orleanist grandson of Louis Philippe. But when the ques- 
tion of the flag was discussed, a dispute arose. The pious Count 
of Chambord declared that he would hold fast to the old white flag 
handed down to him by his ancestors. The Orleanists, forming the 
"right center," wanted to keep the tricolor; they were all the more 
unwilling to give in on the question of the flag because the adoption 
of the white flag would have generally been regarded as a sign of 
the restoration of clerical rule. After the experiences of the Second 
Empire, public opinion was by no means inclined to tolerate this 
nor were the Intellectuals. Some regard, also, had to be paid to 
the feeling in the country. Reactionary forces began to get the 
upper hand in the administration. Republican officials were re- 
moved and statues of Republicans disappeared from the town halls. 
The clergy began to assume more and more influence. In 1875 
they were allowed to undertake higher education and establish uni- 
versities of their own. The more these reactionary and clerical tend- 
encies showed themselves, the more public opinion in France shifted 
toward the left. A thing that contributed greatly to this was Gam- 
betta's agitation. During the war of 1870 he had proved himself 
to be a great organizer. He had traveled over all of France, every- 
where urging that the Republic must be a real Republic, that is, that 
a new social class should be admitted to political control. 

The result of all this was that in 1875 the National Assembly, on 
a vote in regard to the title of the head of the government, decided 



386 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

by a majority of one only in favor of a Republic. At the same time, 
constitutional laws were passed, making tJtie Republic as much like 
the July Monarchy as possible. The president was to be elected 
for a term of seven years and could be reelected; thus he might be 
transformed into a constitutional king. In the election of senators, 
small communes had the same rights as large ones, which gave an 
advantage to the large landowners. But all this merely delayed the 
victory of democracy; it could not permanently prevent it. In spite 
of all these precautionary measures, the Chamber of Deputies, 
elected by direct and universal suffrage, finally arrogated supreme 
authority to itself. This gave the control of the state not to prop- 
erty owners as heretofore, but to the masses of the people who had 
been excluded by previous constitutions from a share in the gov- 
ernment. It also gave France for the first time a really stable con- 
stitution. The era of political revolutions now ceased. No economic 
group any longer possessed an artifically preponderant position. No 
interference with intellectual freedom could again be attempted. So 
disappeared the main cause which had formerly led to revolutions 
in France. The new regime has lasted down to the present moment 
— much longer than any previous government since 1789. 

The democratic theory on which the government is based was 
again shown in 1877 when the reactionary President, in cooperation 
with the reactionary Senate, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. 
This was the occasion when Gambetta gathered the Republican hosts 
with the slogan, "Le clericalisme, voUa Vennemi." The phrase 
appealed to the small property owners and the peasants. The Re- 
publican parties again carried the election. Their influence was so 
strong that they also soon gained a majority in the Senate. 

All the logical changes were now made which have been com- 
prised in the idea of a Republican form of government ever since 
the establishment of the United States (see p. 15). Freedom of 
meeting was introduced. There was also unlimited freedom of the 
press, and after 1881 no more preliminary deposits were demanded. 
In 1882 it was decided to make attendance at school obligatory. 
All the schools were "laicized," that is, were made non-sectarian, and 
great attention was given to more advanced education for girls. 
The granting of higher academic degrees was reserved to the State 
and could no longer take place in ecclesiastical institutions. Thus 
Napoleon Ill's decree of 1850, which gave the clergy control over 
education, was completely undone. 

Other measures aimed at decentralization and at the same time at 
the political education of the people. The election of mayors of 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 387 

communes, with the exception of Paris, was left to the communal 
councils, tlie powers of the mayors themselves were enlarged, and 
the sessions of the communal councils were made public. Repre- 
sentation in the Senate was based on population and the small com- 
munes lost their privileged position. A special concession was made 
to the lower classes in 1884 by the law which made possible the 
establishment of "syndkats," or trade unions, free from government 
interference. This law was at once taken advantage of very widely. 

Thus it became possible for even the Socialist Party, which wanted 
to secure political power by means of democratic institutions, to 
support the Republic and work in cooperation with it. Furthermore, 
the Socialists were no longer excluded from taking part in the gov- 
ernment by any special laws. As they naturally could never get 
control in a country where small property owners and peasants 
dominated, no obstacles were placed in their way to check their 
political activity. One of their leaders (Millerand) was a member 
of a "bourgeois" cabinet as early as 1899. The large group of 
Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies, led by Jaures, formed a part 
of the "government bloc." In 1906 a Socialist (Viviani) even be- 
came minister of labor in Clemenceau's cabinet, and in 1909 another 
socialist (Briand) actually became prime minister. It was not until 
the development of Socialism of the Left or Syndicalism that cool- 
ness developed between the Republican "bloc" and a part of the So- 
cialists, namely those who wanted to abandon constitutional political 
methods altogether. The rise of this Syndicalism may be dated from 
the founding of the General Confederation of Labor about 1896. 
But splits in the Socialist groups by no means resulted in the anti- 
republican and anti-socialistic clerical "Right" securing a preponder- 
ance again. The republic was so firmly established in France that 
it no longer had to depend upon the support of the Socialists of 
the Left. 

It had become so strong that even the new nationalistic attacks 
by the Right were wholly unsuccessful. In the years 1887-89 the 
reactionary parties, aided by a popular general named Boulanger, 
attempted to set up a militarist government by means of a coup 
d'etat and by plebiscites after the fashion of Napoleon III. This 
government was eventually to prepare the way for a war of revenge 
against Germany, but France, which was becoming more and more 
pacifist in its attitude, refused to support the parties favoring re- 
venge. Boulanger's followers were terribly defeated at the polls in 
1889 and Boulanger himself, sentenced to deportation, fled to 
Brussels where he committed suicide in 1891. Somewhat later the 



388 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Republican party gained a similar victory over the clerical-royalist 
group which had been seeking to build up a kind of rival govern- 
ment in the army. The form it took was the affair about a Jewish 
artillery captain named Dreyfus. In 1894 he had been banished 
for life to the Devil's Island in French Guiana because he was sup- 
posed to have betrayed military secrets to Germany. Military offi- 
cers like Colonel Picquart, who later in 1896 expressed belief in his 
innocence, were subjected to military discipline. But the friends of 
the condemned man did not let the matter rest. The most notable 
Republican Socialist leaders like Clemenceau and Jaures, as well as 
writers like Zola and Anatole France, insisted most energetically 
that Dreyfus was innocent. Equally energetic in opposition to them 
stood the army, the Church, and various royalist intellectuals like 
Brunetiere and Lemaitre. The conflict was a very bitter one, but 
it ultimately resulted in bringing the case before the Court of 
Cassation. Though a new judgment was pronounced against 
Dreyfus he was nevertheless pardoned by the President of the Re- 
public. Later he was even restored to his position in the French 
army with the rank of major. More important still was the fact 
that the army was now reorganized from top to bottom and the 
exclusive authority of the nationalistic General Staff was broken. 
The supreme authority in the army henceforth was in the hands of 
the civil authorities. 

The Republic had emerged so successfully from this trial of 
strength that it now even dealt a final blow to the political power 
of the Church, and proceeded to bring about a separation of Church 
and State. 

The first assault was made on the great religious orders known 
as the Congregations. Every association in France had to have an 
authorization from the State. The Congregations in most cases had 
not secured this. In spite of this, not only had they been tolerated, 
but they had even kept a great part of education in France in their 
hands, although this was contrary to Ferry's School Law (see p. 
386), which had remained on paper. In 1901 the Law of Associa- 
tions, so far as the matter of principle was concerned, now brought 
a change. In general, freedom of association was introduced, but 
religious communities were to be formed only by special permission, 
and the members of the unauthorized religious orders were excluded 
from giving instruction in the schools. Congregations like the 
Assumptionists, who refused to obey this regulation, were expelled 
from France. 

Waldeck-Rousseau, who was prime minister when this law was 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 389 

adopted, proceeded with great moderation in its execution. But it 
was otherwise with his successor, Combes. He represented much 
sharper anti-clerical ideas, perhaps just because he had originally- 
been trained for the priesthood in a Catholic seminary. He attacked 
the educational institutions of the forbidden religious orders much 
more vigorously, and finally, in 1904, excluded even the authorized 
Congregations from public teaching. Soon the government went still 
further and extended their war to the secular clergy. A dispute 
with the papacy about the appointment of bishops finally led to the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations between Paris and the Vatican. 
Then, in 1905, the Concordat, which Napoleon I had signed in 1801, 
was declared null, and the Church was wholly separated from the 
State. The Republic declared that it would no longer support re- 
ligious communities in the future. The property of such religious 
associations, after it had been inventoried by the State, was to be 
handed over to new associations cultuelles which were to be formed. 
Similar regulations were to be applied to the Protestant and Jewish 
churches. 

Thus it was planned to establish a free church and a free state, 
and these plans of the government were accepted by the Protestants 
and the Jews. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, under Pope 
Pius X, allowed an open conflict to develop. The Pope forbade the 
clergy to found the associations cultuelles provided for by the law. 
His aim was evidently to make the Church appear like a martyr 
which had been robbed of everything and to rouse public opinion in 
France which had hitherto been fairly indifferent. But the French 
government, and especially Briand, who became minister of educa- 
tion in the Clemenceau cabinet in 1906, parried this move with as 
much skill as moderation. The law was carried out as gently as 
possible, but still without losing sight of its real purpose. 

Thus, the Third French Republic succeeded in carrying out this 
part of its program unhindered, and thereby gave a splendid new 
proof of its stability, and belied as groundless the fear that anarchy 
was beginning. Its strength was also soon shown by the French 
attitude in foreign politics. Ever since 1870 France had been with- 
out a single friend or ally, as Bismarck had wished. France was 
separated from England, and later from Italy also, by colonial rival- 
ries; any connection with Russia ran counter to political ideals on 
both sides. Russia also regarded the support of Republican France 
as quite an inadequate substitute for the support which Bismarck's 
government had given Russian policy against Austria in the Balkans. 
But in the course of twenty years conditions had altered. The great 



390 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

prosperity of France and the wise economic policy of her population 
had given an incomparable importance to financial association with 
a country which had become "the banker of Europe." France was 
the only country in Europe which had not become excessively indus- 
trialized and filled with a surplus population; stable political condi- 
tions and the resulting policy of peace made it possible to exploit 
the rich soil to an ever larger extent; the population, however, was 
kept down to about the same numbers, so that France was not only 
independent of foreign countries for its food supply, but it even had 
food to export from its own abundance. The frugal and industrious 
population conserved so carefully what they had gained that they 
had more money to lend to foreign nations than other countries which 
outwardly appeared to be more prosperous. 

It was in 1888 that Russia was able to place her first loan in 
Paris. Two years later, when Bismarck was compelled to resign 
partly because he would not support Austria-Hungary at Russia's 
expense in the Near East, the plan for a Franco-Russian alliance 
took more definite form. The Russo-German "reinsurance treaty" 
was not renewed; in its place an alliance was made between Russia 
and France in 1891, and in the next year this was followed by a 
military convention between the two countries. The Radical Social- 
ist republic had associated itself on a footing of equality with one of 
the three Powers which was regarded as the protector of absolutism. 
In 1 89 1, the French navy visited Kronstadt and the Tsar had to 
listen to the Marseillaise with bared head. In 1893, the Russian fleet 
returned this visit, and in 1896, the new Tsar, Nicholas II, personally 
visited France, being the first crowned head to do so since 1870. 
France had now acquired the guarantee which had hitherto been 
lacking that Russia would come to her support in case of an attack 
from Germany. 

At the same time, the Third French Republic had been acquiring 
a great colonial empire, unequaled by that of the Old Regime; in 
spite of many superficial defects, which undoubtedly existed and 
caused complaint, it was clear that no other country had so satis- 
factory a position and future prospects as France thirty or forty 
years after the creation of the Third Republic. One may also say 
that at that time the French people had renounced all further political 
ambitions. The idea of pacifism had penetrated the leaders of the 
governing parties and the greater part of the state system of educa- 
tion; many teachers even advocated anti-militarism openly. France 
had reached the position of a people who wished only to be left 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 391 

in peace by others without desiring anything from them. To be 
sure, the reactionary parties, which were excluded from a share in 
the government, still nourished nationalistic aims, but with the ex- 
ception of a small group of Intellectuals their agitation fell on deaf 
ears, and it was noteworthy that even a considerable number of 
politicians who had formerly been in favor of a monarchy had 
"rallied" to the Republic. 

In England the course of events was less dramatic, but ended at 
the same goal. 

The Reform Act of 1832 (see p. 92 f.) had not increased the politi- 
cal rights of the working class essentially, if at all. The working- 
men's condition, however, had been fundamentally improved by the 
State, and the possibility of emigration to America had provided the 
proper balance between the supply of population and the possibility 
of employment. But the workingmen had no real share in drawing 
up the laws for their own protection, and therefore they began anew 
an agitation for electoral reform and for a larger representation of 
workingmen in the House of Commons. In 1866 they were again 
agitating definitely for universal suffrage. 

This time it was easier to overcome the opposition of Parliam.ent 
than in 1832, and a number of monster meetings sufficed to make 
the House of Commons adopt the Reform Act of 1867. Even this, 
however, did not do away with all the inequalities in the existing 
distribution of seats; the large cities were still at a considerable 
disadvantage; but since in the towns every man was given a vote 
who paid £10 rent for lodgings yearly and had resided there for a 
year, practically all workingmen were enfranchised. This increased 
the English electorate by more than a million voters, the greater 
part of whom belonged to the laboring class. 

Supported by the strength of the radical party which developed 
from this electoral reform, Gladstone's new Liberal ministry (1868- 
74) now carried through a number of innovations which still further 
limited the former plutocratic individualistic system. In 1870 educa- 
tion was for the nrst time made compulsory and special taxes were 
collected for the support of schools. In 1872 the secret ballot was 
introduced, which at last freed the electors from pressure by the 
rich. In 1871 trade unions were officially recognized. Finally, the 
practice of purchasing offices in the army was abolished; when the 
House of Lords rejected this democratic measure, Gladstone put an 
end to the existing practice in 1871 by a simple ordinance resting 
on the royal prerogative. 



392 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

What a position the workingmen had thus acquired in political 
life is best seen by the fact that henceforth both the old political 
parties began to make efforts to secure their favor. 

Hitherto, all reforms for the benefit of the industrial proletariat — 
but not for the agricultural laborers for whom scarcely anything had 
been done, — had been brought about by the Liberal Party, the old 
Whigs. The Conservatives or Tories had always opposed them, 
because an extension of the suffrage, which was the necessary condi- 
tion for social legislation, meant also a limitation of the dominating 
influence of the large landowners. Now they perceived that they 
would finally be completely pushed to the wall if they persisted in 
their old attitude of opposing the demands of the workingmen; or, 
to be more correct, one of their leaders perceived this. This leader 
was an "outsider" who, thanks to his foreign origin, was better able 
to grasp the situation than men who had been brought up exclusively 
amid Tory ideas. Disraeli, or as he was known after 1876, Lord 
Beaconsfield, coming from a family of converted Jews, by his extra- 
ordinary tenacity and intelligence had been able to overcome all 
the difficulties which were at first placed in the way of his political 
activity, and had become the intellectual leader of the Conservative 
Party. He now formulated the program of the Tories by which 
they defeated the Liberals in the election of 1874. He reproached 
the Whigs with being no more than a clique of a few large families 
who would never really champion the well-being of the masses. The 
weakening of the authority of State and Church, aimed at by the 
Liberals, was not, he said, in the interests of the people. But it was 
to be the task of the Conservative Party, with the aid of State and 
Church, to improve the working classes; the Conservatives, he said, 
were fundamentally the true people's party. 

These were ideas, as one sees, which strongly recalled those of 
Napoleon III, and in fact were inspired by him, only that the adop- 
tion of them did not rest on an illegal act like the coup d'etat. At 
any rate, Disraeli succeeded in winning to his side the workingmen 
who had been disillusioned by Gladstone's compromise legislation, 
and the Conservatives now began for the first time to undertake 
social and political reforms. As prime minister, Disraeli replaced 
the law of 1871 by another which established complete equality be- 
tween employers and employees, and allowed workingmen to use 
"peaceful means" in carrying on a strike. Employment of children 
imder ten years in factories was wholly forbidden and all factories 
employing women were limited to a ten-hour working day. 

These concessions in turn stirred the Liberals to make greater 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 393 

concessions. First, they abandoned more completely than hitherto 
the principle of non-interference by the state; one of their leaders, 
Joseph Chamberlain, the radical mayor of Birmingham and formerly 
a large employer of labor, municipalized a great number of public 
utilities which had previously been in the hands of private persons; 
the example which he set in the "Birmingham System" was imitated 
in many other towns. Then the Liberals went further in the ex- 
tension of the suffrage than Disraeli had proposed a few years before. 
The Liberals now urged that even agricultural laborers, who were 
relatively numerous in England on account of the large landed 
estates, should be allowed to participate in electing the House of 
Commons. The Reform Act of 1884-85 accordingly abolished all 
inequalities between rural and urban districts by extending the bor- 
ough franchise to the counties; henceforth, any one who rented 
lodgings for which he paid £10 a year had the vote. At a single 
stroke the electors jumped in number from 3,221,000 to 5,700,000; 
it was mainly the rural districts and villages which benefited by this 
act. The counties were divided into electoral districts of equal size 
and many little boroughs lost their right of being represented. The 
practical effect of the law was to give the vote to all industrial 
workers and also to all the agricultural laborers who were better 
off and who did not live with their employers. 

Hand in hand with this reform went a change in English local 
government. All extensions of the suffrage were merely half meas- 
ures so long as local government remained in the hands of rural 
magnates like the justices of the peace. Chamberlain, who joined 
the Tories as a "Liberal Unionist," because he believed in maintaining 
the union of England and Ireland (see p. 181), persuaded the Con- 
servatives to adopt changes in local administration and give some 
political influence to the non-propertied classes. Parliament under- 
took to create new districts in the counties; in every county, local 
administration, with the right to levy taxes, was given to a county 
council elected for three years by all the tax-payers, so that after 
1888 the justices of the peace retained only their judicial authority. 
In 1894 town councils, elected by all the tax-payers, were also es- 
tablished in the towns, so that the rule of the squires came to an 
end. These town and county councils were also given extensive 
powers, so that in many places regular "community socialism" was 
introduced. 

Since then Conservative ministries have merely resulted in post- 
poning, but no longer in preventing, further changes in the demo- 
cratic direction. The Tory Party has sought to distract the atten- 



394 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tion of the country from problems at home by "imperialistic under- 
takings" like the Boer War; but such means have merely meant 
at best a delay for a few years. In spite of them the Liberals have 
succeeded in carrying out three important reforms. 

The first of these reforms was in regard to the House of Lords. 
Now that the House of Commons had come really to represent the 
people and was no longer dominated by landlords and distinguished 
families, the contrast between it and the House of Lords had been 
becoming more and more marked. The House of Lords had become 
a regular class body which by its ecclesiastical-aristocratic veto had 
several times been able to defeat measures against landed property 
passed by the House of Commons, as in the case of measures relating 
to Ireland (see p. 184 f.). The Liberals therefore began to consider 
whether the Upper House ought not to be either abolished or at least 
fundamentally changed ; "mend or end the House of Lords" was the 
motto which had been adopted by the radicals since 1894. 

The conflict again became acute in 1909 when the House of Lords 
rejected the Liberal budget brought in by the Asquith ministry, 
chiefly because the Lords would not consent to the tax on landed 
property contained in the budget. In the new election which then 
took place one of the campaign cries was, "Abolition of the Lords' 
veto." The Liberals won the election, and their ministry brought 
in resolutions wholly abolishing the right of veto by the House of 
Lords in financial matters and in other matters making the veto 
merely suspensive in its effect for two years. The House of Lords 
at first took a rebellious attitude; but when threatened with a 
creation of new peers it finally gave way and passed the resolution 
by a small majority. 

After the opposition of the Upper House had been broken in this 
way other Liberal reforms could be undertaken. Among these, was 
the disestablishment of the church in Wales, where the greater 
part of the population belonged to sects, like the Methodist; this 
measure was important as a matter of principle because, according 
to the intention of the Liberals, it was to be the first step toward 
a separation of church and state in England itself. Other measures 
were the introduction of laws for insurance against old age, sickness, 
and unemployment. 

Thus the pillars of the half plutocratic regime established by the 
compromise of 1832 had completely collapsed when the World War 
broke out in 1914. Great Britain had already followed the example 
of her colonies to such an extent that prior to the reform of the 
House of Lords, some leaders of the Conservative-Unionist party 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 395 

actually proposed that in cases of serious conflict between the Upper 
and Lower Houses an appeal should be made to the people by way 
of a referendum, after the American or Swiss fashion. And finally 
when, in the course of the war, the last step was taken toward imi- 
tating the democratic ideals already prevailing in the colonies and 
equal political rights were granted to women, this step made prac- 
tically no change in the relative position and power of the two great 
political parties. The same is true as to the appointment of Socialist 
leaders as members of the cabinet. The transformation of the Old 
Regime had already gone so far that the Reform Act of 1832, per- 
haps even that of 1867, must be regarded as having had more im- 
portant consequences than the measures passed in the most recent 
decades. 

The most marked contrast to this method of adapting political 
conditions to micet social demands is furnished by Prussia and Ger- 
many, the main lines of whose policy are as characteristic for East- 
ern Europe as are the methods of France and England for the West 
and the South. 

In Germany also the government had to deal with Socialism. Since 
the middle of the nineteenth century and the first beginnings of 
manufacturing on a large scale, German workingmen had begun to 
form organizations, and the more Germany strove to overtake France 
and especially England in the lead which they enjoyed, the greater 
grew the membership in these organizations. 

What attitude should the government adopt toward them? Evi- 
dently no solution like that in France and England was possible. 
Any participation of the Socialists in the government, whether of 
the whole Empire or of the individual States, was impossible because 
the citizens as such, i. e. the legislatures, were practically denied any 
real share in the administration and government of the country. 
Moreover, there was lacking any strong democratic party correspond- 
ing to the radical groups in France and England — any party of ideal- 
istic intellectuals and small bourgeois who were friendly toward the 
common people and who would have favored equal political rights 
for the Socialists simply on grounds of liberalism. The progressive 
parties in Germany had become powerless for ever as a result of 
the unfortunate outcome (for them) of the constitutional conflict in 
Prussia, and the two parties which were regarded as supporters and 
sharers in the government's policy represented principles which were 
most sharply opposed to the demands of the Social Democrats: the 
Conservatives representing landed estates and the authority of the 



396 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

church, were as hostile to the Socialist program as were the Na- 
tional Liberals, composed of the large manufacturers and imperialistic 
intellectuals (see p. 299 ff.). 

Any concessions in the form of granting political rights were there- 
fore not to be thought of. The only way of softening the fury of 
the Socialist attack was for the government to grant the working- 
men certain material advantages and at the same time to interest 
them in favor of the continued existence of the existing regime. 

This is the program which was adopted, though not immediately 
after the war of 1870. The first decade after the founding of the 
Empire showed, to be sure, a steady growth in the Socialist Party; 
but it was still so weak and small that it could at first be ignored. 
In this transition period, therefore, there was a struggle of a dif- 
ferent kind — a struggle between the State and the claims of the 
Church. 

In Prussia as elsewhere the Revolution of 1848 had led to the 
making of concessions to the Catholic Church. The Church, formerly 
regarded with distrust, and gladly tormented by the all-powerful 
State as the only surviving independent organization, had acquired 
complete independence in 1850. The government prized the influence 
of the Church which seemed to assure the education of the people 
as obedient citizens, and had placed elementary education under 
ecclesiastical control, just as was done in France at about the same 
time. After 1870, however, the panicky fear of revolution disap- 
peared. At the same time the opposition of the Catholics proved 
to be more and more an obstacle to all efforts aiming at strengthening 
the authority and power of the government. The Catholic political 
party, known as the "Center," was neither a class party nor was it 
nationalistic. Among its leaders were men like Windthorst, a "Guelf," 
who championed the interests of the Hanoverian provinces annexed 
by Prussia, or men who defended the Catholic Poles from attempts 
to Germanize them. The conflict became very acute through the 
"Old Catholic" movement, which arose as a protest against the 
Vatican Council (see p. 226 f.). The Roman Catholic bishops for- 
bade the employment of Old Catholics in educational institutions 
and refused to sanction marriages between Old Catholics. 

The only way of dealing with this conflict was to place the State 
in control of all school and civil religious matters. In cooperation 
with the National Liberals, who always favored an extension of 
state and imperial control in order to simplify professional life, the 
Prussian- German government succeeded in carrying out a part at 
least of its program, in spite of sharp opposition from the king and 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 397 

the nobility who were interested in keeping up ecclesiastical control 
over education. A complete laicization of the schools was not, in- 
deed, carried out; even the Prussian law of education issued in 1906 
included the principle of sectarian education, because the children 
of dissenters and of non-sectarian parents were forced to go to sec- 
tarian schools. But lay inspectors were put at the side of the eccle- 
siastical school supervisors; civil marriage was introduced in Prussia 
in 1874, and into the whole Empire in 1875; the Jesuits were for- 
bidden to reside in Germany, and in 1872 diplomatic relations with 
the Vatican were broken off. 

Much less successful was the attempt to subject the Catholic 
Church itself to the authority of the State. In the years 1873-75, 
by the so-called "May Laws," the Prussian government attempted 
to transform bishops and priests into mere state officials. The State 
was to supervise the seminaries for priests; bishops and priests were 
to be compelled to study at state universities; the independence of 
the Church was abolished; and the monasteries were dissolved. 

The Prussian government in all this policy stood on a very nar- 
row basis for support. Not only did its measures of force, though 
so often effective hitherto, prove unavailing against an organization 
like the Catholic Church; but neither the sequestration of property 
nor the threat of imprisonment which was held over the heads of 
several bishops succeeded in reducing the Church to submission. 
Furthermore, the Junkers, who were the real ruling group in Prussia, 
gave the government only a half-hearted support; in the Prussian 
House of Lords a strong opposition developed against the Kidtm- 
kampj, or "War for the defense of modern civilization," as it was 
called by a Liberal surgeon named Virchow. Bismarck had to pay 
for the support of the National Liberals with concessions which 
threatened to deal a severe blow to the power of the nobility in in- 
ternal politics. In 1872, the reform of the administration which had 
been promised since 18 14 was carried out, and by a creation of new 
peers laws were forced through the Upper House which deprived 
the feudal nobility of their control of the courts and the police. 

But this imnatural alliance between Bismarck and the National 
Liberals soon went to pieces. It left, however, several permanent 
results. A number of measures were carried through to secure uni- 
formity in commercial and legal matters: the Empire was given a 
uniform system of coinage adapted from the Prussian taler, an Im- 
perial Bank, and a uniform legal procedure. But even at that 
time, Bismarck opposed, on principle, all efforts of the National 
Liberals to make the administration, including foreign and domestic 



398 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

policy, dependent upon the representatives of the people in the 
Reichstag. 

The result was that the National Liberals, on their side, refused 
their consent to proposals which might have narrowed still further 
the already more or less limited share which the legislature had in 
legislation. The National Liberals refused to consent to a number 
of indirect taxes, such as a large increase in the tariff which was 
intended at the same time as protection to German industry, simply 
because this would have rendered the Reichstag's control over the 
budget illusory. Bismarck therefore joined again with the Conserva- 
tives and made an agreement with the Center which put an end to 
the Kidtmkampj. In 1880, he had the Prussian Diet give the gov- 
ernment power to dispense with the "May Laws," and nothing fur- 
ther remained except a formal revocation of the decrees. In 1882 
Bismarck went so far as to restore diplomatic relations with the 
Vatican, but at the same time he ceased making any further reforms 
in the Prussian administration. 

The government's new power and its renewed alliance with the 
parties of the Right now bore fruit in the conflict with the Social 
Democrats. This conflict could not be carried on without giving 
offense to the Liberals; and as the government had assured itself 
again of support from the Catholic party, any successful opposition 
on the part of the Left was out of the question. It was also fortunate 
for the government that in May and June, 1878, two attempts on 
the life of Emperor William I were made by Socialists who, how- 
ever, were not acting in the name of the party. The Reichstag was 
thereupon dissolved and under the impression made by these two 
attempts the Liberals lost their majority at the new election. 

The new Reichstag then adopted without delay, on October 21, 
1878, the government measure directed against the dangerous aims 
of the Social Democrats: all Socialistic societies, meetings, and pub- 
lications were forbidden; the German governments were given the 
right to declare the lesser state of siege, which made it possible for 
them to expel at will all persons suspected of Socialism. The law 
was very strictly administered: 1400 publications were suppressed, 
900 persons were expelled from Germany, and 1500 thrown into 
prison. Whatever was left of the Social Democratic organization, 
which grew out of a union of Socialist Parties in 1875, had to conceal 
itself under harmless names or meet in secret. The conventions of 
the party had to be held abroad, mostly in Switzerland or Denmark. 

But it was clear that methods like these could by no means put 
an end to the Socialist movement. This was at once seen from the 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 399 

fact that the number of persons who voted the Socialist ticket steadily- 
increased, in spite of the anti-Socialist law which remained in force 
until 1890, Therefore the government turned to other measures. 

The new program for combatting Socialism was first officially 
announced in an imperial message in November, 1881, which prom- 
ised to work for the "positive improvement of the well-being of the 
workingmen." It was carried out during the years 1883 to 1889 
by laws introducing compulsory insurance for workingmen against 
sickness, accident, incapacity, and old age. By insurance against 
old age, all workingmen and other insured classes, like maid servants 
and shop clerks, were to receive an old age pension after completing 
their seventieth year, even though they were not incapacitated; 
this amounted, on the average, to 150 marks ($35) a year. A num- 
ber of protective laws were also passed: in 1891 children were for- 
bidden to work in factories until they had completed the compulsory 
education, and for women a ten-hour work day was introduced. 
Finally^ after 1890, the anti-Socialist law was not renewed. 

To this policy the German government held fast down to 19 14. 
The leading principle of the government was to make no kind of 
political concessions, either to the Socialists or to the Liberal parties 
of the Left, but, by promoting the economic prosperity of those 
who were excluded from participation in politics, to interest them in 
the autocratic system of government, and to divert their attention 
from "impracticable" political demands. 

It was easiest to carry out this program with the aid of the Na- 
tional Liberals, which was the party of the large manufacturers. 
Though the National Liberals might often have friction with the 
government, because in cases where their interests did not harmonize 
with those of the government, the government was more inclined to 
listen to the wishes of the large landlords forming the Conservative 
and Catholic parties than to the requests of the manufacturers, 
nevertheless their well-being was looked out for so excellently in 
general that they gave up the last remnants of their former opposi- 
tion. How could they have been vexed with a regime which excluded 
workingmen from all influence in the government; which appointed 
to military and civil positions only persons who could not be re- 
proached with any Socialistic or even really Liberal inclinations; 
which was ready at any time to use force to prevent strikes by means 
of an army which was well-disciplined and commanded by officers 
drawn exclusively from Conservative circles; and which was able 
to force favorable trade agreements with foreign countries by means 
of its military preponderance? 



400 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Similarly, the intellectual classes were also won over without 
great difficulty. The government, especially in Prussia, was very 
strict in its selection of the persons admitted to its monopolistic in- 
stitutions. No Social Democrat was permitted to occupy a pro- 
fessorial chair. Only exceptionally was an investigator who had 
made himself suspicious by expressing liberal sentiments appointed 
to state educational institutions. A social and political writer like 
Karl Biicher was "impossible" for Prussian universities, because he 
had once been the editor of a progressive newspaper like the Frank- 
jurter Zeitung. On the other hand, to intellectuals who were not 
rejected for political reasons, the government offered a pleasant and 
in many respects a privileged position, with safety against disturb- 
ance through violence or strikes. For military reasons, however, 
the State could not neglect the sciences which had a technical appli- 
cation, and it was especially concerned that all instruction which 
was destined to mold future soldiers should be carried on by men 
who were thoroughly in sympathy with the ruling authorities. Why 
then, should German professors and scholars envy their French, 
English and Italian colleagues the intellectual freedom which was 
granted to them? In these countries members of all political parties 
and even pronounced Socialists were given university positions. 

In this way Germany became the El Dorado of capitalists and 
unpolitical men of learning — the state to which the rich in other 
countries, who were being pressed by the attack of the Socialist 
movement, turned with longing as to their ideal — the land on the 
existence of which depended the preservation of order in Europe. 
This was the opinion not only of Germans themselves, but of foreign 
scholars, who feared that the Socialist flood would bring about the 
destruction of all culture and good manners which was associated 
with good order in Europe. 

These views, however, grew less frequent when it became evident 
what the results of this system were for Germany itself and for the 
rest of the world. This militarization of intellectual life, this strug- 
gle of the almighty government machinery against all cultural 
movements which threatened to weaken the ruling political and 
military system, this impoverishment of all intellectual life with the 
exception of the technical sciences — these were all things to which 
foreign countries might be fairly indifferent. But it was a very seri- 
ous matter to them that in foreign relations the German economic 
system was becoming increasingly dependent upon a steady increase 
of exports. It has already been pointed out (see p. 324) that the 
large increase in population, which had been stimulated for military 



THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 401 

reasons, was making Germany ever more and more dependent eco- 
nomically upon foreign countries, as she herself was not a land richly 
endowed by Nature. This fact, as well as the unusually large and 
almost steadily increasing expenditures for military purposes, and 
after 1897-98 for the navy also, created such a burden on living 
conditions in Germany that it was to be feared that in time she might 
cease to be able to compete in foreign markets — at any rate, when 
it was no longer possible to force favorable commercial agreements 
by military threats or to secure a monopoly in a number of products 
by conquering the foreign regions which produced the raw materials. 
From this point of view the German political and economic system 
affected directly the interests and rights of other countries. From the 
point of view of German internal politics, also, there was the fact 
that, in case of a further burdening of living conditions with perhaps 
a reduction in the opportunities for work, the discontent of the work- 
ingmen might increase to such an extent that revolutionary move- 
ments, hitherto very weak, could no longer be kept within bounds 
by armed force. 

As a matter of fact, the Social Democratic movement had by no 
means been kept in check by the decrees issued for the protection 
of workingmen, however much the government might boast of the 
beneficial effects of this social legislation. In actual political life the 
effect of this social legislation was scarcely noticeable. Even if leg- 
islative bodies in Germany had enjoyed control over the executive, 
the growth of the Socialist vote could not have made itself com- 
pletely felt owing to the unfair arrangement of electoral districts 
in the two legislative assemblies which were of most importance — 
the Prussian Diet and the Imperial Reichstag. As a result of the 
shift of population from the country to the city, the rural districts 
had come to have an extraordinary advantage over the towns, where 
most of the workingmen lived, so that the Social Democrats had not 
nearly as many representatives as they deserved according to the 
number of votes they cast. This was also true of the Reichstag 
which was elected by universal suffrage and not by the "three-class 
system" as in Prussia. Hitherto the government had succeeded in 
preventing revolts of workingmen by material concessions as well 
as by armed force, but it was a question how long material conces- 
sions could still be made in view of the fact that the persecuted 
party did not soften at all in its opposition on principle to the 
Prussian- German system of government. In a state which owed 
its origin more or less to war, and was completely prepared for war, 
there was a strong desire to improve the situation by a new recourse 



402 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

to arms, which, whether by conquests, or by a war indemnity im- 
posed on the conquered countries, or above all things by economic 
concessions forced from the conquered foe, would give German in- 
dustry a trade monopoly in foreign countries and a safer market 
capable of further extension. 

In this different attitude toward Socialism lies the distinction 
which separates the states in the West, South, and, in part, the 
North of Europe from those in Central and Eastern Europe. Peo- 
ple have often used the word "democracy" to express this distinction ; 
but this word, which had a very precise meaning among the Greeks, 
has been applied to wholly different modern conditions and used 
to mean so many different things, that it is best not to use it at all. 
In reality, the root of the difference lies in the fact that in the one 
case all social classes have equal political rights and exercise an 
influence on the government in proportion to their numbers, and 
neither the church nor the military officers exercise a controlling 
influence in politics. But in the other case, especially as in Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and Russia, there exists a government by officials 
who are dependent on the government, — a government which refuses 
to cooperate with Socialists and Liberals of the Left and conducts 
its domestic and foreign policy in accordance with the wishes of 
the allied large landowners and large manufacturers, — a government, 
finally, in which the army and the church are given a preponderant 
influence in public education. This is the line of cleavage. Not 
only was public opinion so conscious of it that the alliance of France 
with Russia was often regarded as something monstrous, but it has 
also been of importance more than once in practical politics. Here 
we can only mention the service which Imperial Germany did for 
the Russian government in arresting Russian Socialists and Revolu- 
tionists, although Germany's interests, after she chose to support 
Austria in the Balkans, no longer coincided with those of Russia. 
It was certainly a sound feeling on the part of Russian Liberals, 
in contrast with the Tsar's pro-German court circle, that the close 
connection of the Russian government with Germany, and German 
influence in general, was regarded as the greatest obstacle to that 
liberty which they longed for. Much as the two countries differed 
in their economic organization and in the education of the masses, 
there were too many analogies between the principles of government 
in both for an affinity not to have grown up — an affinity, moreover, 
which was particularly emphasized by the circles who controlled the 
actual government in Prussia. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA 
FOR THE BALKANS 

An "Eastern Question" had existed for a long time. As early as 
the eighteenth century, Russia, which had never possessed an access 
to the sea which was satisfactory in every respect, had attempted to 
get possession of Constantinople as a surer means of connection with 
the Mediterranean. For a long time Turkey's existence had de- 
pended solely upon the jealousy of the Great Powers toward one 
another. 

But the struggle of the Great Powers against Russia's aspirations 
had hitherto been rather a European than an Austrian affair. Austria 
was too much absorbed with other cares — by her struggle to retain 
possession of her Italian possessions, and later by her conflict with 
Prussia for leadership in Germany — to be able to oppose armed re- 
sistance to Russian ambition. The duty of holding the Russians 
back from Constantinople had fallen to England in alliance with 
France, and during the Crimean War these allies had been able to 
put a halt to Russian efforts at expansion. 

A change took place when the Wars of 1866 and 1870 revolu- 
tionized international relations in Europe. Austria had now definitely 
lost her position in Italy and Germany. If she wanted to seek com- 
pensation and carry out a policy of conquest like a Great Power, the 
only region left to her was the Balkan Peninsula, because she had 
neither the inclination nor the ability to carry on a regular over- 
seas colonial policy. So the Danubian Monarchy concentrated its 
whole foreign policy upon the Balkans, either to conquer them di- 
rectly, or to draw them within the sphere of Austrian influence. 

But this meant a conflict with Russia. This conflict was not 
only sharpened by the new political situation, but it was put on a 
fundamentally new basis. While Austria had formerly been able to 
rely upon the assistance of the Western Powers, she now had to 
carry on the struggle all alone so far as these were concerned. 
France, after 1870, no longer counted as a military Great Power; 
and Great Britain, which had refused to build up land armaments 
like those of the Continental countries, no longer formed a counter- 

403 



404 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

weight which could be effectively opposed to the Russian advance 
toward the Mediterranean. There was only one power left which 
could interfere, either to help or to hinder Austria: this was the 
newly- founded German Empire; on its attitude depended primarily 
whether the two rival Eastern Powers should come to war over the 
Balkans or not. 

So long as war could be avoided, the expedient was usually adopted 
which had first been applied in the establishment of the Kingdom 
of Greece: the territories seized from the Turks were not annexed 
by any of the Great Powers, but were made into independent states. 
As in the case of Greece this did not, indeed, solve the problem; it 
merely postponed its solution. The conflict continued in such a 
way that the two Great Powers struggled to secure a dominant in- 
fluence over the new states, which had purposely been left small. 

In this connection Austria found herself in many respects at a 
disadvantage. Little as the Balkan States were inclined toward 
Russia, they nevertheless stood closer to the Russians than to the 
Austrians. This was due to their common religion, although the 
influence of this has often been exaggerated. It was due also to 
similarities of language; although many people in Austria-Hungary 
spoke languages akin to those of the Balkan nations, these people 
belonged to the oppressed nationalities in Austria-Hungary, and 
hated their German and Magyar rulers, whereas the ruling classes 
in Russia were believed to be ready to assist all Pan-Slavic aspira- 
tions. Finally, the close relationship between the Balkan peoples 
and Russia rested on social conditions; although this has often not 
been realized, it has exercised such a strong influence that it must 
be considered somewhat more in detail here. 

With the exception of Rumania and, to some extent, of Albania, 
where medieval feudal conditions with large landed estates have 
survived, the class of feudal landlords is unknown. The whole popu- 
lation of Bulgaria and Serbia — the two peoples who dominate in the 
Balkans — consists of peasants, and there is neither a middle-class 
nor large landed estates. In this respect, there is no analogy on 
their part either with Russia or with Austria. But there is a dif- 
ference: in Austria, especially in the Slavic and Rumanian districts, 
the system of large landed estates is much more pronounced than 
in Russia; and the peasants performing agricultural services, who 
are at the mercy of their feudal landlords, are very often in subjec- 
tion to representatives of foreign races, like Germans and Magyars. 
In Austria, also, the feudal landlords are privileged in all sorts of 
ways, as by the system of primogeniture; but in Russia nothing of 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 405 

this kind exists. The prosperous development of the Balkan States, 
therefore, might be a dangerous example for the Slavic nationalities 
of Austria, but for Russia any such effect was scarcely conceivable. 

In order to understand this, a summary sketch may here be given 
of Austrian history in the nineteenth century. 

Austria was one of the few European states which were not trans- 
formed by the French Revolution. In contrast to Prussia, her in- 
herited institutions proved capable of withstanding the attack of 
French armies, so that the compromise between medieval absolutism 
and enlightened despotism remained as it had been established in 
the eighteenth century. The only new phenomenon was an anxiety, 
formerly unknown, as to all new "revolutionary ideas," and this 
anxiety led to defensive measures which were equaled at the time 
only in Russia. 

The government of Austria lay exclusively in the hands of a 
bureaucracy which in large part was made up of Germans. Uncon- 
trolled by any public responsibility and without any reasonable sys- 
tem of organization, this bureaucracy did its work with unbelievable 
slowness and arbitrariness. The budget of this rich country showed 
regularly a deficit — which was kept secret. This regime was as much 
in contradiction with the wishes of the Liberals as with the demands 
of the gradually awakening national feeling on the part of the vari- 
ous populations which had been united under the monarchy. The 
Liberals as such lived mainly in cities in the German-speaking dis- 
tricts; they wanted a reform of the constitution so that the abso- 
lutism of the bureaucracy might be abolished. The nationalistic 
opposition was most lively in the non-German districts among the 
Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, and Poles. In these districts a revolu- 
tionary opposition was also in favor of federalism in government, in 
contrast to countries like Italy and Germany where the Liberals 
desired a centralized national state. 

From the outset the national movements in Austria differed ac- 
cording to the social and political organization of the districts. The 
Magyar movement, which rested on the old Hungarian constitution 
with its privileges for the nobility, bore an exclusively feudal char- 
acter; it represented the interests of the large landowners. The 
same was true of the Polish movement in Austria, especially as con- 
cerned Eastern Galicia; here the supporters of nationalism were 
the feudal landlords. On the other hand, it was quite different in 
the case of the Czechs and even of the Croats and Serbs: these 
peoples, so far as they were conscious of their position at all, had 
been awakened to it by the zealous propaganda of a number of in- 



4o6 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tellectuals; but nothing had been done for their education; here 
nationalism was mainly represented by the masses of people, and 
their struggles were directed both against the privileged position of 
the German elements in the Monarchy and against the privileges 
of the large landowners. 

From this arose a curiously complicated situation, in which the 
government found it much easier to deal with those nationalities 
who at least did not want to interfere with the privileged aristocracy 
in their enjoyment of all the higher positions in the military and civil 
service, than with those nationalities who were also putting forward 
democratic demands. It was also true that the German elements in 
Austria, who might have sympathized with the Czechs and Croats 
on liberal grounds — since in their own districts there were only a 
few large landed estates — nevertheless opposed them most violently, 
because otherwise they would have lost their own privileged position 
in the government. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Church, 
as a large owner of land, gladly put herself on the side of the aris- 
tocratic authorities. 

This variety of criss-crossing influences, of which we have been 
able to mention only the most important, made it easy for the Aus- 
trian government to maintain itself by continually shifting its policy 
and making bargains; for it possessed two forces which were wholly 
dependent upon the government itself and whose very existence was 
bound up with the survival of the monarchy — two forces which, by 
their very nature, as in Prussia, were willing to make concessions 
to the land-owning nobility: these two forces were the bureaucracy 
and the army. 

How the Austrian government had been able to master the revo- 
lutionary movement by means of these two forces had been shown 
for the first time in 1848. 

When the February Revolution triumphed in Paris, the Austrian 
government was panic-stricken. When the mob in Vienna, which 
included many students, rose in insurrection, Prince Metternich, 
who had hitherto been all-powerful and who was regarded as the 
embodiment of absolutism, fell from power; the Emperor granted 
freedom of the press, permitted the creation of a citizen-guard, and 
on March 15, 1848, summoned a national assembly. New threats 
even compelled the ministry to allow this assembl}'' to be elected 
on the basis of universal suffrage to act as a constitutional convention. 

Since Austria, at that time and for long afterwards, still had no 
large manufactures and was primarily an agricultural country, this 
proclamation of universal suffrage meant the strengthening, not of 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 407 

the workingmen, but of the peasants. Accordingly, more than a 
quarter of the representatives elected to the national convention were 
farmers. But universal suffrage had also resulted in strengthening 
the Slavic populations, who made up altogether a numerical ma- 
jority in the Monarchy; the majority in the convention belonged 
to the Slavic nationalities. It was due to this fact that the consti- 
tutional convention had primarily in mind the abolition of the feudal 
obligations imposed on the agricultural population, like compulsory 
labor services. This reform was adopted unanimously and was the 
most important permanent result of the March Revolution in Vienna. 

But in making this reform, the various nationalities by no means 
forgot their own particular claims. The Czechs in Bohemia de- 
manded that they should have a ministry of their own and that 
their national language should be put on an equal footing with Ger- 
man. The Hungarians went still further. They insisted on a 
national government of their own with responsible ministers. The 
leader of the Liberal Hungarian movement, Kossuth, went so far 
in his idealism as to have the Hungarian Diet abolish feudal land- 
lord rights and decree equality before the law, which meant putting 
an end to the exemption from taxation and the monopolization of 
positions in the government which had been enjoyed by the Magyar 
nobles. At that time the Hungarians also took a similarly liberal 
attitude toward the Croats, who formed a part of the Hungarian 
Kingdom and who had formerly been subjected by the Magyars to 
efforts at "Magyarization": the Croats were given a ''ban," or gov- 
ernor, appointed from their own people. Colonel Jellachich. It was 
only toward the Serbian demand for autonomy that the Hungarians 
took an attitude of downright refusal. 

The Hapsburg rulers in Vienna had been compelled to yield every- 
where at first; but when this panicky fear had passed, they went 
back on their promises. With the help of the army they succeeded 
in crushing the revolution and in restoring the absolutistic regime 
under the form of a military dictatorship. In this they were sup- 
ported by the Slavs, who were as hostile to the German populace 
of Vienna and to the Magyars as was the Hapsburg court party 
itself. The attack against the Hungarians was carried out by none 
other than the new Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, and Vienna was re- 
conquered for the Hapsburgs by an army from Bohemia and Croatia. 

Then, after Emperor Ferdinand had been compelled to abdicate 
and had been replaced by his nephew, the eighteen-year-old Francis 
Joseph, the new ruler declared that he was not bound by any of 
the promises made by his predecessor; he therefore annulled com- 



4o8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

pletely all the measures which the government had promised to the 
various nationalities at the moment it was under revolutionary 
pressure. 

It was in Hungary that it proved most difficult to carry out this 
restoration. The Magyars had created an army of their own which 
had been able to drive the Austrians almost completely out of the 
country. The Hungarian Diet had deposed the Hapsburg dynasty 
and made Kossuth their governor. The Austrian government had 
to call upon the Tsar for help; whereupon a Russian army forced 
its way into Hungary and compelled the revolutionists to lay down 
their arms. By 1849 the rule of the Hapsburgs was restored in 
Hungary. Some Himgarian political leaders were put to death, 
many were banished, and the old Hungarian constitution was de- 
clared annulled. 

The Old Regime was now restored in all the other parts of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy. The constitution was formally revoked and 
freedom of the press abolished. The administration was strictly 
centralized and put almost wholly into the hands of Germans. And 
a concordat was made with the Catholic Church as has been men- 
tioned in another connection (see p. 226). 

But this system proved too weak to stand, the moment the Mon- 
archy ceased to derive strength from successes in foreign policy, 
which alone could have justified such a restoration. In 1859, ten 
years after the restoration, came the costly campaign in Italy (see 
p. 2 53 ) . To this were added financial difficulties. Austria, with her 
rich mineral and agricultural resources and in spite of her miserable 
administrative system, had sufficient means to prolong her existence 
in some way or other under ordinary circumstances ; but the revenues 
were not sufficient to meet the costs of a disastrous war policy. 
Bankers refused to loan money so long as the financial administra- 
tion was conducted by an uncontrolled bureaucracy, and in i860 the 
government loan was not subscribed. The Emperor called an Im- 
perial Council consisting of thirty-eight notables, almost exclusively 
large landowners, to help him out of the difficulty. It was in this 
"Enlarged Council" that the opposition of class interests mentioned 
above first came clearly to light. The majority, consisting of large 
landlords from Hungary, Bohemia, and Polish Galicia, wanted a 
federal system of government, in which each of the nationalities 
should be given local self-government with the power in the hands 
of the local nobility; the Germans, on the other hand, wanted a 
continuance of the strong central power at Vienna, which meant 
prolonging their own control of the administration. 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 409 

The Emperor decided at first in favor of the great landlords. 
Since the Hungarians wished above everything else the restoration 
of their old constitution, he also made shortly afterwards some con- 
cessions to the German party, so that the result was a compromise, 
in which each of the Austrian lands was given a local Diet, but at the 
same time there was created a real imperial parliament or Reichsrat, 
consisting of two houses. The Reichsrat of i860 was composed 
of a House of Representatives chosen by the members of the local 
Diets, which gave an unusually large advantage to the Germans, 
and of a House of Lords composed mainly of the heads of noble 
families and ecclesiastical dignitaries. 

These concessions to the Germans and to the urban districts were 
regarded as so excessive by the great landlords and the non- German 
populations that the new constitution never really came into opera- 
tion. The Hungarians, who felt that both their class interests and 
their national interests had equally suffered, were the first to ob- 
ject and refuse to recognize the new constitution. They and the 
Croats simply refused to elect deputies to the House of Represen- 
tatives. The Czech and Polish representatives quickly withdrew 
from the Chamber also, so that there remained merely the represen- 
tatives of the Germans and of the very small nationalities. At the 
same time the financial deficit of the state was steadily increasing. 
The Emperor therefore resorted to his old plan and decided to give 
way to the landlords and their desire for a federalist system; so the 
constitution of i860 was "suspended" — forever. 

It was a natural result of these events that the Hapsburg mon- 
archs should seek to make an agreement with the most dangerous 
opponents of the idea of centralized government, namely with the 
Hungarian magnates. The Hungarians, who at that time were led 
by an 1848 Liberal named Deak, favored on principle a compromise. 
But it was not until the Austrian military defeats in 1866 that the 
Austrian Emperor was finally induced to go to the point of coming 
to an agreement with tlie Magyars. The Austrian government, whose 
foreign policy at that time was in the hands of a former Saxon 
minister and enemy of Prussia, Count Beust, was naturally anxious 
to preserve Austria from the danger of being attacked in the rear 
by the Hungarians in case of a war of revenge against Prussia. 
Austria therefore recognized Hungary as an autonomous state with 
a ministry of its own, and signed the Ausgleich, or "Compromise" 
of 1867. 

Austria, which henceforth was known as "Austria-Hungary," now 
consisted of two states which, besides the common monarch, had only 



4IO ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

three other things in common: foreign affairs, the army and navy, 
and finance; so far as these three things had to be supported finan- 
cially they were to be managed by three joint ministers. "Com- 
mercial matters" were to be managed on the same general principles, 
but not by joint ministers. The common debt was to be met by a 
special agreement to be revised every ten years. Above the three 
imperial ministers of foreign affairs, war, and finance, "Delegations" 
were set up, consisting of sixty representatives from each of the two 
halves of the Dual Monarchy; the two Delegations enjoyed equal 
rights and took the place of the Reichsrat, which was done away 
with. The old Hungarian constitution was restored. 

By this Ausgleich the government and the Germans had relieved 
themselves of pressure from the most powerful nation within the Em- 
pire; henceforth, the Hungarians possessed no direct influence on 
the administration of the Austrian half of the Monarchy known as 
Cisleithania ; but they were now just as much interested in the es- 
tablishment of a centralized, united, national administration for their 
own territory as the Germans were for theirs. These two ruling 
nationalities, Germans and Magyars, henceforth formed a natural 
alliance against subject nationalities like the Slavs, Rumanians, and 
Italians. 

In Hungary the government remained in the hands of the large 
landowners. The House of Magnates, or upper branch of the Diet, 
was still composed as before of hereditary feudal landlords. The 
franchise for the Chamber of Deputies was indeed made somewhat 
democratic, and the nobility lost their right of appointing the judges, 
but elections were by open instead of secret ballot, so that the voters 
were subject to pressure from landlords. As far as appearances went, 
a parliamentary system of government had been introduced. Tran- 
sylvania was completely incorporated into Hungary; Croatia, on the 
other hand, by a special "Compromise," kept its autonomous ad- 
ministration. 

The Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary also resulted in the 
establishment of constitutional government in Austria itself. The 
half of the Monarchy west of the river Leith was given by the con- 
stitutional laws of 1867 a new parliament with responsible ministers 
and the promise of legal equality for all persons. All citizens were 
declared capable of holding office, religious toleration was estab- 
lished, the law courts were withdrawn from administrative control, 
and even some of the concessions made to the church in the Concordat 
of 1855 were canceled. The different national groups were prom- 
ised equal treatment in the schools. The system of electing the 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 411 

Reichsrat by the Provincial Diets was at first retained; but in 1873 
it was transferred directly to the electorate who, however, still voted 
as formerly in four groups consisting of landowners, towns, cham- 
bers of commerce, and rural districts. It was not until 1907 that 
universal and equal suffrage was introduced. 

But in spite of all these appearances, the real power remained 
almost exclusively in the hands of the Emperor or of his court. 
The Chamber of Deputies was split into so many groups, according 
to social classes and nationalities, that no parliamentary government 
majority could be formed. It was therefore possible for the court 
to create a government coalition out of any groups which it wanted 
to. Its procedure was something like this: the Emperor could al- 
ways count on the votes of the landowners and their deputies whose 
interests were the same as his own, just as was the case in Prussia; 
with these votes his ministers combined the votes of those parties or 
nationalities whose support was easiest to obtain for the government 
measure of the moment; such a ministry held together only until 
the court decided to adopt a new policy with the support of a new 
combination of parties. 

This system of continual compromise and endless bargaining both 
with the different nationalities and with the different social groups 
cannot be described here in detail; not only were the Germans, at 
the outset, split into several groups which squabbled violently with 
one another, but so also were the Czechs. It must suffice to state 
that, of all the parties, the Czechs went furthest in their demands 
for federalism in government; like the Hungarians, they desired to 
restore their old kingdom and be united with Austria only in a 
personal union, recognizing the same monarch. 

The most important result of all these struggles, however, was 
the fact that the direction of the foreign policy of the Dual Mon- 
archy slipped more and more into the hands of the Hungarians. 
Hungary did not recognize any equality among her different races, 
even in form: one nationality alone — that of the Magyars — exer- 
cised unlimited political authority; one social class, the nobility, 
dominated the Diet; the aristocratic character of these Magyar rulers 
drew them close to the Vienna court; how natural it was, therefore, 
that this powerful, closely organized, Hungarian clique should im- 
pose their authority on the Austrian half of the Monarchy, which 
was split into so many parties and divided by so many tendencies! 

This circumstance was also of decisive importance in Austria's 
relations to the Balkans. So far as Austro-Hungarian policy toward 
the Balkans was determined primarily by economic considerations, 



412 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

the interests of the Hungarian landlords proved to be the deter- 
mining factor. 

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had relieved Russia of 
taking France and England into account as far as her policy in the 
Near East was concerned, the Christian populations of the Balkans, 
especially in Herzegovina, who had already revolted several times 
against Turkish oppression, began to have stronger hopes of help 
from St. Petersburg. Russian consuls stirred up their religious and 
racial brothers in Bulgaria and Serbia toward a war of independence. 
The Serbian inhabitants of Herzegovina rose in rebellion against 
the Turkish officials; they were supported by the Montenegrins, 
and in 1875 the Serbs in Serbia, who were autonomous, declared 
that they could not leave their Serbian brethren in the lurch. The 
Great Powers thereupon compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops 
from Herzegovina. For this the Turks avenged themselves not only 
by individual acts of violence like the murder of the French and 
German consuls in Salonika in 1876, but also by frightful massacres 
in Bulgaria, where some villages had taken up arms against Turkey. 
Serbia thereupon declared war; but her army was too weak to 
withstand the Turks, and it was only Russia's intervention which 
forced the Turks to conclude an armistice with the beaten Serbs. 
The other Great Powers also undertook diplomatic intervention; 
but the Turks managed to evade all their warnings, though in such 
a despicable manner that in 1876 the Europeans gave up the defense 
of the Turkish regime as hopeless. 

This meant that for the moment they would give Russia a free 
hand, and in 1877 the Tsar declared war on Turkey. Two Russian 
armies advanced against the Turks, the main army through Bulgaria 
into the Balkans, and a smaller force against Armenia, But victory 
was not so easy to win as in 1829. The training of Turks by 
Prussian and Austrian officers had borne fruit, and though the Turk- 
ish army was incapable of taking the offensive, nevertheless it under- 
stood how to hold the enemy in check most obstinately by good de- 
fensive positions. The Turks had made the town of Plevna into a 
well entrenched camp, and it proved impossible to dislodge them 
by storming the place. The Russians had to begin a regular siege 
and seek help from the Rumanian army. In December, 1877, after 
Plevna had been besieged nearly five months, the place was taken; 
but the Turks by their defense had so revived the fame of their 
former heroic exploits in war that the effect of the defense of Plevna 
had an influence for a long time afterwards. It was not until the 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 413 

winter that the Russians were able to force the Balkan passes, and 
in January, 1878, their troops filed past Adrianople. 

On March 3, 1878, in order to save their capital at Constantinople, 
the Turks quickly agreed to sign the treaty of San Stephano, in 
which they gave up all claims to Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, 
raised Bulgaria to the position of a tributary state, and ceded a piece 
of Armenia to Russia. 

Although Russia, in comparison with her enormous achievements 
during the war, which had cost more than a billion dollars, had re- 
ceived only a small direct advantage from the war, nevertheless, 
the other Powers stepped in to prevent her from getting too much 
influence through the founding of a new Balkan state, consisting 
of an enlarged Bulgaria. Austria mobilized her army and England 
sent her fleet to Constantinople. Germany, also, stood on their 
side. As Russia had neither the inclination nor perhaps the means 
of engaging in war with a European Great Power, she yielded. She 
consented to lay the treaty of San Stephano for revision before a 
European Congress which met at Berlin in the summer of 1878. 

The result of this Congress was that the concessions imposed on 
Turkey were essentially cut down. Serbia and Montenegro, to be 
sure, retained their independence, but the extension of territory as- 
signed to them was reduced. The clause by which Rumania was 
given the Dobrudscha in compensation for the much richer district 
of Bessarabia, which was ceded to Russia, was retained; at the 
same time, a clause was imposed on the Rumanians compelling them 
to give legal equality to adherents of all religions in Rumania, 
even including the Jews. The increase of territory which Russia 
had demanded in Asia Minor was considerably cut down, but the 
most important point was the way in which the newly-created state 
of Bulgaria was cut to pieces: northern Bulgaria was permitted to 
have a prince of its own choosing; southern Bulgaria, or "East 
Roumelia," was merely placed under a Christian governor; and the 
whole of Macedonia was restored to Turkish misrule. The other 
European Great Powers received some direct compensations for the 
extension of territory which Russia received in Asia Minor. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, where the insurrection against Turkish oppression 
had first broken out, were not assigned to Serbia and Montenegro in 
accordance with ethnographic principles, but were left by the Con- 
gress under the nominal suzerainty of Turkey, and Austria was given 
the right to occupy and administer them. Russia had purposely 
never claimed them because she did not want to interfere in the 
Austrian sphere of influence. Great Britain, which had promised 



414 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

in a secret treaty to defend Turkey's rights in Asia Minor, received 
directly from Turkey the right to administer Cyprus in return for 
the payment of tribute. Finally, at the request of the French, 
Greece was enlarged by being given part of Thessaly. 

These decisions of the Congress of Berlin not only regulated the 
situation in the Balkans for the moment; they embodied in general 
the Balkan program of the Great Powers. The Christian popula- 
tions now knew that the Great Powers, and especially Austria, would 
never consent to the creation of independent powerful states in the 
Balkan Peninsula, and also that they would never take determined 
steps against Turkey. Little was to be hoped for, even from Russia. 
The Tsar had attempted to carve up European Turkey and to es- 
tablish in its place independent Christian states; but the other Great 
Powers had prevented him and he had been forced to give in. Only 
by exploiting the rivalries among the Great Powers or by allying 
among themselves would it henceforth be possible for the Balkan 
states to liberate the other Christian districts and unite them with 
the nations which had already been formed. Such an alliance seemed 
more necessary than ever. Now that the Turks had realized how 
their authority was threatened by the existence of Christian com- 
munities in Turkey, their former toleration had often given way 
to a system of the most terrible persecution and even extermination. 
But there was no hope that the Great Powers would do anything 
to prevent this. They had, indeed, imposed on the Sultan promises 
meant to protect the Christian populations; but since they clung to 
the principle that European Turkey must continue to exist, they did 
not dare to adopt any kind of measures which would really compel 
the Turks to respect the treaties. The frightful massacring of Ar- 
menians, which began in 1894, went on imdisturbed without the 
Great Powers troubling themselves about it. 

So the Balkan states took their fate in their own hands. First, 
Bulgaria got possession of East Roumelia, which had been withheld 
from her by the Congress of Berlin; this was done simply by a 
military occupation of the country in 1885. This resulted in a war 
between Bulgaria and Serbia, as the latter wanted to prevent the 
expansion of her rival. But the Bulgarians were victorious, and 
Serbia was only saved by Austria, which did not want to see any 
Balkan state, even Bulgaria, become too strong. But this friend- 
ship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia went to pieces when 
Serbia began to be an economic competitor of Austria and Hungary. 
In spite of many disorders at court after their emancipation, both 
Serbia and Bulgaria developed great economic prosperity; the more 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 415 

Europe became industrialized and its population increased, the 
greater was the profit which accrued to these two peasant states. 
It was just because of this that Serbia, at least, came into conflict 
with Hungary, which exercised a determining influence on the foreign 
policy of the Dual Monarchy. Since Serbia, in contrast to Bulgaria, 
had no free access to the sea, she was compelled to export all her 
hogs through Austria; but now this mode of export began to be 
restricted as much as possible for the benefit of the Hungarian land- 
lords, and there developed a regular tariff war between Serbia and 
Austria-Hungary. 

Similar advances of the Christian population at Turkey's expense 
took place further south. The Island of Crete, which had been given 
a constitution as far back as 1868, had been in almost continual 
revolt against the Turkish governors, and in 1897 the Christians in 
the island proclaimed their union with the Greeks on the main- 
land. The Greeks of the mother country thereupon occupied the 
island; but the Great Powers stepped in and took possession of the 
city of Canea; at the same time, Turkey declared war upon Greece. 
But the Greek army was not at all prepared for this and was put 
to flight by the Turks near Larissa. Owing to intervention by the 
Powers the war was brought to a speedy end. Greece lost a number 
of important strategic points in Thessaly, and had to withdraw her 
troops from Crete and pay a war indemnity of a million dollars; her 
finances were therefore placed under European control. 

In spite of this, Crete was practically taken from Turkey. The 
Great Powers compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops from the 
island and they set up, as governor-general, a son of the king of 
Greece. Crete was made autonomous. But this was merely the first 
step toward complete freedom. In 1904, there began an opposition 
under the leadership of a native statesman, Venizelos. The Opposi- 
tion, which wanted to go further than the Greek dynasty, began a 
war against the cautious governor-general, who finally resigned his 
post; the Opposition then announced again the union of Crete with 
Greece. 

Meanwhile, changes in the attitude of the Powers toward one 
another had been taking place, which reacted powerfully on the 
fate of the Balkan peoples. 

The most important of these changes was the wholly different 
attitude of Germany. In one respect Bismarck had never lost his 
keenness of judgment; he had never over-estimated the real power 
at Germany's disposal and had never allowed the economic pros- 
perity of his country to go to his head. One may say that he never 



4i6 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

forgot how wonderfully favorable the combinations were to which 
he owed his quick victories in 1866 and 1870. He realized that 
they were due to the fact that the other Great Powers not directly 
interested had not interfered, and he shaped his policy accordingly. 
Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in his policy toward the 
Balkans. Although bound by an alliance with Austria, and al- 
though he thoroughly favored his ally being drawn away by Balkan 
interests from political activities in Central Europe, he nevertheless 
always prevented matters from going so far as to allow this to cause 
hostility between Germany and Russia. In 1881 he renewed the 
old friendly understanding between Germany and Russia, and 
steadily recognized that Russia no less than Austria had claims to 
a part of the Balkans. 

The new generation in Germany was typically represented by 
Emperor William II, who ascended the throne in 1888 at the age of 
twenty-nine. He did not recognize these facts as did Bismarck. In 
1890 the aged chancellor was dismissed, partly as a result of the 
young Emperor's shifting to a closer support of Austria in the Near 
East, and the secret "re-insurance treaty" with Russia was not re- 
newed. Two reasons for this more aggressive and pro- Austrian 
attitude probably had a determining influence. One of these was 
the new ruler's inability correctly to appreciate other peoples who 
were not educated and ruled in the same military fashion as the 
Germans; this resulted in the conviction that Germany had no 
need to fear a coalition of other Great Powers, which had been Bis- 
marck's nightmare. The second reason was New Germany's de- 
termination to expand and her belief that a welcome field for ex- 
ploitation was to be found in a Turkey dominated by Germany and 
protected by German arms. This did not mean that Germany was 
directly interested in conquest in the Balkans, as was her ally, but 
it did mean that she was interested in the continued existence of the 
Turkish Empire and in the weakening of the Balkan nations, so 
that the policy of the two Central Powers was now virtually one and 
the same. The German government accepted the risk of turning 
Russia into a natural enemy by this policy; but she believed that 
the identity of political ideals in Germany and Russia (see p. 402) 
would suffice to prevent an actual outbreak of war; she believed 
that the Tsar's dislike of "democracy" would prove stronger than 
his anxiety to maintain Russia's position in foreign affairs. 

The consequences of this new grouping of the Powers became 
more evident after 1905, after the close of the Russo-Japanese War 
(seep. 357 f.)- 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 417 

The defeats which Russia suffered in Eastern Asia in this war 
seemed to have revealed a military weakness in the Tsar's empire 
which no one had suspected hitherto. If Russia could not even 
withstand a relatively small Power like Japan, which had only just 
equipped herself with European weapons, how would she ever be 
able to make war against a European Great Power? All Russia's 
enemies now abandoned their reserved attitude and no longer hesi- 
tated to make aggressive moves; even during the war, in 1904, the 
British had pushed forward in Tibet as far as Lhassa. Within Rus- 
sia itself it was impossible to hold down the Liberal Opposition any 
longer. In August, 1905, the Tsar proclaimed the creation of a 
parliament with advisory powers, known as the "Advisory Duma"; 
later, in October, 1905, the Duma was given "legislative power." At 
the same time, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and so forth 
were proclaimed. The Duma elections of the next year gave the 
reformers an overwhelming majority. The strongest party in the 
Duma were the Constitutional Democrats under Miliukov; they 
were known as the "Cadets," from the Russian name of the letters 
"C. D." which was the familiar abbreviation for "Constitutional 
Democrats." The next strongest party was the Group of Toil, 
representing the peasants; the Extreme Conservatives, on the other 
hand, were scarcely represented at all. The Duma now demanded 
control over the executive — more even than was allowed to legisla- 
tive bodies in Germany. It was therefore dissolved and the govern- 
ment finally succeeded in 1907, by means of a limited franchise, in 
securing the election of a Third Duma, in which the Octobrist party, 
consisting of Liberals of the Right, had a majority. But even so, 
the Tsar had to give his consent to the establishment of parliamen- 
tary government, and the way for reforms was now open. The 
president of the cabinet, Stolypin, who had risen to power through 
provincial administration, undertook to create free peasant pro- 
prietors. In 19 ID, the peasants were given the right to divide and 
take as their own the fields which they had been cultivating; the 
community ownership represented by the mir was replaced by pri- 
vate ownership in land. The government regarded it as all the 
more important to create these new peasant proprietors as a kind 
of conservative force for the future, because there had recently been 
a threatening growth of Socialism. The Liberal reforms which had 
been granted in 1905 had not satisfied the Extreme Left; numerous 
socialistic revolts had broken out, and there had been strikes by 
officials, all of which were only put down with bloodshed. Thus 
the government sought at first to secure support principally from 



4i8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

large landowners and from Conservative-Liberal officials; but later 
it intended to rest its power on a broader basis. 

For the moment, however, in the eyes of her neighbors, Russia 
seemed to be very seriously weakened by the disorders which accom- 
panied the introduction of constitutional government. But her 
neighbors overlooked the considerable solid reform in the army and 
administration which was taking place to remedy the evils which 
had been laid bare in the war with Japan; so there took place one 
move after another against Russia's interests in the Balkans. 

In 1908 a group who called themselves "Young Turks" and who 
were opposed to the Sultan's regime took possession of Constanti- 
nople. They declared that the anarchy in Macedonia, which had 
already led to the appointment of foreign military officers — among 
whom, however, there were no Germans — must necessarily lead to 
a partitioning of Turkey, unless the tyrannical system which had 
hitherto existed was done away with. 

The Young Turk coup d'etat succeeded at first, and a Turkish 
Parliament, elected on the basis of the liberal constitution of 1876, 
came into being. But the only really practical effect of the revolt 
of the Young Turks was that it revealed more clearly than ever to 
the Powers the weakness of the Turkish government. The Powers 
therefore did not delay in taking advantage of this: it was in July, 
1908, that the Young Turks had come into power; in October, 
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared himself independent, taking 
the title of Tsar, and Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

This was a serious blow, not only for Russia, but still more for 
the Balkan peoples themselves, who now saw, for the first time, that 
in place of Turkish rule they were not to have independence but 
the domination of a foreign Great Power. The annexation of the 
provinces struck most deeply at the claims of Serbia, who now had 
to regard her Serbian brothers living in Bosnia as lost. But resist- 
ance was out of the question. A little state like Serbia could not 
possibly attack Austria-Hungary, and Russia refrained from all 
warlike action because Germany declared that the interests of her 
Austrian ally were her own. 

It was doubtful, however, how long the two Central Powers could 
maintain their control over the Balkans. They were steadily be- 
coming more and more isolated. Italy, no less than Austria, believed 
that she had claims to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and her 
war for the conquest of Tripoli had showed that her interests as a 
member of the Triple Alliance could not be made to harmonize with 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 419 

Austria's policy, which aimed at control over Salonica and the 
Western Balkans. France was the ally of Russia, but not wholly on 
Russia's side. England's support was uncertain. The situation be- 
came most threatening when the Balkan states, whose development 
was endangered by the pro-Turkish policy of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, finally united together under the pressure of common 
necessity in an offensive alliance against Turkey in the spring of 19 12. 

It was regarded almost as a wonder that a coalition uniting 
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, could take place. Ap- 
parently its success was mainly due to the diplomatic skill of the 
Greek statesman, Venizelos. It was still more of a wonder that the 
Central Powers allowed this alliance, which was directed against 
their policy in Turkey, to take its course at first. The explanation 
lies in the fact that they greatly over-estimated Turkey's defensive 
strength; after the Turkish successes in the Greco-Turkish War, 
and after the training of Turkish troops by German officers, they 
regarded Turkey's power of resistance as almost invincible. In 
reality, things turned out exactly the otlier way. After the Balkan 
Allies had declared war in October, 19 12, Turkey's power collapsed 
with a speed which was unheard of. The Greeks captured Salonica 
and Janina in Epirus; the Serbs, after a victory at Kumanovo, oc- 
cupied tJskUb and the whole of northern Macedonia; the Monte- 
negrins, after a long siege, seized Scutari in Albania. More decisive 
than anything, however, was the fact that the Bulgarians crushed the 
Turkish armies at Kirk-Kilisse and Liile Burgas, so that the rem- 
nants of the beaten enemy had to withdraw behind the Tchataldja 
Lines, a few miles west of Constantinople. With the support of the 
Serbs, the Bulgarians also succeeded in capturing the strongly forti- 
fied city of Adrianople. The Turks had to recognize that they were 
beaten. In the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, they gave up all 
their European territory with the exception of Constantinople and 
the Dardanelles up to a line running from Enos on the ^^gean to 
Midia on the Black Sea; they also gave up Crete and the other 
islands in the ^gean Sea. 

The Great Powers had not been able to prevent Turkey from 
being despoiled in this fashion. But the Central Powers were at 
least able to bring it about that the Balkan states, especially Serbia 
and Montenegro, which were particularly disliked by Austria for 
economic and political reasons, were not too much enlarged. Though 
Serbia had entered the war largely in order to secure free access 
to the sea and make herself politically and commercially independent 
of Hungarian oppression, she was now forced to abandon the most 



420 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

important part of her conquests. At the insistence of Austria and 
Italy, the Great Powers created an independent principality of Al- 
bania, which was placed under a German prince; Serbia lost the 
coast region on the Adriatic which she had occupied, and received 
merely the right to have a so-called corridor railway; Montenegro, 
also, had to give up to the newly created Albanian principality the 
town of Scutari which she had captured at such cost. 

By their intervention the Central Powers accomplished even more 
than this. Not only were Serbia and Montenegro deprived of a 
good part of their booty, but as a result of their losses, the harmony 
among the Balkan states which had only just been brought about, 
went to pieces again. The plan for dividing the spoils which had 
been arranged before the war could no longer be carried out, and 
Serbia therefore demanded compensations elsewhere. Since Bul- 
garia would not agree to this, the two victorious nations now went 
to war with one another. But Bulgaria was not at all equal to 
her enemies; Serbs beat Bulgarians in the Bregnalnitza valley, and 
Greeks beat them on the Upper Struma. Bulgaria was so weakened 
that Rumania, which had hitherto stood aloof because she did not 
border directly on Turkish territory, stepped in, and without striking 
a blow occupied northern Bulgaria. Even the Turks finally took 
the offensive again and reconquered Adrianople. 

The Peace of Bucharest, on August lo, 19 13, confirmed these 
military developments. Macedonia was divided between Serbia and 
Bulgaria, the Greek boundary was pushed further eastward, and 
Rumania received a considerable piece of land which had hitherto 
belonged to Bulgaria. Furthermore, in the treaty of Constantinople, 
in September, 1913, Bulgaria ceded Adrianople back to Turkey. 

But this only settled the Balkan question for the moment. To 
be sure, the territories which Turkey had given up were regarded 
as definitely lost. But in other respects, the situation was nowhere 
satisfactory. Bulgaria could not reconcile herself to the loss of 
Macedonia and her own northern districts; and Serbia was, and 
remained, very indignant at the way she had been forced back from 
the Adriatic. But all this irritation was at first without practical 
importance, since the Balkan states were so exhausted by the war 
that none of them could think of appealing to arms again. 

Quite different was the situation in Austria-Hungary. While the 
difficulties and suffering of these recent wars forced the Balkan 
states to remain at peace, this very weakness of theirs tempted the 
neighboring Great Power to speedy interference. It had become 
evident that Serbia could not be crushed by economic weapons; but 



THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 421 

now the situation was all the more favorable for a military attack. 
Unless Austria-Hungary quickly interfered to nip Serbia's develop- 
ment in the bud, there was danger that before long the Serbian king- 
dom, which was considerably enlarged and was beginning to have 
great economic prosperity, might became a dangerous neighbor in 
view of the Serbian populations in various parts of the Dual Mon- 
archy. The situation in Bosnia appeared especially dangerous: the 
Austrian government had never been able to break up the system 
of large landed estates which had survived from the time when the 
Mohammedans were in control; the Serbs in Bosnia would there- 
fore be looking over with longing eyes to the peasant state of Serbia 
across the border. 

Equally influential was still another consideration. All Austria's 
acts of interference in the Balkans had met with nothing but empty 
diplomatic opposition on the part of the Franco-Russian Dual Al- 
liance. France and Russia, though friendly to Serbia and Monte- 
negro, had always ended by leaving them in the lurch when Austria 
had threatened military action. Great Britain had not put herself 
completely on the side of Russia and France, even in her diplomacy. 
Was it not natural to expect that, in case of a new intervention by 
Austria, Russia and her French ally would remain just as inactive 
as heretofore? Especially as Austria could again use the German 
army as a threat, as when she annexed Bosnia. 

So Austria decided to attack Serbia in order to reduce the coun- 
try to impotency once and for all. At first she planned to act in 
unison with Italy, but in August, 19 13, the Italian government 
refused to cooperate; so Austria could count only on Germany's 
support. 

The final occasion causing the attack was an act of violence all 
the details of which have not yet been wholly cleared up satisfac- 
torily. On June 28, 19 14, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to 
the Austrian throne, was murdered by a Bosnian student named 
Princip at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. What the murderer's 
motives were is unknown; but it is certain that the attempt, which 
was not the first on that day, was carefully prepared beforehand, and 
that the Austrian police had taken wholly inadequate measures for 
the protection of the Archduke. 

This crime now became the pretext for Austrian measures which 
aimed to bring about war with Serbia. A murder had taken place 
which, if it remained unavenged, would ultimately be a danger to 
all crowned heads; all hesitating persons in Austria were con- 
vinced that thoroughgoing measures must be taken once and for all. 



422 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Any complicity on the part of the Serbian government in the crime 
was not proved and was very unlikely; but it was not difficult so 
to represent the affair that appearances, at least, seemed to be 
against officials in Belgrade. 

Accordingly, on July 23, three weeks after the assassination, 
Austria took Serbia by surprise with an ultimatum. This was so 
worded that Serbia could scarcely accept it. Nevertheless, the Ser- 
bian government did agree to all Austria's hard conditions with the 
exception of two points. But Austria wanted war, and therefore 
the Austrian minister left Belgrade at once on July 25, in spite of 
Serbia's conciliatory answer. Three days later, on July 28, 19 14, 
Austria-Hungary officially declared war on Serbia, 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 

Austria-Hungary and also her German ally had certainly expected 
that the other Great Powers, including Russia, would again leave 
Serbia in the lurch. They had reckoned that Russia, which had 
never yet interfered on Serbia's behalf, would consent to see her 
completely destroyed, and would not only abandon the domination 
of the Balkans to her old rival without a blow, but would com- 
pletely lose her position as a Great Power. Though the Balkan 
states, in spite of the obstacles which the Great Powers had put in 
the way of their development, had at least been able to maintain a 
certain independence, owing to the antagonism between Austria and 
Russia, Germany and Austria now calculated that the Balkan states 
would henceforth be at the mercy of the expansionist policy of the 
Central Powers; and they also calculated that Russia would submit 
to all this and that they could ignore her protests, like those of 
any small state. 

But it turned out otherwise. Russia refused to allow Austria to 
attack Serbia in this way — and the World War broke out. 

Before an account is given of the details of the outbreak of the 
war, it is necessary to make some general observations. 

Whoever wants to study the origin of the war ought not to con- 
tent himself, as is so often done, with a mere statement of the hostile 
interests which existed. Disputes between the Great Powers are 
taking place almost all the time, and there are continually rumors 
of threatening war; but more is needed than all this to cause a 
war actually to develop out of these sources of irritation in such a 
way that no compromise can ultimately be found. The very history 
of Europe since 1870 shows this clearly: no matter how often fric- 
tion developed between the Great Powers between 1870 and 1914, 
it never caused war to break out; it was even possible to settle 
ticklish questions like the partition of Africa without the Great 
Powers resorting to arms. Wars have assumed such giant propor- 
tions since the introduction of universal military service, and the 
economic life of the peoples of Europe since the development of 

423 



424 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

world commerce is so dependent upon the undisturbed functioning 
of international communications, that no conflict seemed worth a 
war. In the age of professional armies a war which aimed at the 
conquest of some border district might seem worth while; and even 
in recent years some of the colonial wars which were carried out 
under similar conditions might be justified. But a war between the 
giant armies of Europe meant a risk which ought to be contem- 
plated only for the sake of a great stake. 

One might regard as such a stake the preservation or the acqui- 
sition of the military domination of Europe, i.e. "World Power" 
(Weltherrschaft). Just because all states, and especially those 
which felt themselves weaker in military force, shrank from war, it 
was of great practical importance to enjoy the prestige of military 
invincibility. The state which, because of its earlier military 
achievements and continued armaments, appeared to be sure of 
victory in a future war, could reap the fruits of war without coming 
to an actual conflict. Its opponents would simply surrender to its 
essential demands. 

This had been the position of Germany in Europe since 1870. 
Relying on the successes of 1866 and 1870, on a military organiza- 
tion which was being built up ever more powerfully and which was 
organized to the last detail, and on a complete militarization of the 
people through the schools and barracks; relying also on the fact 
that Germany's more rapid mobilization seemed to make it possible 
for her to put her enemy at a disadvantage at the outset, if not to 
overwhelm him quickly, — relying on all this, Germany had been able 
to support every demand she made by a threat of war, without 
having to fear anything of the same kind herself (never, so far as 
is known, has a threat of war been made against the German gov- 
ernment). Heavy as were the financial burdens, which the steadily 
increasing armaments imposed on Germany, they all seemed to be 
worth while, even from an economic point of view; for a hint at 
this military organization sufficed to secure from other countries 
concessions of all sorts, not the least important of which related 
to commercial and political matters. 

It was therefore thoroughly natural that Germany opposed all 
efforts at the limitation of armaments more consistently than any 
other state. Why should she be willing to abandon means of exert- 
ing pressure, when she had the feeling that she could compete with 
other countries more richly endowed by Nature, thanks primarily 
merely to her military organization and armaments? 

So all the attempts to lessen the frightful and ever-increasing 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 425 

burden of armaments in Europe and even to prepare the way for 
a wide-reaching system of international arbitration failed, owing 
to the opposition of the German government. When Russia invited 
all the European states to a conference, to consider means for limit- 
ing armaments, and the meeting took place at the Hague in 1899, 
the real purpose of the conference could not be seriously touched, 
because the German representatives declared at the outset that their 
country did not find that armaments were a burden and that they 
had no intention of limiting their military preparations in any way. 
The result was that nothing but a half measure providing for the 
establishment of a permanent court of arbitration at the Hague was 
accomplished; but it was impossible to make resort to this court 
compulsory in international disputes; and even this provision for a 
court was achieved only after long opposition on the part of the 
German delegates. Only a few states went so far in separate treaties 
as to bind themselves to submit all disputes to the Hague court, and 
among the number were not included any of the European military 
Powers. 

Not only had all the efforts to limit the burdens of war in time 
of peace failed, but it had been made perfectly clear which state was 
mainly to blame for this. Not only in purely pacifist circles, but in 
all countries where military expenditures were interfering with social 
progress, public opinion therefore began to turn more and more 
against Germany, which even during the last third of the nineteenth 
century had still enjoyed an increasing popularity as the preserver 
of "order," protecting the capitalist regime from the threats of 
Socialism. People began to feel more strongly than ever that the 
internal policy of all the European Great Powers would be deter- 
mined in last analysis by whether they could put an end to the 
pressure for excessive armaments — excessive even as compared with 
those of the middle of the nineteenth century — which was being im- 
posed by the German military organization. Moreover, this pressure 
was finally felt not merely on the Continent, but in Great Britain. 
Germany was seeking to arm herself at sea as well as on land, and 
the English proposals for limiting naval armaments were summarily 
rejected in Berlin as had been the proposals which Russia had 
made in 1899. 

The burden of these armaments, the like of which the world had 
never seen, began gradually to be ever more crushing. The bound- 
less optimism which resulted from the scientific inventions of the 
second half of the nineteenth century, now began to show its fruit. 
It was becoming clear even to those who had hitherto closed their 



426 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

eyes to the simplest facts of political economy that scientific prog- 
ress had been able to transform things and arrangements which had 
formerly been luxuries of the rich into cheap articles of comfort for 
the poor; but it had not been possible, in like manner, to increase 
the necessaries of life and raw materials needed by the overgrown 
populations of Europe. Progress in the science of communication 
had indeed been able to distribute the existing necessaries of life 
quickly and cheaply, but it could not increase the production at a 
rate proportionate to the increase in population. From these con- 
ditions, there began to develop, about 1905, a steadily-increasing 
rise in the cost of articles which were necessary for the support of 
life and for use in industry; and this led to a gradual revolu- 
tionizing of all economic relations, especially those concerning the 
living conditions of the numerous class of persons dependent on a 
fixed salary. The giant activities of government, commerce, and 
industry had been built up on the basis of cheap labor, which now 
threatened to be no longer available. As a result, there arose a kind 
of nervousness which, together with the fact that the more ambitious 
elements found it less easy than formerly to emigrate, led to a kind 
of unrest and discontent, which regarded any change in the general 
situation, even one involving war, as a happy deliverance. Herein 
lies a psychological root of the war which was especially strong in 
Germany and Austria-Hungary; it is significant that in a relatively 
thinly settled and primarily agricultural country, like France, one 
does not find this feeling; and in England, at any rate, it was still 
easy to emigrate to the colonies. 

Such was the situation when Austria-Hungary declared war on 
Serbia. All now depended on whether it would be possible to make 
Austria retreat from the step which she had taken, by giving her to 
understand that Russia would not consent to the destruction of 
Serbia. The way to do this was for England, which was the Power 
least directly concerned in Balkan conflicts, to undertake the role 
of mediator as quickly as possible and propose an international con- 
ference for settling the Austro-Serbian dispute. England did this, 
but her offer did not meet with a favorable response from the Cen- 
tral Powers.^ Russia was then compelled to make it clear that she 
was in earnest in her determination not to allow Serbia to be 
crushed by Austria. Just as Austria-Hungary had formerly, during 
the Balkan Wars, supported her demands on Serbia and Montenegro 
by mobilizing on the Russian frontier, so Russia now ordered mobi- 
lization on July 30; moreover, it was "general mobilization" which 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 427 

she oraered, because she wanted to convince Germany as well as 
Austria that she was fixed in her determination. 

In Vienna the government took the hint. The authorities realized 
that they had been careless in playing with fire, but that it was not 
yet too late to prevent the outbreak of a general war ; so the Austro- 
Hungarian government made a semblance of accepting the English 
proposal for a conference. 

At this moment, when Vienna might, perhaps, have saved the situa- 
tion, Germany stepped in. It is uncertain how far she may have 
been influenced by the desire in any event to take advantage of her 
own more rapid mobilization against the Russians. The historian 
will be inclined to discover another motive of a more general sort. 
He will call attention to the fact that an influential party in Ger- 
many, consisting mainly of the great manufacturers, wanted the war 
under any circumstances, and he will point out that at this time 
German policy had reached a turning point. For the first time it 
had been shown that the threat of the German sword no longer 
sufficed to compel the other Great Powers to lay down their arms 
without fighting. What had worked effectively in 1908, was no 
longer effective. Even in France, where not long before a minister 
who was not agreeable to the German government had been dis- 
missed upon a demand from Berlin, the fear of Germany was no 
longer so intense as formerly. Thus, one of the props not only of 
German foreign policy, but of Germany's whole economic and po- 
litical system, began to totter. If Germany wanted to recover the 
position which had been such an advantage to her foreign policy 
since 1870, the only thing to do was to make the other Great Powers 
realize anew the superiority of German arms. 

So, on August I, 1 9 14, Germany declared war on Russia, and on 
August 3, on France, because Germany also wanted to take advan- 
tage of her more rapid mobilization against France as well as against 
Russia. Since, according to the German constitution, the Kaiser 
could declare war only in case German territory had already been 
attacked, the German government invented, among other things, the 
story of an attack by French aviators on Nuremberg. In reality, 
the French army had been withdrawn ten kilometers from the fron- 
tier in order to avoid even any appearance of provocation. Hence- 
forth Germany took the lead in everything. The fact may also be 
noted that although Austria-Hungary was the indirect instigator of 
the war and was just as much threatened as Germany by Russia's 
mobilization, Austria-Hungary at first refrained from all hostile acts 



428 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

against the Tsar's empire and continued the pacific attitude which 
she had appeared to adopt at the last minute; it was not until four 
days after Germany had declared war on Russia that Austria did 
likewise on August 5. 

In Germany the declaration of war was hailed with immense re- 
joicing and greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the popula- 
tion; in France, a feeling of sad desperation prevailed, modified at 
most by the consideration that it would be better that the long- 
feared blow should take place at once rather than that the people 
should have to live constantly under the threat of an attack. 

Germany had issued her declarations of war on the supposition 
that the Central Powers would have to deal only with Russia and 
with France. England, during recent years, had taken so little part 
in disputes between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, and 
had paid so little attention to the development of her land army, 
that any intervention on her part was regarded as very improbable; 
and, any way, even if it took place, it seemed that it could only be 
of small importance from a military point of view. But the German 
authorities here betrayed, for the first time, how biased and mis- 
taken they were, owing to their purely militaristic habit of thought, 
in judging the real power of other peoples, who were educated and 
governed according to wholly different principles. In vain did Ger- 
many's diplomatic representatives sound warnings. Those in charge 
of her policy adhered to their conviction that a country which had 
never assumed the burden of universal military service was too 
"degenerate" to be able to interfere in a war of the Great Powers 
on the Continent. 

Now came one of the days in England's history which was to 
decide her destiny. From a business point of view, much, perhaps 
everything, was in favor of her keeping out of the war. Great wars 
have always offered neutrals advantages in commerce; and, further- 
more, after the war was over there was the prospect of great profits 
for English industry. The burden of debts which would be imposed 
on the warring nations would for a long time limit their power of 
competition. England had already considered protecting herself 
from the competition of other countries, especially of Germany and 
of the United States, — a competition which was beginning to be felt 
in some branches — ^by simply changing her commercial policy from 
free trade to the system of protective tariffs and trade agreements 
which were used everywhere on the Continent; now a war on the 
Continent would make it imnecessary to adopt such protective 
measures. 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 429 

Such shortsighted considerations, however, were more than out- 
weighed by imperative arguments in favor of taking part in the war. 

The whole pubHc and private Hfe of England was based on the 
non-existence of military pressure. What Englishmen prized as 
their liberty had only been possible of development owing to the 
fact that military considerations did not dominate either education 
or government administration. The fact that the English govern- 
ment interfered to a relatively slight degree in the life of the private 
individual, rested, in last analysis, upon the fact that the citizen 
was not regarded as a future recruit for the army. This circum- 
stance, which must be regarded as anomalous in Europe, especially 
since 1870, had only persisted as a result of a certain balance of 
power which had developed and which made it seem unlikely that 
an insular country, at any rate, would be subjected to immediate 
military attack. Now if, as between the two Continental combina- 
tions of Powers, victory should fall to the one which had concen- 
trated all its strength on military armaments, England's advan- 
tageous position would be gone forever, England also would then 
have to limit her individual citizens in the liberties of which they 
were so proud. And not only that. If ever the whole Continent 
should once fall under the control of a single military power, it was 
all over with England's independence of action in foreign politics, 
and in fact with her position as a Great Power. If it had been pos- 
sible even then, when face to face with an enemy armed to the 
teeth, to undertake the military training of the whole Eng- 
lish people, which had hitherto been steadily rejected, it would have 
been too late. England would have been forced to obey the dictates 
of an all-powerful enemy and would have sunk to the rank of a 
helpless Second-rate Power. 

There was also the further consideration, as seemed to be shown 
by the events of the immediately preceding years, that Germany was 
one of the Powers which could not be satisfied by concessions and 
compromises. Great Britain had followed the same policy toward 
Germany as toward other countries, such as the United States. 
Everywhere she had tried to come to some sensible agreement on 
disputed questions. She had never put the slightest obstacles in the 
way of German commerce and German imports into England, not 
even where these injured English domestic interests, or where her 
rival could be charged with "dumping," that is, with underselling 
abroad, by charging higher prices at home — a. practice which the 
English regarded as "unfair." Even as regards Germany's plans of 
expansion in Turkey, Great Britain had been ready to make conces- 



430 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

sions: when the war broke out an agreement was ready for final 
signing which gave the Germans considerable concessions in Meso- 
potamia. But now, in their diplomatic notes to England, the Ger- 
mans seemed to want a part of the French colonies in Africa, or 
perhaps the whole of the French colonial possessions, and so threat- 
ened to upset by means of a European war the agreements which 
had been reached with such difficulty for partitioning Africa (see 
above, p. 339 ff.) ; they were also not willing to promise to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, which looked as if they wanted to get a foot- 
hold on the Belgian coast. Under these circumstances, the English 
government, however little they wanted to enter the war, had no 
alternative but to come as quickly as possible to the help of the 
weaker party on the Continent: on August 4, England declared war 
on Germany. 

This was a "statesmanlike" decision in the true sense of the word, 
if one means by this a step which involves heavy burdens for the 
moment in order to escape greater evils in the future. This was also 
true in view of the attitude of the English people, which at first, 
among the lower classes, was almost indifferent. It was really only 
the intellectuals, who saw further than the masses, who were strongly 
in favor of war. It was not until 1915, when German Zeppelin 
airships began to bombard open towns in England, that the British 
people awoke from their apathy and a real war spirit began to 
develop. 

England's entrance into the war now altered fundamentally the 
whole military situation for the two Central Empires. The greatest 
Sea Power of the age was now on the side of their enemies, and it 
was possible to blockade Germany's coasts. This was all the easier 
as the German navy from the outset did not, and could not, think 
of meeting the superior British fleet in open battle; with tlie excep- 
tion of scattered raids it remained in port and so left the sea to the 
British from the beginning. The only exceptions were those German 
warships which at the outbreak of the war were stationed too far 
away to be called back in time; these, to be sure, began at once 
a series of successful attacks on enemy ships and bombarded enemy 
ports. One German fleet even won a victory over an inferior British 
fleet on November i, 19 14, at Coronel, off the coast of Chile. But 
by the end of 19 14, nearly all these German vessels had been 
destroyed; the Emden, which had been operating in the Indian 
Ocean, was destroyed by an Australian cruiser, at Cocos Islands, 
southwest of Java; the fleet of Admiral von Spee, who had won the 
victory at Coronel, was destroyed on December 8, at the Falkland 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 431 

Islands; the Dresden, which was the only ship to escape, was finally- 
sunk on March 14, 19 15, near the Island of Juan Fernandez off the 
coast of Chile. The Goeben and the Breslau, which happened to 
be in the Mediterranean, managed, to be sure, to escape to Con- 
stantinople, where they had an influence on the political situation; 
but their naval activity was limited to the Black Sea. Thus the 
Entente was able to control completely communications at sea. 
Though the Germans and Austrians managed to do great injury to 
shipping through submarine attacks, still they were never able to 
send their own ships out upon the ocean. 

Less considerable, at first, was the assistance which Great Britain 
was able to give on land. The little army of 150,000, which was the 
only one that was ready, evinced in many respects the technical 
superiority which belongs to professional soldiers. But it was 
numerically too small to be able to interfere with decisive effect. 
It was not until later, when the war began to drag out, thanks to 
the French victory on the Marne, that England was able to come 
to the aid of her allies with larger masses of troops. 

But before these events are narrated, the attitude of the other 
European Great Power toward the war must be considered. 

It is uncertain whether the Central Powers ever reckoned on active 
help from Italy in their war against Russia and France; it is cer- 
tain, however, that Italy's cooperation was inconceivable. The 
Italian people never shared the ideas of conservative solidarity and 
absolutistic politics which united Germany and Austria; furthermore, 
any increase in Austria's strength was diametrically opposed to 
Italy's dearest interests. Austria was the chief obstacle to those 
Italian aspirations which aimed at reuniting all persons of Italian 
nationality; Trieste and the Italian Trentino were still under Aus- 
trian rule; moreover, it looked as if the Austrian government was 
trying to favor the Slavic at the expense of the Italian populations 
in the "Terra Irredenta" — in the Italian unredeemed territories. 
Equally opposed to Italian interests was the policy of the Dual 
Monarchy in the Balkans. By her single-handed attack against 
Serbia, Austria had not only broken the terms of the Triple Alliance, 
which had been renewed for six years on December 5, 19 12, but she 
was interfering directly with Italy's sphere of influence on the 
eastern shore of the Adriatic. Accordingly, when Emperor Francis 
Joseph asked Italy for aid, in accordance with the terms of the 
Triple Alliance Treaty, the Italian government, on August 3, simply 
declared its neutrality. This meant, from the very outset, that 
the French military authorities were given a guarantee against any 



432 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

fear of attack from the southeast; they could concentrate all their 
strength against the German invasion. 

Meanwhile, the Germans had already begun their attack upon 
France. Their plan was simple. Since their main, though by no 
means their only, superiority lay in their speedier mobilization, it 
was necessary first to conquer France, which in all probability 
would be able to prepare for war in a shorter time than Russia. 
On the other hand, the French had protected their eastern frontier 
by strong fortresses on which German attacks would probably have 
wasted themselves without effect; in fact, this line of fortresses was 
never broken, and the German attack on Nancy from August 22 to 
September 11, 1914, resulted in the first serious failure which the 
German army met with. The French had not intended to infringe 
Belgian neutrality, and therefore made only inadequate preparations 
along this frontier. For these reasons, the German General Staff 
ignored the neutrality of Belgium which they had only recently 
promised to respect, and decided to circumvent the French fortifica- 
tions and attack France through the neutral territory of Belgium. 
While Luxemburg, which was also neutral, was being occupied, an 
ultimatum was sent to Belgium, demanding that German troops 
should be allowed to march through the country; when this was 
rejected by the Belgians, who had regard for their honor and inde- 
pendence, the Germans, on August 3, began to invade the land. 

Trusting to their neutrality, which was guaranteed, the Belgians 
were not prepared for war, and even if they had devoted all their 
strength to military matters they would not have been able to stand 
successfully against a great military state because of the smallness 
of their country. But the patriotism of the people and their indig- 
nation at being attacked by a country which had been regarded with 
particular sympathy by the ruling classes in Belgium — the Catholic 
party had a decided dislike for the policy which Combes was pur- 
suing in France — resulted in making the advance of the German 
troops much less easy than had been expected. Even though the 
Belgian fortresses were not able to withstand the new Austrian and 
German guns, it was impossible to break the heroic resistance of the 
little nation which the Germans had despised. On August 5, Liege 
was bombarded and fell two days later, though some of the forts 
held out until August 15. Partly, perhaps, as a result of the indig- 
nation which seized the German military authorities because of this 
resistance, which was unexpected and most dangerous for their plan 
of attack against France, there now took place a number of acts of 
violence against the civilian population of Belgium which cannot 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 433 

be passed over in silence, inasmuch as they were of decisive impor- 
tance in the further development of the war, and especially upon 
the participation of other states. 

One of the tendencies in the nineteenth century which had been 
most important and successful in practice was humanitarianism 
(see ch. vi). From the middle of the century an attempt had been 
made to extend the movement even to war; the Red Cross had been 
founded, and wounded men, whether friend or foe, were to be treated 
with equal care. Later, the movement was taken up again at the 
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Detailed regulations were 
issued for the protection of the civilian population in time of war; 
collective penalties were forbidden, as well as the employment of 
cruel weapons. It had been hoped that European countries had 
reached the point of conducting war in a more humane fashion than 
had hitherto been the case, or than was still regarded as necessary 
in dealing with half-savage peoples outside Europe. The conduct of 
the German troops toward the Belgian, and later in many cases 
toward the French, civilian population, now showed that this hope 
was vain. Whole villages and parts of cities were leveled to the 
ground, and the inhabitants were shot in groups. In justification 
it was alleged that there had been some firing by francs-tireurs, or 
irregular troops. But even if isolated cases of this kind may have 
happened, these bloody and terrible collective penalties were con- 
trary both to international agreements and to all feelings of hu- 
manity, especially as it could never be proved that there had been 
any organized attacks by irregular troops. In other countries it 
made a very bad impression that these acts, which were regarded 
as those of "barbarians," were not the acts of individuals such as 
naturally can never be wholly avoided, but had to be regarded as a 
result of the German militarist system. Episodes like the maltreat- 
ment of soldiers in German barracks, or outrages like that at Saverne 
in 19 13, which had hitherto been matters of domestic German con- 
cern, now came to be regarded as a danger to the whole world. 
Even peoples — like many Italians or Americans — who had hitherto 
looked with unconcealed approval upon the German militarist sys- 
tem because of its "efficiency," now began to perceive what it might 
mean for them if the principle that military necessity, or what any 
individual officer regarded as such, was to prevail over all other 
considerations; and what it meant, if military leaders were to be 
made responsible for the successful carrying out of their commands, 
but not for the terrible and prohibited methods which they adopted 
in carrying them out. Whatever individuals may think of German 



434 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

conduct in Belgium and Northern France at that time, the German 
government had given a practical demonstration of their system 
which had an important effect long afterwards and against which 
propaganda later could do nothing. 

The memory of these deeds was not allowed to die out because 
similar acts were continually opening people's eyes to these prin- 
ciples adopted by the German military authorities. Here we can 
only mention the deportation of many Belgians and French, both 
men and women, to compulsory labor in German factories; the use 
of poison gases, which took place first on April 22, 1915, and of 
flame throwers; the destruction of coal mines; the systematic cut- 
ting down of fruit trees; the sinking of passenger ships; and many 
other things of the same kind. All these measures roused indigna- 
tion in neutral countries; this was all the more the case as many 
of the acts were apparently not even justified by military necessity. 
The destruction in Belgium and the occupied parts of France of 
all the factories which had been able to compete steadily and suc- 
cessfully with German manufactures because of the high quality of 
their product, and the damaging of French mines which produced 
the coal for French industry, apparently were only to be explained 
on the supposition that the large German manufacturers, who had 
not been one of the least influences toward war, and who to the 
very last held to their program of the most extensive annexations, 
wanted to use for their economic advantage that complete power 
which the German military authorities claimed in the occupied dis- 
tricts, even in regard to private property. 

At first, however, everything depended on how events would turn 
out on the French theater of war. 

The French military authorities had not repeated the mistake 
which in 1870 had led to the disaster at Sedan. In spite of the fact 
that the German army had already begun an offensive, French 
mobilization was completed quietly. Partly as a result of this situa- 
tion, the French suffered from the disadvantage that all the fighting 
which followed took place on their territory; but they were able 
to oppose the enemy with an army which was ready to fight. Their 
first attack, however, was based on a false conclusion. The French 
General Staff had not only never thought of infringing Belgian neu- 
trality themselves, but they had not expected that the enemy would 
do so. They moved the main mass of their troops, therefore, toward 
the eastern frontier, and attempted to take the offensive there, where 
they supposed the main German force would be. Not only did this 
undertaking meet with no success, the attack at Saarburg, on August 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 435 

20, ending after two days' bloody fighting in the retreat of the 
French, and the advance into Alsace also resulting in the forced 
withdrawal of the French, who kept in their possession only a small 
bit of territory around Thann in the southwest; but it also pre- 
vented them from opposing any adequate forces to the German 
armies which were marching in through Belgium. So on August 
21-23, after the battle of Charleroi, the French and the English had 
to begin their retreat from that point, and soon this retreat was 
extended to the whole French and British front. The operation, 
however, took place in an orderly fashion and the German success 
was incomplete to the extent that they did not succeed in crushing 
even one of the enemy armies as they had done in 1866 and 1870. 
But the Anglo-French retreat began to be more and more rapid, and 
it almost seemed as though it would not come to an end before the 
mountainous territory in the South was reached. The French and 
English troops were pressed back to the Marne, and the French 
Government, thinking that Paris was in danger, transferred its seat 
to Bordeaux on September 3. Then, on September 5, Joffre, the 
French commander-in-chief, issued his famous order for a counter- 
attack. The Germans had pressed forward too rapidly, without suf- 
ficiently protecting their flanks ; in the east, as a result of their fruit- 
less attacks on Nancy, their flanks were as much exposed as in the 
west, where they had marched to the southeast, past the fortresses 
of Paris; the Germans were now attacked by the French and the 
English together — a great impression was made by the attack led 
by General Gallieni, the military commander of Paris — and after 
hard fighting were driven back with a speed which at points was 
like a flight; this was the First Battle of the Marne, September 
6-10, 19 14. The Germans did not stop their retreat until they had 
reached positions to the north of the Aisne, where they immediately 
began, however, to adapt themselves with extraordinary promptness 
to the new situation. While the operations hitherto had been a 
"war of movement," like the wars of 1866 and 1870, the Germans 
now resorted to a "war of positions," such as had prevailed in the 
American War of Secession. The use of modern quick-firing guns, 
and especially of machine guns, with which the Germans were at 
first much better equipped than the Allies, had shown that fighting 
in the open field resulted in a sacrifice of life which had hitherto 
never been known; and since the Germans, even after their retreat, 
could still dig themselves in on French soil, they began to establish 
a series of trenches which, on the whole, fixed the front line on 
the western theater of operations down to the close of the war. 



436 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

The great surprise attack, on which the greatest hopes had been 
placed, had failed: Paris was not captured; the French army was 
not destroyed; the communications with England were not even 
broken. However, it was still possible to accomplish this latter aim, 
and the German military authorities now devoted themselves to this 
task with the greatest energy. But before an account is given of 
this, the other theaters of war must be considered. 

It was of decisive importance that the Central Powers, or at any 
rate Austria-Hungary, were much less successful in the East than in 
the West. The Russians had been enormously underestimated. 
Germans who believed that they would have to do with a military 
system which had suffered such severe blows in the Russo-Japanese 
War now found themselves completely in error. Since then the 
defects which had caused those defeats had been remedied by cease- 
less activity. No fault was to be found with the Russian equip- 
ment, and Russian mobilization took place rapidly and in thoroughly 
good order. The people were united in spirit, so that the Tsar 
even dared to impose upon his people during the period of the war 
complete abstention from alcoholic beverages. The results of these 
reforms were soon evident, especially in the battles with the Aus- 
trian troops. To be sure, the Austrians succeeded in advancing 
from Galicia into Poland and in defeating the Russians at Krasnik 
on July 2 5 ; but when the Russians came on with their full strength 
the Austrians suffered a disastrous defeat at Lemberg on Septem- 
ber 2. Galicia was now in good part lost to Austria, and the Rus- 
sians began to advance against Hungary and the passes in the Car- 
pathian Mountains. They also won decisive victories in a second 
battle in Galicia near Grodek on September 6-13, and in a second 
battle at Krasnik. By September 22, they were able to begin the 
bombardment of the Galician fortress of Przemysl. 

More successful was the resistance which the Germans made in 
the north. While the Austrians could not even defend themselves 
against the Serbs, and in spite of three attacks were driven out of 
the country each time, the Germans succeeded in beating back the 
Russian attack with great victories. The Russians had begun their 
attack on East Prussia on August 7, and by August 20, after suc- 
cessful fights at Gumbinnen, had pressed forward as far as Konigs- 
berg. The German Government, which had hitherto devoted its 
main attention to the French theater of war, was compelled to think 
about taking defensive measures in the East. In this situation it 
turned to a leader who had hitherto not been prominent but who 
was to prove himself just the man for the task of commanding 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 437 

troops in East Prussia. This was the later commander-in-chief, who 
at that time was known merely as General Hindenburg. The effects 
of his appointment were soon seen. On August 26-29 the Russian 
invading army was given a crushing defeat at Tannenberg and 
another at the Masurian Lakes on September 6-12. The Russians 
not only had to clear out of East Prussia, but the Germans were 
able to prepare a counter-offensive against Russia — an undertaking, 
however, which was brought to a standstill by a defeat on the 
Niemen on September 28, and which finally ended with a German 
defeat at Augustowo on September 29-October 4, so that the Rus- 
sians were again able to invade East Prussia. 

But in the main, the situation in East Prussia had been definitely 
saved for the Germans, and for a short time they were even able to 
relieve the Russian pressure on Austria by undertaking, on October 
15-27, an advance against Warsaw — ^which, however, was not suc- 
cessful. 

The really decisive events, however, took place on the West Front. 
At first the Germans had concentrated all their forces on the fight 
with the French and British armies, and had given little attention 
to any attempt to occupy the northern coast of France and Bel- 
gium, Now that they had failed in their main aim, they attempted 
at least to cut the communications between England and France, 
If the coast perhaps as far as Calais were in their possession, they 
believed, it would be possible to threaten England and to check 
the reinforcements which England was sending to France. So they 
began "the race for the sea," and the two front lines were extended 
northward toward the shores of Flanders, 

The real battle was fought out in Belgium, First the Germans 
reached the sea on October 10, by taking Antwerp, From there 
they pushed westward along the coast past Zeebriigge, Ostend, and 
Ghent as far as the Yser. Here and around Ypres the decisive bat- 
tles took place. The contest was very severe and the battles were 
extraordinarily bloody. But victory finally fell to the united French, 
Belgian,- and English armies, although not until the Belgians had 
opened the dykes and flooded the country around the Yser, It was 
not until November 21 that the battle which had begun on October 
19 could be regarded as ended. Although the Allies were much 
too weak to drive the Germans out of their positions on the Yser, 
and although the Germans had thus conquered an important naval 
base on the Belgian coast, which they kept in their hands till the 
last months of the war, nevertheless, the greater success had been 
on the side of the Allies. The German advance had failed to reach 



438 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Calais or even Dunkirk, and communications between France and 
England could therefore be maintained as before. Finally, from the 
point of view of morale, it was of considerable importance that 
through the successful defense of the line of the Yser, a part at 
least of Belgium did not fall into the hands of the enemy. 

Even if one should say that from a purely military point of view 
the outcome of the First Battle of Ypres was as successful for the 
Allies as for the Central Powers, there remained the fact that even 
a merely defensive success on the side of the Entente was equivalent 
to a victory; because everything which served to prolong the war 
was to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the Germans. 

This is the place to sketch the general military situation as it 
was at the close of 19 14, and at the same time to mention certain 
events which have not yet been touched upon. 

No specialist could fail to see at that time that the Central 
Powers had lost the war, not *'lost" of course in the same sense as 
it was lost in 191 8, but lost in comparison with the expectations 
with which it had been begun. It was conceivable that individual 
military successes might still create a military situation which would 
permit the Central Powers to conclude a treaty of peace without 
very great territorial or economic losses, possibly even with some 
small gains. But under no circumstances could the German war 
aims of August, 1914, be attained. Germany would be lucky if she 
won back even a part of her former position of power. Her mili- 
tary prestige had suffered severely. Her ability to make military 
threats, on which her economic expansion had in part rested, would 
prove in the future slight. Not only had the fear of German mili- 
tary power proved to be exaggerated, but the other Great Powers 
now realized what they could accomplish by joint action, and they 
realized also to what purposes the profits of German industry had 
been applied. Great Britain, which had hitherto laid no obstacles 
in the way of German trade, had learned her mistake and had 
entered the ranks of her opponents. Germany had had to assume 
enormous war costs which, even aside from the almost impossible 
case that her enemies might have to pay an indemnity, would have 
placed her industries, which were based on a low cost of living, at 
a severe disadvantage in competition with neutrals. And how would 
this weakened Germany, even in case of victory, have been able to 
defend herself against an economic alliance of the conquered Powers? 
Nothing but a speedy peace could avert the worst, which was other- 
wise certainly to be expected, namely, the ruin of the German Em- 
pire. 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 439 

The basis for these statements lies partly in what has been said 
above concerning the economic tasks of German foreign policy (see 
p. 324), and partly on a consideration of the reasons which alone 
had made Prussia's wars in the past economically profitable (see 
p. 313 f.). In addition a few reasons may be added. 

The most important reason for saying that a prolongation of the 
war would necessarily be harmful to Germany lies in the fact that 
this meant that the other states would have an opportunity to com- 
plete their insufficient military armaments. Naturally, in Germany 
and Austria, people were not really prepared for a war which would 
last several years, but their armament was much more thorough- 
going than anywhere else, and their munition industries and the 
scientific laboratories connected with them were very much more 
developed than in countries like England or Russia, for instance. 
It was now possible for the Allies to make up for lost time, to 
prepare themselves on their side, and to imitate the various inven- 
tions with which the German military authorities had surprised 
them. They could also make serviceable for war their wholly un- 
trained reserves in man-power, as was particularly true in the case 
of England. 

The Entente Powers were also at an advantage in having at their 
disposal almost unlimited amounts of all the raw materials neces- 
sary for making munitions, while the Central Powers, aside from 
war booty, could only count on a definite quantity which could 
scarcely be much increased. This was due to the powerful effect 
of the blockade. 

It is disputed which side first began blockading measures. The 
Germans say that the English took the initiative; but the English, 
on the contrary, maintain that it was the Germans who, for instance, 
began by laying mines in front of English harbors and by seizing 
merchant ships. However that may be, it is a fact that the blockade 
of the Central Powers at sea was the first to be carried out effec- 
tively (with the exception of the Baltic), while the Entente coun- 
tries, in spite of submarine attacks, never found themselves cut off 
from their overseas communications. Furthermore, since the con- 
ception of contraband of war came to be extraordinarily ex- 
tended, the blockade was absolute, or at least became so in the 
course of time, except as to wares imported from neutral territories 
which bordered on the Central Empires; cotton, for instance, was 
declared absolute contraband of war by England and France on 
August 21, 1915. 

This automatically put a limit to the expansion of German mill- 



440 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tary armaments. The shutting-off of the importation of foodstuffs 
was without great practical importance, because the German troops 
were always sufficiently nourished, and the necessary supplies to 
feed them would grow again. On the other hand, the providing of 
indispensable metals like copper, or of materials like rubber and 
oil, was one of the most ticklish tasks for the German military 
authorities. 

Moreover, Germany's position outside of Europe could only grow 
worse as time went on. A superficial observer might with some 
reason maintain, that as far as France and Russia were concerned, 
the year 19 14 closed with the advantage on Germany's side; but 
in the overseas territories the Allies had an advantage, in fact an 
overwhelming advantage. A number of the German colonies in 
Africa, like Togoland and Kamerim had been occupied at once, 
and for the most part conquered. On September 24, 1914, New 
Guinea had been captured by the Australians. The attempt which 
the Germans in Southwest Africa made to bring about the separa- 
tion of South Africa from England by means of a Boer insurrection 
failed, although a number of Boer leaders who had been famous in 
the Transvaal wars joined the movement; but the mass of the 
Boers did not follow them, and by December, 1914, all the rebels 
had been captured and the insurrection was at an end. Even before 
this, a counter-offensive had been begun in September. In order 
to render impossible any renewal of an attempt at rebellion, the 
South African government determined to seize the German colony 
itself: Walfisch Bay was occupied on December 25, and Swakop- 
mund on January 14, 1915; and on July 9, 1915, the last German 
forces in the colony had to surrender. 

More noteworthy, perhaps, was Japan's immediate realization that 
the collapse of Germany's power outside Europe gave her an oppor- 
tunity to come a step nearer her own aim of expelling European 
influence from China. On August 15, 19 14, the Empire of the 
Rising Sun addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding the 
evacuation of Kiaochau, When this demand was refused, which 
was natural, Japan declared war on August 23, and on the 27th 
began the blockade by which she finally took possession of the Kiao- 
chau territory on November 7, 19 14. Japan also occupied the 
Marshall Islands on October 7, 1914. 

Of their colonies the Germans thus retained only German East 
Africa, which, however, had been their most important overseas 
possession; but it was merelj^ a question of time as to when they 
would lose even this. For although the German forces undertook a 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 441 

series of successful expeditions, and although their opponents were 
too much occupied with operations in Europe to despatch an ade- 
quate number of troops at first, the conditions were nevertheless such 
as would correct themselves in favor of the Entente in case the war 
continued a long time. 

To offset this increase in the number of enemies fighting against 
her, Germany did succeed in winning one new ally. Turkey herself 
had scarcely any grounds for entering the war. She still felt very 
severely her defeats in the Balkan wars; and though of the two 
coalitions, the one which had declared war against her hereditary 
Russian enemy stood a little closer to her, nevertheless, her interests 
were clearly in favor of pursuing a more or less honorable policy 
of neutrality — her traditional method of playing off one group of 
Powers against the other. But the German government needed the 
active cooperation of Turkey in order to strike a blow at English 
rule over the Suez Canal and over India; therefore, under pressure 
of the German cruisers, Goeben and Breslau, which were anchored 
off Constantinople, the Turkish cabinet had to decide in favor of 
war. On October 29, 19 14, the Turks opened hostilities by bom- 
barding Russian ports on the Black Sea. Great Britain and France 
were not slow in replying. On November 5, they declared them- 
selves in a state of war with Turkey; the English government 
annexed Cyprus and then, on December 17, proclaimed a British 
protectorate over Egypt, thus putting an end to the last formal con- 
nection between Turkey and the Nile region. The Khedive was 
deposed and in his place, as a sign that Turkish sovereignty was 
completely ended, a "sultan" of their own was placed over the 
Egyptians. The English were now in a position to undertake sys- 
tematic preparations against the threatened attack on the Suez 
Canal. 

Against the blockade, also, Germany attempted a counter-measure 
by proclaiming officially, on February 18, 19 15, that the territory 
around the British Isles was blockaded by submarines. The sub- 
marine was a weapon the use of which was difficult to harmonize 
with existing law in regard to blockades. International law required 
that the life of sailors on merchant ships be safeguarded when these 
ships were declared to be good prizes for having cargoes of contra- 
band of war on board; but submarines were not completely 
equipped, and in many cases not equipped at all, to afford such pro- 
tection to life; consequently, the British government threatened to 
make reprisals against Germans who were taken prisoner from sub- 
marines. Henceforth, also, lives, and not merely goods, on neutral 



442 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

ships were in no less danger than those on ships that belonged to 
the belligerents. But this new weapon, created as a substitute to 
offset the weakness of the German navy, failed to accomplish its 
purpose, as it neither produced famine in England nor led to a 
repeal of the English blockade measures. 

The other weapon which the Germans had and which, like 
submarines, they began to use more and more intensively and sys- 
tematically, was the working upon the public opinion of enemy coun- 
tries with a view to compelling the governments to sign a premature 
treaty of peace. This weapon also was employed as far as pos- 
sible. At first the German government had devoted itself to a 
persistent propaganda in neutral countries, the like of which was 
not employed for a good while by her opponents; this propagandist 
activity, which had originally been chiefly of an apologetic nature, 
was now modified by an attempt to convince the enemy nations 
that their side was the weaker and that they could never win a final 
victory. And this "defeatist" weapon was not wholly without effect; 
in Italy, at least, various Socialist groups were not proof against 
arguments of this kind. But in general, German propaganda did 
not have as much success as had been expected. Countries which 
had all the trump cards in their hands were not going to be per- 
suaded to be afraid of their own destruction; so the Germans did 
not succeed in disturbing the clear insight of the Allies as to the 
real strength of each side, even though various German military 
successes might seem ever so serious to non-specialists. 

In view of the small prospect that the general situation could 
ever be any better for Germany through continuing the war, and 
in view of the circumstance that some of the leading statesmen in 
Germany were aware of this fact, the question naturally arises why 
the German government did not conclude peace, even at a sacrifice. 
The answer probably is to be found in the fact that such an out- 
come, though it would have given the German people relatively 
favorable conditions, would have meant the downfall of the hitherto 
ruling authorities. An "unfavorable peace," meaning by this a peace 
which definitely deprived Germany of the means of exerting military 
pressure, to preserve which she had gone to war in 19 14, would 
have meant the overthrow of a government which had begun a use- 
less war. Though hitherto the German people had put their trust 
unconditionally in the authority of the Government, and had viewed 
foreign policy only in the light in which they had been told to view 
it, this was merely due to the effective influencing of public opinion 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 443 

in the schools and newspapers. Since the days of Bismarck, and 
especially since the time of the Constitutional Conflict in Prussia 
(see p. 300), Germans had accustomed themselves to believe, on the 
basis of their own practical experience, that it was best to put their 
trust in the government, i.e., in the bureaucracy which was de- 
pendent on large manufacturers and landlords, for a correct judg- 
ment in regard to foreign policy and military matters. Had not 
Germany conquered her enemies in war and attained her mighty eco- 
nomic development simply because the autocratic government had 
shown greater insight than the Opposition, which was made up of 
misguided representatives of the people? Was it not their patriotic 
duty for the future also to leave themselves in the hands of this 
safe leadership? 

This view, which more than anything else accounts for the im- 
potency of legislative bodies in Germany, could last only as long 
as the Empire prospered under this absolutistic leadership; as soon 
as the system failed to produce satisfactory results, it would no 
longer be able to defend itself from the attack of the masses, who 
had hitherto been shut out from participation in government, and 
especially from the Socialists. The only way of preventing this 
was to trust, in spite of everything, to the hazardous chance of a 
favorable outcome of the war by continuing it further, although 
normally every new year made Germany's economic, and conse- 
quently her military, position worse. 

How true this was, was shown during the early months of the next 
year, 19 15. At that time the coalition of the Allied Powers acquired 
a new ally. As early as the fall of 19 14, Italy probably decided to 
take part in the war ; at any rate, that was the time when she began 
wide-reaching preparations. But Italy entered the war, not merely 
because she would otherwise have weakened her claims to the Italian 
territories under Austrian control as well as to the Dalmatian coast 
and Albania, but because a victory of the Central Powers would 
have imposed still more frightful armaments on Italy and so have 
ruined her completely. During the winter of 19 14-15 negotiations 
were carried on, and Austria was not opposed in principle to ceding 
certain districts to Italy; but no agreement could be reached be- 
cause Austria refused to hand over at once the districts imder dis- 
cussion. Italy would have had to remain neutral merely on the 
assurance of promises, and this appeared impossible. Supported by 
a strong popular movement, which was strengthened by the steadily 
increasing spirit of nationalism and by the sympathies for the En- 



444 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tente aroused by horror at Germany's method of waging war, Italy 
declared war on Austria-Hungary, though not on Germany, on May 
23, 1915. Hostilities began within the next few days. 

The war between Italy and Austria was a regular war of na- 
tionalities, and, on Austria's side especially, it was waged with an 
energy and passion beyond anything in the Russian and Serbian 
theaters of war. Nevertheless, this was not the main reason that 
the Italians, in spite of all their bravery, made such small progress. 
Half a century before, in ceding Venetia (see p. 256), Austria had 
kept all the important strategic points, and she now reaped the 
benefits of this. During 191 5 the Austrians were not in a position 
to take the offensive against Italy; but on the defensive they were 
practically invincible, and the small gains of territory made by the 
Italians were won with wholly disproportionate sacrifices. So the 
military situation, both on the Isonzo and the Trentino front, was 
at first stationary. This was also true in 191 5 on the Western 
Front, although the French and the English gained a number of 
important local improvements in their front lines. 

Far greater were the changes which took place on the Eastern 
Front. 

Among the enemies of the Central Powers in 19 15, Russia was 
relatively the weakest. No country found it so difficult to overcome 
her inferiority in the supply of nuritions or to develop her reserves 
in man-power as did Russia at that time. The lack of machinery 
and large factories, which were only slightly developed in Russia in 
comparison with the immensity of the empire, and the dearth of 
scientifically-trained mechanics, prevented Russia from undertaking 
the giant production of war material as quickly as Germany or the 
western countries. The inadequate railway system made it far more 
difficult to transport troops and munitions than was possible with 
the close net-work of railways in Germany. Germany had some- 
what the same advantage over her enemies that the South had in the 
American War of Secession: she controlled the "inner line,'' and 
could move her troops more quickly than the enemy from one theater 
of war to another. 

It is not surprising under these circumstances that in 19 15 the 
Central Powers concentrated almost all their efforts at first on the 
struggle with the Russian armies. 

At the beginning of 191 5 the Russians had made considerable 
progress in Galicia. They had occupied the most important points 
in the Carpathian Mountains, which enabled them to invade Hun- 
gary, and on March 22, 1915, they forced the fortress of Przemysl 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 445 

to capitulate. But they soon met with a reverse. The Germans 
came to the help of the Austrians, and in May, thanks to their 
enormous superiority in munitions and artillery, the armies of the 
Central Powers were able to break through the strong Russian posi- 
tions on the Dunajec. The Russians had to retreat eastward in 
hasty marches, and give up not only a large part of Galicia, but 
also the passes in the Carpathians. Soon afterwards, on June 3, 
Przemysl was reconquered by the Germans, and on June 22, Lem- 
berg also. It was not long before the Russians, who had hitherto 
been conducting an offensive war, now had to defend their own ter- 
ritory. The Central Powers opened a concentric attack from the 
north and the south on Poland, and the Russians had to abandon 
enormous areas. On August 5, Warsaw and the fortress of Ivan- 
gorod fell into the hands of the Central Powers. This was followed 
by the fall of fortresses further east, like Novo Georgievsk and 
Grodno, on September 2. The German- Austrian advance lasted till 
the end of September, and won for the Central Powers a territory 
half as large as Germany itself. 

This was a great military success, and yet it had failed in its 
main purpose. The Russian army was neither destroyed nor even 
demoralized. It had been able to retreat in good order, and by 
continual and often successful counter-attacks, which however were 
seldom sustained, it gave evidence that it had not lost its power of 
fighting. The war on the Eastern Front was by no means ended, 
and a change might take place at any moment. The Russians now 
made several changes in command: on September 8, the Tsar per- 
sonally took over the supreme command, with General Alexeiev as 
chief-of-staff. However, the Germans were now in a position to 
withdraw a considerable part of their troops from the Russian theater 
of war and despatch them to Serbia. 

The Austrians had hitherto been unable to get the slightest con- 
trol over the Serbs. It was the Serbs, rather than the Austrians, 
who had hitherto been assuming the offensive. Now a change took 
place. The Central Powers now undertook a great concentric attack 
upon Serbia, whose destruction had been Austria's original purpose 
in going to war. In carrying out this operation Turkey's precarious 
position was a great advantage to the Central Powers. An attack 
upon Serbia could only be carried out easily in case Bulgaria, which 
had come out of the Second Balkan War severely reduced in power, 
joined in the movement. The Central Powers were now able to com- 
pel the Sultan to make concessions to Bulgaria which were sufficient 
to entice the cabinet at Sofia to join their coaUtion. On July 22, 



446 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

19 1 5, a preliminary agreement was signed in Constantinople, giving 
Bulgaria Turkish territory which included the whole length of the 
Dedeagatsch railway and uninterrupted communications with the 
iEgean Sea. Thereupon, on September 19, the Bulgarian govern- 
ment ordered general mobilization, and though the Bulgarian dec- 
laration of war was dated October 14, the Bulgarian army began 
to invade Serbia on October 11, — at about the same time the Aus- 
trians and Germans began their attack on the north. 

This sealed Serbia's fate during the following months. A request 
for help from Greece based on the Balkan Alliance (see p. 419) was 
refused on October 12. The Allies, however, did not leave the little 
country wholly in the lurch. On October 5, an Anglo-French expe- 
ditionary force, under Generals Sarrail and Mahon had landed on 
Greek territory at Salonica upon the invitation of the Greek prime 
minister, Venizelos, though not upon that of the Greek government 
as such. This expeditionary force pushed as far north as Nish, but 
it came too late and was too weak to prevent Serbia's downfall. 
The Germans and the Austrians, and still more the Bulgarians, 
pressed forward so rapidly that by the middle of November more 
than half of Serbia was in the enemy's hands. On November 25, 
the Serbian government had to retire to Scutari in Albania, and 
it was followed a few days later by the whole Serbian army. The 
German government then, on November 28, declared the Balkan 
campaign officially at an end, and their assertion was scarcely an 
exaggeration. All Serbia was occupied by enemy troops. The rem- 
nants of the Serbian army had been transported to Corfu, and the 
Anglo-French expeditionary force was compelled to retreat to 
Salonica. The occupation of Montenegro, also, was merely a ques- 
tion matter of a few weeks: Cettinje was occupied by the Aus- 
trians on January 13, 19 16, and Scutari ten days later. Thanks to 
Bulgaria's joining the Central Powers, safer communications with 
Turkey were also now restored and continued until the fall of 19 18. 

But still the war in the Balkans could not be regarded as wholly 
ended. The Allies established themselves in a strong position at 
Salonica, which was regarded as impregnable owing to reinforce- 
ments received by sea; and so not only was Greece kept from the 
enemy's influence, but the communications between Berlin and Con- 
stantinople were continually in danger of being threatened, depend- 
ing on the changes in the general military situation which might 
take place. At first, however, there was no immediate danger of this. 

The Allies had perceived that the war might be materially short- 
ened if they could succeed in getting Constantinople into their con- 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 447 

trol. This would restore communications with Russia by way of 
the Dardanelles and cut off the possibility of a Turkish attack 
against Egypt. Accordingly, in the spring of 1915, a great Anglo- 
French expedition was undertaken. First, while the troops were 
on their way to the east, an attempt was made to force the Straits 
by a naval attack; but on March 18 this failed completely, and 
caused the loss of one French and two British warships. About 
a month later, on April 25-26, the land attack began, but was 
scarcely more successful. To be sure, the Allies succeeded in dis- 
embarking their troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula; but the place 
had been put into such a good state of defence by the enemy that 
the landing parties, in spite of the bravery with which they fought 
and the bloody losses which they sustained, were unable to make 
any serious advance, and had to resort to the same system of sta- 
tionary trench warfare as on the Western Front. Even the landing 
of a second army on August 6 did not improve the situation. So, 
at the close of 19 15, the Allies were compelled to abandon the 
expedition as hopeless. Between December 8 and January 8 their 
troops evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula without disturbance from 
the Turks. Thenceforth, and until the end of the war, Constan- 
tinople remained unthreatened by military operations, with the ex- 
ception of attacks from airships. 

Though the Turks at Gallipoli had given another evidence of their 
tenacity in holding defensive positions, they could not win any 
greater success on the offensive than during the Balkan Wars, in 
spite of the fact that they were supported by German officers and 
soldiers. Four times between February and August, 191 5, they had 
attempted to attack the Suez Canal; but each time their efforts 
had collapsed miserably. Turkey's main purpose in entering the 
war was thus definitely thwarted, and from 19 15 onwards it was 
not the British but the Turks who had to stand on the defensive 
in Egypt and Arabia. In Mesopotamia, where the English had 
begun operations at the end of 19 14 by occupying Basra on 
November 2 1, this was also true, although the Turks won a number 
of considerable successes in their defensive action. The British 
expeditionary force which had pushed up the Tigris toward Bagdad 
was beaten on November 24, 19 15, south of the ancient city of 
Ctesiphon, and forced to retreat to Kut-el-Amara, owing, it seems, 
mainly to the fact that the communications to the rear had not been 
properly attended to. Here at Kut-el-Amara the British were shut 
in by the Turks, and as reinforcements could not be sent in time 
they were forced to surrender on April 29, 1916. 



448 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

This Turkish success, however, was of only momentary impor- 
tance. It simply taught the British that they could do nothing 
against the Turks by mere raids and improvised attacks; and since 
it was easy for them to rectify their mistake, there was no doubt 
as to the ultimate outcome here also, if the war only lasted long 
enough. 

Thus the year 19 15 had brought the Central Powers, with the 
exception of the Russian and Serbian regions, merely defensive suc- 
cesses. This was the period in which the Entente Powers made up 
for the munitions which they lacked in 1914 and prepared the scien- 
tific equipment for future achievements. The most important step 
in this direction came at the end of the year on December 28, when 
the British government decided to introduce universal military 
service in England and Scotland — a decision which at first, on 
February 10, affected merely unmarried men, but a few months 
later, on May 25, was extended to married men also. 

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, it fell to Germany to 
take the initiative in an attack on the Western Front. Germany 
appears to have perceived at this time the dangers which lay in a 
prolongation of the war. Although a successful military undertak- 
ing could no longer break the superiority of the enemy, the Germans 
at least wanted to try whether, by breaking through on the French 
front, they might not cause among the peoples of the Entente coun- 
tries an illusion of possible defeat. Before the English law for universal 
military service had accomplished its purpose, the German army on 
February 21, 19 16, began a tremendous attack upon the fortress 
of Verdun, one of the points in the row of fortresses which, from 
the outset, they had been unable to take. They secured some initial 
successes in this attack which was made with unexpected force; but 
they could not capture either the city or the fortress, although they 
continued their attacks with extraordinarily large losses until July i. 
They were not even able to hold some of the outer forts which they 
had conquered at first; some of these fell into the hands of the 
French again during the summer, and the rest were won back by a 
French counter-offensive in the fall, the operations ending on No- 
vember 4, 1916. Before this counter-attack took place, the British 
and French on their side began a great attempt on July i to break 
through the German positions on the Somme. This also failed of 
its purpose, though it cost very heavy losses. To be sure, the Ger- 
mans were driven back a considerable distance, but their front was 
not broken and the Allies did not even succeed in capturing 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 449 

Bapaume or Peronnes, and their sacrifices were out of all propor- 
tion to their gains. 

The Battle of the Somme brought into action for the first time 
new engines of warfare which were characteristic of the new inten- 
sive attention which English and French scientists were giving to 
inventions for military purposes. These were the new armored cars, 
known as "tanks," invented by an Englishman, and modeled on 
American motor tractors; they were equipped so as to overcome 
all obstacles like trenches and barbed wire. Though containing 
many defects at first, they soon proved extraordinarily useful, in 
fact indispensable; and they were all the more serviceable to the 
Entente, inasmuch as the armies of the Central Powers were not 
able to oppose them with any equivalent force. In general, the 
year 19 16 marks a turning point, because the Allies began to out- 
match the enemy in practically all the fields of military technique, 
beside branches in which they had had more or less of an advantage, 
as in the case of the French field artillery; they had now caught 
up with, or even surpassed, the Germans everywhere, as for example, 
in aviation, in which the Germans had originally shown technical 
superiority. In the same way, there had been an increase in the 
production of munitions by the Allies. 

The Austrian offensive in the southern Tyrol in May, 19 16, had 
turned out as unfortunately as the attack on Verdun. The Aus- 
trians, to be sure, had at first won some initial successes; but soon 
afterwards, on June 12, they had to retreat, and the little towns 
of Asiago and Arsiero, which they had captured, were again occu- 
pied by the Italians on June 25 and 27. The Italians were then 
able, on their side, to undertake a successful offensive, and on 
August 8 captured Gorizia, the first large town to fall into their 
hands. Here also the year 19 16 closed with a gain for the Allies, 
although it was not a very large one. 

More varying and more dramatic were the events which were 
taking place on the Eastern Front. The first months of the year 
went by fairly quietly, the most important achievements of the 
Russians being some advances in the Caucasus and in Persia. But 
on June 4 the new commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the 
south, General Brussilov, began a great offensive against the Aus- 
trian positions in the Ukraine and in Bukovina. At first the 
Russians were completely successful; they crushed the Austrians 
near Luzsk, won victories on the Strypa, and on June 17 captured 
Czernowitz. Almost the whole of Bukovina was conquered. But 



450 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

while the southern offensive had developed so successfully, further 
north, near Kovel and Baranowitschi, the Russians came upon Ger- 
man troops which had been sent to help the Austrians and their 
advance was brought to a standstill in the second half of June. 
This reacted on the southern sector, so that there, also, the Rus- 
sians were unable to make further progress; however, the campaign 
closed with a decided balance in Russia's favor. 

The Russians appeared to have won a still more important ad- 
vantage by their offensive, inasmuch as Rumania, after long hesi- 
tation, finally declared war on Austria on October 27, 19 16. But 
this step, which was due chiefly to the consideration that the 
Wallachian Kingdom could only successfully lay claim to the Ru- 
manians in Austria-Hungary in case she took part in overthrowing 
the Dual Monarchy, soon turned out to be a source of embarrass- 
ment to the Allies. Rumania was not at all prepared for a war 
with the great military Powers, and after a few easy victories, due 
to her surprise attack, she was quickly defeated. The combined 
German, Austrian and Bulgarian forces speedily occupied all of 
Wallachia, and between September, 19 16, and January, 19 17, drove 
the remnants of the Rumanian army back into Moldavia, so that 
the economically valuable part of Rumania, with its supplies of 
grain and oil, fell into the hands of the Central Powers. So Ru- 
mania's entrance into the war turned out most unexpectedly to the 
advantage of the enemy. 

The year 19 16 is also noteworthy for the only important naval 
battle which took place. 

The German navy was unable to force the British fleet to figlit, 
because the latter held itself in reserve in a safe harbor. In spite 
of this, the Germans attempted to weaken it by destroying smaller 
British naval detachments wherever possible. An opportunity of 
this kind seemed to have come on May 31, 19 16. The German 
High Seas Fleet happened upon a detachment of battle cruisers under 
Admiral Beatty, near the Skagerrak, west of Jutland. The consid- 
erably weaker British force held out successfully until the main 
British fleet could come up; when this began to take part in the 
battle, the Germans withdrew, and, thanks to darkness and fog, 
suffered only relatively small losses. 

Judged by its results, this naval battle was perhaps the greatest 
victory of the whole war. Henceforth, the German High Seas Fleet 
disappeared from the seas, and the memory of the superiority of the 
British navy made such a lasting impression on the Germans who 
took part in the battle that the desperate attempt at the very end 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 451 

of the war to send the German fleet out again, which meant sending 
it to certain destruction, is supposed to have given the signal for 
the German Revolution of November 3, 1918. 

At the close of the year 19 16 the Central Powers regarded it as 
necessary to revive the spirits of their own people and at the same 
time to strengthen the "defeatist" movement among their enemies. 
On December 12, 19 16, the German chancellor made a peace offer 
expressed in extremely indefinite terms and in a victorious tone. 
The offer did not meet with the slightest success in the Entente coun- 
tries ; at home in Germany it may, perhaps, have materially strength- 
ened the "determination to hold out," especially after the Allies 
made known their conditions; these, in general, were less severe 
than those which the Central Powers were finally compelled to accept 
in 19 1 9. The Germans never made a specific statement of their 
peace terms, although the President of the United States, who was 
supposed to have offered mediation originally at Germany's request, 
sought to secure such a statement from them in his note of Dec- 
ember 18. The reason for this evidently lay in the fact that the 
announcement of terms which could be discussed would have 
destroyed the* illusions of the German people concerning the mili- 
tary situation; furthermore, the formulation of "reasonable" terms, 
meaning by this terms which accorded with the actual strength of 
the two sides at the time, appears to have been made difficult by 
the fact that the German government was dependent upon the great 
manufacturers, who wanted annexations of territory. At any rate, 
up to the end of the war, the German authorities never completely 
renounced Belgium, although this was demanded by the Entente as 
the first condition of peace. 

The year 191 7 also brought no essential changes of importance 
on the Western Front, in spite of the enormous efforts made. The 
most notable event was the German evacuation of their positions on 
the Somme in March and April, in order to evade a new attack by 
the French and the British. But the later Allied attacks in the 
West made no essential improvement in the Allied front line, al- 
though the French conquered a number of long contested positions 
by the end of the year. 

It was again in the East that the great change took place during 
this year. 

The partial success of Brussilov's offensive had left a feeling of 
deep depression in Russia. The Liberals were disillusioned in their 
hopes as to the political situation both at home and abroad. They 
had expected that the war would free them from the "German 



452 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

yoke" and from the autocracy which had propped itself up on the 
dread with which Germany was regarded; but, up to this time, they 
had not been freed of either the one or the other. The government 
had not known how to conduct the war successfully, nor had it 
undertaken political reforms such as the Liberals wished. In fact, 
many people believed that the pro-German court party in Russia 
did not want any real victory over Germany at all. The conflict 
became acute when the government refused to make any conces- 
sions to the Duma, which it had been forced to call together on 
February 27, 191 7. On March 3 popular insurrections took place 
in Petrograd, and as the Tsarist government was unwilling to give 
way and even declared the dissolution of the Duma on March 11, 
a regular revolt broke out. As the Petrograd garrison at once took 
the side of the revolutionists, the Opposition had easy sailing. 
Within twenty- four hours, on March 12, the Tsarist regime was 
overthrown, the ministers were arrested, and a Workman's and 
Soldier's Council, or Soviet, was established. On March 14 there 
followed the establishment of a regular provisional government under 
the presidency of Prince Lvov, who belonged to the progressive 
party, and who represented democratic parliamentary views. On 
the next day, March 15, the revolutionists succeeded in compelling 
the Tsar, Nicholas II, to abdicate. 

From the outset and even before the revolution, there had existed 
within the Russian Opposition two tendencies which were sharply 
opposed to one another: on the one side, a group of intellectuals, 
democrats, and idealists; and, on the other, the representatives of 
the masses, who had abandoned democratic ideals and adopted 
Socialist-revolutionary theories. Owing to the great concessions 
made to the Liberals, as well as to extraordinarily tolerant admin- 
istration and legislation, the gulf between these two parties was at 
first bridged. Capital punishment was abolished, military courts 
were done away with, and all exiles were permitted to return. The 
Finnish constitution was ratified and the Poles were promised com- 
plete independence. All restrictive regulations against oppressed 
nationalities and religions were revoked, and universal suffrage, in- 
cluding woman's suffrage, was introduced. A wholly new Russia 
was supposed to have arisen which would not only put an end to 
the Tsarist police regime at home but would also conduct with holy 
zeal a patriotic war abroad. 

Before any further account of this Russian revolution is given, 
it is necessary to note the consequences which the overthrow of 
Tsardom had in foreign countries. 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 453 

If one considers the feeling of political solidarity which had 
hitherto bound together the three Eastern Empires it is easy to 
understand what an impression was made everywhere by the dis- 
appearance of one of these empires from the absolutistic circle. The 
German government at once felt compelled to promise to grant to 
its own subjects the demands which had long been made by the 
Opposition for a reform of the Prussian "three-class system of vot- 
ing" and for other similar modifications of the existing regime. 
More important than these proclamations, which remained without 
effect, was the influence which the Russian revolution had upon 
the policy of the United States. 

The United States was the first country to recognize the new 
Russian Republic — on March 22. This had a symbolic importance. 
The fall of Tsardom put an end to one great obstacle which had 
hitherto stood in the way of America's eventually joining the Allies. 
American democracy (one may perhaps argue) would never have 
joined a coalition which included Tsarist Russia among its mem- 
bers. But now this was all changed, and the way was open for 
the possibility of an alliance, at the very moment when America 
had to face the question whether it would enter the war or not. 

The United States had always represented the view that a 
blockade-war did not justify any belligerent in disregarding the 
rules of humanity and international law in regard to neutrals. 
America, which had put into practice so eagerly the idea of inter- 
national arbitration, and had already brought about a peaceful union 
of all the American states, was of the view, and not unjustly, that 
all such pacifist agreements were worthless if they could be ignored 
in time of war. And it accorded with their principles and their 
practice to prevent, above all things, any infringements of the law 
which endangered not only property but also human life. Therefore 
the United States, as the most powerful neutral, had issued warn- 
ings, even to the Entente Powers, against acting contrary to inter- 
national agreements, such as the agreements in regard to sending of 
mail matter; but she adopted a much sharper tone toward the 
Powers which were guilty of inhuman acts against her own citizens. 
Most important among these acts was the campaign against mer- 
chant ships by German submarines, which often paid no heed to 
the rules prescribed for the protection of passengers and crews, and 
even sank ships without giving the passengers any warning. It 
now happened that a case of this kind involved a considerable num- 
ber of American citizens. On May 7, 1915, the great English 
passenger ship Lusitania, which was going from New York to Eng- 



454 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

land, was torpedoed off the Irish coast by a German submarine. 
A hundred and twenty-four Americans lost their lives. This led 
to a sharp exchange of notes between Washington and Berlin, May 
15-31, 1915. Without reaching any definite result, it still appeared 
that the German military authorities would henceforth pay some- 
what more attention to the rights of neutrals on the seas. But the 
discussion lasted further. It was also complicated by the fact that 
the Entente had begun to arm a large number of merchant ships 
against submarine attack, and Germany requested that she be al- 
lowed to sink such vessels, at least, without warning. In the midst 
of these discussions, in which public opinion in America was by 
no means unanimous on one side or the other — for the old sharp 
anti-English feeling still existed — a new incident occurred which 
gave the dispute another aspect. On March 24, 1916, the French 
unarmed passenger ship Smsex, on which there were several Ameri- 
cans, was torpedoed by a German submarine in the English Chan- 
nel. The American government thereupon sent an energetic note 
to Berlin; when it received a merely evasive answer in regard to 
the Stissex, it despatched still another note which had almost the 
character of an ultimatum. This time public opinion in America 
was much more unanimous, and the note took a much more ener- 
getic tone than the previous ones, little as the President and Con- 
gress betrayed any desire to enter the war. The German govern- 
ment now realized the seriousness of the situation and promised in 
its note of May 4 not to sink without warning any more merchant 
ships in the future. 

This side-tracked the dispute for the moment, but did not really 
settle it. Germany, for instance, emphasized at the end of her note 
that she reserved full freedom of action for herself in case the United 
States was not able to compel Great Britain also to observe the rules 
of international law. President Wilson, on the other hand, in his last 
answer, insisted that the promise of the German government could 
not be made dependent on conditions of this kind. 

Such was the situation, when the German government, in the fol- 
lowing year, on January 31, 191 7, issued an official statement to all 
neutrals that henceforth it intended to conduct an unrestricted sub- 
marine campaign against merchant ships. All merchant ships, even 
though neutral, which were found in the war zone, which included 
the seas around Great Britain, France, and Italy and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, were to be torpedoed by German submarines without 
warning. 

This decision was a desperate attempt, by means of a famine 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 455 

blockade, to bring to a successful end for the Germans the war 
which they had not been able to win with their armies; above all 
else, it was an attempt to compel England, which could not be 
attacked by armies, to make a premature peace. The submarine 
weapon was not wholly without prospects of success; but it was an 
extraordinarily dangerous weapon, and its adoption was due to the 
feeling prevailing at German Headquarters since 1915, that any 
chances must be taken. On the basis of President Wilson's previous 
notes, Germany had to reckon with the danger that the United 
States also would now intervene in the war. Furthermore, a num- 
ber of other neutral states, from which the Germans had hitherto 
been able to import goods to make up for their deficiency in raw 
materials and food, would suffer such economic injury that further 
assistance from these sources would necessarily be limited. Finally, 
the world's supply of means of transport and of wares of which the 
Central Powers would be in the greatest need, even in case of vic- 
tory, would be seriously diminished by this submarine warfare; and 
so the economic misery at the close of the war would be increased, a 
misery from which an over-populated country like Germany would 
necessarily suffer most severely. 

But all these considerations were thrown to the winds. This was 
partly due to the wholly false estimates made by the German Navy 
Department, which again underestimated the enemy's pov^er of re- 
sistance and inventive cleverness in devising means to meet the 
submarine danger. 

America's answer was not slow in coming. It was on February 
I, 1917, that the unrestricted submarine campaign was to begin; 
on February 3 the United States broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany, and on the next day urged other neutral states to do 
likewise. This did not yet amount to war, and the other neutral 
states, so far as they followed America's request at all, were slow 
in acting upon it; Brazil, for instance, did not break off diplomatic 
relations with Germany until April 9. But the United States might 
take the final step at any moment. 

It was at this point that the Russian Revolution became an 
influence in giving a decisive turn to events. Even as late as 19 16 
America had still been disinclined to take part in the war. Presi- 
dent Wilson, who had formerly been a professor of political science 
and was a typical idealist representing the idea of law in interna- 
tional relations, was a member of the Democratic Party, which 
included the pacifistic lesser bourgeoisie; he had been reelected in 
November, 19 16, partly because he had been regarded as being the 



456 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

candidate of the peace party. From a financial point of view, every 
argument was against entering the war; it was certain that the 
American government would have to assume an enormous burden 
of taxes, as the English and Italians had already done, in case it 
waged a war for which it had made so little preparation; and these 
taxes, which would not be compensated by any economic profits, 
would appear all the more burdensome, because the United States, 
from the very beginning, had renounced all conquests and even in- 
demnities. The consideration which drove America to war, there- 
fore, was similar to that in the case of England: it was a question 
of securing for the future that development toward a peaceful rela- 
tion among nations, for which America had already begun so suc- 
cessfully to pave the way, — a relation which was not based upon 
threats of war and armaments, universal military service, the build- 
ing of fortresses and so forth, but which would relieve the United 
States of the necessity of "militarizing" herself for defence against 
a European Power. Germany's announcement of unrestricted sub- 
marine warfare now seemed to show that here was a Power which 
would disregard its promises to other states just as inconsiderately 
as it overstepped humanitarian provisions in favor of neutrals in 
case of military necessity; an indication of this had recently been 
given by the German intrigues in Mexico against the United States. 
In addition to these influences, as has been said, came the fact that 
Russia had now become one of the free peoples; on April 5 the 
Congress of the United States declared war on Germany. 

America's entrance into the war could not exercise an influence 
upon military events in Europe at once, except so far as the supply- 
ing of American munitions to the Entente countries had to be lim- 
ited. But from the outset it had an immense "moral" effect: new 
reserves in man-power and money now stood at the disposal of the 
Allies; a new power had joined them which could not, under any 
circumstances, be forced to give in by a country like Germany, which 
was lacking in sea power. The Americans also made it a matter 
of honor, when they were once in the war, to carry it on as vigor- 
ously as possible, and they improvised an army and navy with 
enormous energy. 

Their achievements were all the more significant inasmuch as the 
unrestricted submarine campaign turned out to be a complete 
failure. At first, to be sure, there was a considerable increase in the 
number of ships sunk. Great Britain was also compelled to do what 
the Central Powers had done long before — to limit the consumption 
of food and finally on February 25, 19 18, to adopt a system of 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 457 

rationing it. But in England there was never any food shortage 
which could be compared with the privation in Germany and Aus- 
tria, though even this was without great effect on the armies of the 
Central Powers. Furthermore, means of defense against submarines, 
like depth bombs axid the throwing of artificial smoke screens about 
vessels, were discovered, which materially lessened their activity. 
The submarines also proved totally ineffective against ships of war. 
And of the numerous transports which brought the American troops 
to Europe, not a single one was sunk; nor were the communica- 
tions between England and France broken. As an offset to America's 
entrance into the war, therefore, Germany had risked a venture 
which proved worthless. 

Furthermore, the "moral," and also the actual, support of the 
United States came to the aid of the Allies at a moment when they 
were more in need of this support than ever, if the war was not to 
be indefinitely prolonged. The Russian situation had taken a very 
different turn from that which the Liberal Opposition had expected. 
At first, to be sure, events had moved in the main as the Intellectuals 
had anticipated. They succeeded, on May 5, 191 7, in getting a vote 
of confidence for the Provisional Government from the Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Councils; and when a Socialist, Kerensky, be- 
came prime minister on July 22, it might have been hoped that the 
Extreme Left would support the government thenceforth. The revo- 
lutionists also managed, between July i and 13, to begin a great 
offensive in Eastern Galicia, which promised much. But at this 
moment the military power of Russia collapsed at home. 

For a considerable time there had existed within the Russian 
Social Democratic Party a radical left wing, known as the Bolsheviki 
or Maximalists, who had abandoned the Marxian doctrine that the 
proletariat ought to get control over the state by peaceful means. 
The Bolfheviki represented the principle that nothing but a revo- 
lution could bring the rule into the hands of the workingmen, and 
also that the future state ought not to be organized on a democratic 
basis, but that political rights should be reserved for the property- 
less classes. The advocates of these views had been banished from 
Russia under the Tsarist regime. The most notable among them 
was a landowner's son named Ulianov, who came to be called Lenin, 
apparently because of his residence in Siberia near the river Lena; 
during almost the whole period of the war, Lenin had been living 
in Switzerland, and latterly at ZUrich. The Provisional Govern- 
ment now opened to these exiles an opportunity to return to Russia; 
with the aid of the German government, which gladly put at the 



458 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

disposal of the Russian revolutionists a "sealed" train for crossing 
German territory, thus preventing them from coming into any con- 
tact with the German population and especially with the German 
Socialists, all these Bolshevist leaders succeeded in getting back to 
Russia. Lenin himself arrived at Petrograd on April i6, 191 7. 
Scarcely had they reached Russia when they began an extraor- 
dinarily active propaganda in favor of their ideals, not only among 
the people of Russia itself, but in the armies, where the government 
let them have a free hand. 

The thing which was of decisive importance was that they were 
able to appeal to the feelings of the peasants as well as of the in- 
dustrial workingmen. To the peasants who would follow them they 
held out the prospect not only of an end of military service, but 
also of a division of the great landed estates, for which prepara- 
tions had been made by the Tsarist government itself, but which 
could only have been wholly accomplished after a considerable time. 

It is no wonder that these enticing arguments found a hearing 
among the masses who, through the prohibition of alcohol, had been 
deprived of their most effective means of forgetting their present 
misery through pleasant illusions, for a few hours at any rate. 
The discipline in the Russian army collapsed. Many of the peas- 
ants deserted their regiments and returned home. The Russian mili- 
tary advance, which had begun so successfully, was changed on 
July 2 1 into a retreat which resembled a flight. All attempts of the 
government to stop the movement proved fruitless; neither the ap- 
pointment of the minister of war, Kerensky, as prime minister, nor 
the orders to arrest Lenin, Trotzky — whose real name was Bronstein 
— and their companions, were able to accomplish anything. Even the 
appeals of "the old guard" Socialist leaders, like Plechanov, remained 
unheeded. The Provisional Government finally had no support ex- 
cept from the troops in Petrograd, and on November 7, 19 17, even 
this force was overthrown by a coup d'etat of the Bolsheviki, who 
made use of naval troops. Kerensky and the Provisional Govern- 
ment disappeared; their place was taken by the "People's Com- 
missaries," Lenin and Trotzky, representing the Bolsheviki. A 
counter move by Kerensky on November 13 resulted in failure at 
Tsarskoe Selo. 

It is not possible at this point to discuss the Russian situation, 
which has not yet reached the end of its development; the later 
course of the Bolshevist movement in Russia must therefore be 
passed over here. But the Petrograd coup d'etat affected the whole 
military situation, and some account of this must now be given. 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 459 

The Bolshevist People's Commissaries, upon coming to power, 
opened negotiations with the Central Powers in order to secure a 
truce and negotiate a peace. They declared as their conditions: no 
annexations, no indemnities, and the self-determination of peoples. 
The Central Powers accepted these conditions, and, on December 
15, a separate truce was signed at Brest-Litovsk between Soviet 
Russia and the Central Empires. Shortly after that, on December 
22, peace negotiations were opened. 

The peace negotiations were extraordinarily slow, chiefly because 
the German delegates did not hold to the conditions which they had 
accepted, but had in view open and secret annexations of Russian 
territory of enormous extent, without consulting the populations in 
any way. As the Bolshevists had destroyed the Russian army, 
they could no longer make any resistance to the enemy's demands; 
and so finally, on February 24, 19 18, they were compelled to accept 
the German conditions, after Germany had already, on February 9, 
concluded a separate peace with the Ukraine. The treaty of peace 
itself was signed on March 3; but before this, as the truce had 
already terminated, the Germans had again begun their advance, 
and had occupied Kiev and Narva. The treaty of peace naturally 
made Rumania's military position untenable; so this country also 
had to sign a preliminary treaty on March 5, shortly after the con- 
clusion of the treaty with Russia, and on May 7 consented to a 
final peace treaty at Bucharest. This provided for considerable ces- 
sions of territory to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Central Powers in 
general, and also converted Rumania into an economic vassal of 
Germany by a petroleum monopoly and so forth. The only com- 
pensation which Rumania received was that she was given a free 
hand in Bessarabia, which had hitherto belonged to Russia. 

It is easy to understand that this withdrawal of Russia from the 
ranks of the Entente caused a deep depression among her former 
allies — all the more so, as it was easy to see that the Central Powers 
would now be able to throw against the Western Front all the mili- 
tary forces which were set free by Russia's desertion. That no 
"defeatist" collapse took place, in spite of thi^, is due to the fact, 
aside ijjpm the general reasons already mentioned, that America's 
help seemed to make up for the loss of the Russian armies. It was 
also due to the manner in which the peace negotiations at Brest- 
Litovsk had been carried on by the Germans and to the contents of 
the treaties themselves, which destroyed every hope of reaching an 
acceptable peace. The German government perhaps never made a 
greater political mistake in the course of the whole war than it did 



46o ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

in imposing on Russia, in contradiction with the conditions at first 
agreed upon, a treaty which involved such enormous sacrifices of 
territory and such oppressive economic clauses as did the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, The peoples in the Entente countries, even those 
who held "defeatist" views, now perceived what they would have to 
expect if they laid down their arms merely in return for general 
promises ; from this moment onwards, the idea of a premature peace 
was no longer discussed. 

The harm which the Germans had done to themselves could never 
be counteracted, no matter how great were their military efforts; the 
Entente, which might suffer military reverses at some points, but 
which could not be overcome, was now more invincible than ever. 
However, it chanced that the great offensive which the German 
General Staff undertook against the Anglo-French positions on the 
Western Front with the aid of the troops withdrawn from Russia 
failed. The Germans, to be sure, secured a number of very consid- 
erable initial successes. They forced the English contingent in the 
St. Quentin sector to give way, and for a moment, on March 21, 
1918, and the following days, it seemed as if they were going to be 
able to break the connection between the English and French 
troops. The French, also, had to withdraw and give up Noyon 
and other places. But this very disaster resulted in the accomplish- 
ment of a reform which had long been necessary in the Allied armies, 
but to which the English had hitherto been steadily opposed: the 
Western Front was finally put under the command of a single per- 
son; General Foch, who had distinguished himself in the Battle of 
the Marne, and who had been commanding the French armies since 
May 15, 191 7, was now, on March 26, 1918, made commander-in- 
chief of all the forces of the Allies in France. To be sure, this was 
far from stopping the German advance; but it did hinder local 
reverses from developing into a disaster along the whole front, such 
as had almost been the case in March. 

The German offensive lasted until the middle of July. It often 
met with obstinate and even successful resistance; but in the end 
the German attack almost always resulted in a gain of ground. 
Many towns and positions which had come to be regarded as defi- 
nitely in the possession of the Allies were reconquered by the 
enemy. The Germans even succeeded for a second time in advanc- 
ing to the Marne, and on July 15 in crossing it in several places. 
But here the fortune of war changed. On July 18, the French and 
the Americans undertook a great offensive between Chateau-Thierry 
and Soissons, and drove the enemy systematically back. Not only 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 461 

on the Marne, but also further north near Albert, the Germans 
began a general retreat which lasted till August 4. 

Guided by the sure hand of Marshal Foch, who had borne this 
title since August 6, there now followed a systematic advance of 
French, British and American troops, which drove the Germans out 
of one position after another, in spite of their obstinate resistance. 
By the beginning of September they had been driven back to the 
line from which they had begun their offensive in March. 

The Allies soon pressed forward still further. The American 
troops, which, in view of the critical position in the spring of 19 18, 
had been transported to Europe in great numbers, made the first 
attack since 19 14 which turned out successfully against a strongly- 
held front position: on September 12-13 they captured the salient of 
St. Mihiel near Verdun. 

The German army was not yet broken in organization. The sol- 
diers still did their duty as conscientiously as ever, and the with- 
drawal movements took place in a wholly orderly fashion. But it 
may be surmised that the disastrous result of the last great offen- 
sive, which they had hoped would end the war, aroused among the 
troops a stronger and stronger conviction of the invincibility of the 
Allies and consequently a certain discouragement. The lack in raw 
materials for manufacturing munitions, at a time when their former 
capture of booty had now been changed into severe losses in their 
own guns, may also have led them to see the serious inferiority of 
their own military leaders. Nevertheless, the Germans still had an 
army which was able to threaten the Allies with a war of despera- 
tion for a relatively long time. 

Whoever thought this, however, had overlooked the fact that Ger- 
many was only one link, though the strongest, in a coalition, and 
that meanwhile this coalition had completely collapsed. 

In order to understand this, it is necessary to go back a little in 
the history of the other theaters of war. 

The establishment of the Allied expeditionary corps in Salonica 
(see p. 446) had turned out to be an excellent speculation. After 
the Allies had interfered in Greece, they secured control of the 
Greek fleet, and finally, on June 11, 191 7, compelled King Con- 
stantine, who had been an out and out adherent of the pro-German 
policy of neutrality, to leave the country along with the heir to the 
throne. The Allies thus had at their disposal a territory in their rear 
which they could trust, and which was now under the direction of the 
friendly Venizelos, who had become prime minister again on June 
26, 19 1 7. Even before these events had taken place, the Allied 



462 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

troops, in combination with the reorganized Serbian army, had made 
an attack against the territory occupied by the Bulgarians; on No- 
vember 1 8, 19 1 6, this had resulted in the re-conquest of Monastir, 
that is, of a little Serbian soil. They had also succeeded, on 
February 18, 19 17, in restoring connections with the Italian con- 
tingents in Albania, so that Greece was completely cut off from the 
Central Powers. Now, when the consequences of the severe defeat 
of the Germans in the Second Battle of the Marne began to exercise 
a greater influence on the spirits of Germany's allies, the Allied 
armies in the Balkans were ready to take the offensive against 
Bulgaria. On September 15, 1918, French, Serbian, English and 
Greek troops began a combined attack on Bulgaria, which broke 
the resistance of the enemy in a few days. The Bulgarians fell back 
in disorderly flight and on September 25, ten days after the attack 
had begun, they asked for an armistice — the first country in the 
coalition of the Central Powers to take this step. Their request was 
granted on September 30; and the agreement amounted to an un- 
conditional surrender. The Bulgarian army had to lay down its 
arms and deliver its prisoners without receiving a reciprocal right 
in return; German and Austrian troops and diplomatic representa- 
tives were also to be expelled from Bulgaria. Bulgaria thus disap- 
peared from the ranks of the belligerents, and threw herself upon 
the mercy of the victors, who thereby cut off the connection between 
Turkey and the Central Powers. A short time afterwards, on Oc- 
tober 4, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who had been responsible in 
good part for the policy of his country, abdicated and handed over 
the government to his son. 

It was now only a question of time before Turkey would be com- 
pelled to take the same step. Whereas she had not been able to 
defend herself against the enemy, even with German help, now she 
was completely lost, as communications with Berlin were no longer 
open. 

Thanlis to their steady methodical work, the British had recov- 
ered from their defeat in Mesopotamia and had conquered Palestine 
from the Turks. In May, 19 16, the English auxiliary corps which 
had arrived too late to relieve Kut-el-Amara (see p. 447), began a 
long, slow march up the Tigris. The Turks defended themselves 
bravely, but were driven out of one position after another. The 
British took Kut-el-Amara on February 24, 1917, entered Bagdad 
on March 11, Samarra on April 23, and Tekrit on November 5; 
they also advanced toward the northeast to the frontiers of Persia. 
The British expedition on the Euphrates was no less successful; 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 463 

here, under the splendid leadership of General Maude, who was 
commander-in-chief of the whole Mesopotamian expedition, they 
won a decisive victory over the Turks at Ramadieh on September 
28, 1917. 

However, in the course of 19 18, military operations in this region 
began to drag. It was in Palestine that the decisive victory over 
the Turkish forces was won. 

The English first secured control over the desert lying between 
Egypt and Palestine by defeating the Turks at Katia on the 
Egyptian frontier on April 23, 19 16, driving them out of the 
region around El Arisch. On December 23, 1916, they captured a 
strong Turkish position at Maghara on the Syrian frontier. Then 
they began to build a railway across the desert reaching from the 
Suez canal to Gaza in Palestine. The Turks had cleverly entrenched 
themselves at Gaza and succeeded for some time in beating back 
the attacks of the English in the spring of 191 7; but General 
Allenby, who was entrusted with the command in June, finally 
overcame the resistance and captured Gaza for the British on No- 
vember 7, 191 7. From this point on, the British advance went 
forward relatively quickly. Jaffa was captured on November 17, 
Jerusalem on December 9, and Jericho on February 21, 1918, Later, 
to be sure, the British met with some reverses, but on September 
19, 19 1 8, when they succeeded in bringing about a decisive engage- 
ment, victory was wholly on their side. They broke through the 
Turkish positions on the coast and were able to announce officially 
that the Turkish armies were destroyed. Within a few days all 
Palestine was in their hands. In this movement, the English had 
been supported by forces placed at their disposal by the King of 
the Hedjaz; this prince, without doubt as a result of an under- 
standing with the British, had revolted against the Turks in June, 
19 1 6, founded a kingdom of his own at Mecca, and been recognized 
for some time as an independent prince; similarly, in Mesopotamia 
an independent Arabian kingdom had been proclaimed, free from 
Turkey. 

Under these circumstances, even if Bulgaria had not surrendered, 
the Turks would have perhaps been compelled to make peace. At 
any rate, scarcely a month later, on October 30, 1918, they also 
threw themselves upon the mercy of the victorious Allies. They, 
likewise, had to surrender all their fortresses, including the Bos- 
phorus and the Dardanelles, which had been so long contested and 
which had never fallen into an enemy's hands since the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire. The Turks had to demobilize their army, hand 



464 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

over their war vessels, place their railways under the control of the 
Allies, break off all relations with the Central Powers, and expel 
all Germans and Austrians from their territory. 

Of Germany's three allies, there remained only Austria-Hungary; 
but this empire also was near its end. 

For a long time the Austrian government had seen more clearly 
than the German that a continuation of the war would mean the 
downfall of the old system of government, and had sought various 
means to prevent this disaster, without, however, being able, up to 
the last moment, to bring themselves to sacrifice Austrian territory 
to Italy. Germany had always refused her approval, and due to 
this as much as to the inadequacy of the Austrian proposals, all 
negotiations with Italy had failed. 

The fact that the Austrians were unwilling to make any conces- 
sions to the Italians was in part owing to the fact that they re- 
garded themselves as victors over Italy. 

After various Italian attacks had failed of great success in the 
course of 191 7, the Austrians, supported by German auxiliary troops, 
made a great counter-attack in October of this year. Favored, it 
is said, by the "defeatist" and Socialist influences which prevailed 
in some of the Italian divisions, the Austrians succeeded in a sur- 
prisingly short time in breaking through the enemy positions at 
Caporetto on October 24, and in pressing forward from here far 
into Venetian territory. On October 28 they recaptured Gorizia, on 
the 29th occupied Udine, and on November 9 reached the Piave 
river. On December 4-6 they also succeeded in advancing in the 
neighborhood of Asiago. 

Henceforth, the Austrians were mostly able to maintain them- 
selves for several months in these conquests, and could thus, like the 
Germans, carry on the war in the enemy's country. Various Italian 
attacks only succeeded in unimportant front line gains. The Aus- 
trians, however, were also just as unable to advance beyond the 
front line which they had seized at their first onrush; a great Aus- 
trian offensive from the Asiago plateau to the sea, which was 
launched on June 15, 19 18, had failed completely by June 25. The 
Italians at this time had the support of French and British aux- 
iliary troops. 

This situation, when Austria's confidence in a successful outcome 
had been broken by the defeats of the Germans in France, was a 
good psychological moment for a new attack by the Allied Powers. 
On October 24, therefore, the Allies began a great offensive against 
the Austrian positions in the Trentino and on the middle Piave, 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 465 

which led, on October 31, after a brave initial resistance of the Aus- 
trians, to an Austrian retreat which was like a flight. The Aus- 
trians abandoned their positions along the whole front. At the same 
time, on November 3, the Italians captured the Austrian naval 
forces at Trieste. Nothing remained for Austria to do except to sign 
an armistice on November 3, which was equivalent to an uncon- 
ditional surrender. She not only had to agree to demobilization, 
but had to put all her railways at the free disposal of the 
Allied Powers, who thus acquired the right to attack Germany by 
way of Austria; all German troops had to be removed from Austria- 
Hungary within fourteen days; and Austria had to renounce reci- 
procity in regard to the delivery of prisoners and the raising of the 
blockade. 

While this was happening, the old Austrian government had ceased 
to exist. On October 30, an independent Czecho-Slovak state had 
been proclaimed at Prague; and on October 31, when the Serbs were 
approaching Belgrade and threatening to invade Hungary, the Hun- 
garians declared their independence and organized a Hungarian 
republic. Soon after this a revolution occurred in Vienna, which 
compelled Emperor Charles to abdicate on November 12, and trans- 
formed German-Austria into a republic. Thus Austria fell apart 
into its national constituent elements. Both the dynasty and the 
former German-Magyar dual rule over the Slavic nationalities came 
to an end. 

So at last it was only the German armies which still stood in the 
field, and even these were in a position in which they could only 
be saved from disaster by a speedy armistice. 

Immediately after the American success at St. Mihiel the German 
government had sought to open peace negotiations, and on September 
15, 19 18, had offered peace conditions to Belgium. But the offer 
was naturally rejected, and at the end of the month there began 
a vast concentric attack upon the Germans from Ypres, Cambrai, 
and the Argonne — a great simultaneous assault at many points on 
the front, which prevented the Germans from making any further 
use of their advantage of the "inner line" by shifting their more or 
less inadequate reserves from one place to another. Under these 
circumstances the Allied forces were able to press forward every- 
where. On September 27, the English broke through the so-called 
"Hindenburg Line" on the Cambrai front, capturing St. Quentin on 
October i, Armentieres on October 3, Cambrai on the 9th, and Laon 
on the 13th. The Allied offensive from the sea-coast could now be 
taken up again and resulted in quick successes: Roulers was cap- 



466 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

tured on October 14, whereupon the Germans began to evacuate the 
Belgian coasts north of the city as far east as Ostend; by October 
19 the Belgians had occupied all the rest of the coast. They then 
took Ghent, while British forces between the Scheldt and the Sambre 
pressed forward in the direction of Valenciennes, so that the Ger- 
man positions on the Scheldt were threatened. Ludendorff, Quar- 
termaster General of the German army, who was generally regarded 
as responsible for the German plans of campaign and especially for 
the offensive of 19 18, had to resign on October 26 — an admission 
that his undertaking had failed. 

Parallel with these last battles there had been going on for about 
a month negotiations toward peace. Five days after Bulgaria's sur- 
render, Germany had turned to the President of the United States 
with a request for mediation, proposing as a basis President Wilson's 
message to Congress of January 8, 19 18, as well as his later similar 
declarations. The President thereupon demanded, above all things, 
that the Germans should put an end to their "illegal and inhuman 
practices," like submarine warfare and the systematic devastation 
and plimdering of the territories which they were evacuating. He 
also demanded a change in the German government, so that there 
should no longer be any autocratic power which could arbitrarily 
disturb the peace of the world. The German government there- 
upon promised to give orders to the submarines not to torpedo pas- 
senger ships in the future, and in Germany they promised to intro- 
duce a parliamentary form of government. The President then laid 
the German request for peace before the Allied Powers who replied 
on November 6. 

The Allied Governments had a difficult decision to make. The 
battle on the Sambre, which had begun on November i, had cut the 
last important commimications between the German troops in the 
Ardennes and those in Belgium; and this, together with the tre- 
mendous advance of the French in the south, had made the posi- 
tions of the Germans so untenable that they had no alternative but 
to choose between a hasty retreat back over the German border or 
the danger of being surrounded, — a disaster like Sedan only on a 
wider scale. If the Allies, in spite of this, entered upon peace nego- 
tiations, they would have to renounce the great final military 
triumph which could be held up before the eyes of friend and foe 
afterwards as the complete defeat of the German military power. 

But, on the other hand, since the power of resistance of the Ger- 
man armies had not yet been thoroughly broken, there was no deny- 



THE WORLD WAR, 19 14- 19 18 467 

ing that such a triumph would cost a great sacrifice in human life, 
and that such a final act of glory, which was not absolutely neces- 
sary, was not worth the blood which would have to be shed for it. 
Furthermore, the "Fourteen Points" in President Wilson's message 
to Congress of January 8, 19 18, which had been accepted by Ger- 
many, contained many demands which formed part of the program 
of the Allies, like the handing back of Alsace-Lorraine to France, 
and the creation of an independent Polish state which should include 
all regions occupied by Poles even though they formed part of 
Prussia. And even if all the Allies gave up wide-reaching demands 
in order to abide by President Wilson's conditions, Germany would 
suffer a very essential diminution of her territory, especially in the 
east. 

Accordingly, the Allies accepted the proposal transmitted by 
America, however unpopular it was in many respects. They merely 
made as reservations to the Fourteen Points two conditions: that the 
demand for the freedom of the seas should not be accepted in the 
sense understood by Germany; and that "the restoration of the 
evacuated districts" mentioned by the President should be under- 
stood to mean that "Germany had to make compensation for all 
damage done to the civil population of the Allies." 

The Germans made no objection to these reservations, and on 
November 7, 19 18, requested an armistice. This was granted to 
them on November 11. 

The armistice conditions, which reflected the actual military situa- 
tion, were milder than those in the three armistices which had pre- 
ceded. They were, to be sure, an agreement between a victor and 
a defeated party, and contained numerous one-sided provisions to 
Germany's disadvantage, such as the delivery of prisoners by one 
party only, the maintenance of the blockade, the evacuation by Ger- 
many of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which was 
occupied by Allied troops. But no general demobilization of the 
German army was insisted upon; of the war material, only a part 
had to be handed over, except that all submarines were surrendered ; 
of railway stock only so much was to be restored as had been carried 
away by the Germans from the occupied territory. An unlimited 
right of occupation, such as the Allies had insisted upon in dealing 
with the other three defeated countries, was not required of Ger- 
many. Naturally German East Africa, which was the only German 
colony in which a remnant of German forces had been able to main- 
tain itself, was to be evacuated, and the German government was 



468 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

to withdraw all its troops from the territories which had formerly 
belonged to Russia, and to annul the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and 
Bucharest. 

At the moment when this armistice was signed, the old German 
government was no longer in existence. On November 3 the naval 
troops in Kiel had given the signal for revolution, and witliin a 
short time the movement had extended over all Germany. It was 
directed not only against the Kaiser, but also against the federated 
princes in the German Empire, who were rightly regarded as being 
identified with tlie old system. On November 7 a republic was pro- 
claimed in Bavaria; on the 9th the Chancellor, Prince Max of 
Baden, resigned and the revolutionists announced the abdication of 
Emperor William II, who thereupon fled at once to Holland with 
the Crown Prince. A Socialist party leader, who under the old 
regime would not have been allowed to fill even the lowest position 
in the civil service, now became German Chancellor on November 9. 
Having reached this point we must halt. What has taken place 
since can only be judged when it is known how events have turned 
out. It only remains to note briefly the official conclusion of the 
war through the treaties of peace. 

Naturally, the treaty of peace with Germany was the most im- 
portant. 

The negotiations met with extraordinary difficulties. The coali- 
tion of victors had swollen at the close to a host of about thirty 
countries and their claims collided with one another in many points. 
The negotiations, therefore, after March 25, 19 19, were carried on 
merely by the heads of the four Great Powers, the "Council of 
Four," representing Great Britain, France, the United States, and 
Italy. 

Much more serious and complicated was the question of dealing 
with tlie economic misery into which the war had plunged Europe. 

According to President Wilson's Fourteen Points there could be 
no question of the victors treating Germany as Germany had treated 
France in 1871 (see p. 311) — of demanding complete reparation for 
the costs of war together with money gifts to the military 
leaders and statesmen of the victorious countries. But even aside 
from the Fourteen Points, such a demand could not have been car- 
ried out. Germany, to be sure, had suffered much less through the 
war than France, Belgium or Serbia; she had no devastated dis- 
tricts, nor destroyed factories and mines. But Germany, which was 
not rich by nature, had been severely injured in her export trade 
by the war, and the finances of the Empire, in which the expendi- 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 469 

tures even before the war had reached much too high a figure in 
proportion to the real capital in the country, had been completely 
ruined by war expenditures; moreover, in order to keep the popu- 
lation in good spirits, the government had not dared to impose 
appropriate new taxes, as had been done in England and Italy. The 
population possessed barely enough money to pay even the current 
expenses of the government, to say nothing of making any regular 
payments on the war debts. On the other hand, the injured coun- 
tries, like France, demanded that the defeated enemy should at 
least make good the damages, which often could not be justified on 
any military grounds; this was especially the case with France; the 
economic advantage which she had enjoyed before the war owing 
to her relatively thinly settled population had now been changed 
into an economic disadvantage, inasmuch as a million French peas- 
ants had fallen and the supply of labor was insufficient. There 
were many other economic difficulties, which cannot be taken up 
here, such as the lack of marine transportation facilities due to the 
submarine warfare, and the abnormally low point to which exchange 
in the defeated countries had fallen. 

It was natural that under these circumstances the French should 
desire compensation in the form of territory, aside from Alsace 
which gladly returned to France. All her demands of this kind, 
however, always failed on account of the opposition of her allies. 
Instead, the conception of the word "restoration" was extended, and 
there was placed on Germany the obligation of making yearly repara- 
tion payments. It is possible that the settlement of the colonial 
question was also regarded as a kind of compensation, in place of 
the complete compensation which could not be made in cash. It 
was in this matter that those who drew up the treaty of peace de- 
parted furthest from President Wilson's program. In order to put 
an end to conflicts for the possession of colonies. President Wilson 
had desired an impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, having 
regard at the same time for the interests of the natives; instead of 
this the former German colonies were simply partitioned among the 
allies, to be sure in the form of a mandate under the League of 
Nations, so that the territories, at least in theory, were to be open 
to all nations upon the same terms. 

The second reason why the American program, deficient as it was 
in many respects, was not completely carried out, lay in the effort 
of France to create guarantees for herself against a new attack from 
Germany. The experiences which France had had with the German 
government before 1914, as well as her conviction that the German 



470 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

mentality had not changed since the armistice, resulted in a partial 
adoption only of measures which were to secure peaceful intercourse 
among nations in the future. Disarmament, to be sure, was imposed 
upon Germany, and other states carried through similar measures; 
Great Britain, for instance, put an end to her universal military 
service; France, on the other hand, which had only unwillingly 
adopted the Prussian system of universal military service after 1870, 
now clung fast to it in order to have protection against her neighbor. 
On the other hand, as a result of American pressure, a League of 
Nations was established along with the treaty of peace and as an 
integral part of it; this was to take up again the old Russian plan 
for a diminution of armaments and to provide for the application 
of international means of compulsion against states which rejected 
arbitration and proceeded directly to war. For the present, how- 
ever, Germany was to be excluded from the League of Nations until 
she had given evidence of a changed frame of mind. 

In other respects the terms of the treaty of peace do not seriously 
diverge from the Fourteen Points, and still less from the earlier 
resolutions of the Entente Powers. There is one demand which 
was fulfilled almost without exception — the demand that every na- 
tionality should acquire its freedom. As applied to Germany, this 
meant that not only should Poland acquire the parts which had 
belonged formerly to Austria and Russia, as well as the part which 
had been taken by Prussia, but also that the Danes in Northern 
Schleswig, who had been denied the right of self-determination since 
1866, should be allowed to decide to what state they should belong. 
President Wilson's program also included the demand for a free 
access to the sea for Poland; as the only seaport to be considered, 
namely Dantzig, had no large Polish population, a compromise was 
arranged by which the town was made into a free state by itself. 
Regions where the composition of the population was a matter of 
dispute acquired in general the right to vote on their future; thus 
the Allies returned to the system of voting by plebiscites which had 
been forgotten since 1866. 

Hard as these conditions appeared to the Germans — hard mainly 
because their concessions were rewarded with scarcely any counter 
concessions — there was nothing for the totally defeated state to do 
but to accept them. On June 28 the German delegates signed the 
treaty in the Hall of Mirrors, at the Palace at Versailles, where the 
German Empire had been proclaimed in 1870. Formal ratification 
by the Allied Powers took place on January 10, 1920. 

For Austria-Hungary the conditions were much severer. She had 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 471 

made no stipulations in signing the armistice, and, furthermore, two 
of the newly-created states into which the former Dual Monarchy 
fell apart — Czecho- Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia — were the friends of 
the Allied Powers. Although in general the boundaries were drawn 
in accordance with the lines of nationality, these pro-Ally states 
received great concessions in the Treaty of Saint-Germain with 
Austria, signed on September 10, 1919. Czecho-Slovakia, for in- 
stance, was given the part of Bohemia occupied by Germans, It 
was still less in accordance with the principle of nationality to 
assign the German Tyrol to Italy, although strategic reasons could 
be alleged for doing this. The German part of Austria, which was 
now a republic, but which had formed the relatively poorest part 
of the monarchy, was not only treated as the legal successor of Old 
Austria, because of the predominance of German officials, but the 
little state was also forbidden to join itself to Germany. By the 
Treaty of the Trianon, of June 4, 1920, peace with Hungary was 
worked out along the same lines. It is noteworthy, on the other 
hand, that these treaties contain clauses for the protection of racial 
minorities: the Powers have the right to prevent the forcible sup- 
pression of linguistic groups. 

By the Treaty of Neuilly, of November 27, 19 19, Bulgaria came 
out of the war materially reduced in size, and many districts in the 
southern Balkans which were assigned to Serbia are probably pre- 
dominantly Bulgarian by race. 

Finally, by the Treaty of Sevres, of August 10, 1920, which has 
not yet (1922) been ratified, Turkey was destroyed as a Great Power. 
She was deprived of control over the Straits. The Sultan, to be 
sure, was allowed to continue his residence in Constantinople, but 
his military and political authority over the city was taken from 
him. Great stretches of the Turkish Empire — Syria, the west coast 
of Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia — were freed 
from Turkish control, so that the Sultan retained only a modest 
empire in the interior of Asia Minor. The expulsion of the Turks 
from Europe, which had been the dream of Christianity for nearly 
five hundred years, seemed to have been accomplished, and What- 
ever may happen in the future to Constantinople, and however the 
question of Russia's attitude to the new regime on the Bosphorus 
may turn out, the Turkish Empire can never be revived again in its 
old form. 

It would need another whole volume if, at the close of this sketch, 
one should try to give an account of the consequences which the 
war has had for Europe and in fact for the whole world. Several 



472 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

points have been touched upon in the account of the treaties of 
peace, but aside from these there is so much more to be told that 
no attempt shall here be made to tell it. Moreover, surmises as to 
the future do not belong in a historical narrative; only the dilet- 
tante and the amateur philosopher of history venture to make 
prophecies. Attention, therefore, shall be called to only one point 
which has not yet been mentioned, because it could find no place 
in the narrative. It concerns the change in agrarian conditions. 

That the war resulted in an extension of political rights is not 
surprising; nor is it to be wondered at that the appeal for manual 
labor, with the temporary shortage in labor supply, resulted in an 
improvement in the condition of the workingmen and even in an 
extension of political rights to women in many countries. The over- 
throw of the three autocratic monarchies in Central and Eastern 
Europe had the further natural result that political rights which had 
hitherto been in large part a matter of privilege in Western and 
Southern Europe were now extended over nearly the whole conti- 
nent. But in addition to these changes — and as much in the lands 
of the victors as in those of the defeated enemy — there now took 
place a change, which has perhaps more deeply modified the struc- 
ture of economic life than all the new constitutions and treaties of 
peace. The war, and the continued crisis in transportation which 
followed the war, have again suddenly recalled to people's minds, 
hypnotized for a century by the Industrial Revolution, the funda- 
mental importance of agriculture; and at the same time people 
have begun to realize the eminent political importance of a system 
of agriculture based on small peasant proprietors. Russia took the 
first step by dividing up the large landed estates among the culti- 
vators of the soil. Since then, one state after another has followed 
her example, and even in Prussia, where the problem was perhaps 
dealt with most timidly, the political privileges connected with large 
landed estates have at least been abolished, and the way is open for 
"internal colonization." But in other states, also, where no forcible 
interference with private property has taken place, economic power 
has shifted into a different set of hands. The large landowner in 
England, who even before the war was scarcely able to manage his 
estates in the old fashion, has now been compelled in very many 
cases through the necessity of the age to sell his estate or allow it 
to be divided up. In France, where small peasant proprietors have 
strongly prevailed ever since the French Revolution, the new era 
is indicated by the fact that the peasants have grown rich in con- 
trast to the townspeople, and many estates which were formerly in 



THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 473 

the possession of the bourgeoisie have gone over into the hands of 
the peasantry. Thus, in most countries, the rural districts have 
acquired an economic preponderance over the towns. Though the 
progress of science in the nineteenth century ruined agriculture in a 
good many places, by making it possible to sell foodstuffs imported 
from abroad at a lower price than domestic products, now it appears 
that the reverse is about to happen — that agriculture is beginning 
to act as a check on industry by setting too high a price on the 
indispensable necessaries of life. Thus the problem which arose 
from the Industrial Revolution more than a hundred years ago, as 
to how to feed cheaply the masses of men necessary for manufac- 
turing on a large scale, has now reached a new critical stage; while, 
on the other hand, the struggle which the French Revolution began 
against the privileges and domination of large landed property has 
now for the first time reached a triumphant close in all Europe. 



INDEX 



Abd-el-Kader, iig-124, 135. 
Abolition, see Slavery. 
Absenteeism, 52, 168, 264. 
Abyssinia, 3+2-344, 347- 
Addis-Ababa, Treaty of, 344. 
Adowa, 343. 

Adrianople, 41 f., 413, 4i9f. 
Adriatic Sea, 252, 420, 431. 
Mgean Sea, 350, 419, 446. 
Afghanistan, 134, 137-139, 142, 144- 

147, 355- 

Africa, 20, 1 12-128, 149, 325-351, 
368-372, 423, 440 ; Abyssinia, 342- 
344, 347; Algeria, 1 12-128, 189, 
332-334, 337, 342, 344-347; Brit- 
ish South Africa, 327f., 368- 
372; Congo, 339, 341, 347; 
Egypt, 112, 32S-333, 335-341, 
343, 441, 447 ; German colonies 
and policy, 325-327, 339-350, 374, 
440, 467; Sudan, 128, 335-340, 
343; Tangier, 122, 344; Tunis, 
128, 326, 332-335, 342, 348; 
slavery in, 20, 123, 336, 338- 
341, 368. 

Agadir, 346. 

Agriculture, 53, 58, i3of., 165-182, 
356f., 364, 372f., 472f. ; in Aus- 
tria, 406 ; in England, 85-88, 98- 
100; in France, 115, 208, 426; in 
Prussia, 263-265, 283f . ; in 
United States, 103-110; see also 
Peasants. 

Aguinaldo, 377. 

Aigun, Treaty of, 133. 

Akkerman, Treaty of, 41. 

Akulscho, 135. 

Alabama, privateer, 247. 

Aland Islands, 217. 

Alaska, 380. 

Albania, 328, 404, 420, 443, 446, 462. 

Albert, Battle of, 461. 

Albert, Austrian Archduke, 256 

Alexander I, Tsar, 26, 36, 40, 75-77. 
80, 213. 

Alexander II, Tsar, 219, 22lf. 

Alexandria, 328, 331. 



Alexeiev, Russian General, 445. 

Algeciras, 345-348. 

Algiers, Algeria, 1 12-128, 189, 332- 
334, 337, 342, 344-347. 

Alleghany Mountains, 105, 107. 

Allenby, English General, 463. 

Alliance, Holy (1815), 26f., 67, 69; 
Conservative Alliance of the 
Great Powers (1815), 25-80, 
212, 285; Dual Alliance (1891), 
390, 421, 428; Triple Alliance 
(1882), 334, 348-350, 418, 428, 
431 ; see also Treaties. 

Alma, Battle of the, 218. 

Alsace-Lorraine, I25f., 299, 306-310, 
435, 467, 469- 

Alsen Island, 294. 

America, see United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, etc. 

Amherst, Lord, 142. 

Amu-Darya (Oxus) River, 138. 

Amur River, 133. 

Ancona, 71, 255. 

Anglican (Established) Church, 
82f., 95, 167, 170, 175, 184, 340, 
392, 394- 

Anglo-Saxon, see England. 

Angola, 341. 

Annam, 352-354. 

Annexations of territory : by con- 
quest, 60, i65f., 23of., 296-299, 

418-421, 451, 459f., 465, 467-471 ; 

by plebiscite, 253-255, 2S7f., 297, 
471- 

Antwerp, 74, 437. 

Arabi Bey, 331, 336. 

Arabia, Arabs, 11 9-128, 338, 349f., 
447, 463, 471. 

Arago, French physicist, 198. 

Aral, Sea of, 136, 138. 

Arbitration, 247, 379fif., 425, 470. 

Ardennes, 466. 

Argonne, 465. 

Aristocracy, see Landowners, No- 
bility. 

Arkansas, 242. 

Armenia, 412-414, 471. 



.475 



476 



INDEX 



Art, i6f., 224f., 322. 

Asia, 5f,, 129-164, 213-219, 327, 338, 
352-360, 440, 447, 462U 471- 

Asia Minor, 38, 4if., 113, 4^3, 47i- 

Asiago, 449, 464. 

Asquith, 394- 

Athens, 38, 42. 

Atlanta, 242. 

Auber, French composer, 72. 

Augsburg, 191, 296 

Augustenburg, 294. 

Augustowo, Battle of, 437. 

Ausgleich, Compromise of, 1867, 
409f. 

Australia. 9, 3i8f., 329, 355, 3^3-367, 
372ff., 440. 

Autocracy, see Conservatism, Liber- 
alism, Parliaments. 

Austria (Austria-Hungary), 25-27, 
45ff., 69ff., 225, 248-258, 284- 
297, 304, 3i3f., 402-412; Balkan 
ambitions. 37fi., 43, 2i6f., 258, 
338, 348-350, 414.-471; political 
and social conditions, 216, 225, 
227, 272-279, 284, 3'^7, 403-412, 
47of. ; in World War, 422 f., 
426f., 43 if., 436-440, 444-451, 
459f., 464-471. 



Babeuf, 191. 

Baden, 278, 288, 310, 468. 
Bagdad, 447, 462. 
Balaklava, 218. 

Balkans, Balkan question, 36, 40^ 
43, 80, 216, 258, 275, 338, 348- 
350, 402-423, 426, 431, 441, 443, 
445-450, 459-465, 471. 
Bapaume, 449. 
Baranowitschi, 450. 
Baratieri, Italian General, 343f. 
Barbary Pirates, 112-118, 136. 
Bardo, Treaty of, 333. 
Barricades, 65, 194, 198, 206. 
Basra, 447. 
Battles (arranged chronologically) : 

Jemmapes (1792), 66 

Jena (1806), 265-268, 273, 281. 

Navarino (1827), 41, 65 

Dargo (1842-45), 135 

Custozza (1848), 249; (1866) 256, 

29s 
Novara (1849), 249 
Sinope (1853), 217 
Alma (1854), 218 
Balaklava (1854), 218 
Inkerman (1854), 218 



Battles (arranged chronologically) : 
Sebastopol (1855), 218 
Solferino (1859), 253 
Bull Run (1861), 237 
Vicksburg (1862-3), 24if. 
Gettysburg (1863), 242 
Koniggratz, Sadowa (1866), 256, 

296, 314 
Lissa (1866), 256, 314 
Langensalza (1866), 296 
Weissenburg (1870), 306 
Worth (1870), 306 
Froschweiler (1870), 306 
Spichern (1870), 306 
Borny, Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte, 

St. Privat (1870), 307 
Sedan (1870), 307f., 382, 434, 466 
Majuba Hill (1881), 369 
Adowa (1896), 343f. 
Manila Bay (1898), 376 
Santiago (1898), 376 
Liao-Yang (1904), 358 
Port Arthur (1904-05), 358 
Mukden (1905), 358 
Tsushima (1905), 358 
Coronel (1914), 430 
Falkland Islands (1914), 430f. 
Saarburg (1914), 434 
Charleroi (1914), 435 
Mame (1914), 435f.; (1918), 

46off. 
Krasnik (1914), 436 
Lemberg (1914), 436; (1915), 

445 
Grodek (1914), 436 
Przemysl (1914), 436; (191S). 

444f. 
Gumbinnen (1914),. 436 
Tannenberg (1914), 437 
Masurian Lakes (1914), 437 
Augustowo (1914), 437 
Ypres (1914), 437f-; (1918), 465 
Dunajec (1915), 445 
Warsaw (1914-iS), 437, 445 
Gallipoli (1915), 447 
Kut-el-Amara (1915-17), 447, 462 
El-Arish (1916), 463 
Maghara (1916), 463 
Verdun (1916), 448f. 
Somme (1916-17), 448f., 451 
Asiago (1916-18), 449, 464 
Gorizia (1916-17), 449, 464 
Luzsk (1916), 449 
Strypa (1916), 449 
Czernowitz (1916), 449 
Kovel (1916), 450 
Jutland (1916), 4Sof. 



INDEX 



477 



Battles (arranged chronologically) : 

Caporetto (191 7), 464 

Piave (1917-18), 464f. 

Ramadieh, Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, 
Jericho (1917-18), 463 

St. Quentin (1918), 460, 465 

Noyon (1918), 460 

Chateau-Thierry (1918), 460 

Soissons (1918), 460 

Albert (1918), 461 

St. Mihiel (1918), 461, 465 

Argonne (1918), 465 

Cambrai (1918), 465 

Armentieres (1918), 465 

Laon (1918), 465 

Roulers (1918), 465 

Sambre (1918), 466 
Bavaria, 278, 296, 302f., 468. 
Bazaine, 247, 307!. 
Beatty, English Admiral, 450. 
Beirut, 349. 
Belfort, 309. 
Belgium, 69-75, 80, 339^-, 430-435, 

437f., 451, 465, 468. 
Belgrade, 422. 
Belleville, 383. 

Benedek, Austrian General, 296. 
Benedetti, French Ambassador, 305f. 
Bengal, I40f., 148. 
Bentinck, Lord, 143. 
Berlin, 281, 339f-, 413^- 
Bessarabia, 413, 459. 
Beust, Austrian Minister, 409. 
Birmingham, 181, 393. 
Bismarck, 224, 289-297, 327, 339f-> 

389f., 397, 415- 
Blanc Louis, 193, 196-198. 
Blanqui, French Sociahst, 198. 
"Bloc," 200, 387. 
Blockade, 236f., 354, 43of., 439-442, 

4S0ff., 465. 
Boers, 327, 368-372. 
Bohemia (Czechs), 296, 405-411, 

465, 471. 

Bokhara, I36f. 

Bolivar, Simon, 30-33. 

Bologna, 253. 

Bolsheviki, 222, 457-460. 

Bombay, 142, 148. 

Bona, 117, iigi. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon I, 25-27, 57, 
117, 200, 25of., 389; "Napoleon 
III," 211; Louis Napoleon, Na- 
poleon III, 117, 126, 200-213, 
223 f., 251-253, 256-258, 293, 296f., 
303-308, 352, 382, 389f; Joseph, 
31 ; Prince Jerome, "Plon-Plon," 



252; Prince Imperial, only son 
of Napoleon III, 369. 

Bonn, M. J., quoted, 168. 

Bordeaux, 208, 310, 435. 

Borny, Battle of, 307. 

Bosnia, 41J, 418, 421 ; see also 
Balkans. 

Bosphorus, 282, 463, 471. 

Boston, Mass., 232. 

Botha, Louis, South African Prime 
Minister, 371 f. 

Boulanger, French Minister, 387. 

Boulogne, 200. 

Bourbaki, French General, 308. 

Bourbons, 25-27, 28-66, 201, 385. 

Bourgeoisie (Middle-class), 11-15, 
45, 53f-; in France, 58-70, 189- 
211, 223-225, 381-391; in Eng- 
land, 82-93, 391-395; in Ger- 
many, 263-274, 279-284, 395- 
402. 

"Boxers" in China, 356, 359. 

Boycott, 179. 

Brazil, 33f., 228, 455. 

Bregalnitza, 420. 

Brest-Litovsk Treaties, 459f., 468. 

Briand, French Minister, 387, 389. 

Bright, John, 99. 

Britain, British, see England. 

Brunetiere, French literary critic, 
388. 

Brussels, 72. 

Brussilov, Russian General, 449, 451. 

Bucharest, 39, 420, 459, 468. 

Buddhism, 159. 

Buenos Aires, 30. 

Bugeaud, French Marshal, 122. 

Bukovina, 449. 

Bulgaria, 404, 412-414, 418-420, 445f-, 
450, 462f., 471. 

Bull Run, Battle of, 237. 

Buller, English General, 370. 

Bundcsrat, 302. 

Buonarroti, French Radical, 191. 

Bureaucracy, 84, 221 f., 265-273, 405- 
410, 442f. 

Burma, 142, 146, 354. 

Byron, Lord, 40. 

Cabet, French author, 191. 

Cadiz, 31, 54fif. 

Cadorna, Italian General, 258. 

Cairo, 328-332, 2>z6, 341. 

Calabria, 47, 256. 

Calais, 4371. 

Calatafimi, 254. 

California, 156, 231, 233. 



478 



INDEX 



Cambodia, 352-354- 

Cambrai, 465. 

Cameroons, see Kamerun. 

Canada, 115, 175, 361-367, ZI^-ZTA, 

380. 
Canals, 106, 251; Suez, 114, 329, 

331, ZZ1, 441, 447, 463; Panama, 

378f. 
Canea, 415. 

Canning, George, 2>Z, 40. 
Canton, China, 5, 150-152. 
Capacites, 192, 194. 
Cape Colony, Capetown, 328, 341, 

363, 368-374. 

Capitalism, see Landowners, Manu- 
facturing, Socialism. 

"Capitulations," 329. 

Caporetto, 464. 

Caracas, 31. 

Carbonari, 47ff., 63. 

Carnot, Hippolyte, 206. 

Carpathian Mountains, 436, 444^- 

Carpetbaggers, 245. 

Casablanca, 346. 

Casement, Roger, 186, 

Caspian Sea, 135-138. 

Catholicism, see Church. 

Caucasus, 41, I34ff-, 219, 449. 

Cavaignac, Godefroy, 193; Louis 
Eugene, Minister of War, 198, 
201, 205. 

Cavour, 219, 249-255, 257, 259. 

Cawnpur, 147. 

Censorship, see Press, 

Central Powers, see Germany, Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

Cettinje, 446. 

Ceylon, 142, 331. 

Chamberlain, Joseph, 181, 393. 

Chambord, Count of, "Henry V," 
62, 385. 

Charleroi, 435. 

Charles I of Austria (1916-18), 

465- 
Charles IV of Spain (1788-1808), 

31. 
Charles X of France (1824-1830), 

63-66, 91, 116-118, 190, 192. 
Charles Albert of Sardinia (1831- 

1848), 249. 
Chartists, 95f., 171, 192. 
Chassepots, 257. 
Chateau-Thierry, 460, 
Cherbourg, 67. 

Chernaiev, Russian General, 137. 
Chile, 32, 34. 
Chimkent, 137. 



China, 5, 129, 1331, 150-157, 160- 
164, 352-360, 440. 

Chios, 38f. 

Cholera, 218. 

Christian, see Church. 

Christian IX of Denmark, 294. 

Church (Established) Anglican, 
82f., 95, 167, 170, 175, 184, 340, 
392, 394; Dissenters, 83, 87, 90, 
183 ; Orthodox Greek, 36, 212, 
216; Protestant Lutheran, 27of., 
284; Roman Catholic, 83, 90, 
167-173, 176, i82f., 212, 225- 
227, 27of., 284, 386-389, 396-399, 
406; Church lands and privi- 
leges, II, S7-6i, i67ff., 251, 259, 
269, 406; influence on educa- 
tion and politics, i6f., 45-55, 
61-64, 190, 195, 203f., 209, 225- 
227, 270f., 284, 386-389, 396-399. 

Cisleithania (Austria), 410. 

Classes of Society, see Church, No- 
bility, Bourgeoisie, Working- 
men. 

Clauzel, French Marshal, 120. 

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 378f. 

Clemenceau, Georges, 387-389. 

Cleveland, Grover, 375, 379. 

Coal, 7, 83, 87, 103, 163, 167, 259, 
322, 434. 

Cobbett, William, 91. 

Cobden, Richard, 99, 209, 224. 

Cochin-China, 352-354. 

Cochrane, Thomas, 32, 34. 

Cocos Islands, 430. 

Code Napoleon, 44. 

Colombia, 32, 34, 379. 

Colonies, colonial policy, 3f., 29-35, 
314, 325-380, 440, 469; American, 
375-380; Dutch (Boers) 327, 
338, 355, 363, 368-372; English, 
6, 140-155, 165-186, 3i8f., 325- 
346, 356, 361-365, 378-380, 440; 
French, 65, 112-128, 327-349, 
352-355, 430; German, 32S-327, 
335, 339-342, 344-347, 430, 440, 
467, 469; Italian, 325f., 333f., 
338, 342-344, 347-350; Russian, 
129-139; Spanish and Portu- 
guese, 6, 29-35, 327, 339, 341. 

Columbia, District of (U.S.), 233. 

Combes, French Minister, 389-432. 

Commerce, 5f., 30, 37, 88, 98-100, 
133-157, 162, 236, 277-279, 317- 
324, 428flf. ; see also Blockade, 
Colonies, Tariff. 

Communard, Commune, 384f. 



INDEX 



479 



Communist Manifesto, Communism, 

381-383; see also Socialism. 
Compromise, Missouri, of 1820, 231- 
234; Great (1850), 233; or Aus- 
gleicli of 1867, 409-412. 
Concordats witii the Papacy, 61, 225, 

250, 284, 389. 
Conferences : 
Algeciras (1906), 345-348. 
Berlin (1884-85), 339f. 
Hague (Peace; 1899), 425. 
Hague (Peace; 1907), 433. 
Paris (1919), 466ff. 
Versailles (1919), 466!?. 
See also Congresses, Treaties. 
Congo, 339, 34 1, 347- 
Congresses : 
Berlin (1878), 4i3f. 
Paris (1856), 219. 
Verona (1822), 56. 
Vienna (1815), 18, 25-28, 36, 71 f., 

75, 80, 90, 212, 219, 239. 
See also Conferences, Treaties. 
Connubio, 250. 

Conscription, see Military Service. 
Conservatives, Conservatism : soli- 
darity of, 25-100; in England, 
82, 87, 90-92, 98-100, 170-173, 
182-185; in France, 57ff., 223- 
225, 383-391 ; in Prussia-Ger- 
many, 263!?., 395-402 ; in Aus- 
tria, 405-412; see also Land- 
ovi^ners. Manufacturers, Primo- 
geniture. 
Constantine (Algeria), 119, 121, 

127. 
Constantine of Greece, 461. 
Constantine Romanov, yy. 
Constantinople, see Turkey. 
Constitutions, constitutional govern- 
ment, 27, 7ii¥., 359fv 418, 45^; 
Austrian, 402-412; English, 84- 
86, 166, i84f., 391-395; French, 
58fif., 66ff., 192-208, 292, 300- 
303, 309f ., 385fv 453 ; Japanese, 
158-160, 163; Spanish, 54f . ; 
United States, 230, 235, 24Sf ; 
see also Liberalism, Suffrage. 
Corfu, 37, 446. 

Cormenin, French Radical, 191. 
Corn Laws, 98-100. 
Coronel, Naval Battle of, 430. 
Cotton, 163, 228-230, 236-239, 244, 

Z2&, 439- 
Cracow, 79. 
Credit Fonder, 208. 
Creoles, 29fl., 33. 



Crete, 41, 216, 415, 4x9. 

Crimean War, 212-222, 252, 293, 403. 

Crispi, Italian Minister, 343f. 

Cromwell, Oliver, 166. 

Cronje, Boer General, 371. 

Cuba, 375-377- 

Custozza, Battles of, 249, 256, 295. 

Cyprus, 414, 441. 

Cyrenaica (Tripoli), 348-351. 

Czartoryski, Russian Minister, jy. 

Czechs, 296, 405-411, 465, 471. 

Czernowitz, 449. 

Daghestan, 135. 

Dahomey, 335. 

Daimios, 206. 

Dalmatia, 443, 

Dardanelles, 43, 213, 217-219, 349, 
446f., 463, 471- 

Dargo, 135- 

Darmstadter, German author, 
quoted, 110. 

Davis, Jefferson, 235, 244. 

Deak, Hungarian Statesman, 409. 

Decazes, French Minister, 6if. 

"Defeatism," 243, 442, 451, 459f. 

Delarey, Boer General, 371. 

Delcasse, French Minister, 345. 

Democracy, i04ff., 192-207, 402, 452, 
457f ., 472f . ; see also Liberalism, 
Constitutions, Parliament. 

Denmark, 293f., 297, 302, 378. 

DeWet, Boer General, 391. 

Disraeli, 224, 329, 392. 

Dissenters, 83, 87, 90, 183. 

Dodecanese, 350. 

Dominions of British Empire, 361- 
374- 

Dred Scott Case, 234. 

Dreyfus, French Officer, 388. 

Dual (Franco-Russian) Alliance, 
390, 421, 428. 

Dual Monarchy, see Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

Dublin, 165-168, I79f. ; University, 
173. 

Dufferin, Lord, quoted, I7if. 

Duma, 417, 457. 

Dunajec, Battle of the, 445. 

Dunkirk, 438. 

Dutch, see Holland. 

Economic Imperialism, 317-473; see 
also Commerce, Manufacturing. 

Ecuador, zi- 

Education, I59f., 222, 391 ; state con- 
trol over, 61, 209, 270-272, 276, 



48o 



INDEX 



312, 386-389, 396f., 400-402, 424; 
clerical control over, i6f., 45-55, 
61-64, 190, 19s, 203f., 209, 225- 
227, 284 386, 396. 

Emden, 430. 

Emigration, see population prob- 
lems. 

Engels, Socialist writer, 97. 

England (Anglo-Saxon, Great Brit- 
ain), agriculture, 85-88, 98-100; 
colonial expansion, 6, 140-155, 
165-186, 3i8f., 325-346, 356, 361- 
375, 378-380, 440 ; commerce, 30, 
88, 98-100, 140-143, 147-153, 209, 
428-430; Industrial Revolution, 
7-9, 85-100; workingmen, ii-iS, 
84-90, 94-98, 238, 391-395; popu- 
lation problem, Ssf., 97, 100, 140, 
149, 317-322; sea power (navy), 
7, 28, 32-34, 41, 100, 314, 430f., 
439-442, 45off., 465, 467; non- 
military character of, 84f., 94, 
97, 100, 403!., 428-430; Parlia- 
mentary Reform, 86-94, 96, 
l84f., 391-395; World War, 
428-431, 435-454, 456f., 460- 
472. 

Enlightened Despotism, 2, 16, 19-21, 
44ff., 53fif., 83, 88, 270-272. 

Entails, see Primogeniture. 

Entente (Anglo-French Agreement) 
of 1904, 331, 335-337, 344-346, 
430-471. 

Epirus, 41, 348, 419. 

"Equality," see French Revolution. 

Eugenie, Empress, 212. 

Factories, see Industrial Revolution, 

Manufacturing, Workingmen. 
Factory Acts, 94fT. 
Falkland Islands, Battle of, 430f. 
Falloux, French Minister, 203f. 
Farragut, Admiral, 241. 
Fashoda, 2,2S-2:i7- 
Favre, Jules, 206. 
February Revolution (1848), 96, 

174, 194-196, 223, 225, 248f., 

280, 406. 
Fellaheen (Egyptian peasants), 

328-330. 
Fenians, 175, 178, 183. 
Ferdinand I of Austria (1835-48), 

407. 
Ferdinand VII of Spain (1807- 

1833), 31, 54 
Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies 
(1830-59), 249, 254. 



Ferdinand I of Bulgaria (1887- 
1918), 418, 462. 

Ferry, Jules, French Minister, 354, 
386, 388. 

Feudalism, see Landed Property. 

Fiji Islands, 355. 

Finland, 452. 

Flanders, 437. 

Flaubert, French author, 225. 

Florence, 256f. 

Foch, Ferdinand, 460. 

Food-supply, see Population prob- 
lem. 

Formosa, 162, 354. 

Fourth Estate, 187-314; see also 
Workingmen, Socialism. 

France: Revolution of 1789, 11-18, 
25-27, 53ff-, 89-91, 93, 189, i8if¥., 
225, 384f., 405; Napoleon I 
(1799-1815), 25-27, 57, 117, 200, 
250f., 389: Louis XVIII (1815- 
24), 25-27, 58-63; Charles X 
(1824-30), 63-66, 91, 116-118, 
190, 192; Louis Philippe (1830- 
48), 66-68, 123, iSgf., 192-195, 
200, 385 ; Second Republic 
(1848-52), 197-207,223-225; Na- 
poleon III, Second Empire 
(1852-70), 200-213, 223f., 251- 
253, 256-258, 293, 296 f., 303-308, 
352, 382, 389f; Commune 
(1871), 383-385; Third Republic 
(1870- ), 353-355, 382-391; agri- 
culture, 115, 208, 426; colonies, 
65, 1 12-128, 327-347, 352-355, 
430; manufactures, 58, 189, 
I9if. 319-321, 472f. ; peasants, 
12-14, 58, 115, 472f. ; population 
problems, 58, 125-127, 319, 469; 
workingmen, 66, 68, 125-127, 
190-199, 201-204, 209, 223fif., 381- 
384. 

France, Anatole, 388. 

Francis II of the Two Sicilies 
(1859-61), 2S4f. 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 42if. 

Francis Joseph, 253, 407flf., 431. 

Fraternity, see French Revolution. 

Frederick II, the Great (1740-86), 
266. 

Frederick William III (1797-1840), 
26, 280, 285. 

Frederick William IV (1840-61), 
28off., 287fif. 

Frederick Charles, Prussian Prince, 
304. 



INDEX 



481 



French Revolution of 1789, econo- 
mic consequences, 11-15, 472f. ; 
ideas of, 25, saff., 89-91, 93, 189, 
191 f., 194; panic caused by, 16- 
18, 225, 384f ., 405 ; see also 
February and July Revolutions. 

Froschweiler, Battle of, 306. 

Fugitive Slave Law, 233. 

Fukien Province, China, 354. 



"Gag-rule," 234. 

Galicia (Polish), 80, 405, 408, 436, 
444 f., 457. 

Gallicanism, 64, 225. 

Gallieni, French General, 435. 

Gallipoli, 447. 

Gambetta, Leon, 306, 308, 331, 386. 

Guarantees, Law of Papal, 258f. 

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 249, 252-257, 
308. 

Garrison, William Lloyd, 232f. 

Gaza, 463. 

Geneva Award, 247. 

Genoa, 249, 251. 

Gentz, German publicist, 139. 

George V of England (1910- ), 150. 

Georgia (U.S.), 237, 242f. 

Georgia (Caucasus), 134-136. 

Germany, 261-314, 395-402, 412-472; 
Confederation of 1815 (1815- 
1866), 261-263, 276-279, 285-297, 
300; North German Federation 
(1867-71), 297-303; German 
Empire (1871-1918), 309-314. 
322-327, 395-402, 468; Republi- 
can Revolution (1918), 451, 468; 
Kaiser William II, 416, 427, 468; 
colonies and colonial policy, 
325-327, 335, 339-342, 344-347, 
430, 440, 467, 469; commerce, 
276-279, 322-326, 397, 438; edu- 
cation, 273f., 396f., 400; manu- 
facturers and industrial develop- 
ment, 276-279, 320-326, 399-402, 
4i6f., 426-428, 438, 451 ; mili- 
tarism, 31 1 -314, 400-402, 424- 
430, 432-435, 470: population, 
317-324, 40of. ; unification of, 
261-263, 276-279, 285-314, 397f-; 
Socialism in, 291, 395-402, 425, 
442f., 468. 

Gettysburg, Battle of, 242. 

Ghent, 437, 466. 

Gladstone, 175-184, 391. 

Goeben, 441. 

Gok-Tepe, 138. 



Gold Discoveries, 231, 363-365, 369, 

372. 
Gordon, English General, 336. 
Gorizia, 449, 464. 
Gottingen University, 27if. 
Grabbe, Russian General, 135. 
Grain, see Agriculture, Corn Laws. 
Grant, General, 241-243. 
Gravelotte, Battle of, 307. 
Great Britain, see England. 
Great Mogul, 145, 147, 150. 
Greece, 28, 36-43, 213, 275, 404, 41 5, 

4i9f., 446, 461 f. 
Grodek, Battle of, 436. 
Grodno, Fortress of, 445. 
Guadaloupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 231. 
Guam, 376. 
Guelf, 302, 396. 
Guiana, 379, 388. 
Guilds, 12, 83. 
Guinea, 335, 340. 
Guizot, French Minister, 189, 192- 

194, 251. 
Gurkhas, 147. 



Hadschi-Achmed of Constantine, 

ii9flf. 
Hague, 72, 425, 433. 
Haller, German historian, 274. 
Ham, Fortress of, 200. 
Hambarg, 340. 
Hanover, 261, 266f., 271 f., 278, 294- 

298, 302, 310. 
Hanseatic Towns, 278. 
Hardenberg, Prussian Minister, 267, 

269. 
Hastings, Marquis of, 141. 
Haussmann, Baron, 208, 
Havana, 375. 

Havelock, English General, 147. 
Hawaiian Islands, 375, 378. 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 379. 
Hebel, German writer, 113. 
Hedjaz, 463. 

Heine, German writer, 191-194. 
"Henry V," Count of Chambord, 

62, 385. 
Heligoland, 340. 
Herat, 145. 

Herzegovina, 4i2f., 418. 
Hesse-Cassel, 266, 278, 297. 
Hesse-Darmstadt, 278, 297. 
Hetairia, 38. 

Hindenburg, German General, 437. 
Hindenburg Line, 465. 
Hindus, I42ff., 365f. 



482 



INDEX 



History, if., 3f., 26f., 37f., 211, 272, /^ Italy, 7, 38, 44-Si, 248, 317; unifi- 



423, 427, 472f. 
Holland (Dutch), 6, 34, ^T, 69, 71, 

74, 88, 154-157, 327, 338, 355,363, 

368-372. 
Holstein, 293-299, 347. 
"Holy Wars," i2of., 128. 
Home Rule, Irish, 176-186. 
Homestead Laws, io6f. 
Hongkong, 1 52. 
Hovas, 340. 
Hue, Treaty of, 353- 
Hugo, Victor, 206, 
Humanitarianism, 19-21, 86-92, I42f., 

149, 19s, 204f., 2o8f., 229, 232ff., 

319, 338-340, 38iff., 433f-, 453- 

456- „ „ 

Hygiene, 9, 13, 208, 318-320. 

Ibrahim Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, 
4of. 

Ideas of 1789, see French Revolu- 
tion. 

Immigration, see Population Prob- 
lems. 

Imperial Conferences, 373f. 

Imperialism, economic, 315-373- 

Indemnities, (1815) 59; (1866) 
296; (1871) 309, 311; (1897) 
41s; (1918) 459; (1919) 468ff. 

Industrial Revolution, 7-10, 84ff., 
167, 317-324, 415, 42iff., 472f., 
see also Manufacturing, Work- 
ingmen. 

Infallibility, Papal, 226f. 

Inheritance, Law of, see Landed 
Estates. 

Intervention, 25-26, 30-56, 72fif. 

Inkerman, Battle of, 218. 

Inquisition, 45, 54, 56. 

Intellectuals, 53, 64, no, 117, I49f-, 
192, 2o6fif., 221, 28ofif., 320-324, 
400-402, 457; see also Liberals. 

Intelligentsia, 221, 264. 

Intervention, 25-26, 30-56, 72ff. 

Inventions, industrial, 7ff., 318-324, 
425f. ; medical, 13, 208, 318-320, 
379; military, 161, 241, 324, 
434f., 449, 453-455, 457- 

Ionian Islands, 37, 41. 

Ireland, 85, 99f., io8f., 165-186, 264, 

393f. 
Islam, see Mohammedanism. 
Ismail Pasha, 329ff., 336. 
Isonzo River, 444. 
Istria, 256, 258, 443- 
Italia Irredenta, 258. 



cation of, 227, 248-258; since 
1870, 389, 403, 408, 410, 418; in 
World War, 43 if., 443f., 449. 
464-468; colonies, 325f., 333f., 
338, 342-344, 347-350, 356. 

Iturbide, 33. 

Ivangorod, Fortress of, 445. 

Ivory Coast, 335. 

Jaffa, 463. 

James II of England, 182. 

Jameson, Dr. Leander Starr, 341, 

.369f. 
Janina, 419. 
Janizaries, 43, 116. 
Jansenism, 226. 
Japan, 5, 133, 154-164, 355-36o, 416- 

418, 440. 
Jaures, French Socialist, 387. 
Jellachich, Croatian "Ban," 407. 
Jemmapes, Battle of, 66. 
Jena, Battle of, 265-268, 273, 281. 
Jericho, 463. 
Jerusalem, 463, 
Jesuits, 63f., 190, 275, 397. 
Jews, 124, 126, 263, 267, 273, 388f., 

392, 413. 
Joffre, General, 435. 
Johannesburg, 369f, 
John VI of Portugal, 34. 
John, Archduke, Administrator, 287. 
John, Negus of Abyssinia, 342. 
Johnson, President Andrew, 245. 
Johnston, Confederate General, 243. 
Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, 31. 
Josephism, 225. 
Joubert, Boer General, 369. 
Journal des Debats, 209. 
July Monarchy (Louis Philippe), 

66-68, 123, 189-195, 200. 
July Revolution (1830), 65f., 116, 

189, 192; effects of, 71-82, 9if. 
Junkers (Prussian Squires), 289ff., 

299, 327. 
Juntas, 31. 
Jutland, Battle of, 45of. 

Kabyle Tribesmen, 119, I2lff. 

Kaffirs, 369. 

Kamerun, 335, 340, 440. 

Kars, 136, 219. 

Kashgaria, 134. 

Kentucky, 239, 241. 

Kerensky, Russian Minister, 457f. 

Khedive," 329ff. 

Khiva, I36ff. 



INDEX 



483^ 



Khroumirs, 119, 333. 

Kiakta, 134. 

Kiaochau, 356, 440. 

Kiel, 293, 468. 

Kiev, 459. 

Kimberley, 368-370. 

Kirghiz Tribes, I36f. 

Kirk-Kilisse, Battle of, 419. 

Kitchener, General, 336, 370. 

Klephts, 38. 

Kodok (Fashoda), 337. 

Koniggratz (Sadowa), Battle of, 

256, 296, 314. 
Konigsberg, 436. 
Korea, 133, 159-161, 357!. 
Kossuth, Louis, 407f. 
Kovel, Battle of, 450. 
Krasnik, Battle of, 436. 
Kronstadt, 219, 390. 
Kriiger, Paul, 369f. 
Kriigersdorp, 370. 
Kwang-S , Chinese Regent, 356. 
Ku KIux Klan, 245. 
Kuldja, 134. 
Kulturkampf, 397f. 
Kumanovo, 219 
Kut-el-Amara, battles of, 447, 462. 



Labor Legislation, see Workingmen, 
Legal Equality. 

Ladysmith, Siege of, 370. 

Laharpe, tutor of Alexander I, 75. 

La Marmora, Italian General, 256. 

Lamartine, French writer, 198, 200f. 

Lancashire, 238. 

Land League, Irish, 178-180, i82f. 

Landed-Estates, Landowners, 11-14, 
57-68, 75-77, i3off., i37f- 163, 
184, 259f., 263-273, 280-284, 391- 
395, 399-402, 404-412, 472 f. 

Langensalza, Battle of, 296. 

Lauenburg, 294. 

Lausanne, Treaty of, 350. 

League of Nations, 470. 

Ledru-Rollin, French Radical, 20lflf. 

Lee, Robert E., 236f., 239, 241-243. 

Legal Equality, 11-15, 27, 44f., 53, 
57ff., 82ff., I04ff., 127, 244ff., 
250, 267ff., 279, 287, 369, 372, 
395ff. ; see also Liberalism, 
Serfdom, Suffrage. 

Legislatures, Legislative control, see 
Constitutions, Parliament. 

Lemaitre, French writer, 388. 

Lemberg, Battles of, 436, 445. 

Lenau, German poet, no. 



Lenin (Ulianov), Bolshevist leader, 

457- 
Leopold I of Belgium (1831-1865), 

74. 
Leopold II of Belgium (1865-1909), 

339- 

Leopold of HohenzoUern, 307f. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, French historian, 
131. 

Lesseps, Ferdinand, 329, 339, 379. 

Liao-Yang, Battle of, 358. 

Liberal Unionists, 181, 185, 394. 

Liberals, Liberalism, in England, 87, 
90-92, 95f., 100, 175, 177-185, 
39iflf. ; in France, 64-68, 117, 
i89ff., 223-225, 381 ff.; in Prus- 
sia-Germany, 263fF., 395-402; in 
Russia, 75ff., 452f., 457ff- ; in 
Italy, 248-259; in Japan, I56f. ; 
see also Constitutions, Parlia- 
ments, Intellectuals, Legal 
Equality. 

Liberia, 342. 

Liberty, idea of, see French Revolu- 
tion. 

Liege, 432. 

Li-Hung-Chang, 162, 354. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 235, 239-245. 

Lisbon, 34. 

Lissa, Battle of, 256, 314. 

Lister, English surgeon, 319. 

Liverpool, 92. 

Lodz, 76. 

Lombardy-Venetia, 45f., 249, 252. 

London, 73, 86, 148, 181, 202, 373, 
382, 419. 

Lorraine, see Alsace-Lorraine. 

Louis XVI (1774-1793), 61, 65. 

Louis XVIII (1814-24), 25-27, 58-63. 

Louis Philippe (1830-48), 66-68, 123, 
_i89f., 192-195, 200, 385. 

Louisiana, 115, 242. 

Lucknow, Siege of, I46f. 

Ludendorff, German General, 466. 

Liile Burgas, Battle of, 419. 

Lusitania, 453f. 

Lutherans, 27of., 284, 

Luxemburg, 432. 

Lvov, Russian Prince, 452. 

Lynch Law, 246. 

Macao, 151. 

Macaulay, T, B., 89. 

MacMahon, French General and 

President, 123, 307, 384. 
McKinley, William, 375. 
Macedonia, 413, 418-420. 



INDEX 



Madagascar, 34of. 

Madras, 142, 148. 

Madrid, 56. 

Mafeking, 370. 

Magyars, 404flf. ; see also Austria- 
Hungary. 

Mahdi, 336. 

Mahon, English General, 446. 

Mahrattas, 142. 

Maine, Battleship, 375. 

Majuba Hill, Battle of, 369. 

Malaria, 379. 

Malta, 332. 

Malthus, English economist, 8. 

Manchester, 91, 98. 

Manchu Dynasty, 359. 

Manufacturing, Industry, Manufac- 
turers, 58, 83-100, 163, 189-192, 
2o8ff., 236ff., 273f-, 276-279, 317- 
326, 399-402, 4i6f., 426-428, 438, 
451, 472; see also Industrial 
Revolution, Workingmen. 

Manchuria, 161, 356-358. 

Manila, Battle of, 376. 

Manin, It_lian patriot, 248. 

Marat, French revolutionist, 191. 

March Revolution (1848), 281, 284, 
4o6f. 

Marchand, French officer, 335f. 

Marie, French Minister. 

Marne, Battles of the, 435^-. 46off. 

Marshal Islands, 440. 

Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, 307. 

Marx, Karl, 97, 382, 457. 

Mascara (Algeria), 119^-, 122. 

Massachusetts, 232. 

Massowah, 342f. 

Masurian Lakes, Battles of, 437. 

Matabeleland, 341. 

Maude, Frederick S., General, 463. 

Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 
240, 247. 

"May Laws," 397f. 

Maynooth College, Ireland, 173. 

Mazzini, Italian patriot, 249. 

Mecca, 120, 463. 

Mecklenburg, 278, 283. 

Medicine, see Inventions. 

Mediterranean Sea, 36-38, ii2f., 119, 
127, 216, 251, 327, 329ff-, 350, 
403fif., 431, 454. 

Mehemet AH, 40, 329f., 335- 

Mekong River, 353f. 

Menelek of Abyssinia, 342-344. 

Mesopotamia, 447, 462f., 471. 

Messina, 249, 254. 



Merv Oasis, 138. 

Methodists, 183, 394. 

Metternich, 40, 114, 248, 257, 275, 
284. 

Metz, Siege of, 3o6f. 

Mexico, 22, 156, 23of., 233, 240, 
247. 

Middle-class, see Bourgeoisie. 

Mignet, French historian, 66, 

Mikado, 156-158, 163. 

Milan, 47, 248f. 

Militarism, military service, 311-314, 
424-430; Prussia, 265-268, 275f., 
281, 289!?., 29Sf., 299-306, 311- 
314; in Germany, 311-324, 400- 
402, 424-430, 432-435, 470; in 
France, 60, 186, ^Syfi., 470 ;_ in 
Japan, I57f. ; absence of milita- 
rism in England and United 
States, 186, 236-243, 248, 363, 
366f., 378-380, 403f-, 428-430, 
470. 

Miliukov, Russian Minister, 417. 

Millerand, French Minister, 387. 

Mincio, 249, 253. 

Mir, Russian village community, 
222, 417. 

Mississippi River and Valley, 103, 
io6f., 109, 174, 237, 241 f. 

Missolonghi, 40. 

Missouri Compromise, 230, 234. 

Mobilization, demobilization, 304, 
424-427, 434, 465. 467. 

Modena, 47, 71, 250, 253. 

Mogador, 122. 

Mohammedans, Islam, ii3fif., I35ff-i 
I46f., I49f., 33iff., 344, 349, 421; 
see also Arabia, Turkey. 

Moldavia, 39, 42, 219, 450. 

Mole, French Minister, 123. 

Moltke, Hellmuth von, 295, 311. 

Monasteries, see Church lands. 

Monastir, 462. 

Mongolia, 134. 

Monitor, 241. 

Monroe Doctrine, 33, 240, 247, 379. 

Montenegro, 4i2f., 419-421, 426, 
446. 

Morea (Peloponnesus), 39-41- 

Morny, French Minister, 205. 

Morocco, ii2f., I2if., 128, 326, 334, 

337, 342, 344-347- 
Mortality, see Population. 
Moscow, 357. 
Mukden, Battle of, 358. 
Muraview, 133. 



INDEX 



485 



Mutsu-Hito, isSff. 

Nagasaki, 154. 

Nanking, 152, 154. 

Naples, 47-52, 69, 78, 249, 254f., 259. 

Napoleon, see Bonaparte, France. 

Narva, 459. 

Nassau, 296f. 

National Liberal Party in Germany, 

30of., 396-399. 
Nationalities, National Movements, 

36-51, 54, 69-81, 109, i27f., i49f., 

165-186, 248-258, 262, 285-314, 

356, Z^iT, 382, 387f., 404-411, 431, 

443, 450, 452. 
Negroes, 241-246; see Slavery. 
Negus, Emperor of Abyssinia, 342. 
Nesselrode, Russian diplomat, 43. 
Netherlands, see Holland. 
New Caledonia, 355, 385. [238f. 
New England, lO/f., 229f., 232f., 
New Guinea, 355, 440. 
New Jersey, 235, 
New Mexico, 231. 
New Orleans, 241 f. 
New South Wales, 363. 
New Zealand, 9, 3i8f., Z^Z-Z^T- 
Nice, 249, 253 f. 
Nicholas I of Russia (1825-55), 40, 

12,, 77, 79, 130, 132, 2i2f., 216- 

219. 
.Nicholas II (1894-1917), 390, 417, 

445, 452. 
Niger, 334, 339, 
Nikolaievsk, 133. 
Nikolsburg, peace preliminaries of, 

296. 
Nile River, 335!., 339!., 343. 
Nish, 446. 
Nobles, Nobility, Junkers, 11-15, 

44fif., 58-64, 67, 75fif., 87, I30f., 

I58f., 195, 215, 22if., 225, 239, 

263-272, 276, 279-284, 301 f., 397, 

401-402; see also Landowners, 

Primogeniture. 
"Non expedit," 259. 
"Non possumus," 256. 
North America, 9, 29, 33, 115; see 
also Canada, Mexico, United 

States. 
North German Federation, 297-303. 
North Sea, 114, 454; see also 

Blockade. 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 105. 
Nova Scotia, 367. 
Novara, Battle of, 249. 



Novo Georgievsk, Fortress of, 445. 
Nuremberg, 296. 

O'Brien, William Smith, 169. 

O'Connell, Daniel, 169-172. 

O tobrist Party, 417. 

Odessa, 38. 

Odschaks, 116. 

Officers, officers' revolts, 47flf., 55, 

215, 267f., 399, 402; see also 

Militarism. 
Ohio, 105, 23Z. 
Old Catholics, 396. 
Oldenburg, 278. 
Ollivier, French Minister. 307. 
Omdurman, 336. 
Opium, Opium Wars, 148, 15 if., 

i55f. 
Oran (Algeria), 119, 122, 127, 337. 
Orange Free State, Orange Colony, 

368f., 371. 
Orangemen (Ireland), 182, 186. 
Oregon Territory, 301. 
Orenburg, 136, 138. 
Orleanists, 66, 201, 204, 386. 
Orsini, 251. 
Ottawa, Z73- 

Otto I of Greece (1832-62), 42. 
Oudh, 146. 

Oudinot, French General, 202. 
Owen, Robert, 95. 

Pacific Ocean, 32, 133, 231, 2^7, 355i 
374f., 279- 

Pale (Ireland), 165. 

Palermo, 249. 

Pamir, 139. 

Panama, 34, 378f. 

Papacy, Pope, 45fif., 202, 225-227, 
248-259, 303, 389, 3961. ; see also 
Church. 

Paris, 62, 66, 82, 127, 172, 174, 191- 
203, 208, 210, 219, 280, 286, 307f., 
376, 22,zi., 389, 406, 435. 

Parliaments, Legislatures, Parlia- 
mentary Reform : in Austria, 
402-412; in England, 86-94, 166, 
176-186, 391-395; in France, 
58ff., 66flF., 192-208, 38sff-; in 
Japan, 163 ; in Prussia-Germany, 
280-292, 300-303, 309f. ; see also 
Constitutions, Suffrage. 

Parma, 47, 70, 253. 

Parnell, Charles Stuart, 176-184. 

Pasteur, Louis, 319. 



486 



INDEX 



"Pays Legal," 60, 190, 192. 
Peasants, 12-14, 58-64, 75, 79, 98, 105- 

109, 131-133, 157, 167-183, 221- 

222, 224, 263, 265, 268f., 283{., 

356f., 372f., 404, 417, 458, 469, 

472f. ; see also Agriculture, 

Landed Estates. 
Peel, Sir Robert, 99, 172. 
Pegu, 142, 146. 
Peking, I33f., 161, 354, 360. 
Pendjeh, 138. 
Peronne, Battle of, 449- 
Perovski, 137. 

Persia, 134, 136, I38f., I44f-, 449- 
Pescadores Islands, 162, 354. 
Peterloo, 91. 
Petrograd, St. Petersburg, 79, 215, 

221, 452, 457- 
Phanariots, 38f. 
Philadelphia, 233, 242. 
PhiHppines, 376f. 
Piave, 464f, 
Picquart, 388. 

Piedmont, 2i8f., 249f., see also Italy. 
Pindari raids, 142. 
Pirates, 37, 65, 112-118, 136. 
Pius IX (1846-78), 202, 226, 249ff- 
Pius X (1903-14), 389- 
Plebiscites, 205-208, 224, 253-255, 

297f., 470. 
Plechanov, Russian Socialist, 458. 
Plevna, Siege of, 412. 
Plombieres, 252. 
Plutocracy, 83f., Sgfi., 97, 106, 282, 

394; see also Landowners, 

Manufacturers. 
Pocket Boroughs, 86, 89. 
Poland, 37, 7i, 75-8i, 266, 293, 302, 

396, 405, 4o8f., 436, 444f-, 452, 

467, 470. 
Polignac, French Minister, 65. 
Population problems, food supply, 6, 

8-14, 99-100, 107-109, 124-128, 

I49f., i63f., 167, I73f-, 185, 283f., 

317-324, 363-366, 40off., 425f., 

469, 472 f. 
Port Arthur, i6if., 356-358- 
Port Said, 329. 
Porto Rico, 376f. 
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 358. 
Portugal, 3, 6, 30, 33f., 55, Hi, 

327, 338f., 341, 369. 
Potatoes, 99f-, 167, I7if-, iQi- 
Potomac River, 241. 
Prague, 256, 297, 465. 
Press, newspapers, freedom of, 

60, 63, 65, 68, 80, igof., 209, 



269f., 276, 292, 386, 398, 400, 
407f., 417. 

"Prestige," 117, 210, 2i2f., 219, 
242, 251, 303, 305 f., 342, 438. 

Pretoria, 369, 371. 

Pretorius, Boer pioneer, 369. 

Primogeniture, Entails, 11-15, 20, 
45. 52, 329; in Austria, 275, 
404f . ; in England, 82 ; in 
France, 57, 62, 67; in Prussia, 
264, 269, 282; in Russia, I30f., 

215, 404f. 

Princip, Bosnian assassin, 421. 

Privateers, 240, 247. 

Privilege, system of, see Land- 
owners, Manufacturers, Plutoc- 
racy, Primogeniture. 

Prohibition of alcohol, 232, 436, 
4S8.. 

Proletariate, see Workingmen. 

Pronunciamentos, 33, 55. 

Progressives, see Liberals, Radicals. 

Propaganda, "Defeatism," 243, 442, 

451, 4S9f. 

Property rights, see Landowners, 
Primogeniture. 

Protestants (Anglicans, Dissenters, 
Lutherans, Quakers), 82f., 87, 
90, 95, ^32, 167, 170, 175. i83f., 
193, 232, 27of., 284, 340, 392, 

394- 
Prussia, 25, 43, 70, 73-76, 79, 108, 163, 

216, 218, 221 f., 225f., 253, 256, 
261-314; East Elbian territory, 
108, 263-265, 279, 281-285; ri- 
valry with Austria, 261-263, 
282-297, 403, 409, 439, 472 ; agri- 
culture, 263-265, 283 ; army, 
265-268, 275f., 289f., 295f., 299, 
301-313; bureaucracy and no- 
bility, 108, 263-272, 279-282, 
29off., 30of., 472; see also Ger- 
many. 

Pruth River, 39. 
Przemysl, Siege of, 436, 444f. 
Punjab, I42f., 146-149. 
Puritan, 132, 183, 193, 232. 

Quakers, 99, 183, 232. 

Radetzky, Austrian General, 249. 

Radicals, Reds, 77f., giff., 99, I99, 
223f., 384, 394; see also Social- 
ists. 

Railways, 3, 7, 92, 103, 106, 127, 147, 
156, 163, 189, 2o8f., 236, 243, 



INDEX 



487 



251, 280, 284, 356f., 372, 444, 
465, 467. 

Raw materials, 7, 115, 117, 148, 215, 
231, 236, 239, 3i7ff-, 325f-, 375, 
401, 426, 439, 455, 461 ; coal, 7, 
83, 87, 103, 163, 167, 259, 322, 
434; cotton, 163, 228-230, 236- 
239, 244, 328, 439; iron, 7, 103, 
167, 322 ; wool, 7. 

Realism, 224f. 

Realpolitik, 28S, 290. 

"Reconstruction" in the South, 
245f. 

Red Cross, 433. 

Reds, Radicals, 77f., 9iff., 99, 199, 
223f., 384; see also Socialists. 

Reform Bills in England, gzi, 95f., 
143, 170, 391 ff- 

Religion, 16-18, 36, 59, 63f., I42f., 
I49f., 159, 2i7ff., 269, 271 f., 386, 
404, 4i3f., 452; see also Church, 
Mohammedans. 

Republics, republicanism, 11, 15, 29, 
66, 71, 75, 17s, 186, 192-207, 212, 
223f., 228, 239, 249, 287, 308, 
359. 382-391, 465, 468. 

Reunion Island, 340. 

Rhodes, Cecil, 341, 369. 

Richmond, Va., 235, 237, 241. 

Riego, Spanish General, 55f. 

"Right to work," 193, 197, 223. 

Rights, see Legal equality. 

Roberts, Lord, 37of. 

Robespierre, 191. 

Romanovs, see Russia. 

Romanticism, 61 f., 68, 225, 277. 

Rome, 45, 203, 225-227, 248-259, 284, 
303, 389, 396ff. ; see also Church. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 358. 

Roon, German Minister, 289, 311. 

Rumania, 39, 41, 217, 219, 404, 410, 
413, 420, 450, 459. 

Russia, 6, 25, 75-81 ; Alex, nder I 
(1801-25), 26, 36, 40, 75-77, 80, 
213; Nicholas I (1825-55), 40, 
7Z, 77, 79. 130, 132. 2i2f., 216- 
219; Alexander II (1855-81), 
219, 22if. ; Alexander III (1881- 
94), 390; Nicholas II (1894- 
1917), 390, 417, 445, 452; 
Soviets, 452f., 457-460; absolu- 
tism and liberalism, 75-81, i3off., 
2i2f., 216, 220-222, 402, 416-418, 
451-453, 4S7f-; colonial expan- 
sion, 129-139, 356-358; popula- 
tion, 129-132, 317, 319; Balkan 
ambitions, 36-43, 213-221, 314, 



389!., 402-405, 412-423 ; in World 
War, 426-429, 436f., 439, 441, 
444-JS3, 457-460, 470-473-. 

Saarburg, Battle of, 434. 

Sadowa (Koniggratz) Battle of, 

256, 296, 314. 
Said of Egypt, 328f. 
Saigon, 352f. 

Saint Germain, Treaty of, 471. 
Saint Mihiel, Battle of, 461, 465. 
St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 79, 

215, 221, 452, 457. 
Saint Quentin, Battles of, 460, 

465. 
Salonica, 412, 446, 461. 
Sambre, Battle of the, 466. 
Samoa, 355, 378. 
Samurai, I57f., 160. 
San Domingo, 377. 
San Francisco, 156, 231. 
San Stephano, Treaty of, 413. 
Santiago, Battle of, 376. 
Sardinia, Kingdom of, see Italy. 
Sarrail, French General, 446. 
Savannah, 243. 
Savoy, 253. 
Saxony, 266, 278f., 288, 294, 296, 

409. 
Scandinavians, 108, 319. 
Schamyl, 135. 
Scharnhorst, 267. 
Scheldt River, 71, 73, 466. 
Schleswig, 293-299. 
Schopenhauer, 224. 
Scott, General Winfield, 231. 
Scutari, 420, 466. 
Sea-Power, Navy, 7, 28, 32-34, 41, 

100, 236, 314, 354, 430f., 439- 

442, 45off., 465, 467. 
Sebastopol, Fortress of, 213, 217- 

219. 
Secession, War of, 106, 175, 235-246, 

314, 378, 444. 
Sedan, Battle of, 307f., 382, 434, 

466. 
Semmelweiss, Austrian physician, 

319. 
Senegal River, 334. 
Serajevo, 422. 
Serbia, 41 f., 405f., 407, 412-415, 418- 

423, 426, 431, 444-446, 448, 462, 

471. 
Serfs, serfdom, 7Sf., I3if., 214, 221 f., 

269. 
Sevres, Treaty of, 471. 
Shantung, 356. 



488 



INDEX 



Sherman, General W. T., 242f. 

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, i6i. 

Shogun, 155-158. 

Siam, 354. 

Siberia, 6, 129, 131-134, 136, i39, 
356f., 457. 

Sikhs, I46f., ISO. 

Silesia, 269, 279, 290. 

Sinn -Fein, 186. 

Sinope, Battle of, 217. 

Skagerrak, Battle of, 4Sof. 

Skobelev, Russian General, 138. 

Slavery, 19-21, 88, 196, 221 ; in 
America, 34, io6f., no, 228-245, 
376; in Africa, 20, 23, 336, 338- 
341, 368; in Asia, 136-138, I43- 

Slovaks, 465, 471 ; see also Czechs. 

Smyrna, 38, 42. 

Socialism, Socialists, 97f., 193-198, 
201-204, 223f., 291, 381-402, 417, 
425, 442f., 457- 

Soissons, Battle of, 460. 

Solferino, Battle of, 253. 

Sombart, German economist, quoted, 

323- 
Somme, Battles of the, 448, 451. 
Song-Ka River, 353. 
South Africa, 9, 327ff., 368-372, 

440. 
South America, 29-35, 40, 123, 318. 
South Carolina, 235, 237. 
South Germany, 278, 283, 302f., 

305 f., 309, 367. 

Southwest Africa, 340, 440. 

Soviet Government, 452, 457. 

Spain, 6,28-35, 37f., 52-56, 112-114, 
127, 212, 305, 345f., 375f. 

Spee, German Admiral, 430. 

Spichern, Battle of, 430. 

Squatters, 105. 

"Standardization," 322. 

Stanley, H. M., 339. 

Steam Power, 3, 7ff., 83-85, 92, 157, 
321 ; see also Industrial Revolu- 
tion. 

Stein, Prussian Minister, 267. 

Stolypin, Russian Minister, 417. 

Strasbourg, 200, 308. 

Students, 194, 221 f., 406; see also 
Universities. 

Submarines, 324, 431, 439, 441 f., 453- 
457, 466f., 469. 

Suez Canal, 114, 329, 331, 337, 441, 

447, 463. 
Suffrage: in England, 86-94, 96, 143, 
170, 391-395; in France, 58f., 
62f., 67, 190, 192, 194, 224, 386; 



in Japan, 163; in Prussia, 280- 
282, 309, 399, 453; elsewhere, 
260, 381, 399, 4o6f., 411, 452. 

Sussex, 454. 

Switzerland, 66, 71, 308, 319, 346, 
395, 398, 457- 

"Syllabus," Papal, 226, 256. 

Syndicalism, 387. 

Syria, 112, 349, 463, 471. 



Tahiti, 355- 
Taku, 161. 
Talleyrand, 73. 
Tamerlane, 137. 
Tananarive, 341. 
Tanganyika, Lake, 339, 341. 
Tangier, 122, 344. 
"Tanks," 449. 

Tannenberg, Battle of, 437. 
Tariffs, tariff policy, 90, 126, 134, 
156, 162, 189, 209, 229f., 235, 
238, 27s, 277-279, 302f., 309, 362, 
415, 428. 
Tarim Valley, 134. 
Tegetthoff, Admiral, 266. 
Tennessee, 241 f., 245. 
Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, 330. 
Texas, 23of,, 242. 
Thibet, 417. 
Thiers, Adolphe, 65f., 123, 205, 257, 

305f., 310, 383, 385. 
Tien-Tsin, 134, 353f., 356. 
Tigris River, 447, 462. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 103. 
Togoland, 340, 440. 
Tokio, 156, 158, 160. 
Tongking, 353-355- 
Tories, 87, 90-93, 97-100, 170, 392. 
Toulon, 125, 257. 
Transportation, see Commerce, 

Railways. 
Transvaal, 368-37 1, 440. 
Treaties (arranged chronologically) 

Vienna (1815), 25-28, 212 

Akkerman (1826), 41 

Adrianople (1829), 42f. 

Turcomanchai (1828), 136 

Nanking (1842), 151 f., 154 

Guadaloupe Hidalgo (1848), 231 

Clayton-Bulwer (1850), 378 

Paris (1856), 219 

Zurich (1859), 253 

Anglo-French Commercial (i860), 
209 

Turin (i860), 253 

Prusso-Italian (1866), 256, 295 



INDEX 



489 



Treaties (arranged chronologically) 
Prague (i856;, 256, 297 
Prusso-South German (1866), 

297, 302, 305 
Frankfort (1871), 309-312 
Saigon (1874), 353 
San Stephano (1^78), 413 
Berlin (1878), 4i3f. 
Anglo-Boer (1881, 1884), 369 
Triple Alliance (1882), 334, 348- 

350, 418, 428, 431 
Bardo (18S3), 333 
Hue (1883), 353 
Reinsurance (1887), 390, 416 
Ucciali (1889), 342ff. 
Anglo-German (1890), 340 
Anglo-Portuguese (1890), 341 
Anglo-Italian (1891), 343 
Franco-Russian (i89iff.), 390, 

421, 428 
Franco-Siamese (1893), 354 
Shimonoseki (1895), i6if. 
Addis-Ababa (1896), 344 
Paris (1898), 376 
Hay-Pauncefote (1901), 379 
Pretoria (1902), 371 
Anglo-Japanese (1902), 357 
Anglo-French Entente (1904), 

337, 342, 344, 346 
Algeciras (1905-06), 34Sf., 348 
Portsmouth (1905), 358 
Franco-German Moroccan (191 1), 

346f. 
Lausanne (1912), 350 
Balkan Alliance (1912), 419, 446 
London (1913), 4i9{. 
Bucharest (1913), 420 
Brest-Litovsk (1917-18), 459f., 468 
Bucharest (1918), 459, 468 
Versaill s (1919), 468ff. 
Saint Germain (1919), 471 
Neuilly (-919), 471 
Trianon (1920), 471 
Sevres (1920), 471 
Arbitration treaties, 247, 379ff., 

42s, 470 
See also Conferences, Congresses. 
"Treks," 368f. 
Trentino, 258, 431, 444, 464. 
Trianon (Versailles), Treaty of, 

471. 
Tricolor Flag, 66, 197, 385. 
Trieste, 256, 258, 431, 464. 
Tripolitania, 333, 348-350, 418. 
Trocadero, 56. 
Trotzky (Bronstein), 458. 
Tchinovniks, 221. 



Tsushima, Battle of, 358. 

Tudors, 83, 166. 

Tuileries, 66, 195, 208, 384. 

Tunis, ii3f., 128, 326, 332-335, 337. 
342, 348. 

Turcomanchai, Treaty of, 136. 

Turcomans, I36ff. 

Turkestan, 134, 136-139, 144. 

Turkey, Sultan, Constantinople, 36- 
41, Cg, ii3f., 116, 124, 135, 139, 
213, 216-219, 27=;, 313, 326, 328- 
332, 348-350, 403, 412-416, 418- 
420, 441, 445, 462-464, 471. 

Tuscany, 47, 249f., 253. 

Tyrol, 256, 449, 471. 

Ucciali, Treaty of, 342ff. 
Uganda, 335. 
"Uitlanders," 369. 
Ukraine, 77, 449, 459- 
Ulster, 176, 181, i8sf. 
Ultramontane Party, 225. 
Ultra Royalists, 59, 61-63, 66. 
Umbria, 255. 

"Uncle Tom's Cabin," 233. 
"Undesirables," 365f. 
United States, 27, 2gi., 103-111, 
I56f., 228-247, 283, 318, 322, 376, 

375-379, 435, 444, 45i, 453-457, 
46of., 466-470. 

Universal military service, see Mili- 
tarism. 

Universities : Austrian, 274 ; French 
(universite), 64, 190, 203, 209; 
German, 271 f., 368, 400; Irish, 
173; Japanese, 159; Russian, 78, 
222. 

Ural Mountains, 132, 136. 

Urga, 134. 

Ueskiib, 419. 

Van Diemen's Land, 364. 
Vatican Council, 226?., 396. 
Venetia, Venice, 88, 248, 2S2f., 255- 

257, 273, 295, 297, 444- 

Venezuela, 379. 

Venizelos, 415, 419, 446, 461. 

Verdun, Battles of, 448f. 

Verona, 32, 253. 

Versailles, 309, 383 f., 468ff. 

Veuillot, 257. 

Vicksburg, 242. 

Victor Emmanuel II of Italy (1849- 

78), 249, 252-255. 
Victoria (Australia), 364. 
Victoria, Empress-Queen, 150. 



490 



INDEX 



Vienna, 248, 284 296, 406-408, 411, 
46s; Congress of, 18, 25-28, 36, 
38, 71 f-, 75, 80, 90, 212, 2i9f., 
239. 275- 

Villafranca, Treaty of, 253. 

Villele, French Minister, 63f. 

Virchow, German surgeon, 397. 

Virginia, 229, 236. 

Vistula, 78. 

Viticulture, wine, 58, 116, 191, 
209. 

Viviani, French Minister, 381. 

Vladivostok, 133, 357- 

Volga, 236. 

Voltaireanism, 190, 203, 225 f, 

Wady region, 335. 

Wallachia, 42, 219, 450; see also 
Rumania. 

Waldeck-Rousseau, French Minister, 
388. 

Wales, 394. 

Walfisch Bay, 440. 

Warsaw, 75f-, 78, 437, 445- 

Washington, D. C, 233, 241. 

Watt, James, 7. 

Wei-hai-wei, 161, 356. 

Wellesley, Arthur, Duke of Welling- 
ton, 142. 

West Indies, 115, 149, 228, 375, 
378. 

West Point, 236. 

Whigs, 87, 89f., 92, 170, 392. 

"Whites" (moderates, property- 
owners), 77f. 

White (Bourbon) Flag, 385. 

White Russia, ^T. 

Widow burning, 143. 

William I, King of Prussia (1861- 
88), German Emperor, 281, 288, 
305 f., 398. 

William II, German Emperor (1888- 
1918), 344, 370, 416, 427, 468. 



William III of England (1689- 

1702), 182. 
.Vilson, President, 451, 454, 466-470. 
Windthorst, 396. 
Woman's suffrage, z^T, 395, 452, 

472. 
Women in industry, 9, 85 f., 94, 392, 

399, 472. 
Wool, 7. 
vVorkingmen, 11-15, 66, 68, 84-90, 94- 

98, 125-127, 190-199, 201-204, 

209, 223flF., 238, 246, 28of., 320f., 

362f., 381-384, 391-396, 39&-402, 

457f- 
"World Power," 424. 
World War, 185, 347, 374, 394, 4^3- 

472. 
Worth, Battle of, 306. 
Wiirtemberg, 278, 303, 309. 
Wiirzburg, 296. 



Yalu River, 358. 

Yang-tse River, 151. 

Yedo (Tokio), I56f. 

"Young Ireland," 172, 174, 183. 

Young Turks, 418. 

Ypres, Battles of, 437f., 465. 

Ypsilanti, 39. 

Yser, Battle of, 437. 

Yuan-shi-kai, 359. 



Zambesi River, 339, 341, 

Zanzibar, 34of. 

Zarashan, 137. 

Zemstvo, 222. 

Zola, French novelist, 388. 

Z Oliver em (Tariff Union), 277-270, 

294, 303. 
Zouaves, 121. 
Zulus, 369. 
Ziirich, 253, 457. 






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